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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on the problem of cooperation within the international political 
economy, with special reference to the European Union's relations with key partners in 
East Asia. In pursuing this focus, the thesis probes a number of central issues in 
international cooperation, which thus far have not been applied in detail to inter-regional 
cooperation. In particular, the argument focuses on the reasons for cooperation and 
defection, the balance between material interests, institutions and ideas in shaping 
cooperation, and the shifting balance between bilateral and multilateral modes of 
cooperation. 
This research makes use of three bodies of conceptual literature related to IPE and 
interregionalism. It firstly makes use of existing thoughts on cooperation inherent in modern 
IPE theory, especially with regard to neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social 
constructivism, to analyse the balance between bilateralism and multilateralism as well as 
between material interest, institutions and ideas. Secondly, Robert Axelrod's findings 
concerning the 'evolution of cooperation' are integrated into the work, making use of ideas 
which support as well as clarify various means of understanding the global political 
economy already presented by IPE theories. Thirdly, in the respective chapters, 
comparisons are drawn between IPE's propositions on cooperation and Axelrod's notions 
of cooperation in relation to literature on regionalism and interregionalism. These insights 
are finally combined to set the foundations for a set of questions and propositions on 
interregional cooperation. 
These questions and propositions are subsequently analysed through four 
empirical cases focused on the European Community's political-economic relationship with 
East Asia. The bilateral cases are observed through a material, institutional, and ideational 
analysis of the EC's interregional relationships with Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the 
People's Republic of China. A similar analysis focusing on the multilateral dimension is 
conducted with the EC's interregional relationship with East Asia as seen through the Asia 
Europe Meeting (ASEM). The observations in both cases include an analysis of trade, 
institutional development, and the EC's strategic documents. These observations are 
designed to draw out comparisons of how an evolution of cooperation occurs based on 
primary values and interests, cooperative modes, the development of accepted codes of 
conduct, and progressive institutionalisation. It is argued that this material, institutional, and 
ideational analysis provides insights which are not possible in a more parsimonious or 
dichotomous approach. 
The thesis contends that the evolution of cooperation between the EC and East 
Asia has taken on a strongly material form and that the preferred cooperative mode has 
been 'active bilateralism', strongly stimulated by the predominantly important issue of trade 
but with some characteristics of a maturing dialogue and bilateral institutionalisation. The 
ASEM multilateral forum, suffering increasing indifference, can be seen as 'passive 
multilateralism' and strongly based on values and ideas, albeit possibly conflicting and 
incompatible ones. 
On the basis of the evidence assembled, the empirical cases provide further insight 
into the initial research questions and suggest that bilateral interregionalism in the EC-East 
Asia relationship is more grounded in material interests while multilateral interregionalism 
as seen in ASEM is based more strongly on ideas and values. The research also confirms 
the coexistence and confluence between bilateralism and multilateralism, the binding role 
of institutions, the importance of policy areas, and acknowledges the possible effect that a 
combination of endogenous and exogenous factors may have on the evolution of 
interregional cooperation. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Towards the end of the 1970s during the climax of trade imbalances, despite 
numerous attempts on the part of the Japanese to appease the Europeans, 
trade conflict escalated and became what is now know as the two trade wars 
between Europe and Japan. In 2004, the Chinese trade surplus with the 
European Communities (EC)' member states stands at an unprecedented 
Ecu79 billion and shows no sign of slowing down. Ironically, the EC-China 
partnership is in constant and civilized dialogue with neither side showing 
intentions of taking drastic action against each other. After two decades and a 
half, the EC has now decided to take sharply contrasting action in the face of 
what, at their respective times, are considered sharp and unprecedented trade 
deficits. In the meantime, the EC has had an unremarkable relationship with 
the ROK, marked by a number of steady conflicts, but rarely of a ground- 
breaking nature. 
The global political economy has changed significantly since the 1970s, 
and alongside this, this thesis argues that there appears to be an evolution of 
cooperation between actors. An evolution has occurred not only in the 
process of socialisation and dialogue between trading partners, but also in the 
development of institutions. It is perhaps unfair to compare an event occurring 
towards the 1980s to a situation occurring in the 21st century. An assumption 
could be made that if the EC and Japan were to chance another series of 
trade conflicts again in the 21st century, the consequences may turn out 
differently. 
Indications suggest that there has been such an evolution of 
cooperation of sorts emerging in the EC-East Asian interregional context. 
Numerous dialogue and negotiations resulted in the 1991 Hague Declaration 
between the Europeans and the Japanese, which today continues to be the 
only bilateral framework agreement and a loose constitution of sorts 
This thesis is focused on the European Communities (EC), or the first pillar of the European Union 
which deals with economic, social, and environmental policies. Any instances when the analysis 
extends to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) or Police and Judicial Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters (PJCC), this thesis will refer to the EC member states or the EC. 
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determining their relationship. While the Japanese continue to enjoy a healthy 
trade surplus with the EC, this partnership has remained stable for quite some 
time. China, apart from a few relatively minor trade issues with the EC, has 
enjoyed a trading relationship without incident ever since their partnership with 
West Europe was first conceived during the 1954 Geneva Convention. The 
Republic of Korea, on the other hand, appears to have had a turbulent 
relationship with the Europeans marked with a number of issues being taken 
to the World Trade Organization, despite the fact that the Korean trade 
surplus is considered to be lower than the Chinese and the Japanese, 
respectively. 
Apart from the bilateral efforts, the global political economy has also 
seen the evolution of multilateral efforts which have become increasingly 
relevant in the 1990s. Take on the multilateral aspect of the EC-East Asian 
relationship, and the evolution of cooperation is equally unpredictable. The 
Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) was launched with much fanfare in 1996 with 
the Bangkok Declaration, only to have the enthusiasm dampened by the 1997 
Asian Economic Crisis. The second ASEM summit held in London showed far 
less promise than the first, particularly with effective means for Europe to help 
Asia out of the crisis (Schmit, 1999: 5). By the third summit, only four years 
from the launching party, members were talking about means to battle the 
forum fatigue and means to make the dialogue more effective (Commission 
2000: 2). Ever since, ASEM has been plagued by indifference, disappointment, 
and disillusionment. Ever since the third summit, partners have been looking 
into various means to stimulate a process which has been considered by 
many critics to have stagnated. 
Since the 1990s and the beginning of the EC's pursuit of multilateral 
strategies with Asia, the EC-East Asian relationship has also seen the 
coexistence of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The last decade has 
witnessed the proliferation of bilateral framework agreements which exist in 
conjunction with the ASEM process. This appears to contradict the EC's 
proclamations on the importance of multilateralism, both through the ASEM 
framework and global multilateral institutions such as the WTO. The 
coexistence of bilateralism and multilateralism clearly points towards 
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increased flexibility in the EC's choice of strategy, but is also a source of 
confusion for its external partners. 
Understanding Interregional Cooperation in IPE 
The foregoing example of the unevenness in the reactions and strategies of 
the EC with its East Asian partners provides a two-fold puzzle. Firstly, it 
provides a puzzle concerning the nature of cooperation. The EC's different 
reactions towards each of its East Asian partners pose some important 
questions concerning how cooperation takes place, under which conditions, 
and in which forms. Similarly, the different trajectories the relationships take 
on, ranging from what can be perceived as a very advanced relationship 
between the EC and Japan, to a growing one with the ROK, and a fledgling 
relationship with China introduce additional complexity to the cooperation 
equation. For years, the field of international relations and international 
political economy have been taking on the . challenge of explaining why 
cooperation, or the lack of it, in the global political economy has taken on its 
present forms. How the EC's actions vis-ä-vis its partners have unfolded and 
evolved over time are expected to boil down to choices which are influenced 
by its own expectations of what they want the partnerships to yield. 
International Political Economy (IPE) theories have a number of answers to 
these questions, and these will be explored in greater detail in this thesis. 
The second part of the puzzle concerns the nature of interregionalism 
and the manner in which the EC's interaction with its East Asian partners has 
evolved. There appears to be some inconsistency in the manner in which the 
EC has treated each of its interregional relations. Apart from the inconsistent 
treatment of each of its partners, the EC also appears to be making use of 
both bilateral and multilateral strategies in its interregional partnership with 
East Asia. Literature on regionalism offers some insights into the puzzle of the 
EC's nature as an interregional actor. Coupled with IPE literature on 
cooperation, this thesis examines the puzzle of how and why the EC takes on 
the interregional choices it does with its individual East Asian partners. 
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The main focus of this thesis is on the nature of cooperation, why 
actors cooperate, under which conditions, and in which forms. Cooperation is 
considered to take place when "actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or 
anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy coordination" 
(Keohane 1984: 51-52). This general description of cooperation has appeared 
to become the accepted definition, with policy coordination implying that state 
policies have been adjusted so that undesirable outcomes for other states 
they are engaged with are decreased (Milner 1997: 7). Another perspective 
on cooperation that this thesis takes into account is that cooperation is 
considered to have been maximised when the actors involved agree to take 
on the direction with the most mutually beneficial outcomes (Axelrod 1984). 
Given these perspectives, in this thesis, cooperation is considered to take 
place when actors in partnership either consciously or unconsciously adjust 
policy coordination to maximise mutually beneficial outcomes while minimising 
undesirable outcomes. 
The objective of this research is to understand how cooperation 
evolves, to propose an analytical framework for this evolution of cooperation, 
and to test the framework through a series of case studies on the EC-East 
Asian interregional relationship. In order to accomplish this, the thesis first 
takes into account the ongoing debates in IPE theory and extracts the notions 
of cooperation inherent within the relevant schools of thought. The research 
then builds on these notions of cooperation by drawing on the research on the 
evolution of cooperation by Robert Axelrod and constructing an analytical 
framework in order to more fully understand the nature of cooperation. 
This thesis explores the idea that cooperation fluctuates between 
bilateral and multilateral forms depending on the material, ideational, and 
institutional influences inherent in a certain international political economy 
relationship. The balance between bilateralism and multilateralism, as well as 
the shifting weight between the material, ideational, and institutional 
influences in a relationship will affect the nature of cooperation, the reasons 
they cooperate, as well as under which conditions actors decide to cooperate 
under. 
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Exploring Regionalism and Interregionalism 
Regionalism and interregionalism is a critical part of this research due to the 
manner in which they help to provide an empirical foundation for further 
exploration of the conditions for cooperation, the motives for cooperation, and 
the different forms it takes on. In the context of EC-East Asian interregional 
cooperation, these are key questions which need to be examined in detail to 
gain an understanding on how cooperation works and how it evolves. By 
studying the conditions, motives, and forms in which cooperation takes on, 
one can gain a better understanding of the EC-East Asian partnership. An 
enhanced understanding of the EC-East Asian interregional relations in turn 
provides a further insight into how cooperation operates within the GPE. 
There is no question that regionalism has proliferated in the past 
decade, witnessed by the increasing number of PTAs, both regional and 
interregional. East Asia is considered to be where the third wave of 
regionalism is taking place, stimulated by the disillusionment caused by the 
1997 Asian Economic Crisis (Pomfret 2007: 924). Notably, the first wave of 
regionalism came with the creation of the European Community and the 
European Free Trade Area (Panagariya 1999: 480). One of the reasons for 
these 'waves' of regionalism is the desire to cooperate more strongly with 
regional partners. In cases such as the European integration project, mutual 
interests and ideas as well as institutions have been a factor in its success. 
This is less true for Asia's experience in regionalism where the participating 
countries are more diverse where interest and ideas are far more difficult to 
reconcile. 
Regionalism on its own is considered to be an 'elusive concept', where 
it is still inconclusive whether it involves geographic proximity and the 
relationship between economic flows and policy choices or non-geographic 
criteria (Mansfield and Milner. 1999: 590-591). As Soderbaum and van 
Langenhove note, `there is still no consensus on the main concepts in the 
study of regionalism, and there is even greater disagreement in the 
conceptualisation of interregionalism' (2005: 257). Whether regionalism needs 
to involve neighbouring countries is still a contested issue, with academics 
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such as Katzenstein arguing that regional 'geographic designations are not 
'real', 'natural, ' or 'essential', and that they are socially constructed, politically 
contested, and hence, open to change' (1997). Fishlow and Haggard have 
made the distinction between regionalization, which notes the regional 
concentration of economic flows and regionalism, which have been defined as 
a political process characterised by economic policy cooperation and 
coordination among countries (1992). Mansfield and Milner have noted how 
this links commercial regionalism directly to the creation and proliferation of 
preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (1999: 591). 
Apart from regionalism being an 'elusive' concept, the utility of its 
arguably most controversial product, PTAs, is also still under examination. 
Panagariya, for example, argues that a definite positive impact of PTAs for 
developing countries is difficult to determine, particularly when developing 
countries continue to remain undecided on what their actual preferences are 
(2002: 1416). There have also been criticisms concerning the discriminatory 
nature of PTAs (Panagariya 2002, Bhagwati 1991), although arguments 
towards the contrary are also equally abundant. Lamy notes, for example, 
how PTAs and multilateral liberalisation efforts can progress simultaneously 
(2002). It is also important to note that Article XXIV of GATT allows regional 
integration agreements on grounds that they eliminate internal trade barriers, 
particularly since GATT members appeared to agree that it would be difficult 
to prevent states from forming PTAs in any case (Mansfield and Milner 
1999: 613). 
The question of PTAs inevitably leads to two of the most pertinent 
questions concerning regionalism: whether it leads to further liberalisation and 
if it' could be used as a means to expand liberalisation in place of global 
multilateral efforts. As with PTAs, the arguments run both ways (Panagariya 
1999). To begin with, one of the reasons parties try to enter into PTAs and the 
regionalism efforts, in the first place is because many have lost out in the 
formal GATT/WTO disputes. Viewed in this manner, the developments within 
the ý GATTMITO multilateral mechanisms have actually encouraged its 
members to form PTAs as a means to build bargaining leverage within the 
multilateral regime (Mansfield and Reinhardt 2003). Laird describes 
multilateral efforts to be `dysfunctional' (particularly among nation-states which 
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are so politically and economically unequal) and suggests the use of 
regionalism as an 'intermediate way-station' (1999: 150 Hettne book). 
Bhagwati argues that Article XXIV technically encourages parties to fully 
liberalise and by doing so, would become useful even for third parties not 
included in the PTA agreements (1991). The burden of having to commit to 
liberalisation under Article XXIV actually may discourage parties from forming 
PTAs altogether in the first place (Laird 1999: 1190). Bhagwati, however, also 
argued that within a GPE where producers play the main role in deciding trade 
policies, liberalisation through PTAs could also be replaced by increased 
protection against third parties (1993). As a response, third parties could form 
rival blocs which consequently reduce the opportunities for liberalisation 
(Mansfield and Milner 1999: 614). 
Today, regionalism has been proposed to be in its third generation 
whereby the institutional environment to handle external regional policies is 
more apparent and powerful. Regions are also becoming more proactive and 
can involve themselves in interregional arrangements and agreements that 
can have an impact on partnerships at the global level (Soderbaum and 
Langenhove 2005: 257). Soderbaum and Langenhove note that third 
generation regionalism is clearly different from second generation regionalism 
(an example being the EU) in that third generation regionalism is focused 
more externally and towards shaping governments while second generation 
regionalism2 was mainly concentrating on maximising economic and political 
processes (2005: 257). The increasing presence of regional actors also 
created a demand for intermediaries which link global and regional systems 
(at the top end of the international system) as well as regional and national 
policy-making levels (at the bottom end of the international system). It is 
explained that the need for intermediaries at the upper end of the international 
system, which consists of global and regional systems, resulted in two form of 
interregionalism, bilateral interregionalism and transregionalism (Rüland 
2001: 5). 
Hänggi notes how the role of interregional cooperation has often been 
ignored in literature on regionalism (2000), although recent literature refers to 
2 Second generation regionalism has been labelled `new regionalism' due to its multifaceted nature and 
the fact that it refers to a much wider number of policies (Langenhove and Costea 2005: 4) 
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how regionalism and interregionalism both have an effect and shape each 
other. While second generation regionalism is known to already contain 
elements of interregionalism within it, third generation regionalism is argued to 
be the actually stepping stones for interregionalism. Langenhove and Costea 
point towards third generation as containing a more suitable institutional 
environment for dealing with 'out of area' consequences of regional policies 
(2005: 12). They also point out that third generation regionalism is more 
proactive in engaging interregional arrangements and agreements which have 
an effect on partnerships at a global level. Finally, it is argued that third 
generation regionalism is more actively engaged at the UN (Langenhove and 
Costea 2005: 13). 
Gilson's observation of ASEM reveals how interregionalism actually 
strengthens regionalism when those involved in an interregional process gain 
a regional identity which may not have been present before (2005: 309). In the 
East Asians' cooperation process with the EU in the ASEM meetings, Gilson 
explains how they had to invent an 'Asianness' to strengthen its position 
opposite the EU (2005: 309). Scholte, for example, explains how 
interregionalism is actually a process whereby the partners come to recognise 
themselves as individual regions (1996: 70). As a result interregionalism could 
be used both as a tool for managing different and distinct relations for as a 
way to define concepts of region. 
There have also been calls for interregionalism to be analysed in its 
own right and not only within the framework in which regionalism offers. This 
would, Soderbaum et al. argues, allow for research on how regionalism and 
interregionalism relate and impact on one another (2005: 378). They continue 
to explain how interregionalism has an effect on both bilateralism and 
multilateralism, with interregionalism becoming an alternative to classical 
Westphalian multilateralism. In the meantime bilateralism and interregionalism 
could either compete, or exist side by side while actually mutually reinforcing 
each other (Soderbaum et al. 2005: 379). 
This interpretation of the close link between regionalism and 
interregionalism has been further expanded in other scholarly analysis as well. 
Doidge explains how interregionalism is not only related to international 
functions, but that it also contains a specific set of functions related to global 
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governance which are influenced in their performance by the regional actors 
within the process (2007: 244). Regional and interregional are 'joined at the 
hip' because when different regional actors meet, interregionalism affects 
regionalism, while interregionalism is itself shaped by the `constellation of 
regionalisms/regional actors it involves (Doidge 2007: 255). 
Regionalism and interregionalism suggest a set of questions 
concerning cooperation which are appropriate for examination under the 
context of IPE theory. As noted earlier, the core focus of this thesis is on the 
nature of cooperation, why actors cooperate and in what forms. Regionalism, 
specifically interregionalism . in the context of the EC-East Asian partnership, 
provides some clear guiding questions, both theoretical and empirical, on how 
to begin observing the nature of cooperation. Literature on regionalism has 
incorporated some of the most pertinent questions and areas of primary focus 
concerning cooperation within the GPE. 
To reiterate, present literature indicates that regionalism occurs due to 
the lack of viable and effective mechanisms and institutions for liberalisation 
(Laird 1999: 150). WTO mechanisms, for example, have proven to be 
premature as a means of proliferating trade liberalisation (Mansfield and 
Reinhardt 2003). The literature on regionalism also provides evidence that 
actors are motivated to maximise their opportunities to increase trade with 
preferred actors (Mansfield and Milner 1999, Panagariya 1999). In addition, 
the literature also makes note of the forms of cooperation and how they can 
take on different manifestations, ranging from bilateral to regional and global 
efforts (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004). In other words, regionalism appears to 
incorporate some of the reasons actors choose to cooperate, how cooperation 
takes places, and in which forms. 
Regionalism, interregionalism, and their relevance to IPE theory as well 
as some of the central questions concerning cooperation are explored 
extensively in this thesis. The conceptual chapters to this thesis link our 
understanding of theory to regionalism and interregionalism and argue that 
the central questions being asked in IPE are the same ones being asked in 
literature on regionalism and interregionalism. The empirical chapters make 
specific use of the EC-East Asian interregional partnership to gain further 
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insights into some of the central questions and propositions and enhance our 
understanding of cooperation. 
Structure and Methodology 
In order to explore the key questions within this research project (the nature of 
cooperation, why actors cooperate, and in what forms), the thesis is divided 
into five substantive chapters. Chapters 2 to 4 first lay out the theoretical basis 
for analysis of cooperation, particularly within an interregional context, and 
provide a set of propositions on how cooperation may work within the GPE. 
Chapters 5 and 6 subsequently `test' the propositions within the context of EC- 
East Asian interregionalism. The Conclusion revisits the propositions made on 
cooperation, provides further discussion on the puzzle of international 
cooperation, and examines the limitations of the study as well as its general 
applicability to other cases of interregional and international cooperation. 
Chapter 2 first studies propositions on cooperation inherent in IPE 
theory. It first makes an argument against monocausal arguments and 
parsimonies and proposes that cooperation is better understood through 
eclectic and 'rich' approaches. Drawing on neorealism and neomercantilism, 
liberal institutionalism, and social constructivism, the Chapter analyses how 
material interest, institutions, and ideas are important in cooperation within the 
global political economy (GPE). Chapter 3 brings forward the propositions on 
cooperation taken from IPE theory made in Chapter 2, and makes use of 
Axelrod's work on cooperation to develop further insights into cooperation. 
This Chapter makes links between the balance in the 'form' of the cooperation 
process, bilateralism and multilateralism, and the balance in the 'influences' of 
thecooperation process, material interest, ideas, and institutions. 
Chapters 2 and 3 work together to set up the background to 
understanding cooperation within the context of regionalism and raises a set 
of questions and propositions which are consequently analysed in the latter 
empirical chapters. The thesis provides insights into the questions raised by 
IPE and cooperation through the use of bilateral and multilateral case studies 
of the EC's relationship with Japan, the Republic of Korea and China. A brief 
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history is first introduced on each of the case studies in order to provide a 
context to the respective relationships as well as to explore the global political 
economy environment the relationships evolved in. The EC-East Asian 
relationships are later analysed in more detail, specifically from an EC point of 
view, through the use of trade data, an institutional analysis and a rhetorical 
analysis. This series of analysis additionally act as a test of the analytical 
framework and specifically extracts the quality of the relationship and the 
nature of cooperation. 
Chapter 4 justifies the analysis of the EC-East Asian interregional 
partnership as a 'test' of the key propositions and questions in cooperation set 
up previously in the Chapter. This is done by explaining the role of the EC, 
firstly as a global actor, and subsequently as an interregional actor. It is 
argued that the EC is capable of acting as a unified global actor, particularly in 
issues of trade, with a unique and complicated mechanism for policy-making. 
In its interregional interactions, the section argues that as an interregional 
actor, explanations abound on how the EC has a mixture of motivations 
ranging from material, institutional, to ideational. Chapter 4 consequently 
justifies the selection of East Asia as an EC interregional partner as a suitable 
test for the analysis of international cooperation. It is explained how the 
'uniqueness' of the partnership, namely the predominantly commercial 
interaction, the short history of the partnership, and the East Asian partners' 
tendency towards protectionism, helps to generate a number of insights which 
are important in understanding interregional cooperation. In the last section, 
Chapter 4 expands on, clarifies and justifies the methodology and 
triangulation process used in providing further insight to interregional 
cooperation. 
Chapter 5 undertakes an examination of bilateral interregional 
cooperation between the EC and East Asia through use of vertical and 
horizontal approaches. It first makes an examination of the vertical dimension 
of the EC-East Asian bilateral partnership, a process which analyses the EC's 
interaction with each of its East Asian partners individually. The examination 
of the vertical dimension focuses mainly on endogenous and exogenous 
effects on the relationship, the fluctuation in cooperation, and the pattern for 
interaction and cooperation in the partnership. The horizontal dimension 
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subsequently uses a triangulation of EC-East Asia trade statistics, analysis of 
institutional development and dialogue intensification, and a rhetorical 
analysis of EC-East Asia strategic documents to gain further insights into the 
evolution of interregional cooperation. Consequently, the Chapter draws out 
the material, institutional, and ideational influences from trade data, 
institutional and dialogue development, and strategic documents to see how 
EC-East Asian bilateral interregionalism can be used to gain further insights 
into interregional cooperation by looking across the three bilateral 
relationships. Chapter 6 mirrors the structure and logical reasoning of Chapter 
5, but observes the EC-East Asian relationship from the multilateral context of 
the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM). From this perspective, the research is able 
to examine the interregional partnership from a multilateral perspective and 
compares and contrasts it with the bilateral perspective in Chapter 5. 
The Conclusion links the empirical findings back to the initial questions 
and propositions and makes an in depth analysis of the initial research 
question on the nature of interregional cooperation in EC-East Asia, why the 
partners cooperate, under which conditions, and in which forms. This Chapter 
makes proposals on the links between bilateralism and multilateralism as well 
as re-emphasising the relevance of material interest, ideas, and institutions in 
the . balance between bilateralism and multilateralism. 
Finally, the Conclusion 
re-evaluates the questions and propositions made in chapters 2 and 3, 
acknowledge a number of limitations to the study, and proposes further 
research questions. 
This thesis makes use of data generated from secondary literature for 
the history of interaction between the EC and East Asia. The secondary 
literature was indispensable for this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, it 
provided the highlights for the EC-East Asian partnership as well as the trends 
and trajectories. Secondly, it documented the evidence bilateral and 
multilateral institutionalisation of the respect partnerships. Thirdly, the various 
examples in the secondary literature of the historical highlights provided an 
insight into the issue of codes of conduct, trust, and familiarity between the 
partners. 
Primary sources, mainly trade statistics and original EC strategic 
documents, were used in Chapters 5 and 6 as a means to observe how 
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cooperation is being conducted. Trade statistics, particularly focused on 
aggregate trade and trade imbalances from 1958 to 2005, were collected to 
observe patterns in trade. These statistics were subsequently analysed in 
conjunction with the historical highlights and used to analyse how material 
interests have been relevant in the EC-East Asian partnership. The EC was 
expected to have 'evolved' due to material interests at various stages of its 
partnership with East Asia, and the collected trade statistics are core to how 
this evolution has occurred. 
Strategic documents generated by the EC are a useful indicator of how 
the EC perceived the direction of its partnerships. In this thesis, all key 
bilateral and multilateral strategic documents between 1977 and 2006 were 
analysed to gauge how much importance the EC placed on ideas, as well as 
to see whether a combination of other EC priorities were present within the 
documents. These key strategic documents are considered to be the 
guidebook to how the EC cooperates with its partners, so a thorough 
examination of the statements made within these documents are expected to 
shed some significant insights into the EC's interregional cooperation with 
East Asia. 
These primary and secondary sources are by no means conclusive, but 
used together, they generate significant data to provide some preliminary 
answers to how cooperation has taken place, particularly with the context of 
the EC-East Asia interregional partnership. Combined, these sources are also 
critical in extracting the material interests, institutional influences, and 
ideational values inherent within the interregional partnership. This 
methodology allows us to avoid the inclusions and exclusions present in IPE 
theory and literature on interregionalism by objectively noting some of the 
most influential criterion in the evolution of cooperation. The discussion of 
methodology particularly related to the use of IPE theory to understand 
cooperation and on the manner in which regionalism and interregionalism can 
be used to explore cooperation, are continued in the next two sections. 
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IPE Theory and Cooperation 
In this research, the nature of cooperation is extracted from rational choice 
theories, liberal institutionalism, and social constructivism which are 
considered to be inherently very different, but often overlapping, explanations 
to similar phenomena. A definitive formula to understanding cooperation, quite 
understandably, is far from having been discovered. One of the reasons for 
this is the manner in which social scientists need to carry out their research in 
an uncontrolled experimental environment, meaning that most research is 
subject to the prevailing "attitudes, beliefs, and interpretations" under a 
specific period time and context (Harrison 2001: 4). Robert Cox has indeed 
become famous among students of IPE in his assertion that "theory is always 
for someone and for some purpose" (Underhill 1994: 22). In other words, 
"theories of IPE are rooted in personal preferences, prejudices, and 
experience. " (Strange 1994: 6). Theories of IPE have often been viewed as 
"competing and mutually exclusive, even irreconcilable, ideologies" (Underhill 
1993: 21), meaning that to every theory, there is almost inevitably an equal 
and opposite theory. These propositions confirm that value judgements and 
preferences are inserted consciously or subconsciously into IPE theories. 
These value judgements and preferences play a part in creating parsimonies 
as well as dichotomies in analysis. 
This thesis is not an attempt to synthesise IPE theories, but rather to 
understand the various notions of cooperation presented in modern IPE 
theory. The parsimony, value judgements and policy preferences inherent in 
the IPE theories are taken into consideration to further understand the nature 
of cooperation, reasons for cooperation, conditions for cooperation, and the 
forms cooperation takes on. 
The parsimony of theory potentially presents a problem in analysing 
cooperation since a single phenomenon could be explained in a dozen 
different ways. Ultimately, most explanations are far from conclusive, and in 
fact, most explanations in IPE admit to benefiting from insights developed 
from other theories. As a result, a convergence of theories has continually 
developed within IPE, resulting in developments prefixed with the "neos" 
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which are clear indications of how each of the major IPE thoughts have found 
shortcomings within their propositions and developed accordingly to fit in 
ideas originally emanating from theories which they usually contradicted. The 
realist school of thought, for example, has taken note of the importance of 
institutions, even when it first completely rejected the role of institutions within 
the global political economy (Glaser 2003: 403). Instead of serving merely as 
"theoretical lens" (Wendt, 1999), a "liberal constructivist" direction has also 
developed for a "constructivist interpretation of liberal theory" which puts an 
emphasis on how ideas and communication are important when they are 
more compatible with present domestic values and institutions (Moravscik 
1997: 540). Similarly, there have been calls for the synthesis of neorealism 
with neoliberalism (Thies 2004: 162). 
Chapter 2, the first substantial Chapter, analyses the debates going on 
concerning cooperation in the GPE between the neorealist, neoliberalist, and 
social constructivism. Though the concepts may initially appear daunting and 
so different that they appear irreconcilable, some major themes clearly 
emerge when one analyses cooperation between actors within the GPE. The 
first theme is an apparent balance between material and ideational interest. In 
suggestions derived from current IPE literature, actors appear to alternate 
between the opportunities for tangible and reciprocal returns found in trade 
and investment (Gilpin 2001: 38, Ruggie 1992: 11) and the less tangible 
alternative of winning over other states in terms of "ideas" manifested in free 
trade, good governance and human rights (Forster 2000, Tsoukalis 1997, 
Manners 2002). While the questions linger on for whether actors are ever free 
to make a rational choice and whether states are indeed the main actor in 
decision-making, this thesis further examines whether a balance is continually 
being struck and re-struck between material and ideational dimensions of 
cooperation. 
The second theme which this research-extracts from literature on IPE 
theory is the balance in the forms of cooperation and how actors may decide 
to shape the cooperation process, possibly to maximise efficiency or to 
maximise one's own interests. One of the ways to look at this is to distinguish 
between the two prevalent modes of cooperation present in the GPE, the 
bilateral and multilateral modes of cooperation. IPE literature makes less of a 
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distinction between these modes of cooperation, although one might argue 
that the institutional elements introduced in neoliberalism make it more 
favourable towards multilateralism than neorealism, for example. Social 
constructivism, on the other hand, makes equal use of the distinction between 
agents and structures, consequently placing arguably similar emphasis on 
either mode of cooperation. A key question in this research is linked to the first 
theme, and examines propositions in key IPE literature on how the balance 
between material and ideational interest may also help to determine the 
bilateral and multilateral forms of cooperation, or vice versa. 
The third theme in IPE theory which this research makes use of is the 
nature of institutions, and how institutions may shape the nature of 
cooperation. Neoliberal institutionalists obviously place a strong emphasis on 
institutions as a key structure in policy-making decisions (Keohane and Nye 
1989, Jervis 1999: 44-46) while their main ideological counterpart, neorealists 
feel that institutions, while important, are only secondary in state choices 
(Waltz 2000, Glaser 2003). Social constructivists deal with institutions by 
considering the system of states embedded in a society of states which 
includes sets of values, rules, and institutions commonly accepted by states 
and which make it possible for the system of states to function (Ruggie 1998: 
11). In any case, there is a consensus that institutions matter as a factor in 
cooperation and that any analysis of the GPE would be incomplete without 
taking the cooperation structures institutions offer into account. This thesis 
aims to further investigate IPE theory and the manner in which theories 
suggest how institutions may interact with material and ideational interests 
involved in cooperation, as well as help to determine the preferred mode of 
cooperation. 
While the main theoretical strands of IPE offer some very good insights 
into the nature of cooperation, this research contends that most of them 
appear to be rather evasive about the manner in which cooperation is initiated 
and eventually evolves. The parsimonious nature of each of the theoretical 
strands, while valuable in identifying certain factors in cooperation, could also 
be considered too determined on seeing the GPE in a predefined manner. In 
other words, IPE theorists will see the world exactly the way they prefer to see 
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it. This subjectivity of sorts might be considered an obstacle to one's 
perception of exactly how cooperation functions within the GPE. 
In this thesis, Robert Axelrod's work on the Evolution of Cooperation 
and subsequent research into the nature of cooperation is suggested as a 
means both to improve one's understanding of how cooperation works as well 
as to determine how cooperation develops over time and under different 
circumstances. Axelrod's initial work focused on two players involved in 
cooperation (1984) while his subsequent research analysed more complex 
environments where more than two players were involved (1997). Using 
computer simulations with programmed conditions, Axelrod derived a number 
of hypotheses about cooperation which both confirm and develop on existing 
knowledge on cooperation presented in IPE theory. Axelrod's conclusions 
from observation of simulations of the Prisoner's Dilemma game showed that 
rational reciprocity was highly relevant with two player games (1984: 20). In 
contrast, values, ideas and codes of conduct, while pertinent in two player 
games, were significantly more detectable in n-player games (Axelrod 2001: 
7-8). This is especially true in the promotion of cooperation and collective 
behaviour in punishment for those who defect. 
Chapter 3 makes use of Axelrod's findings and attempts to shed further 
light on the observation of cooperation. Unlike the methods used by IPE 
researchers who rely strongly on historical accounts, Axelrod's method 
involves computer simulations and mathematics. It is perhaps the difference in 
the methods used which make the similarity in the conclusions particularly 
striking. Conclusions found in Axelrod's work on cooperation replicate the 
numerous propositions made by IPE theorists. Inherent in Axelrod's proposals 
are notions that material interest, norms, values and codes of conduct are all 
elements which determine how cooperation evolves. Likewise, Axelrod's 
findings on the interaction between two agents in a Prisoner's Dilemma and 
between multiple agents in a n-player game draw some strong comparisons 
with how cooperation may evolve in bilateralism and multilateralism. The 
findings not only are close, but this thesis proposes that Axelrod's research 
confirms notions of cooperation found across the IPE theories this thesis 
focuses on, including neorealism, neoliberalism, and social constructivism. 
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Axelrod's findings support this research's proposal that cooperation 
may be best analysed by extracting notions of cooperation found in major 
theoretical paradigms, rather than focusing on single perspectives. This thesis 
takes on this key idea and Chapter 3 goes on to introduce a set of key 
questions and propositions. The main proposition made is that bilateral 
cooperation is mostly based on materialism and can be explained, to a large 
extent, by the Prisoner's Dilemma framework. Issues such as the relative 
power and status of the actors involved as well as quid pro quo action can 
determine how well or how poorly the bilateral cooperation process develops. 
In contrast, values, ideas and codes of conduct become more relevant in 
multilateralism than in bilateralism. This is due to a number of factors, 
including collective pressure on inherently uncooperative states as well as 
clear signs of how the accepted norms have developed at an international 
level. 
A number of related questions and ideas can be generated and 
developed from this key proposition. First, we would expect institutions to 
constrain the ability of an actor to freely pursue its own vested interests at 
both the bilateral and multilateral levels. How much of an effect this may have 
on a partnership is a question this thesis constantly revisits. Institutions, 
alongside material and ideational factors, are taken as a major criterion in 
testing the analytical framework and analysing the EC-East Asian partnership. 
Secondly, this research explores the proposition that bilateralism and 
multilateralism can coexist, and could function both proportionally and inverse 
proportionally. In other words, the two modes of cooperation may either 
reinforce each other, or force actors to choose which mode is its preferred 
means to cooperate. The issue under investigation in this research is primarily 
under what conditions both bilateralism and multilateralism flourishes under 
and how their coexistence may affect the evolution of cooperation. 
Thirdly, this thesis explores the manner in which the clarity or ambiguity 
of policy intentions in a given relationship will have a strong effect on whether 
states decide to cooperate or to defect. It is expected that partners will have a 
mix of material interest preferences, institutional constraints or capacity, and 
ideational preferences. The partners will have a way of signalling these 
preferences and the fulfilment of one or more of these preferences is 
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necessary for continued cooperation. These signals, are however, not always 
necessarily clear and the ambiguity of exactly what a partner's policy 
intentions are could result in the stagnation of cooperation, or even defection. 
Finally, exogenous and endogenous factors are important for analysis 
of cooperation. One would expect fluctuations and exogenous pressure in the 
global political economy, or exogenous factors, to affect the immediate 
endogenous issues within a partnership. Trade between the EC and East Asia 
will be affected by the fluctuations within the global political economy. 
Similarly, EC-East Asian institutional development will similarly be affected by 
the development of global economic institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization as well as internal development taking place within the EC itself. 
One would also be able expect ideas in exclusive partnerships to change in 
accordance with development of global political economy ideas, values, and 
codes of conduct. Taking the importance of endogenous and exogenous 
factors into account, the research makes certain to cover both factors through 
a summarised historical account of the EC-East Asian bilateral and 
multilateral account. A more detailed investigation into endogenous factors 
are also conducted through a thorough investigation of material interest, 
institutional and dialogue development, and a rhetorical analysis of official EC 
strategic documents for East Asia. 
Tahle 1: Kev Ouestions to be Investigated on the Conduct of Interregional Cooneration 
Primary Is bilateralism based more strongly on material considerations? Are values, ideas and codes 
Questions of conduct more relevant in multilateralism? What is the role of institutions in this balance? 
Related Do institutions constrain the ability of actors to freely pursue vested interests? 
Propositions Can bilateralism and multilateralism coexist? How? 
How does clarity of policy intentions affect willingness to cooperate? 
How do endogenous and exogenous factors influence partnerships? 
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EC-East Asian Bilateral and Multilateral Regionalism 
There has been no lack of scholars making use of various IPE theory to 
analyse cooperation or defection within the GPE and this extends to the area 
of EC-East Asian economic partnerships. In an analysis which covered the 
main neoclassical theories, Dent argued that the Asian side of the negotiation 
often conducted relations through a state-centric method and often resorted to 
neomercantilist tendencies in their international economic relations (1999). 
Hamilton-Hart takes on a slightly more liberal institutionalist view by 
elaborating on how the governance capacity of the local government could 
limit the bounds to cooperation, even if a hegemon or institutions were in 
existence in Asia (2003). Kang, taking on a different theoretical perspective, 
rejects the basic propositions of neorealism by stating that a balance of power 
is not being instituted in Asia, but does not seem to refute the fact that states 
are extremely important and the struggle for security is still relevant (2003). 
These preliminary examples of arguments amongst a number of 
international relations theorists help to demonstrate that there continues to be 
a struggle over the means to analyse how cooperation takes place within the 
East-Asian GPE. The purpose of this thesis is not to argue a singular point of 
view on the EC-East Asian partnership through theoretical inclusions and 
exclusions. Instead, this thesis intends to test the balances proposed in 
chapters 2 and 3 through the use of the EC's bilateral and multilateral 
partnership with Japan, the ROK and China. This section first argues for the 
rationale behind the use of these three countries and its partnership with the 
EC to test the analytical framework. Then, a proposition on the methodology 
for the tests are made, with an explanation of how tests of the trade data, 
institutional development and dialogue intensification, and a rhetorical 
analysis of EC strategic documents can provide empirical links back to the 
analytical framework's focus on the two balances (bilateralism and 
multilateralism against material interest, institutions, and ideas). 
A case study of the EC's external cooperation with Japan, the ROK, 
and China is suitable to test patterns in the evolution of cooperation between 
the EC and its Asian counterparts for a number of reasons. The primary 
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reason is due to the fact that all- of the East Asian states have historically had 
a long and well documented period of constant interaction with the 
Europeans. Another important reason is because all three countries are 
involved in a multilateral interregionalism, the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) 
process, and has extended ties on a bilateral interregional basis as well. This 
provides the thesis with a test on both modes of cooperation simultaneously, 
which is essential in addressing the balance between bilateralism and 
multilateralism. 
The balance between material interests, institutions, and ideas is also 
empirically abundant in the EC-East Asian relationship. Trade has been the 
leading stimulant in a cooperation process between the EC and East Asia, to 
the extent that political and social issues have been relegated to a relatively 
minor position (Dent 1996, Gilson 2000). With the rise of China's economic 
power in the recent decade, material interests have never been more 
important in the EC-East Asian partnership. This provides a good measure of 
material interest for this research to measure the effects of. 
As for the measure of institutional influence, the EC has also engaged 
in a process of both bilateral and multilateral institutionalisation with East Asia. 
Bilateral institutionalisation has proven to be intensive, particularly between 
the European with Japan and China (Shambaugh 1996, Gilson 2000, Kapur 
1986). The presence of international institutions involving East Asia and the 
EC has had a profound effect on the EC's bilateralism and multilateralism in 
the - region. While the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) has been accused of 
being lacking in substance as well as enforcement powers, they provide a 
stage for negotiation and consultation between the member countries which 
usually are followed up under the more formal structure of the WTO. The 
abundance of institutional influences in the EC-East Asian partnership 
provides rich areas of investigation to provide answers to the questions and 
propositions raised by cooperation and interregionalism. 
In a partnership which appears to be so strongly focused on trade, 
ideas appear to be the least conspicuous area of enquiry. The EC, however, 
is known to produce numerous documents on its external commercial policies 
and this extends to its relationship with East Asia. These strategic documents, 
many of which are jointly negotiated with its East Asian counterparts, are 
-21- 
excellent clues of various aspect of the partnership. It is also the best way to 
see how ideas, values and codes of conduct have been documented. In other 
words, these strategic documents are a significant way to extract how the EC 
perceive the partnership is going, and which ideas the EC (and to some 
degree, its partners) hold as most important. Through a rhetorical analysis of 
these documents, one would expect to see how ideas have influenced the 
EC-East Asian partnership. 
In the analysis of the key questions and propositions on cooperation in 
this thesis, the dynamic elements of cooperation must not be forgotten. Each 
of the selected countries has its own distinctive character and its relationship 
with the EC is expected to have noticeable patterns of fluctuation in 
cooperation. One would have to consider if the changing nature of all actors 
involved will result in further interesting patterns in the bilateral cooperation 
process as well as the multilateral process. Japan, China, and the ROK all 
have had their own respective periods of economic rises and declines and are 
all in various stages of economic development. They also operate under what 
is still considered to be, an anarchic, hierarchical, and evolving GPE. In 
addition to this, the EC and East Asia have the option of both bilateralism and 
multilateralism open to them. These dynamic elements of cooperation are 
expected to play a significant role in the evolution of cooperation between the 
EC and East Asia. 
The analysis of the propositions and questions on cooperation as well 
as the dynamic elements of cooperation is examined in detail in the empirical 
tests conducted in chapters 5 and 6. Chapter 5 includes a vertical dimension 
examination for each of the individual EC-East Asian bilateral partnership but 
is also focused, in the horizontal dimension, on establishing a critical and 
conceptual analysis which starts to test in detail the two core balances of the 
thesis. The empirical bilateral examinations will initially determine whether 
there are grounds to claim that there is a stronger focus on material interests 
in bilateral relationships. This chapter structure is resembled in Chapter 6 for 
the multilateral partnership as seen in ASEM. Instead of a vertical study of the 
individual countries, Chapter 6 conducts a vertical analysis of each ASEM 
summit instead. Consequently, the horizontal analysis conducts an 
examination of the material, institutional, and ideational influences across the 
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ASEM summits. The multilateral tests will recall the initial propositions and 
questions on cooperation and examine whether there is a clearer emphasis 
on ideas in multilateral partnerships. 
Active Bilateralism, Passive Multilateralism, and Revisiting IPE 
Propositions on Cooperation 
The Conclusion critically examines the results of the bilateral and multilateral 
tests and analyse the overall evolution of cooperation. This is done through a 
consideration of the balance between bilateralism and multilateralism and 
material interest versus ideas, values and codes of conduct in EC-East Asian 
relations. The previous hypothesis are re-examined in the light of the empirical 
findings. This chapter will review the argument as well as the implications of 
the proposition that materialism is most pertinent in bilateral cooperation while 
values, ideas and codes of conduct are more relevant in multilateralism. It will 
also re-confirm the importance of institutions in the evolution of cooperation. 
Similarly, the chapter revisits exogenous and endogenous factors which 
appear to have played a part in affecting the conditions under which 
cooperation takes place as well as contributed to the fluctuation in 
cooperation. The important factor of the clarity of mutual policy intent, 
reciprocity, and trust is further clarified, as this appears to have played a role 
in the effectiveness or ineffectiveness of the modes of cooperation. In fact, the 
existence of the bilateral and multilateral modes of cooperation as well as the 
material, ideational, and institutional elements ingrained in the evolutionary 
dynamics appear to serve both as a stimulant and a hindrance to the 
cooperation process. The Chapter goes on to conclude that the EC is 
favouring a phase of active bilateralism versus passive multilateralism in its 
relationship with East Asia, where the Europeans prefer to shift existing 
indifference in the increasingly tedious multilateral ASEM process to a set of 
more effective bilateral agreements with preferred partners. 
The Conclusion also returns to the question of cooperation in IPE 
theory and the validity of some of the suggestions made about cooperation 
and interregionalism in this thesis. The findings in the EC-East Asian empirical 
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study and the tests on material, ideational, and institutional factors on each of 
the empirical cases are investigated to see if they support the propositions 
made in chapters 2 and 3. This conclusion discusses patterns in cooperation 
which can be perceived, factors dictating cooperation or defection, the 
theoretical correlation between bilateralism and multilateralism, and between 
materialism and ideas in cooperation theory. 
The final section of the Conclusion goes on to address the limitations of 
this study as well as to propose some grounds for further research. It 
demonstrates how the extraction of insights concerning cooperation from 
various strands of IPE theory as well as the use of non-conventional theory 
related to cooperation can assist in one's understanding of interregional 
cooperation in the GPE. Extraction of a particular issue from different IPE 
schools, in this case cooperation, helps to overcome the parsimony and the 
tunnel vision which could limit our understanding of an issue. It also results in 
increased objectivity and aids with the comprehensiveness of the analysis. 
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Chapter 2 
IPE Theory and Cooperation 
Practitioners looking at international political economy theories for an answer 
on how to initiate interregional cooperation within the modern global political 
economy are understandably a little confused. The study of International 
Political Economy (IPE) is littered with findings which yield ironic results, 
theories overlapping each other and confusion amongst different camps. 
Current debates continue between realists and liberalists, neorealists and 
neoliberal theorists, as well as one between the rational choice schools and 
the constructivists. A host of midrange theories, offering synthesis between 
each of the major theoretical paradigms add further complexity to the debates. 
A practitioner searching for a simple solution to problems in cooperation would 
not find a straight answer while looking at IPE theory. 
This Chapter focuses on IPE theory and locates the principles of 
cooperation found within IPE. This is done by extracting the main thoughts on 
cooperation in the Global Political Economy (GPE) suggested by neorealism, 
neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism. The Chapter importantly 
notes how the inclusions and exclusions on certain principles of cooperation 
suggested by the individual IPE 'theory presents an obstacle to our 
understanding of cooperation. This Chapter proposes that an eclectic 
approach which combines the insights on cooperation of these major IPE 
theories are required to be able to identify the motives for cooperation 
between actors, the various forms available, as well as the qualitative nature 
of the cooperation process. 
To achieve these ends, this Chapter is divided into three sections. The 
first section presents neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social 
constructivism separately in order to obtain a picture of their individual views 
on cooperation. The section separates each of the IPE views on cooperation 
according to the central problematics of IPE on the nature of the actor, the 
nature of GPE, and the nature of actors' interaction within the GPE. In addition 
to this, Wendt's use of the importance of ideas against the importance of 
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structures in classifying theory is used as an extra mechanism to enhance our 
understanding of cooperation based on IPE. 
The second section argues that the inclusions and exclusions present 
in the individual IPE theories, while serving as useful insights, are more useful 
combined together. The section considers the views of several IPE theorists 
who offer the propositions that firstly, viewing the issues for analysis is more 
important than presenting theoretical inclusions and exclusions, and secondly 
that the IPE theories suggest some very strong areas of overlap. These areas 
of overlap provide an excellent case for a combined approach into our 
understanding of the principles of cooperation. 
The third section then `explores' cooperation using the combined 
approach and notes how the IPE theories offer a set of factors which influence 
cooperation as well as a set of dynamic elements inherent in cooperation. The 
section explains that the main factors of material interest, institutions, and 
ideas stand out in IPE theory as the main criterion in influencing the 
interregional cooperation process. These factors need to be considered under 
the dynamic elements of constantly evolving actors, a hierarchical and 
anarchic international system adopting to its own evolution as well as the 
evolution of actors and alternating bilateral and multilateral modes of 
cooperation. These factors and dynamic elements of cooperation are the 
major themes extracted from IPE theory as a whole, and will serve as the 
main' components of the conceptual questions and propositions introduced in 
Chapter 3. 
The third section also includes an analysis of the implications which 
IPE theories have for regionalism and interregionalism. The last part of the 
third section examines the underlying debates in regionalism and argues that 
the questions being asked in the concept of regionalism are mirrored in IPE 
areas of enquiry. In other words, regionalism scholars' desire to articulate the 
significance of the state (or state-led institutions) as an actor, the confluence 
between trade and politics, and the growing importance of ideas are topics 
IPE theories similarly try to elaborate and provide explanations for. 
In summary, Chapter 2 is designed to extract knowledge on the 
principles of international cooperation based on existing traditional IPE 
literature and given central problematics on cooperation. The knowledge is 
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then combined and the most important principles of cooperation, namely the 
factors influencing cooperation and the dynamic elements of cooperation are 
laid out for further analysis. In essence, this Chapter lays down the IPE 
background on cooperation which is necessary in taking the thesis further into 
Chapter 3 where this thesis further proposes Robert Axelrod's non-traditional 
approach to understanding cooperation as a means of providing further insight 
into the analysis of cooperation within the GPE. 
IPE Theory: Central Problematics of Neorealism, Neoliberal, and 
Social Constructivism 
Cooperation in the global political economy takes place under certain contexts 
and the study of IPE captures a strongly vivid picture of the ongoing 
processes which results in the various forms of cooperation taking place in the 
world. Before going into an analysis of the various flavours of IPE theory, a 
discussion of some of the central problematics of IPE assists in setting up a 
context for analysis of cooperation within IPE. The intention for this discussion 
of the central problematics of IPE is so that we can isolate the core of the IPE 
theories which are directly relevant to issues of cooperation. This section goes 
into a discussion of this core which includes the nature of the actor, the nature 
of GPE, and the nature of actors' interaction within the GPE. 
The definition of IPE and its central problematics remain fundamentally 
the same despite some variability within the interpretations. IPE deals 
specifically with the interaction between states and markets within an 
international system considered to be under anarchy and attempts to isolate 
the various factors which cause the interaction as well as the consequences 
of the interaction. It is notable that in IPE, there are the critical problems in 
analysing anarchy and the levels of analysis one undertakes in evaluating the 
global political economy. 
Firstly, the nature of the actor is considered one of the main central 
problematics of IPE, and the role of the state and institutions are critical to 
one's understanding of cooperation. The state continues to be a principal 
decision-maker, but is no longer in complete control and undergoing 
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continuous evolution, while the domestic and international levels have 
become inevitably interconnected (Underhill 1994: 20). Interaction within the 
IPE between states and markets continues to evolve in various ways without a 
single sovereign authority to dictate the rules. The direction in which the IPE 
evolves and how this leads to different interaction between the central actors 
continues as a central focus of the study in IPE. 
It is integral to note that although state sovereignty has shifted 
positions and transformed from its conventional nature of being territorially- 
bound, its presence continues to be important. The state continues to be a 
"crucial nodal point" for political conflict over structure and institutions 
(Underhill 1994: 37). In a globalised world, states behaviour needs to be more 
flexible and new circumstances must be allowed for to enable transformations 
towards a more peaceful world (Krasner, 2000). Smith explicitly states that 
nation-states continue to be powerful, but are being significantly "re-shaped" 
and that identity needs to be reconceptualised as geopolitics is becoming 
increasingly outdated (1999: 18). Thus, when defining states' 'strengths', 
binding oneself to the old notions of territory-locked notions of sovereignty 
could result in shallow and erroneous analytical outcomes. 
As concerns unique transgovernmental organizations such as the EU, 
this does not necessarily mean that state sovereignty is declining, but rather 
that the identifying features of sovereignty has changed ever since 
globalisation became a part of world affairs. If EU member states have truly 
weakened through this decline in sovereignty, one would suspect that the 
slide towards integration would have been far swifter and. less problematic. 
The nature of the EU's "history-making decisions", where major 
transformations are made to the policy-making framework, are almost entirely 
controlled through intergovernmentalism in the Council (Peterson, 1995). One 
could argue that the systemic and sub-systemic levels played a large role in 
the development of proposals, but the fact that the proposals needed to take 
into account the preferences of member states needs to be considered (Hix 
1999: 202). The Commission cannot propose on a supranational whim, or the 
history-making decisions will simply not be taken at the intergovernmental 
conferences (IGCs) level. 
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IPE also discusses a possible shift from the primacy of the state to one 
of states being constrained by institutions. Sassen, in her discussion of 
sovereignty in the age of globalisation, writes of how sovereignty has been 
decentralised and territoriality to some degree denationalised when nation- 
states have been "reconstituted and partly displaced onto other institutional 
arenas outside the state and outside the framework of nationalised territory" 
(1996: 28). Keohäne took a similar view, indicating that sovereignty had been 
shifted from territories categorised by barriers to a "bargaining resource for a 
politics characterised by complex transnational networks". In other words, 
state sovereignty continues to matter, but is used differently to bargain for 
"greater gains" from exchange in the international area (2000: 117). Milner 
instead feels that distribution of power among countries is not an exclusive 
factor in the formation of the international economy. She quotes Keohane who 
said that hegemonies might necessary for creating international institutions, 
but once created, they begin to function by themselves (Milner 1998). 
The second point of discussion concerning IPE problematics is the 
nature of the GPE, particularly the debate on its hierarchical and anarchic 
nature. This primarily means that the GPE lacks a dominating authority which 
takes on the duty of governing the world. As this Chapter will go on to discuss, 
different IPE theories offer different stands or ways of understanding the 
nature of the GPE. 
Considering the question of the status of actors within the system, one 
clearly sees that the de jure status of states as equals is not reflected in 
reality. This could either mean that some sort of order between states has 
developed as the neorealists would argue3 (Waltz 1986: 112), or that hierarchy 
is present within the system as the neoliberals would propose. In other words, 
the international system has "always been characterised by organised 
hypocrisy" due to its multitude of norms, power asymmetries, and absence of 
any authoritative mechanism for resolving conflicts (Krasner 2000: 134). How 
this anarchic and hierarchical nature affects actors is an important question 
IPE theories attempt to answer. 
3 Technically, Waltz states that anarchy and hierarchy cannot exist at the same time, but he does admit 
to possible development of an order of sorts (1986: 112) 
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The third central problematic is the interaction between actors and the 
GPE and how cooperation can be reached. According to Strange, IPE 
"concerns the social, political, and economic arrangements affecting the 
global systems of production, exchange, and distribution, and the mix of 
values reflected therein" (1994: 18). Gilpin defines the GPE as a "sociopolitical 
system composed of powerful economic actors or institutions such as giant 
firms, powerful labour unions and large agribusinesses that are competing to 
formulate government policies on taxes, tariffs, and other matters in ways that 
advance their interests" (2001: 38). Underhill notes how major IPE theorists 
appear to have agreed on the essential point that the fundamental problematic 
of IPE is the interaction of a transnational market economy with a system of 
competitive states (1994: 21). 
These views offer examples of the agreement amongst IPE theorists 
that the manner in which actors interact with each other within the GPE, 
sometimes to reach cooperation, is a central concern of the field. In the 
discussion of cooperation in the GPE, one needs to be reminded that the field 
of IPE offers various lenses to view the social, political, and economic 
interaction between and agents and structures, as well as the results of the 
interaction. IPE also attempts to offer various explanations to why an 
interaction has resulted in such a manner, although findings can be 
significantly different due to the different theoretical orientations. A number of 
questions arise from this and include the puzzle of how cooperation is 
initiated, what kind of interest matters and how interests are formed. These 
are central problematics revolving around the interaction between actors and 
the GPE in which IPE theories attempt to provide explanations for. 
To sum up, the central problematics of IPE involve the constant 
evolution of the actors and institutions, an anarchical and hierarchical GPE, 
and attempts to reach cooperation of actors interacting within the GPE. These 
are important areas of consideration in cooperation and are constantly 
reflected in the following debates between major IPE theories. This discussion 
is important because of a number of reasons. First, knowing about the 
different theoretical viewpoints will aid in identifying the major agents involved 
within the sociopolitical interaction. Secondly, the various theoretical 
argumentations will present a clearer picture of the characteristics of the 
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agency and structure. Thirdly, the assumptions behind the theories will help to 
clarify why certain actions are taken and how cooperation has taken on the 
form that it does. To reach these important findings, the next section identifies 
how each of the theories attempt to explain the three key problematics of IPE. 
Neorealism 
Neorealism is grounded on a number of basic assumptions including the 
anarchic international system, primacy of states, and the distribution of 
material capability (Waltz, 1979). In Waltz's seminal work, Theory of 
International Politics, it was proposed that the only relevant actor, states, were 
equal, functionally undifferentiated units of the interstate system, and 
distinguished mainly by their relative capabilities to carry out similar tasks 
(1979). 
Neorealism's proposition. on the nature of actors is at the core of 
neorealist thought: that states are supreme, equal under international law, and 
rational. Neorealist theories center in on rational, unitary political actors, 
conflictual goals, and material capabilities (Legro & Moravscik 1999: 12). It 
also suggests that the international political system is anarchic, a direct 
implication of the equality and overarching importance of states. States 
functioning in an anarchic international system operate on the principle of 
relative gains and are mainly concerned with national interests. They are 
expected to be rational entities in its efforts to maximise national interests. 
Neorealists have a common belief that all states are essentially power seeking 
units, and this is an obligation if it does not wish to perish (Howlette and Poore 
2004: 20). 
At first glance, it is perhaps fair to note that the nature of neorealism 
leaves little room for cooperation, particularly given the view that supreme 
equal states are acting inside an anarchic international system under the 
principle of relative gain. Mearsheimer, an offensive realist, explains how the 
fear of cheating on agreements in order to unfairly achieve a relative gain 
greatly hinders cooperation within a neorealist world (1995: 12). Jervis agrees 
on how neorealists view the world to be full of conflict, but still sees room for 
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cooperation (1994). Particularly among defensive neorealists, cooperation 
can indeed take place although dependent on the 'severity of the security 
dilemma' and the actors' intentions (Jervis 1994: 62). In the case of 
neorealists, suboptimal outcomes are expected due to the fact that states lack 
the capacity to reach common interests and that gains are usually relative. 
Neorealism's state-centric view means that the theory can only 
acknowledge institutions to the extent that international institutions are created 
by states and used to advance state interests (Waltz 2000, Glaser 2003). 
Institutions are considered to be only secondary actors which states will turn 
to when they face comparatively peaceful international conditions. Neorealists 
view multilateral cooperation as an opportunity for states to share the cost of 
involvement, thus reducing costs of intervention so that it is suitable with its 
interests (Glaser 2003: 410). In other words, realists are that institutions 
indicate the distribution of power within the GPE, and that they have no 
independent effect on state behaviour or its tendency to cooperate 
(Mearsheimer 1995: 7). This implies that in the neorealist perspective, 
multilateralism is a lesser alternative to direct interaction with other states 
(bilateralism) in only specific conditions. In fact, the realist focus on relative 
power can even explain how powerful states such as the US can be tempted 
to act unilaterally (Brooks and Wohlforth 2005: 509). 4 
Theories based on neorealism which put on a direct emphasis on the 
nature of the GPE are proposed in the theories of hegemonic stability and 
neo-mercantilism. Hegemonic stability suggests that a dominant power, or 
hegemon, would bear the cost of maintaining an international market 
economy, institutionalised in international economic regimes characterized by 
liberal norms and rules (Underhill 2006: 11-12). Charles Kindleberger argued 
that the hegemon was necessary for the survival of an open and stable world 
economy. The theory of hegemonic stability indicates that the existence of a 
liberal economic order is representative of the distribution of power among 
states in the system. A hegemonic distribution means that the hegemon has 
determined that a liberal market system is the most suitable payoff for its 
expensive role as the world leader. For Kindleberger, cooperation works 
° Brooks and Wohlforth, however, make several cases against unilateralism in their article. 
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although there is a clearly hierarchical structure and the actors are unequal 
due to the natural distribution of economic power amongst the actors. 
Similarly, work by Krasner and Gilpin focuses on how international economic 
"regimes", with their sets of liberal norms and -rules, would guarantee 
maximum economic yields for the majority and create the opportunity for "free- 
riding". This would eventually result, according to the neorealist prediction, in 
certain acts of non-cooperation such as the protection of national markets 
against outsiders considered to be a threat (1983,2001). 
Robert Gilpin's neo-mercantilist argument is that the "nature of the 
global economy will be strongly affected by the security and political interests 
of, and the relations among, the dominant economic powers, including the 
United States, Western Europe, Japan, China, and Russia. " (2001: 12). 
Relative power in neorealism shapes all outcomes, including trade 
negotiations, human rights violations, or military intervention, with those with 
more power shaping outcomes to suit their own interests (Sterling-Folker 
2006: 14). As such, the main economic powers are "highly unlikely" to 
concede control of global economic distribution to market power, particularly 
when today's political economy could affect national interest to a large extent 
(Gilpin 2001: 12). 
Neoliberal Institutionalism 
Neorealism has indeed come under constant criticism by those who perceive 
that the theoretical perspective is generally empirically inaccurate, fails to 
show more motivations in a hegemon's dominance, and the lack in content of 
relations among states due to its parsimonious nature (Underhill 2006: 12). 
Sterling-Folker explains the skepticism towards realism by saying that realism 
severely limits the human reason to achieve the progressive liberal goals or 
norms usually accepted as moral rights (2006: 13). It lacks the logic found in 
goals such as human rights, economic parity, lasting security, founded on the 
grounds of reasoned argument, common interests, and mutual moral 
principles (Sterling Folker 2006: 13). Keohane and Nye describes the realist 
assumptions as challengeable due to its portrayal of the world under constant 
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conflict, a picture which does not reflect the real world. This portrayal, while 
empirically inaccurate, is still useful as an extreme model of the world and 
Keohane and Nye have used this to frame their own seminal work on complex 
interdependence, considered to be the third generation of neoliberal 
institutionalism (2001: 21). Keohane and Nye's work on complex 
interdependence deepened the study of neoliberal institutionalism and has led 
to the description of the theory as the study of the interaction of individuals in 
the economic sphere (Underhill 2006: 13). 
. The main actors in the case of neoliberal 
institutionalism are 
significantly more comprehensive than in neorealism. In neoliberal 
institutionalism, states continue to be primary actors, although it includes the 
characteristics of multiple channels (other than states) to connect societies, 
absence of hierarchy among issues, and the minor role of the military force 
(Keohane and Nye 2001: 21-23). This eventually results in varying goals of 
actors according to issue area, the use of different power resources specific to 
issues areas, agenda formation in accordance with changes in the distribution 
of power resources, and an increased role for organizations to set agendas 
with the weak states making use of coalitions for its own political actions 
(Keohane and Nye 2001: 31-33). Moravscik proposes that the core 
assumptions of neoliberal IR theory include the primacy of societal actors, 
representation and state preferences, and the manner in which the 
configuration of interdependent state preferences determines state behaviour 
(1997: 516-520). 
The focus of neoliberal institutionalists in examining the nature of the 
GPE is for means towards an increased efficiency in the international system. 
Neoliberals perceive that there can be a hierarchical order, even in an 
anarchical world. In such a world, consent and cooperation is possible in 
achieving absolute gains. International regimes are expected to increase the 
probability of cooperation by providing information, reducing transaction costs, 
and. generating the expectation of cooperation among those involved in the 
relationship (Krasner 1983). It appears that the neoliberal institutionalists 
believe in much more unrealised or potential cooperation, and that without 
institutions one can only expect suboptimal outcomes (Jervis 1999: 44-46). 
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As concerns the nature of actors' interaction within the GPE, neoliberal 
institutionalists perceive institutions to be the mediator as well as the means to 
achieve cooperation within the GPE. The foundation of international 
institutions are based on frameworks of international principles, rules, norms 
and decision-making procedures which states wishing to maximise its 
interests will agree on (Krasner 1983, Keohane 1989). Institutions 
encompassing these principles make use of the ideals to constrain the states 
from absolutely maximising its interests and preference through unilateral 
power (Keohane, Nye, and Hoffman 1993: 2-3). It also increases the level of 
information provided to all parties by increasing transparency as well as to 
raise the costs of defection (Kupchan 1994: 50-51). While neoliberal theory 
does not argue that institutions matter in every instance, or that it virtually 
guarantees cooperation, the neoliberal argue that multilateral cooperation can 
under certain conditions be easier to achieve when international institutions 
exist (Sterling-Folker 2004: 63). 
Neoliberal institutionalists views on cooperation are markedly more 
optimistic than their neorealist counterparts, perhaps because of its strong 
focus on economic issues. As noted by Lipson, many of the different 
institutional arrangements created within the GPE are associated with 
economic and security issues, and the possibility for cooperation is increased 
when economic relations are being discussed (1988). Clearly, neoliberal 
institutionalists are more accommodating (than neorealists) towards 
cooperation in their aim towards the resolution of market failures (Ruggie 
1998: 9). The neoliberal perspective puts a lower emphasis on material power 
and argues against the overwhelming power of a single authoritative actor 
such as the state. This has essentially resulted in an analytical perspective 
focused not only on the importance of institutions for cooperation but has also 
drawn in, to some extent, the relevance of social forces. 
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Social Constructivism 
A limitation of the neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist notions of 
cooperation is that the premises for analysis cannot always explain reasons 
for states to cooperate so well with each other in some situations, while failing 
to do so in other situations. The weakness of basing theories on state 
centricity and focusing on the zero sum maintenance of state interests, the 
mainstay of neorealist theories, serves to poorly explain the various external 
factors determining policy outcomes. Placing the focus mainly on the state 
also means that a number of other influential actors involved in policy-making 
are excluded from the policy process. This is similar to neoliberal theories, 
which give due emphasis to the importance non-state actors, such as 
multinational corporations and institutions, . 
but still lack a comprehensive 
analysis of why the various state or non-state actors behave the way they do. 
Again, it does not completely gives reasons for the varying degrees of 
cooperation, some of which take place regardless of the state, national 
interest, corporation's interest, or institutional frameworks. As Wendt argues, 
neorealism is incapable of explaining structural change, "underspecified to 
generate falsifiable hypotheses", and does not even explain the "small number 
of big and important things" which it purports to do (1999: 17). The issues of 
ideas and the `social construction' of actors are a glaring omission in the 
neorealist and neoliberal institutionalist theories. 
The Third Great Debate in IR involves an awkward bout between the 
neorealists and neoliberalists against the emerging contenders, social 
constructivists. The debate is awkward because social constructivism is not a 
theory of international politics, but encourages us to look at how actors are 
socially constructed, not which actors to study or where they are constructed. 
As such, units, levels of analysis, or agents and structures embedded within 
international politics need to be chosen (Wendt 1999: 7). 
This brings us to the first area of difficulty in constructivism: that it is a 
social theory that 'does not make claims about the content of social structures 
or the nature of agents at work in social life' (Finnemore and Sikkink 
2001: 393). Wendt argues that in social constructivism, structures of human 
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association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material 
forces and that identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by 
these shared ideas rather than given by nature (1999). He further states that 
the debate in international political theory should be between different theories 
of system structure and how structure relates to agents (1999:. 11-12). It 
emerges from social constructivism that international actors are based on 
ideas as much as by material forces, and eventually all observation (in rational 
choice theory) is theory-laden, dependent on background ideas, generally 
taken as given or unproblematic about what kinds of things there are and how 
they are structured (Wendt 1999: 370). In other words, social constructivism 
can only serve as a framework for us to understand how agents and 
structures are mutually constituted, and through that framework, it is possible 
for us to understand the composition of cooperation in the GPE. 
Social constructivism give institutions their due importance within the 
GPE's social framework. In Barnett and Finnemore's analysis of international 
organizations under a constructivist lens, they reach three conclusions. The 
first is that institutions can be viewed as purposive actors, instead of merely 
an arena for states to pursue their policies. Their second argument is that 
through institution's autonomy, they can have independent effects on the 
world and become powerful actors in the GPE in their own rights. Thirdly, 
Barnett and Finnemore note how institutions can also be evaluated 
normatively, and contrary to propositions made in other theories, institutions 
can have as many undesirable qualities as they have desirable qualities 
(Barnett and Finnemore 1999: 726). Additionally, a number of academic works 
in the area of social constructivism have also noted how institutions can 
'teach' states new norms of behavior (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001: 401). 
Highlighting the theoretical stand of social constructivism on the nature 
of the GPE is far from being a straightforward task, primarily because the 
viewpoint is largely a-Ia-carte. Wendt's observation that "anarchy is what 
states make of it" is representative of this a-la-carte nature. Social 
constructivism indicates that structure produces agency and vice versa which 
means that the nature of the GPE and the interaction of actors within the GPE 
is constantly evolving. Consequently, their resulting interaction is determined 
by how the dominant structures and agents have been formed at certain 
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periods of time. Barnett notes how the normative structure shapes the identity 
and interests of actors such as states, and that these identities and interests 
are rarely constant (2005: 263)Even the nature of how power is used by 
actors is divided by social constructivists into the conceptual areas of 
compulsory, institutional, structural, and productive power (Barnett and Duvall 
2005). Barnett and Duvall argue that power is reflected in the production of 
effects that shape - an actor's capacity, in and through social relations 
(2005: 39). 
Ironically enough Wendt's version of thin constructivism itself is not free 
of problems. Wendt admits that his works should only be used as a 
"theoretical lens" (Wendt, 1999) and that by itself, certainly does not explain 
any state behaviour or give any "few and big" propositions (Keohane 
2000: 126). This statement alone puts constructivism at a serious 
disadvantage over other theories by admitting that it cannot stand alone, and 
that like other critical theories, are limited to dissent while sacrificing authority 
over big topics to mainstream theories (Amin&Palan 2001: 560). Social 
constructivism's arguments could, to some degree, be in danger of tautology, 
because of the manner in which he implied the possibility of "identifying 
actors' identities as circumscribable entities at any given point in time" which 
effectively ignores the complexity of the identity phenomenon (Zehfuss 2001: 
340). Social constructivism has also been accused of lacking empirical data 
and unable to overcome the situation of "thinness of norms" in the 
international environment (Krasner 2000: 131). Critics of social constructivism 
note that 'theory' could be considered as more successful in stimulating 
thinking about the analysis of international relations than in renewing 
ontological debates (Keohane 2000: 126). 
Ideas versus Structures in IPE Theory 
While the previous parts offered a means of understanding the difference 
between IPE theories through an analysis of its central problematics, this brief 
part offers an additional way to understand the differences in IPE theory 
through Wendt's use of ideas versus structures. This is offered in addition to 
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the central problematics in IPE so that it is distinctly clear how the IPE 
theories analysed in this thesis are classified. There are suggestions that in 
order to classify a set of theories into a theoretical paradigm, the paradigm 
needs to have superior parsimony, coherence, empirical accuracy, and 
multicausal consistency (Moravcsik 1997: 515). In other words, IPE theory 
necessarily comprises of inclusions and exclusions which is necessary, 
according to Moravscik, to maintain methodological rigour. These inclusions 
and exclusions are comprehensively demonstrated in Wendt's classification of 
theories through the use of ideas versus structures. 
In Wendt's classification of international theories, a distinction is made 
between the difference the ideas make (materialism and idealism) and the 
differences that structures make (holism and individualism). Materialism 
focuses mainly on issues of national interest, while idealism has value and 
ideological frameworks such as human rights, democracy, and free trade as a 
centre. A holistic structure focuses mainly on structures, while an individual 
structure is one giving importance to the single agent, or actor. As such, 
realism would be identified as a theory which is both materialistic and 
individualistic in nature, while liberalism would be grounded in idealism and 
individualism. Wendt's own "thin constructivist" stance would be situated 
somewhere in the idealistic and holistic classification (Wendt 1999). 
Figure 1: Wendt's Classification of International Theories 
World Systems Theory Holism English School 
Neo-Gramscian Marxism World Society 
Postmodern IR 
Feminist IR 
Classical Realism 
Liberalism Idealism 
Individualism 
Wendt's classification of international theories 
(1999) 
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There are other ways of classifying theories, such as the method proposed by 
Legro and Moravscik, although such classifications also rely on the influences 
of materialism against idealism and holism versus individualism (1999). Legro 
and Moravcsik see three paradigms, including the institutionalists, liberal, and 
epistemic paradigms. They state that the debate has traditionally revolved 
around the question of scope, power, and the interrelationship or variation in 
material capabilities (such as seen in realism), national preferences (such as 
in liberalism), beliefs (such as in epistemic theory) and international 
institutions on state behaviour (1999: 11). This method of classifying theories 
helps to reconfirm Wendt's idea that theories can be classified according to 
their emphasis on materialism or idealism on the one hand, and holism or 
individualism on the other hand. 
Understanding Cooperation through Convergence of IPE Theories 
The notoriously complex debates between advocates of each theoretical 
school serve to prove the point that there are extensive areas of overlap 
between each of the schools and that theory is not only about inclusions and 
exclusions of certain principles of cooperation, but is also about convergence. 
At times, the ideas debated become so converged that theorists seems to 
have become so perplexed that, in several instances, they begin to ask the 
other camp why they are even arguing. One of the obvious answers to this is 
that throughout the great debates, except for some of the most headstrong 
theorists (see Waltz 2000) an extensive process of adoption of ideas from the 
other camps has been put in place. This process of convergence between 
theories has proven 'useful to our understanding of the GPE because 
academics appear to be conceding ground to each other by admitting that 
their own championed theories are still incomplete. Weaknesses in the 
theories, often due to their necessarily parsimonious nature, also limit our 
understanding of the circumstances under which cooperation take place. 
Convergence, on the other hand, may actually assist our understanding of 
cooperation by not limiting the understanding to a set of dichotomous rules, 
but instead opening up to a more eclectic approach. 
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Strange urges that a suitable method for analysis should allow the 
researcher to "allow more pragmatism in prescription" as well as an analytical 
method which would transcend the available ideologies and make 
communication or debate possible between them (1994: 17). She urges that 
theory should try to "scientifically explain", without bias, aspects of the 
international system not easily explained by common sense while not 
necessarily trying to predictor prescribe (1994: 11-12). In advancing the theory 
of neoliberal institutionalism, Keohane and Nye integrate the realist 
importance of power to such an extent that Legro and Moravscik have 
classified neoliberal institutionalism as belonging to the realist paradigm 
(1999). The "via media", an approach taken by constructivists such as Wendt 
stresses the means in which rationalism and constructivism could be 
synthesised by means of an antimaterialist and holist methodology (see 
Wendt 1999,2000). Similarly, Barnett notes how constructivism and rational 
choice, although generally considered competing approaches, can be 
combined to further one's understanding of global politics (2005: 264). 
There seems to be an ongoing set of differences which are not totally 
irreconcilable between IPE theorists concerning the inclusions and exclusion 
inherent in IPE theory and the overlap of theory suggests that they may not be 
as different as they first appear. 
Table 2: WE I neor - Extensive areas of overLa 
Neorealism/Neo-Mercantilism Neoliberal Institutionalism Social Constructivism 
lature of Actor Focus on States, Equal under States key, but also existence Actors based on ideas and structures 
international law, and rational of societal actors working relating to agents (agents produce 
under multiple channels, structures and structures produce agents) 
institutions, and organizations 
Jature of the Global Political Anarchic with some sort of Anarchic, hierarchical Anarchy is what states make of it 
: conomy order (Waltz), hierarchical 
(according to hegemonic 
stability) 
4ature of Actors' Interaction Initiated by states, Maximise Maximise national interest - Normative structures and ideas shape 
Vithin the GPE national interest, relative often where actors have how actors interpret and construct their 
material gains mutual interests, often under social reality as well as their identity and 
institutions, absolute material interests 
gains 
deas versus Structures Materialist and Individualist Materialists and Holist Idealist and Holist 
1 
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Despite the given contrasts between neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism, the two theories admit to the importance of rational choice, an 
issue which gives rise to the question that neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism are two sets of theories which are not as unlike each other as 
they appear to be. Keohane and Martin have admitted how both admit that the 
lack of a sovereign authority allows states to advance their interest 
unilaterally, making the two theories "half-siblings" (1999: 3). In essence, the 
basic proposition of power advanced by the neorealist school has also been 
adopted by the neoliberal school. It has also been mentioned that the divide 
between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is greatly exaggerated, 
due to the fact that even neorealists take into account the fact that states use 
institutions to advance their interests (Glaser 2003: 409). Consequently, 
neoliberalism is often identified as a "virtual twin" of realism, while other 
neoliberals have called for the synthesis of their approach with liberalism 
(Thies 2004: 162). Although the debate between neorealism and 
neoliberalism has become rather dated and their fields are now more 
reconcilable than ever before, considering their respective arguments 
continues to be necessary for a proper analysis of international cooperation.. 
Taking in new strands of neorealist and neoliberal thought might 
explain this phenomenon in the global political economy and provide some of 
the reasons cooperation exists under anarchy. Ernst Haas offers one 
explanation, by indicating that welfare state encourages leaders to initiate 
cooperation with each other as much as possible, because it offers a means 
of satisfying the needs and demands of constituents (Ruggie 1999: 1). 
Axelrod and Keohane have argued that organisation in world politics exists 
despite anarchy, and that relationships between actors can be carefully 
structure in some issue areas (1986: 226). Jervis explains that while offensive 
realists continue to explain the world in terms of zero-sum relationship, 
defensive realists are much more likely to agree with their neoliberal 
counterparts (1999). 
The social constructivist's view that neorealism and neoliberalism 
disregards the role of ideas may not be entirely true, and there may actually 
be overlaps in this theoretical 'divide' as well. Consequently, the argument 
that neorealism and neoliberalism might have overlooked preferences, rules, 
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and norms might seem unfair for advocates of the respective schools. 
Keohane has argued that a connection between ideas and the material world 
can be found in concepts of interest and power (2000: 127). It is also true that 
to a certain extent, interests do involve beliefs (Keohane 2000: 128). It is also 
true that in modern structural realism, realists often make use of other theories 
to explain issues not covered by realism's central thesis (Glaser 2003: 403). 
To this, even Wendt makes a partial contribution by admitting that 
material conditions, such as that found within neorealism and neoliberalism, 
also have the constitutive effects, albeit independent of ideas, of physical 
limits of possibility and defining cost and benefits of alternative courses of 
action (2000: 166). To constructivists, who have more flexible propositions 
concerning interests, preferences, norms, and ideas these argument would 
seem to inadequate. After all, interest and power are usually held as constant 
in the neorealist and neoliberal worlds, while constructivists would suggest 
that preferences and ideas are constantly changing. As cooperation is 
concerned, this may have translated into variations between hard bargaining 
and soft negotiation. 
Social constructivists argue that "the system of states is embedded in a 
society of states which includes sets of values rules and institutions that are 
commonly accepted by states and which make it possible for the system of 
states to function" (Ruggie 1998: 11). Ruggie argues that neorealism and 
neoliberalism does not sufficiently explain how territorial states acquire their 
current identity and interests, and does not have an analytical means for 
dealing with the fact that specific identities of specific states have a way of 
shaping their perceived interests and patterns of international outcomes 
(1998: 14). Yet, neoliberal institutionalists do have arguments on preference 
formation and transfusion which could be considered to lean heavily towards 
ideational elements of constructivism, although in its strictest sense, their 
focus on the formation of domestic preferences and transfusion into 
institutions is not a constructivist idea. 
While it is true that there are significant overlaps in IPE theory which 
facilitate the combination of approaches to increase our understanding of 
cooperation, the unique insights which do not necessarily overlap serve to fill 
in each other's inadequacies. A strong point of consideration is the manner in 
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which neoliberal institutionalism fills in the gap left behind by constructivists 
such as Wendt concerning how normative ideas at the domestic level affect 
the international system, instead of looking at only ideational elements at the 
international systemic level. Neoliberal institutionalists would explain that state 
actors are bound by the rules and regulations set up by international 
institutions, and that domestic preferences used to launch institutions also 
embrace norms and values. Ideas, classified as world views, principled 
beliefs, and causal beliefs, could influence politics by "acting as road maps, 
helping to cope with the absence of unique equilibrium solutions, and 
becoming embedded in durable institutions". Nevertheless, a "liberal 
constructivist" direction has already been undertaken for a "constructivist 
interpretation of liberal theory" which puts an emphasis on how ideas and 
communication are important when they are more compatible with present 
domestic values and institutions (Moravscik 1997: 540). 
It appears that while the rational choice camps offer a good insight into 
the structure of the current global political economy, especially concerning the 
role of dominant actors and vested interests, they struggles to explain the 
social side of relationships. Rational choice theories such as neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalism concur that anarchy exists within the international 
system, but they differ mainly on the extent of anarchy and the degree of 
independence main power have in making a decision (Lawton et al 2000: 6). 
This rather bleak view on the nature of the global political economy means 
that rational choice theories imply that cooperation is based on the influence 
of some extremely powerful actors and that negotiations are conducted on the 
basis of vested interests. While neoliberal institutionalists would explain that 
state actors are bound by the rules and regulations set up by international 
institutions, the norms and values inherent in the setting up of international 
institutions are not as obvious in their explanations. As such, social 
constructivist theories which attempt to explain the intangible composition of 
relationships through the analysis of the structure of the global political 
economy as well as the inherent qualities of interactions are highly valuable. 
While international political economy theorists attempt to clarify their views on 
the functioning of the global system, it is becoming increasingly true that in 
some areas and in some types of interaction, some theories offer more 
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relevant insights than others. This also holds true for cooperation, where the 
consequences of cooperation varies according to the influencing factors in the 
process as well as the context for cooperation. 
Exploring Cooperation 
Cooperation is considered to take place when "actors adjust their behaviour to 
the actual or anticipated preferences of others, through a process of policy 
coordination" (Keohane 1984: 51-52). This general description of cooperation 
has become the accepted definition, with policy coordination implying that 
state policies have been adjusted so that undesirable outcomes for states 
they are interacting with are decreased (Milner 1997: 7). As noted in the 
Introduction, in this thesis, cooperation is considered to take place when 
actors in partnership either consciously or unconsciously adjust policy 
coordination to maximise mutually beneficial outcomes while minimising 
undesirable outcomes. The contention in this part is that policy coordination 
and preferences are formed, as suggested by IPE theory, through the 
influencing factors of material interest, institutions, and ideas. 
Avoiding inclusions and exclusions means that one can draw on the 
collective insight on cooperation made by each of the theories discussed to 
further understand interregionalism. Each of the theories, different in some 
issues while similar in several insights, help us to isolate a number of factors 
necessary for the understanding of cooperation. Factors influencing 
cooperation might not be as complicated as the theories individually and 
collectively suggestion. Recognition that process and environment, or 
structure, are interactive parts of the same whole would eliminate debates 
such as the one between neorealism and neoliberalism, constructivists argue 
(Wendt 1999, Thies 2004: 179). 
The neorealist and neomercantilist contribution to our understanding of 
cooperation is its focus on state-centrism, maximised zero-sum material 
interest, and the secondary role of institutions. Before social constructivism 
and the issues of normative ideas and socially constructed realities were 
offered in IPE theory, one had a fairly precise idea of how cooperation would 
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take place. The state-centric neorealist school would argue that cooperation 
would be in a predominantly bilateral form and would focus on security and 
power. This was if cooperation would ever take place at all, something hard 
core realists are sceptical about. 
Neoliberal institutionalists' contribution to the understanding of 
cooperation is far more explicit. To reiterate, the theory focuses on institutions, 
interdependence, multiple channels of contact, and the assumption that state 
goals are multiple and unhierarchical. The implication for cooperation is that 
the chances for cooperation are higher, would take place in a predominantly 
multilateral form, and would focus on efficiency and relative gains5. 
The constructivist school says a lot about how cooperation might be 
formed, but proposes very little on the possibility, form, and main goals for 
cooperation. The main contribution from social constructivism is in obliging us 
to think of how ideas are an important component of cooperation, and helps to 
explain how cooperation takes place when the neorealists and neoliberals 
would consider cooperation to be very unlikely. Notably, Wendt has proposed 
that the question is not materialism versus idealism, but rather how material 
forces and ideas are articulated. He states that ontological awareness is 
important, and some issues have to go in the foreground while others stay 
significant but in the background (2000: 170). Social constructivism's status as 
a "way of looking" at international politics, however, essentially surrenders its 
potential to be a theory which gives a precise framework for the analysis of 
cooperation. 
Drawing on the contributions by each school of thought as noted in this 
part and in the previous section, the three critical factors which influence 
cooperation comprise of material interest, institutions, and ideas. The 
neorealist school puts a very strong emphasis on the fulfilment of material 
interest, particularly by the state. Neoliberal institutionalism, while agreeing 
with neorealists on the difficulty of achieving cooperation in anarchy, puts its 
faith in institutions as well as the fact that there are a wider range of actors as 
well as issues. Finally, social constructivism proposes that without the 
5 Neoliberal institutionalists also admit to a strong degree that national preferences are dominated by 
materialist values. 
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analysis of ideas as one of the critical factors, it is impossible to understand 
how cooperation takes place. 
Understanding the nature of cooperation through the convergence of 
theory, apart from the mentioned critical factors, also requires an 
understanding of the dynamic elements of cooperation. Neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, and social constructivism all contribute to our understanding 
of these dynamic elements of cooperation. To understand cooperation, one 
first needs to consider the nature of actors, who are the primary participants 
within a cooperation process. Secondly, this section argues that cooperation 
takes place under the context of a hierarchical international system which 
means that actors are not created equal, and do not have an equal say in the 
cooperation process. Thirdly, this section emphasises the importance of the 
modes of cooperation, bilateralism and multilateralism, as another dynamic 
element of cooperation. 
The first dynamic element of cooperation in which IPE theory urges us 
to take into account is the evolutionary nature of actors, and the distinction 
between claims of rationality and the evolution of actors' identities and 
preferences. This context is important because it serves as a starting point to 
our understanding of how rationality, as argued by neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism, continues to be a dominant description of actors functioning in 
the global political economy, although suggestions that a more careful 
methodology to determine what is "rational" might be required. States, for 
example, are rational, although perhaps no longer unitary, actors working in 
anarchy. It is also important to remember that the state is embedded within 
and shaped by domestic and global social forces/structures, and that agents 
constitute structures as much as structures constitute agents 
(Hobson&Ramesh 2002: 8,19). This means that while actors interact, 
identities and interests are sustained and expectations are created, thus 
creating and maintaining social structures which subsequently limit choices 
(Wendt 1999). 
As regards the nature of actors, identities and preferences are usually 
held as constant in a number of issues, particularly those normally regarded 
as high politics, while in lower politics identities and preferences might be 
more malleable. It is, according to social constructivists, debatable that 
-47- 
identities and preferences do change from time to time according to the ideas 
present in the international system at the period, but one usually sees a strong 
inclination towards , the preservation of security issues as well as matters of 
national interest. It is an important reminder that identities and preferences 
change while the policy exchange area under discussion changes from states 
to markets and to the different levels in states and markets interaction. 
The second dynamic element of cooperation, according to suggestions 
in IPE theory, is the evolutionary nature of a hierarchical international system 
which is expected to change accordingly with the evolution of actors within the 
system. Structures and the society matter in the debate and without some sort 
of consideration over these factors, a complete understanding of how 
cooperation takes place between states, institutions, and society would be 
difficult. It is also important to note that the state is embedded within and 
shaped by domestic and global social forces and structures, and that agents 
constitute structures as much as structures constitute - agents 
(Hobson&Ramesh 2002: 8,19). This means that while agents interact, 
identities and interests are sustained and expectations are created, thus 
creating and maintaining social structures which subsequently limit choices 
(Wendt 1999). 
Considering the question of the status of actors within the system, one 
clearly sees that the de jure status of states as equals is not reflected in reality 
as noted in earlier discussion on anarchy, hegemons, and the hierarchical 
international system. Today, it has been argued that due to the growth of 
international institutions and a supposedly weakened US economy, the US 
hegemony is in decline (Corden 1990: 13). This claim is today contentious and 
under debate, especially since the United States today "enjoys a power 
advantage this is unmatched in modern history, both in the overall size of its 
advantage and in the diversity of its predominant power, which includes 
economic, military, and technological advantages" (Glaser 2003: 405). 
Rational choice theories offer straightforward material explanation for 
the hierarchical institutional arrangements, especially found in the state's 
contractual relations, credit rating agencies, and off-shore tax havens, it has 
been argued (Cooley 2003). Even social constructivists would admit that the 
real world is hierarchical, and that "anarchic" norms often fall prey to various 
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kinds of hierarchical structures such as hegemonies, influence sphere, patron- 
client relations, and informal empires (Wendt 2000: 177). The question of 
hierarchy, or suggestions of some sort of unequal order, among states 
characterises the nature of the international system and must be taken 
account of when considering factors for cooperation. 
The third dynamic element of cooperation implied by IPE theories 
concerns the mode of cooperation and the links to material interest, 
institutions, and ideas. To understand cooperation, one must distinguish 
whether cooperation is grounded on a bilateral or multilateral basis and how 
material interest, institutions, or ideas influence the mode of cooperation. In 
today's GPE, it is highly possible that one would be analysing the interactions 
between an international organisation with a state, or regional organisations 
with a transgovernmental organisation. Empirical evidence has become 
available to show that important powers might prefer multilateralism in some 
cases while resorting to bilateralism in other cases (Hemmer&Katzenstein 
2002: 575). It is also highly likely that a state would be able to carry on a 
cooperative relationship with another state through both bilateral and 
multilateral means simultaneously (Smith 2004). Analysing why a mode of 
cooperation becomes predominant and the explaining the success of a mode 
of cooperation in a partnership is important for the understanding of 
cooperation. 
The major influencing factors for cooperation and the dynamic 
elements of cooperation give rise to a number of important considerations. 
One must first ask how and why cooperation fluctuates. Present theoretical 
frameworks do very little to explain why cooperation takes place in some 
cases, and while it does not in others. Cooperation can fluctuate and actors 
can behave unexpectedly to those they interact with, even when the 
predominant conditions appear to be the same. In some cases, it appears to 
boil down to the simple matter of how the actors behaved within the 
negotiation process. In most cases, however,. intricate details overlooked, if 
not ignored, by the main theoretical perspectives are the determining factors 
on whether cooperation took place in a particular case. Available IPE theories 
such as neorealism and neoliberalism, due to their necessarily inclusive and 
exclusive nature, deal highly inadequately with grey areas in cooperation. 
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Constructivists' non-arguments offer little in the area of causal explanations 
but do help to clear up some of the constitutive elements of cooperation. 
The given critical factors which influence cooperation and the dynamic 
elements of cooperation will become a recurring theme in the following 
Chapters. Chapter 3 makes use of Robert Axelrod's work on cooperation to 
inform and consolidate existing IPE theories. The chapter discusses in detail 
how the underlying factors of material interest, institutions, and ideas can 
influence actors to gravitate towards the bilateral and multilateral modes of, 
cooperation. Chapter 3 consequently introduces a set of conceptual 
problematics to attempt to bridge the gap between the theoretical paradigms 
in order to promote convergence and avoid parsimonies. In Chapter 3's 
proposition of an empirical test for the conceptual problematics, EC-East 
Asian evolution of cooperation, there is a continued reference to the 
evolutionary nature of actors, the evolutionary nature of the hierarchical 
international system, and the constant shifts between the bilateral and 
multilateral modes of cooperation. 
IPE Theories and the Implications for Interregional Cooperation 
As noted in the Introduction to this thesis, a combination of theories has been 
necessary in understanding the EU's motivations for engaging in regionalism 
and interregionalism. The debates in classical IPE theories of neorealism, 
neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism elaborated in this Chapter 
and its findings apply to interregionalism as well although translation of some 
of these conclusions to interregionalism may not be straightforward for a 
number of reasons. The main reason for this is because of the struggle in 
defining regionalism and specifying what its main features entail. In other 
words, understanding the implications IPE theories have on interregional 
cooperation requires an examination of the so far unresolved debates on 
interregionalism. These debates are centred on the familiar topics of the 
significance of the state as an actor, the relevance between trade and politics 
in the international system, and the growing important of ideas. 
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We can expect these theoretical debates to extend to interregionalism. 
Hänggi notes how realism would focus on the dynamics of rival regionalism 
and the attempt to balance power between different regional actors (2000: 8). 
He continues to note how we can expect liberal institutionalism to emphasise 
the necessity of cooperation to manage complex interdependence on an 
interregional level (Hänggi 2000: 9). Other scholars have made use of social 
constructivist approaches which explain how identity is formed through 
interregional interaction (Roland 1999: 3-7, Gilson 2005: 309-310). Systemic 
explanations of interregionalism have also been made through eclectic 
approaches which combine, for example, realist and liberal-institutionalist 
perspectives (Roloff 1998). 
To begin with, an agreement among scholars of interregionalism still 
has not been reached on who the main actors in interregionalism are and 
whether the state (and institutions led by states) continues to be one of the 
main actors. This argument relates directly to the IPE theoretical discussion 
over the nature of the actor. Many define regionalism as cooperation within 
regions, while others consider regionalism to mean 'subregional cooperation 
created from below, not by states or supranational actors' (Lahteenmaki and 
Kakonen 1999: 204). If the latter view is to be taken as true, neorealism, and to 
some extent neoliberal institutionalism, would lose some of its relevance in the 
interregional debate. This is a controversial proposition and not entirely 
backed up by empirical evidence. In. the Introduction as well as in this 
Chapter, this thesis has argued the manner in which the state continues to be 
primary actors within the GPE. Likewise, Lahteenmaki and Kakonen, while 
noting the growing irrelevance of the state and the changing notion of 
sovereignty, argue that neorealism 'cannot be entirely replaced' and that 'most 
forms of regionalisation in Europe are still strongly influenced by the state' 
(1999: 221).. 
Similarly, Soderbaum and Langenhove state that states are 'certainly 
important' and 'crucial actors of interregionalism' although they have noted 
how non-state actors are often found to be involved in the process (2005: 258). 
Pedersen argues for the continued importance of the state by proposing a 
'partial theory of regionalism based upon modified realist tenets'. He explains 
that his theory of cooperative hegemony argues that the most salient points in 
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regional projects are best explained through examination of the interests and 
strategy of the biggest state (or states in the region (Pedersen 2002: 678). This 
approach in understanding regionalism makes use of not only power politics 
(derived from realism) but also provides attention to the evolving ideas and 
institutions of these states (Pedersen 2002: 695). 
The literature on interregionalism reflects the IPE theoretical debate 
over the nature of the GPE in the manner in which new regionalism is being 
defined. One of the features which distinguish new regionalism is the manner 
in which one or more small countries link up with a large country (Ethier 
1998: 1150). This clearly portrays a degree of hierarchy within the GPE, 
particularly when in new regionalism, most of the important regional 
arrangements have been proven to be one-sided with the smaller countries 
usually making more concessions (Ethier 1998: 1150-1151). Another point to 
note is how third-generation regionalism attempts to manage the anarchical 
GPE by shaping global governance and are not just aimed at optimising 
economic and political processes (Soderbaum and Langenhove 2005: 257). 
Apart from the debate on actor focus and the importance of states, a 
struggle appears to have arisen on issue areas and whether interregionalism 
is primarily focused on trade, politics, or a combination of both. This relates to 
the IPE theoretical discussion over the nature of actors' interaction within the 
GPE. Much of the literature on regionalism appears to agree that PTAs and 
their explicit focus on trade has been the most obvious product of regionalism. 
Yet, not dissimilar to the manner in which politics and economics have fused 
into the study of IPE, the two appear to have become integral partners within 
regionalism as well. This is well represented in Fishlow and Haggards' 
definition of regionalism as 'regional concentration of economic flows or 
political process characterised by economic policy cooperation and 
coordination among countries' (1992). The third wave of regionalism, for 
example, displays strong evidence of political economy, particularly when it 
implies the shaping of global governance (Soderbaum and van Langenhove 
(2005: 257) and the willingness of major global actors to mediate trade 
disputes (Mansfield and Milner (1999: 591). 
Added to the debate around politics and trade is the issue of ideas, 
vales and codes of conduct. This is linked to the IPE theoretical debate on 
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ideas versus structures. Ideational arguments, particularly in EU literature, 
note that the EC's desire to expand its global `actorness', often reflected in 
interregionalism, is part of the EC's desire to expand its normative power. This 
has been said to be empirically evident in the EC's interregional efforts with 
the Mercosur bloc (Doctor 2007), ASEM (Gilson 2002), and the ACP states. 
Ideas may have also been a prominent characteristic in new regionalism in 
the manner in which small countries are appearing to make significant 
unilateral reforms (Ethier 1998: 1151). Whether ideas have been the dominant 
force continues to be a contested issue and arguments have been made on 
either side. There is also the point of contention that if ideas were indeed the 
most important factor in the EC's interregional efforts, would it not be more 
effective for the EC to focus exclusively on global multilateral efforts rather 
than bilateral or interregional efforts. 
Tahly 3- Linking Ouestions between IPE Theories and Reuinnalism/Interrenionalism 
IPE Theories Regionalism/Interregionalism 
Nature of Actor States, institutions, agents vs. State-led or led by non-state actors? 
structures 
Nature of the Global Anarchic? Hierarchical? Varying Small countries linking up to large 
Political Economy interpretations of anarchy? countries (hierarchy), emphasis on 
shaping global governance (managing 
anarchy? ) 
Nature of Actors' Relative or absolute gains? Trade liberalisation and how to make 
Interaction within the GPE regionalism and global liberalisation 
institutions coexist. Gains between two 
partners or absolute global gains? 
Ideas versus Structures Materialism, idealism, or holism? Material interest (as reflected in security 
and trade issues) or ideas? 
These underlying debates in the conceptualisation of regionalism and 
interregionalism demonstrate the continued relevance of IPE theories and the 
discipline's areas of enquiry. The questions IPE theories ask: nature of actors, 
nature of the GPE, the interaction of actors within the GPE, and the issue of 
structure and agency are mirrored in the debates being held in regionalism. 
The following Chapter develops these ideas and debates further by examining 
the relevance of Robert Axelrod's theories of cooperation and developing a 
set of core proposals to examine cooperation and interregionalism. 
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Chapter 3 
Axelrod, Cooperation, and Interregionalism 
Traditional IPE theory, as explained in the previous Chapter, makes use of 
inclusions and exclusions on principles of cooperation to highlight some of its 
main ideas. Despite these inclusions and exclusion, the neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, and social constructivism has proven to have some extensive 
areas of overlapping ideas. Combined, these ideas provide some very 
important insights into the nature of cooperation. As noted in the previous 
chapter, material interests, institutions, and ideas are the primary factors 
which can dictate cooperation processes and outcomes. These factors 
function under the concerns of the dynamic elements of cooperation which 
include the evolutionary nature of actors, the evolutionary nature of a 
hierarchical international system, and the bilateral and multilateral modes of 
cooperation. This assumption, derived from IPE theory, makes up the 
argument that cooperation is rarely constant and prone to fluctuation. 
While Chapter 2 focused on the main factors influencing cooperation as 
well as its dynamic elements, Chapter 3 places a stronger emphasis on the 
modes of cooperation and the specific conditions which affect the partners' 
fluctuation between bilateralism and multi lateral ism. Material interests, 
institutions and ideas once again are considered as the main factors for the 
fluctuation between modes of cooperation. The primary argument in this 
Chapter is that material interests tend to be more observable in bilateral 
relationships while ideas are prominent in multilateral relationships. 
Institutions appear to exist in both modes of cooperation and play an 
important role in regulating both bilateralism and multilateralism. 
The first section of this chapter delves further into the nature of 
cooperation in an anarchic world by using Axelrod's study on patterns of 
cooperation to determine the expected pattern of behaviours under different 
circumstances. Axelrod's work is valuable in studying cooperation because 
the findings show both the standard Prisoner's dilemma and the n-player 
game, situations which allude to the bilateral and multilateral negotiation 
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process. Further studies into the evolution of cooperation also expand on how 
norms and metanorms can actually influence the cooperation process, thus 
adding an extra ideational dimension to an otherwise rational and material 
analysis. This section also draws some initial parallels between the ideas 
various IPE theories forward in condition required for cooperation and 
combines it with Axelrod's proposals. Most importantly, it poses the critical 
question of why some types of cooperation appear to be more suited to 
bilateralism while others are more suited to multilateralism. 
The second section specifically compares Axelrod's ideas on 
cooperation and compares and contrasts it to that of IPE theories. The section 
proposes that Axelrod's propositions on cooperation both confirm and add to 
the IPE theories. Most importantly, Axelrod provides some explicit ideas on 
how cooperation can proliferate, a task which this thesis argues traditional IPE 
theories have not yet fulfilled. This section goes on to list some of the 
important factors for cooperation or defection. 
The final section analyses cooperation and generates a set of 
questions and proposition to further our understanding on cooperation and 
interregionalism. A matrix set of ideas on cooperation resulting from a 
combined approach to neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism and Axelrod's 
findings on cooperation is proposed as an analytical tool means for the 
investigation of cooperation. This section also focuses on the empirical 
relevance of this research and areas which might be used as pilot studies to 
test the framework, including the EC's bilateral and multilateral relationship 
with Japan, the ROK, and China. 
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Axelrod's Understanding of Cooperation 
While IPE theory serves as an important foundation for understanding 
cooperation, the ideas provided in the individual theories can often be far from 
explicit. The previous chapter brought together the ideas proposed by 
neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and social constructivism within IPE's 
central problematic (nature of the actor, the nature of the GPE, and the 
nature of actors' interaction within the GPE) in order to gain an understanding 
of how cooperation might work in the international system. This understanding 
of cooperation based on IPE problematics is essential, but this research 
further attempts to solidify our understanding of cooperation through the use 
of Robert Axelrod's extensive research on the nature of cooperation. 
The additional use of Axelrod's ideas on cooperation provides an extra 
dimension to IPE theory because it offers a relatively objective means in 
understanding cooperation. In essence, IPE theories are subjective in nature 
due to its uses of inclusions and exclusion as well as the manner in which the 
respective theories relegate some issues to secondary importance. It is also 
important to remember that social constructivism does not make propositions, 
but provides an analytical framework which urges us to think of an actors'. 
causal and social knowledge. 
Axelrod's use of computer simulations to gain an understanding of 
cooperation avoids inclusions and exclusions, and allows for objectivity and 
explicit propositions in a manner in which IPE theories cannot achieve. 
Axelrod specifically explores the various means to understand cooperation 
through analysis of the nature of the actors (which Axelrod calls players), the 
context for cooperation, and the conditions which would lead to cooperation. 
Through Axelrod's methods, some very explicit propositions are made on 
when actors will decide to cooperate or defect. 
The following parts discuss how Axelrod's work can be used to expand 
on the proposition that bilateralism is closely linked to materialism as well as 
the manner in which multilateralism is bound to be infused with ideas. 
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Two-Player Games and Materialism in Axelrod's Evolution 
In the previous Chapter, neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism was noted 
for, among other issues, its focus on rational actors seeking material gains. 
Clearly, the pursuit of material gains has become a key focus of actors within 
the GPE and the manner in which actors attempt to achieve material gains 
dictates how cooperation evolves. This section examines Axelrod's early work 
on the Evolution of Cooperation and the strategies generated from the two- 
player game under the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario in order to see how two 
actors interact to achieve these material games. 
Axelrod's seminal work on the Evolution of Cooperation is capable of 
explaining, at a basic level, reasons two actors would cooperate with each 
other. In Axelrod's analysis of the Prisoner's Dilemma where two players6 
were engaged in a scenario where they could either cooperate or retreat, 
computer simulations indicated that reciprocity was the rule which allowed for 
most gains by the other player. In other words, the only means for maximum 
yields is for two players to cooperate with each other (1984). 
..... _ A_ mi... n- . 
1. Tliln- (Avnlrnrl 1QRJ. Q\ 
Column Player 
Row Cooperate Defect 
Player Cooperate R=3, R=3 S=O, T=5 
Reward for mutual Sucker's payoff, and 
cooperation temptation to defect 
Defect T=5, S=O P=1, P=1 
Temptation to defect and Punishment for mutual 
sucker's payoff defection 
The main focus of Axelrod's work in the two-player game, under the Prisoner's 
Dilemma, is how reciprocity is a critical factor for cooperation. It appears that 
Axelrod's most valuable contribution to the field is not in the area of game 
theory, but in the "focusing of attention on the importance of evolution in 
selecting equilibrium from multiple possibilities" (Binmore 1997). In other 
words, the conditions for cooperative play are the main focus of Axelrod's 
work, and a large portion of the findings indicate that reciprocity will 
6 In Axelrod's computer simulations, those involved in the cooperation process are referred to as 
`actors'. I 
-57- 
encourage cooperation (Hoffman 2000: 4.3). Axelrod, of course, accepts that 
there are multiple possibilities, but the Evolution of Cooperation as well as 
other subsequent research indicates that an "evolution of cooperation", or 
circumstances whereby cooperation is more widely visible than defection, is 
observable in a wide variety of circumstances, even if defection could also 
evolve in the reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma (RPD) (Hoffman 2000: 4.1). 
The first point of overlap between Axelrod's work and that of 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism is that the actors are operating 
under anarchy. Axelrod proceeds to discuss that in a world where individuals 
who pursue their own self interest without the aid of a central authority are 
analysed, cooperation can begin even with the tendency of egoists tend to 
retreat from cooperation. Under a computer simulation model, the most 
successful strategy emerging was the TIT FOR TAT strategy. The strategy 
was one where a player, faced with the choice of either cooperating or 
retreating, basically reciprocated the actions of the other player. In other 
words, the TIT FOR TAT player would begin by cooperating and continuing to 
cooperate for as long as the other player continues to cooperate. If the other 
player retreats, the TIT FOR TAT player would also retreat and continue to do 
so until the other player cooperates. 
Cooperation, Axelrod states, can only be initiated by "a cluster of 
individuals basing cooperation on reciprocity" rather than by scattered 
individuals (1984: 21). His research concluded that strategy-based reciprocity 
can thrive in a world where many different kinds of strategies are being tried 
and that cooperation based on reciprocity can be sustained (Axelrod 
1984: 21). The lack of reciprocity, on the other hand, will lead to defection. 
Success in cooperation is characterised by the avoidance of unnecessary 
conflict, provocability7 in face of uncalled for defection, forgiveness after 
responding to provocation, and clarity of behaviour. These are features clearly 
displayed in the success of the TIT FOR TAT strategy (1984: 20). 
While it is tempting to completely commit to Axelrod's KISS ("keep it 
simple, stupid) principles (1997: 5)8, the Prisoner's Dilemma can be 
Provocability is a state when actors intentionally take specific measures to retaliate against defection. $ Axelrod states that the KISS principle is vital because researcher and audience have limited cognitive 
ability. When an unexpected result shows up, Axelrod argues that it is "helpful" to be confident that 
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considered to be lacking in an increasingly socialised world and perhaps more 
representative of the neorealist and neoliberal institutional schools. In the 
Prisoner's Dilemma, two players, apparently without personality, beliefs, 
values, or norms, are developing a relationship apparently under a vacuum 
social context. The only premises for cooperation are a stated maximum gain 
in benefiting from the relationship through two types of decision: to cooperate 
or to retreat. The only proposed gains are measured in numbers, indicating 
that the players had either lost or won relative to the other player in this 
Prisoner's Dilemma. This focus on material interest and gains, to a degree, 
replicates the focus on relative gains and absolute gains in the neorealist and 
neoliberal institutionalist schools, respectively. 
Apart from the focus on anarchy and material gains, Axelrod's work on 
the two-player Prisoner's Dilemma draws comparisons to neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalist through its inherent concentration on rationality in a 
usually fixed environment. Players in the Prisoner's Dilemma bases decisions 
on rationality and assumption of rationality, conditions which are not always 
representative of the functioning of the real world. Only recent accounts of 
research on cooperation have included a world of "adaptive agents" which 
indicate that even a fully rational player needs to take into account that other 
players could be experimenting rather than optimising. In addition, Axelrod 
states that computer simulations, which involve different sets of strategies, 
offer a rich possibility for checking the effectiveness of strategic ideas in 
environments that are highly diverse (Axelrod 2000: 13). This means that in 
future research, environmental variables could be introduced to the 
cooperation simulations in order to see how rational actors would react to 
changes in the environment. 
Despite its simplicity and incomplete nature, Axelrod's Evolution of 
Cooperation theory offers an invaluable insight into reasons two players might 
be persuaded to cooperate with each other. It also offers a means to 
understand how a player might act under certain types of situation, why 
cooperation could rise or fall, and how cooperation could be promoted. 
they understand everything that went into the model. The assumptions constituting the agent-based 
model, he argues, should be simple. 
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Deriving from the given examination on two-player game in the 
Evolution of Cooperation, a number of key points can be made. First, 
reciprocity appears to be the key to a successful cooperation process with 
retaliation as a necessary alternative should cooperation break down. The 
tendency for cooperation appears to be greater because in the long run, 
defection has proven to be unrewarding (Keohane 1984, Axelrod 1984). This, 
however, does not mean that states will not defect from cooperation. Despite 
the risk of both sides losing out from mutual defection, a state in pursuit of its 
best interest would rather risk having both sides lose from the relationship 
than being the only side losing out in the relationship. 
Secondly, there are some very clear areas of overlap between 
Axelrod's findings in the Evolution of Cooperation thesis and traditional IPE 
theory with the principles of rationality and material gains. Actors are first and 
foremost, rational, and are trying to achieve the best cooperation strategy in 
order to thrive in an anarchical environment. This shows that in the two-player 
game, some of Axelrod's principles on cooperation can be very relevant to the 
assumptions made in neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. 
Thirdly, a link appears to be emerging between bilateralism and the 
pursuit of material interests. In Axelrod's two-player game, it is clear that the 
evolution of cooperation is very strongly stimulated by the desire to maximise 
gains between the two players. As mentioned in Chapter 2, neorealism 
favours bilateralism as the best means to achieve material gains as well. Even 
the most critical theorists against neorealism and neoliberalism find it difficult 
to refute the fact that materialism and individualism are major factors in 
international political economy, while the state can often remain a strong 
force. In other words, even though it is true that the world is an indisputably 
socialised place, states still play an extremely important role and vested 
interests are still an integral part of the integration process. In Ruggie's 
definition on bilateralism, where it explains that it is "premised on specific 
reciprocity, simultaneous balancing of specific quid pro quos by each party 
with every other at all times" (1992: 11), traces of the power and interest 
reminiscent in neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism theories continue to 
remain. Neoclassical theories may have failed to explain the particular 
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"construct" of actors, but appears to have done a sufficient contribution in 
explaining the status quo of the world as it is. 
Finally, it is important to note that Axelrod's computer simulations take 
place under laboratory-like conditions. In other words, the two-player games 
are not subject to outside influences and the actors are usually perfectly 
rational. The actors' only aims in these simulations is to find a strategy which 
benefits them the most, and the most important variable is whether to 
cooperation or to defect. This is hardly representative of the real world, 
although these laboratory-like conditions provide insights on cooperation 
which can be far more explicit than that of IPE theories. 
N-Player Game, Codes of Conducts, Norms, and Values in 
Axelrod's Evolution 
Quite clearly, the spirit of cooperation in the global political economy has 
become increasingly embodied in the idea of codes of conduct, norms and 
values. These factors combine to form a highly ideational factor in 
international cooperation, quite unlike the traditionally powerful material 
factors such as power and interest espoused by the rational school of thought. 
Axelrod's early work on cooperation concentrated mainly on the reiterated 
prisoner's dilemma in a two person game, a simulation which yielded results 
which are perhaps more linked to neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. 
This part points out ideational factors for cooperation which become more 
prominent in Axelrod's latter work on more complex simulations involving 
multiple players. An explanation is made to illustrate how his findings help to 
support the idea that codes of conducts, norms, and values are indispensable 
in the evolution of cooperation. Links are then made to the relevance of 
Axelrod's findings to social constructivism. 
In 1997, Axelrod extended his work on cooperation into the field of 
complex environments, where there were more actors that just the two as was 
presented in the Prisoner's Dilemma. The strategies which evolved were 
remarkably similar to TIT FOR TAT. The pattern was for cooperation to 
continue after three mutual acts of cooperation, defection when the other 
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player defects out of the blue, continuation of cooperation after the 
cooperation has been restored, cooperation when mutual cooperation has 
been restored after an exploitation, and defection after three mutual 
defections (1997: 20). In a study of cooperation in the presence of noise, 
where misunderstandings are rampant and the other players' intentions are 
often ambiguous, Axelrod found that reciprocity continues to be the most 
effective strategy, as long as it is couple with either generosity or contrition. 
Termed "Generous TIT FOR TAT" players need to learn to sometimes 
cooperate when he would usually defect while "CONTRITE TIT FOR TAT" 
learns to cooperate after the other player defects in response to one's own 
defection. Generous TIT FOR TAT is expected to be most effective when the 
population is not adapted to the existence of noise, while Contrite TIT FOR 
TAT is likely to be useful under a situation when the population is used to 
noise, since it allows players to correct its own errors and bring back mutual 
cooperation very quickly (Axelrod 1997: 38). 
Interestingly, Axelrod also found that in a quarter of his simulations 
under a complex environment, the median rule (where the strategy was to 
randomly cooperate or defect) managed to gain more effectiveness than TIT 
FOR TAT. In the. simulations, the player populations managed to devise a 
strategy which exploited one of the other eight representatives while achieving 
less cooperation with two other representatives. In other words, the player 
managed to 'free-ride' on other cooperative players without getting singled out 
as a defector. The net effect, Axelrod explains, is a gain in effectiveness. To 
do this, however, the player needed to be able to identify another player 
based upon only the behaviour another player shows. The players following 
this strategy must also be able to adjust its own behaviour to take advantage 
of another player which appears vulnerable to exploitation. Finally, this 
strategy needs to be able to exploit discriminately without "getting into too 
much trouble with the other representatives" (Axelrod 1997: 21). In summary, 
the, only way to possibly beat the TIT FOR TAT strategy in a complex 
environment is to stop being "nice", which means that the most highly effective 
rule is to always defect on the very first move and sometimes, the second 
move as well. The highly effective rule also had to learn to "apologise" to other 
representatives in order to get mutual cooperation and to have a response 
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which allowed them to exploit an exploitable representative (Axelrod 1997: 21). 
This scenario shows a possible way for a unitary actor to take advantage of 
the global political economic system, although the difficulties in doing so are 
clearly detailed. 
Axelrod's studies in cooperation through computer simulations appear 
to embed several of the ideas observable in IPE theory, particularly that 
concerning a generalised principle of conduct, rules and principles. Ruggie 
states that a feature which makes regimes multilateral in form, beyond 
quantitative factors, is the fact that the regimes roughly reflect the proper 
generalised principles of conduct. In multilateral trade regimes, for example, 
MFN treatment has rules on reciprocity in tariff reductions, application of 
safeguards, and collectively sanctioned procedures (Ruggie 1992: 13). He 
goes on to argue later that "system of states is embedded in a society of 
states which includes sets of values, rules, and institutions that are commonly 
accepted by states and which makes it possible for the system of states to 
function" (1998: 11). Keohane's early work on liberal institutionalism stated 
that states were constrained from fully pursuing their own vested interests 
because of the formation of institutionalised arrangements which contain their 
own set of rules and principles (1984: 67). Wendt adds a further dimension to 
this by stating that interests are largely constituted by ideas and that social 
systems are also structured by the distribution of knowledge (1999: 189). He 
also argues that the structure of the contemporary international system 
"contains a lot of culture" and that culture is deeply embedded in how both 
statesmen and scholars understand the nature of international politics (Wendt 
1999: 190). 
It is particularly in the area of promotion of cooperation that Axelrod 
touches on values and ideas. According to Axelrod, promotion of cooperation 
can occur by ensuring that continued contact with both players will continue, 
changing the payoffs, teaching people to care about each other, teach 
reciprocity, and improve recognition abilities (1984). Axelrod points out that 
the role of social structure in supporting cooperation based upon reputations 
(whom informs whom of what), when social structure is favourable, means 
that cooperation based on reputation can be sustained even when two players 
may never meet again (2000: 19). In his earlier work as well as later analysis, 
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Axelrod also indicates that cooperation can be sustained when the "shadow of 
future" is considerable, meaning that two players would be more conducive to 
cooperation when they feel that they might meet again in the future (1994, 
2001a). A notable piece on Evolution of Cooperation without Reciprocity also 
revealed that cooperation can arise when agents donate to others who are 
sufficiently similar to themselves in some arbitrary characteristic. This "tag 
based donation", based on markings display, or other observable traits, can 
lead to emergence of cooperation among agents with only rudimentary ability 
to detect environmental signals and no memory of past encounters (Axelrod, 
Cohen, and Riolo 2001: 441-443). This piece clearly indicates that 
cooperation could also take place without reciprocity when one player 
sufficiently "believes" in another player enough to cooperate with him. 
At this point, it is rather clear that it is in an actor's best interest to 
cooperate. It is, however, not merely an issue of power and interest which 
persuades two actors to cooperate with each other. Even under simple 
concepts such as the two-player Prisoner's Dilemma, issues such as 
reputation, player characteristics, and trust (Axelrod 2001: 7-8) indicate that 
some generalised principle of conduct takes place. Apparently, even when 
actors are involved in a two-player game, they can also be confined to the 
system of generalised principles of conduct which is inherent in multilateral 
cooperation and institutions. It is important to note, however, that a 
generalised principle of conduct does not add up to construction of values and 
norms. In the case of two-player games, a code of conduct could be 
considered to be based largely on material values and common sense. In 
other words, the most principle code of conduct is for a player to cooperate or 
to risk being punished for defection and losing out in the net gains of a 
bilateral relationship. 
Given that there exists a "system of generalised principles of conduct", 
Axelrod's Complexity of Cooperation theory appears to add to our 
understanding of cooperation. In general, the "best strategy" is for players to 
stick to rules which would promote cooperation in a two player game. This 
includes continued cooperation while cooperation is reciprocated, defection 
immediately after another player's defection, forgiveness after cooperation 
has been restored. and forgetting when mutual cooperation has been restored 
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after an exploitation. Defection as a response to repeated defection by other 
players is also an essential rule, and once again reflects the need for 
reciprocity and provocability (Axelrod 1997: 20). 
This complexity of cooperation theory, which incorporates a n-player 
game instead of a two player game, appears to illustrate the fact that norms 
do evolve during a n-player game where players are allowed to punish 
individuals who do not cooperate. A result in one of Axelrod's findings is 
particularly indicative of how norms will dictate whether cooperation will be 
sustained in a multilateral environment. In a computer simulation, the player 
being punished for not cooperating in a n-player game would become less 
"bold" due to the punishment incurred. The player would, however, become 
bolder as soon as he/she finds out that some players forgave him/her, simply 
because those players felt that there was no direct incentive to pay the 
enforcement of punishing a defection. Eventually, punishment would become 
scarce, and the defecting player's boldness would increase again, while the 
cooperative norm would eventually collapse (Axelrod 1997: 64-65). 
Axelrod eventually found that designing a "metanorm", treating the 
failure to punish a defecting player as a defection from the society's codes of 
conduct in itself, would promote and sustain and promote cooperation 
(1997: 65). It remains to be argued whether such a metanorm already exists in 
the global political economy, but this finding in itself, reveals that the 
sustainability of cooperation is largely dependent on the norms, or as Ruggie 
similarly argues, a "generalised principle of conduct", which the global social 
system upholds. 
The ideational factors explored in this part need to be taken into 
consideration for a comprehensive analysis of cooperation in the GPE. 
Clearly, material factors such as relative gains, national interest, and power 
are not the only elements which would encourage international cooperation. 
Despite Axelrod's rational approach to the interaction of actors in the GPE, his 
findings indicate that absolute gains, identity, and efficiency consideration rate 
also rate highly in the evolution of cooperation. 
The importance of individual actors appears to become more diffused 
when an analysis on the multilateral level is made. Axelrod's n-player game 
also shows how an individual player would be powerless to stop another 
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individual player from exploiting a multilateral relationship. In such cases, it 
has been proven that only the cooperation of multiple players in mutually 
punishing a defecting player would sustain cooperation. 
, 
Some important points emerge from this discussion. First, ideational 
factors covering codes of conduct, values, and ideas are critical to 
cooperation among nations under several circumstances and are certainly 
more observable in multilateralism than in bilateralism. Findings from 
Axelrod's n-player game clearly help to accentuate the point that when 
multiple actors are involved, ideas, codes of conduct and values become 
extremely important for cooperation to take places successfully. This makes a 
multilateral relationship less prone to mutual defection than in a bilateral 
system due to its inclusion of sets of ideas, values and norms which are 
designed to sustain cooperation. 
Secondly, there are clear parallels between Axelrod's later research 
and the focus on ideas, values, and codes of conduct which are observable in 
social constructivism and, to some extent, neoliberal institutionalism. In 
Axelrod's n-player games, ideas clearly play a major role in sustaining 
cooperation and varies anywhere from collectively punishing a defector to 
multiple actors treating failure to punish defection as an act of defection in 
itself. Familiarity and trust between actors are also important to promote 
cooperation. 
Thirdly, reciprocity is still a major condition for successful cooperation, 
although its importance becomes more diffused in a multilateral cooperation 
process. The presence of ideas, values and codes of conduct appear to serve 
as the minimum requirement for cooperation and often implies reciprocity 
within itself. This also means, however, that in multilateralism, certain actors 
can get away with free-riding. It is important to note that in a GPE governed as 
much by ideas as interests, institutions and norms play a crucial role in 
governing against arbitrary defection and exploitation of the multilateral 
cooperation process. Interests also cannot be construed as "given", since 
interest means different things to different states. As such, it may not be easy 
to spot defection, although generalised principles of conduct accepted within 
the present GPE will go a long way to assess an actor's cooperativeness. 
There is also more "noise" in a multilateral relationship, and the possibility of 
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sustaining a relationship between two parties is far easier than in an n-player 
relationship where much more tolerance is expected from the players. 
Axelrod's Ideas on Cooperation and Traditional IPE Theories 
Axelrod's study of the two-player game as well as the n-player game places 
his research in the important position of having considered cooperation in both 
the bilateral and multilateral dimensions. The conclusions to his research on 
the evolution of cooperation and the complexity of cooperation also puts 
forward some important ideas on actor's pursuit of material gains against the 
importance of ideas in sustaining cooperation. Quite clearly, Axelrod's earlier 
work on the two-player game placed a stronger focus on material gains while 
the latter work on the n-player game under complex environments made some 
very significant references to ideas, values and codes of conduct. 
Axelrod's specific propositions on cooperation can be divided into four 
dimensions, all of which provide further insight into the nature of cooperation. 
The first dimension is individualist and materialist, where two actors interact in 
a reciprocal manner in order to maximise gains and somehow sustain 
cooperation at the same time. The second dimension is individualist and 
ideational, where two players interact in. a similar manner but also makes use 
of bodes of conduct, familiarity, and trust to sustain cooperation. The third 
dimension is holist and materialist, with multiple players engaging with each 
other in a complex environment to achieve material gains. In this dimension, it 
is expected that there would be much more noise, and even though reciprocity 
is expected, actors will try to find room to free ride. The fourth dimension is 
holist and ideational, where multiple players make full use of ideas to create 
and promote a culture of cooperation. 
-67- 
Tabl e 5: The Four Dimensions of Axelrod's Principles of Cooperation 
Material Ideas 
Individualist Actors interact within the Prisoner's Dilemma Principle code of conduct is to cooperate or to risk being 
" TIT for TAT implies that reciprocity is a must punished 
for cooperation to take place 'shadow of future' or familiarity and trust between actors 
" Lack of reciprocity can lead to defection can enhance the chance for cooperation 
" Less noise " Tag based donation shows that belief and trust in another 
player is enough for cooperation, even if there is no 
promise of reciprocity 
Holist Use of TIT for TAT strategy from the two a singular defecting actor will become less bold if he/she 
player game is still one of the most effective is punished for defecting 
techniques treating failure to punish defecting player as a defection 
" Complex environments are much noisier from the society's codes of conduct will promote 
than the 2 player Prisoner's Dilemma cooperation (metanorms) 
" Reciprocity is expected and still the most " cooperation of multiple actors are needed to mutually 
effective strategy, but there is more room for punish a defecting actor 
'free riders' 
Understanding these four dimensions is important because it clarifies how 
Axelrod's propositions on cooperation can be linked to bilateralism and 
multilateralism, on the one hand, and materialism and ideas, on the other 
hand. Unlike in the IPE theory discussed in Chapter 2, Axelrod does not clarify 
the 'degree' of materialism or idealism required to sustain cooperation. 
Axelrod only treats materialism and idealism as relevant as important dictators 
to the outcomes of both two-player and n-player games. This is in contrast to 
neorealism, for example, where material interests are considered to be highly 
important to the cooperation process or to social constructivism, which argues 
that ideas are most highly significant in actors' interaction with each other. 
Highly notable is how institutions appear to be irrelevant in Axelrod's analysis, 
although one might argue that multilateral institutions often have a high level 
of ideational principles embedded into its foundations. 
-68- 
Takle 6: Axelrod and IPE's Factors for Conneration 
Neorealism/ Neoliberal Social Constructivism Axelrod 
Neo- Institutionalism 
Mercantilism 
Materialism High Medium Low Relevant (dictates outcomes i 
Prisoner's Dilemma as well as variation 
of 2 player games) 
Idealism Low Medium High Relevant (dictates outcomes, particularl 
in n-player games) 
Institutions Low High Medium No mention 
Mode of Cooperation Bilateral Bilateral or Multilateral Bilateral or Multilateral Bilateral or Multilateral 
When considering the nature of actors, the nature of the GPE and the nature 
of actors' interaction within the GPE, Axelrod's research on cooperation both 
confirms and adds to the insights present in IPE theory. The actor is not only 
rational, but also possesses an ability to remember and learn from past 
interaction. This 'learning' process combined with rationalist links back to 
propositions made by neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism as well as 
social constructivism. This suggests that while actors may act rationally, they 
are dynamic in nature and their behaviour will evolve according to how they 
learn and remember. 
The nature of the GPE, in Axelrod's perspective is anarchic, but 
unhierarchical. In other words, not unlike neorealism, actors are born equal 
and free to pursue any cooperative strategy they prefer. Rules, however, do 
evolve over the course of an actor's interaction with others and this could well 
lead to hierarchy or an order of some sort. These ideas are not in 
contradiction and actually support the assumptions made on the nature of the 
GPE by IPE theories. 
Axelrod's ideas can be applied very explicitly in the treatment of nature 
of actors' interaction within the GPE. According to Axelrod's various computer 
simulations, cooperation and reciprocity are usually rewarded, and while 
absolute material gains is the main aim, sustainability of cooperation is even 
more important for an actor's survival. Hence, ideas, values, and codes of 
conduct have proven to be important factors, even in Axeirod's computer 
simulations, to sustain cooperation. This mixture of the desire for material 
gains balanced with ideas make for an interesting combination of the insights 
-69- 
on cooperation presented by the neorealist and neoliberalist school against 
the social constructivists. 
Tabl e 7: Axelrod and IP E's problematics 
Neorealism/ Neoliberal Institutionalism Social Constructivism Axelrod 
Neo-Mercantilism 
enure of Actor Focus on States, States key, but also existence of Actors based on ideas Rational with an ability to 
Equal Under societal actors working under and structures relating to remember and learn from past 
international law, and multiple channels, institutions, and agents (agents produce interaction 
rational organizations structures and structures 
produce agents) 
atture of the Anarchic, Anarchic, hierarchical Anarchy is what states Anarchic and 'noisy', 
Iobal Political hierarchical make of it unhierarchical, but with 
ronomy (according to evolving rules 
hegemonic stability) 
sture of Initiated by states, Maximise national interest - often Normative structures and Cooperation and reciprocity are 
ators' Maximise national where actors have mutual ideas shape how actors usually rewarded and defection 
teraction interest, relative interests, absolute material gains interpret and construct is punished, absolute material 
ithin the GPE material gains their social reality as well gains is usually best while 
as their identity and relative gains imply 'free-riding' 
interests and defection, ideas are 
present to sustain cooperation 
as versus Individualist and Holist and Materialist Holist and Idealist Can vary from individualist and 
tructures Materialist materialist to holist and idealist 
Cooperation or Defection -A Puzzle for IPE 
The principles of cooperation versus defection within the multilateral and 
bilateral forms of cooperation are areas of research which would yield several 
further insights into how the global political economy functions. Most of the 
theoretical work on cooperation offers the point of view that cooperation does 
take place, although specific analysis on the rise and fall of cooperation in 
various areas of policy has been ambiguous at best. There are specific rules 
for sustaining cooperation, as can be seen from Axelrod and Keohane's work 
on cooperation. Ruggie and Wendt offer suggestions on how ideas and 
institutionalism provide a means of constructing multilateral frameworks which 
would help to enhance a multilateral cooperation. Despite this knowledge, and 
a general cognition by policy-makers about the best practice for cooperation, 
inter-state relationships often go through patches of rises and falls in the level 
of cooperation. 
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Further questions are raised when one acknowledges that the evolution 
of cooperation takes place in the dimensions of bilateralism and 
multilateralism. Interestingly, bilateral cooperation can rise proportionally to 
multilateral cooperation or inverse proportionally. In other words, these two 
forms of cooperation appear to function relative to each other in the global 
political economy. Multilateral cooperation appears to encourage further 
bilateral cooperation, while multilateral defection on the part of a state could 
result in either mutual defection, or bilateral cooperation. 
Rises and falls in cooperation of such a nature appear to be a direct 
function of the materialism versus idealism debate and respective policy areas 
involved in the cooperation process. It appears that in areas where important 
national interests are at stake, materialism could be considered to be the 
more important value. Elsewhere, particularly where high politics or crucial 
economic interests are not involved, idealism could take over priority and 
nations will appear to function on a level of norms, values, and generalised 
principles of conduct instead. This would explain why two states which have 
failed to cooperate on a multilateral level can become obligated to cooperate 
on a bilateral level instead. In areas of policy where there are no conflicts, it is 
possible for multilateralism and bilateralism to mutually thrive. Likewise, in 
rare cases where two nation have conflicting interests, and have no means of 
reconciliation and negotiating the interests, the cooperation process fails 
completely and mutual defection at all levels of cooperation may take place. 
The pattern of rises and falls in cooperation is also a particularly 
interesting research area. Few relationships continue infinitely without such 
patterns which show increases and declines in a partnership's ability to 
cooperate. Here, it appears that internal and external factors affect the 
willingness to cooperate of both actors. These could range anywhere from 
evolving nation-states, fluctuations in the global political economy, to issues 
such as the inability to understand each other9. Within each of these cases, 
ideational and material factors, likewise, will affect the ability to cooperate of a 
nation-state. As a result, the multilateral and bilateral cooperation status will 
also be consequently affected, resulting in a rise or decline of cooperation. 
9 Axelrod would classify this as "signaling problems" or "noise". 
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These are all important observations on the nature of cooperation 
derived from IPE theories and Axelrod's research on cooperation. They are, 
however, scattered and ad hoc accounts of insights to cooperation and do not 
present a unified means of understanding cooperation within itself. The next 
section proposes a set of questions and propositions which combine the 
principles of IPE theory and Axelrod's understanding of cooperation to 
address the various balances, qualities, and forums within a cooperation 
process. 
Conceptual Problematics Arising from Theory and Empirical 
Framework 
As previously argued, present theories on cooperation are relatively inflexible 
due to its uses 'of inclusions and exclusions and often limited in its abilities to 
examine the forms of cooperation which exist in today's global political 
economy. While offering several pertinent insights into reasons states 
cooperate, IPE theories struggle to comprehensively explain various patterns 
of cooperation going on in the world. Ultimately, theorists on cooperation 
might best admit that some theories explain some types of cooperation better 
than others. The various types of cooperation which exist in the global political 
economy are plentiful, and so varied that in the end, they could be used to 
prove each theory as accurate. 
Before considering the problematics arising from theory to analyse the 
evolution of cooperation, one must note the core balances within this thesis. 
The first balance is between the modes of cooperation, bilateralism and 
multilateralism. The second core balance is between the pursuit of material 
interest, the pursuit of values and ideas and the mediating role of institutions. 
According to extractions of IPE theories made in this research, these are the 
two core balances which dictate the mode of cooperation, conditions for 
cooperation, codes of conduct in the relationship, and the fluctuations of 
cooperation or defection. In other words, how cooperation evolves strongly 
depends on the manner in which the actors involved choose to balance 
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between bilateralism and multilateralism (on one hand) and material interest, 
institutions and shared ideas (on the other hand). 
This research, extracting from ideas on cooperation from major IPE 
schools of thought, explores the suggestion that bilateral cooperation could be 
mostly based on materialism and can be explained, to a large extent, by the 
Prisoner's Dilemma framework. Issues such as the relative power and status 
of the states involved as well as quid pro quo (TIT for TAT) action can 
determine how well or how poorly the bilateral cooperation process develops. 
In contrast, values, ideas and codes of conduct are suggested to be more 
relevant in multilateralism where such ideational elements are expected to be 
more achievable than mutual material interest. As suggested by social 
constructivism, neoliberal institutionalism, and Axelrod's evolution of 
cooperation, this is due to clear and binding rules, collective pressure on 
inherently uncooperative states, as well as clear signs of how the accepted 
norms have developed at an international level. 
These key propositions suggest that the best scenario for bilateral 
cooperation may take place where the type of cooperation is based largely on 
material interest, and the actors involved are functioning on an individualist 
basis. This assumption is valid when one considers the factors surrounding 
the cooperative scenario. Actors which are free from the confines of an 
institution and pursuing a clear and identifiable material interest will do so, 
providing that the interests are mutual. This is an argument made by 
neorealists which is highly potent. In contrast, the best scenario for multilateral 
cooperation occurs when actors are functioning on a holist basis and are 
cooperating based on ideas, values and codes of conduct. These cooperation 
principles, based on mutually shared ideas, trust and respect for those 
involved in the partnership, are more practical in an environment where 
multiple actors are involved in an anarchic and often confusing environment. 
If the mode of 'cooperation is unclear and the actors are uncertain of 
whether to pursue material interest or values and ideas, the cooperative 
scenario can also change. When the vested interests involved are vague, or 
actors are uncertain of whether to follow the bilateral or multilateral mode of 
cooperation, chances are that the relationship is more prone to defection than 
usual. There are several reasons for proneness to defection which includes 
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the lack of clarity in the pursuit of the relationship, "noise" from exogenous 
forces, and the natural tendency of states to defect. 
This is particularly interesting, because the scenario supposes that it is 
not in the extremes of idealism versus materialism, or individualism versus 
holism that cooperation can actually suffer. Instead, a culture of cooperation is 
most at risk when the type of cooperation lacks clarity as to which mode of 
cooperation is being taken and without clear agreements of mutual material 
interests or shared ideas. In simple terms, if actors engaged in a partnership 
are unable to determine what their mutual interests are (materially or 
ideationally) or what mode of cooperation they prefer (bilateral or multilateral), 
there is a very strong chance that the cooperation process will collapse. A 
situation where an actor is functioning on its own will, but partially bound by 
the structures of a multilateral international system can and does take place. 
This is particularly evident in today's world where international organisations 
and global interregional institutions such as the UN or the WTO appear to 
enforce a multilateral structure on the way actors function, but yet have to find 
a means for enforcement of rules. This could allow some actors to, for 
example, free-ride by pursuing their vested interests and making use of the 
international political or commercial rules, while not following the rules 
themselves. 
Similar situations where material interests interfere with idealism also 
suggest trouble for the evolution of cooperation. These are exemplified by the 
infamous double-standards, a term widely used to describe both American 
and European foreign and commercial policy. This is where the distinction 
between material interest and ideas are vague, and ideas are used as an 
excuse to either pursue or defect from cooperation. Two actors, or a group of 
actors attempting to cooperate under circumstances where it is unclear 
whether the principles are that of material interest or ideational values will 
often find the temptation to defect too great. Defection in such instances could 
involve the withdrawal from cooperative means such as abortion of 
negotiations, ' retaliatory commercial measures, or referring to an external 
judicial process. 
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Figure 2: Varying degrees of cooperation according to modes and interests (darker areas in the 
box mean more cooperation) 
More Bilateralism 
Mo. 
More Materialism 
as 
This research also proposes that institutions may be responsible for 
sustaining relationships in the unlikely grey areas which fall between clear-cut 
bilateralism and multilateralism and obscurity of mutual interests. Keohane 
states that institutions are necessary, even on restrictive premises, in order to 
achieve state purposes (1984: 245). According to Ruggie, this means that 
there is "a certain indivisibility among members of a collectivity with respect to 
range of behaviour in question", and that successful multilateralism breeds 
diffuse reciprocity, meaning that all members gain "rough equivalence of 
benefits in the aggregate over time" (1992: 11). It is perhaps no surprise that 
Ruggie's qualitative assessment of multilateralism corresponds to Axelrod's 
quantitative findings, where it can be deduced that cooperation is not a zero- 
sum game, and a group of players holding a metanorm would eventually be 
able to sustain cooperation, yielding relatively high benefits to all cooperative 
players. 
It is quite clear that power, interest, values, ideas, and principles of 
conduct have become increasingly governed by institutions. Institutions 
initiated through cooperation today facilitate interstate agreements and 
provide a structure in which states can make use of in pursuit of their interests 
through cooperation. It appears that in the face of Cold War American 
hegemony, an evolution of cooperation of sorts has emerged in the existing 
-75- 
I....,, 
i 
international regimes that have created quasi-governments which facilitate 
international agreements and decentralised enforcement of agreements. In 
turn, cost of transactions has been reduced, multilateral negotiations have 
become more orderly, and there has been an increase in the symmetry and 
quality of information governments received (Keohane 1984: 244). 
The global political economy has clearly evolved to the extent that the 
pursuit of unfettered material interest is no longer viable whereas the evolution 
has not been to the extent that straightforward multilateralism can be wholly 
sustained. In such cases, the development of institutions helps to create an 
evolution of cooperation which is less than ideal, but clearly sustainable. 
Institutions help to provide some direction for the mode of cooperation, clarify 
some of the conditions for cooperation, lays down codes of conduct and 
suggest outcomes for cooperation. 
Figure 3: Level of Institutionalisation (darker areas in the box mean more cooperation) 
Level of Institutionalisation 
This research also suggests that due to the institutionalisation of relationships, 
the mode of cooperation can be mixed, which could lead to an either 
predominantly bilateral or multilateral relationship. It is in the grey areas of 
cooperation, where there is an imbalance in structure and interest that 
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Axelrod's study on cooperation also becomes invaluable. As mentioned earlier 
success in cooperation occurs through the avoidance of unnecessary conflict, 
provocability in face of uncalled for defection, forgiveness after responding to 
provocation, and clarity of behaviour. Repeated occurrences of conflict and 
eventually defections from relationships in the GPE often see ties eventually 
restored and sustained. This signals what Axelrod calls experimenting rather 
than optimising (2000: 13), and the awareness that other players in the game 
are also doing the same thing. In such situations, being "nice" appears to be 
the only way to adopt cooperation, and could serve as an explanation as to 
why cooperation can sometimes be sustained despite periods of conflict 
between actors. 
Table 8: Key Questions and Propositions to be Further Explored 
Theoretical Basis Focus Insights to IPE Theory 
Neorealism/ Material Interest Are material interests more relevant in 
Neoliberalism bilateralism? 
Social Ideas Are ideas more relevant in 
Constructivism multilateralism? 
Neoliberal Institutions Do institutions help in sustaining 
Institutionalism cooperation in either mode of 
cooperation? 
Axelrod's Evolution Rational How does cooperation evolve? How is it 
of Cooperation Choice, Ideas, sustained or revived after defection (or 
Values, Codes periods of indifference)? 
of Conduct 
In summary, the proposition made is that the rise or fall in cooperation may be 
dependent on the balance of the mode of cooperation and material interest 
versus ideas. The fate of cooperation in the partially unbalanced areas could 
rest largely on the degree of institutionalisation which may have occurred 
during the history of the partnership. Lapses in cooperation may also be 
salvaged through the actors' propensity for avoidance of unnecessary conflict, 
provocability in face of uncalled for defection, forgiveness after responding to 
provocation, and clarity of behaviour. The area where cooperation is bound to 
failure is when there is maximum ambiguity between structure and interest, 
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where it is unclear whether the relationship is following a holistic or 
individualistic structure and material or ideational interests. 
Figure 4: Determinants of Cooperation (darker areas mean suggest more cooperation) 
Bilateralism Materialism 
Multilateralism Ideas 
Level of Institutionalisation 
These initial propositions and questions raised through an eclectic approach 
to understanding cooperation also brings forward some further questions 
related to interregionalism as well. The previous Chapter explained how the 
questions IPE theory and literature on interregionalism raised concerning the 
nature of the actor, the nature of the GPE, the nature of actors' interaction and 
the importance of ideas against structures were fundamentally the same. The 
addition of Axelrod's research on the evolution of cooperation adds extra 
dimensions to how we might further explore the evolution of interregional 
cooperation. 
The first dimension Axelrod adds to our observation of interregionalism 
is that actors are rational and have an ability to learn from past interaction. 
This raises the issue of whether the actors within interregionalism actually 
care about the development of values, trust, and codes of conduct. This is a 
question rarely asked by scholars of interregionalism and answers questions 
about how trust and the development of values, trust and codes of conduct 
have helped in sustaining various forms of interregionalism would go a long 
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way into explaining the nature of the actors within interregionalism. In other 
words, if partners 'remember' past interactions, they will also be able to 
forgive certain instances of defection more easily, while cooperation is more 
easily fostered. 
A second dimension involves Axelrod's implied argument that the GPE 
is anarchic, unhierarchical, and noisy, although with evolving rules. In terms of 
economic power, states are by nature, asymmetrical and the lack of hierarchy 
in the GPE appears to be a difficult argument to take on. Yet, multilateral 
interregionalism is often conducted on the basis of equal partnerships (see 
Chapter 6), so there is an argument that interregionalism can manage 
hierarchy, reduce 'noise' and evolve rules. Once again, this needs to be 
further explored in the empirical sections. 
The third dimension Axelrod offers is the idea of reward for reciprocity 
and punishment for defection. The question raised for interregionalism is 
whether reciprocity and mutual cooperation matters. Within this process of 
reciprocity, we would also expect reciprocity in material terms to be easier to 
fulfil than in ideational terms. Hence, a question which needs to be further 
asked is whether ideas also matter in this interaction of actors within the GPE. 
The final dimension which needs to be explored under Axelrod's terms 
is very directly related to the main questions and propositions raised earlier in 
this Chapter. Axelrod makes room for the possibility that cooperation can take 
shape in the form of both 2 player games and n-player games, environments 
which emulate bilateralism and multilateralism. Axelrod also showed how 
cooperation in both the 2 player game and the n-player game is sustained 
through the same principles of reciprocity, values, trust, and codes of conduct. 
Yet, in the n-player game, which emulates multilateralism, there appears to be 
more provision for ideas than material interest (see earlier section on Axelrods 
and norms), This proposition also needs to be further explored in an empirical 
context. 
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Table 9: Axelrod and Interreeionalism 
Axelrod Interregionalism: Questions for 
Further Exploration 
Nature of Rational with an ability to remember Are rational actors affected by past 
Actor and learn from past interaction interaction and the development of 
values, trust, and codes of conduct? 
Nature of Anarchic and 'noisy', unhierarchical, but To what extent does interregionalism 
the Global with evolving rules manage hierarchy, reduce 'noise', and 
Political create rules? 
Economy 
Nature of Cooperation and reciprocity are usually Does interregionalism require 
Actors' rewarded and defection is punished, reciprocity and encourage mutual 
Interaction absolute material gains is usually best cooperation? Do ideas matter in 
within , the while relative gains imply 'free-riding' interregionalism? 
GPE and defection, ideas are present to 
sustain cooperation 
Ideas Can vary from individualist and How does the nature of interregional 
versus materialist to holist and idealist cooperation change in its bilateral and 
Structures multilateral forms? 
To further understand the questions and propositions on cooperation and 
interregionalism, namely the manner in which bilateralism and multilateralism 
as well as material interests, institutions and ideas may affect the level of 
cooperation needs to be explored under an empirical context. An empirical 
observation of these questions and propositions will provide solid grounds for 
further exploration into these preliminary concepts and is expected to yield 
further insights, including more questions and propositions. Chapter 4 justifies 
the use of the EC-East Asian interregional partnership as an empirical test for 
the key questions and propositions advanced in this Chapter. The Chapter 
first explains the EC's role as a global and interregional actor. It later 
elaborates on the uniqueness of the EC-East Asian partnership and suggests 
how this may provide further insights into cooperation. Finally, it justifies the 
triangulation and methodology used in the empirical chapters, particularly the 
combined use of evaluating the material, institutional, and ideational sides of 
the EC-East Asian cooperation process. 
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Chapter 4 
Exploring the EC's Interregional Cooperation with 
East Asia 
This Chapter sets the background for further exploration of the questions and 
propositions raised in Chapter 3 and focuses on how regionalism and 
interregionalism as seen in the EC-East Asian interregional partnership might 
be used to shed further insight into cooperation. It begins with an analysis of 
the'EC's role as a global actor and explains how the EC can indeed act as a 
unitary actor with its own set of complex policy-making procedures. 
Subsequently, the EC's motivations for regionalism and interregionalism are 
analysed. The final section ends with an explanation of the suitability of the 
EC-East Asian partnership as an empirical 'test' to further investigate 
cooperation and notes some of the unique features of the partnership which 
make the EC-East Asian partnership a particularly appropriate test. 
The EC as a Global Actor 
Introduction of interregionalism to the equation poses some important 
questions regarding the role of the EC as a global actor. Since the studies in 
this research involves analysis from the establishment of a European 
Community, it is important to note that several of the institutional 
developments mentioned in this thesis did not take effect until several years 
since the European Community's conception. This is not problematic for the 
research particularly because the evolution of the European project means 
that one could see the gradual transition in the European's external 
commercial policy form being centred mainly on the member states to a 
shared one between a largely "supranational" European Commission and a 
largely "national" European Council. It is also notable that the EC-East Asian 
relationship did not particularly take off until the middle 1960's, a period when 
the European institutions began to take shape. By the 1970's the European 
Commission had been given full competency in matters concerning the EC 
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external trade relations, meaning that it was given full powers to negotiate on 
behalf of the member states in international forums. 
The EC is considered a 'trading state' which favours establishment of 
stability conducted internally and externally through institutions and rules 
(Smith 2004). The EC's institutional arrangements have also been described 
as 'structural diplomacy' whereby the establishment of institutions and rules 
might be able to create stability and predictability in accordance with the EC's 
external aims (Keukeleire 2003). Using Michael Smith's concept of 
"negotiated order", Forster reaches some salient points in the nature of EC's 
involvement in external policies. In analysing patterns of relations with the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), part of Forster's 
conclusions stated that the EC is a "part-formed political system" with power 
and influence shared between the state governments and the community 
level. These powers are used to influence policy elsewhere, although the 
nature of external policies is conservative due to the limitation of consensus 
requirement among member state governments (2000: 789). 
Consequently, an analysis of the European Union institutions and 
policy-making for EC-East Asian relationships needs to be conducted for 
several reasons. First, an analysis of the EC's 'transgovernmentalism' needs 
to be undertaken to analyse how member-state influences might affect the 
EC's institutions and policies. This analysis will also consider how the EC 
might be considered to be a transgovernmental entity with several state-like 
features. Secondly, the analysis examines the EC's institutional capacity to 
cooperate as a coherent single voice in its external relations with East Asia as 
well as highlight the most important EC institutions in this relationship. Thirdly, 
the analysis is expected to shed further light into the multilayered nature of the 
EC and differentiate how the different layers affect the EC-East Asian 
relationship. Finally, analysis of the EC institutions provides an indication of 
how they might be better suited for the bilateral or multilateral modes of 
cooperation. It may also explore the reasons the EC might prefer to enter into 
one mode of cooperation rather than the other. 
To start the analysis, a clarification must be made on who the main 
actors in the EC might be, particularly after its constant evolution. The first 
debate is centred on whether the EC is capable of functioning as a traditional 
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state. The second debate concerns where the power lies between the 
European Council, representing mainly member state interests, and the 
European Commission, usually regarded as the guardian of "European" 
interests. The third debate relates to the second, and considers how each of 
the institutions is involved in the multilayered nature of the EC's policy-making 
mechanisms. 
Answering the first debate on how the EC functions in comparison with 
a nation-state is particularly relevant in the discussion of EC-East Asian 
relations because it guides the direction in which relations are conducted. It is 
important to note that the EC is not a state, a characteristic which complicates 
its external relations to a large degree. The characteristics which relate most 
to the discussion in hand is that the EC can be considered an international 
actor with state-like features, functioning within a multi-layered policy network 
system, and generally united in issues of external commercial policy. 
The EC is a sui generis institution with several state-like features, and 
its operation has been compared to that of a state government. Even though 
the EC has functions similar to a state, and has several institutions which 
resemble the State, it does not mean that the EC entity can always behave in 
an autonomous manner in direct pursuance of their unambiguous national 
interests. As a result, the EC's pursuit of either its material or ideational 
interests should not be regarded as a product of unnegotiated policy-making. 
To illustrate the complexities involved in EC policy-making and the possible 
impacts on policy, Collinson describes the EC as an entity with horizontal 
action between the issue-system (a three level game played between the 
national, Union, and international levels) which cuts across vertical interaction 
between different level system (the Commission and the Council developing 
policies between themselves and within their own hierarchical operating 
structure) (1999: 220). This sums up the nature of the EC rather concisely, 
also managing to capture the details of the institutional framework, national 
preferences, and the implied difficulty in reaching a coherent decision, 
characteristics which may hamper EC relations with East Asia. In addition, the 
EC, is not actually a nation-state, but rather a complex system of governance 
operating between a regional group of states (Dent 1999: 7). Taking this view, 
the EC would then be classified as a non-state actor which plays an important 
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role in the global political economy, with affairs which include transnational 
and transgovernmental factors. 
The second debate relates to the first, and centres around the 
multilayered nature of the EC's policy-making process and the institutions 
involved. According to Wallace, the active involvement of the European 
Council in determining the overall direction of policy and the dominance of the 
Council of Ministers in consolidating cooperation takes an upper hand over 
the Commission role, and almost excludes the EP and the ECJ from 
involvement in policy directions (2000: 34). This argument has been hotly 
contested by other schools of European integration, with some arguing that 
each of the EC's main institutions has varying influence at various levels. 
Peterson and Bomberg contribute to this argument by distinguishing between 
history-making, policy-setting, and policy-shaping, and points out that the 
intergovernmental Council has more influence at the history-making level, 
while the Commission may control more of the policy process at the other two 
levels (1999: 6-9). In other words, the Council may have the final say in major 
decisions, but the Commission is undeniably significant as the institute which 
shapes and forms policy proposals. A satisfactory judgement of this very 
complex debate seems to be that one institution is often more powerful than 
the other, depending on the policy area and the interests involved. 
As concerns the EC-East Asia bilateral relationship, it is noteworthy 
how the history-making level has very little importance or relevance as a direct 
factor affecting the relationship, This effectively places the usually highly 
influential Council, representing national interest, to the background of the EC- 
East Asian partnership. It also means that in the area of external trade, the 
Commission appears to have more control over policies than other institutions 
making the Commission a very strong player in EC-East Asian relations. This 
is reflected in the manner in which the EC's strategies with East Asia are 
dictated through strategies and framework agreements as well as 
communication produced by the Commission. Throughout the history of the 
EC-East Asia bilateral relationship, it is also clear that the EC member states 
appeared to have created a habit of interaction which gives the Commission 
the primary role in dealing with the EC (see Chapter 4). Although the role of 
-84- 
the Commission is highly active in this relationship, it is important to 
remember that the decisions eventually need to be agreed by the Council. 
History-making decisions, however, have an arguably significant but 
indirect effect on the EC-East Asia relationship in events such as the creation 
of the single market or even enlargement. These history-making decisions 
caused some very serious changes within the institutional setup of the EC and 
eventually caused ripple effects on the EC-East Asia relationship. The 
Maastricht Treaty, for example, clearly showed how a coherently functioning 
EC could increase its effectiveness in international trade negotiations. The 
single market programme promoted policy collaboration among member 
government and increased the EC's effectiveness in international trade 
negotiations. The programme has also allowed third country firms to benefit 
from regulatory approximation and the application of the EC's mutual 
recognition principle (Young and Wallace 2000: 109). This will be discussed in 
further detail in the next section. 
The third debate relates to the second and first, and considers how 
each of the institutions is involved in and affected by the multilayered nature of 
the EC's policy-making procedures. Limitations to the Commission's 
competency can sometimes be a problem, and sometimes can plague the 
EC's ability to act with credibility and coherency in the EC-East Asian relations 
framework. While Articles 133 and 228 gives the Commission exclusive 
competency in matters concerning external commercial relations as well as 
grants the Commission with rights to talk to external partners on matters 
concerning trade, it is still restricted by the fact that they will have to negotiate 
in accordance with the Council's national positions and that states still 
exercise informal veto rights at the negotiation mandates and ratifications 
stages (Woolcock 2000, Meunier and Nicolaidis 2000: 331). 
There are concerns that this problem of mixed competencies, exclusive 
versus shared competency, will take away the EC's ability to speak with one 
voice as well as cause uncertainty and undermine the EC's credibility in global 
negotiations (Smith 2001: 792, Meunier and Nicolaidis 2000: 343). It could also 
affect the nature of the international political economy itself, as "fragmented 
actors" are believed to be less likely of producing packages of linked deals 
and are more likely to be protectionist in nature (Meunier and Nicolaidis 
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2000: 331). This appears to have been reflected in the EC's relationship with 
East Asia, and its conduct of arguably protectionist trade measures. Yet, one 
could view the institutional struggles and the wrangling between national 
governments as similar in nature to the US executive and legislative 
branches, and between the federal and state governments (Jackson 
1995: 323). From this perspective, one could perhaps argue that the 
incoherence and uncertainties in the EC-East Asian framework presented by 
the institutional complexities are not different from any commercial power with 
such vast resources and that the resulting problems are expected. In sharp 
contrast, there is also evidence that in the EC's past relationships with East- 
Asia, member states appear to have been rather willing to give the 
Commission a relatively free reign to negotiate on their behalf resulting in a 
very strong negotiating position as well as an increased capacity for stable 
cooperation. 
Although one might expect the European Commission to act on behalf 
of Europe rather than the individual member states the officials represent, this 
is not always necessarily the case. According to the neoliberal thesis even 
where state centric negotiations determine actual outcomes, 
transgovernmental coalitions may evolve between like-minded officials whose 
own self-serving interests many not necessarily be aligned to the state they 
are supposed to represent (Dent 1999: 7). Commission officials are a case in 
point. Comments have also been made indicating that the Commission has 
multiple accountabilities, and essentially, officials entering the Commission will 
still be nationals of a member state and bought up in an educational, 
administrative, and political system which is fundamentally national in 
direction (Christiansen 1997: 82). Indeed, the cabinets, or the Commissioner's 
private offices, have long been accused of representing the interest of their 
respective nations, especially the nation of the incumbent Commissioner 
(Peterson 2002: 87) In similar vein, national courts continue to have a close 
involvement in the development of Community law (Peterson and Shackleton 
2002: 360). One does not argue that either the Commission or the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) is not committed towards tighter integration, but the fact 
that individual nationalities have so much to do in the makeup of the 
institutions illustrates how national sovereignty is far from reduced. 
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Also, the growth in both the number and scope of international 
organisations, together with the new interlinkages created by globalisation, 
have widened the nature of of transnational relations and introduced greater 
complexity to the governance of international economic relations. The 
implication of this is that although the EC might claim not to have national 
positions and given the power of transgovernmentalism within the EC, it is 
inevitable that in its relationship with East Asia, national positions and 
preferences can be inherent in its negotiating position. 
There are. several issues to note in the EC-East-Asian relationship 
stemming from the three debates when mentioning the EC as a single 
collective body rather than a set of member states. First, the EC is 
transgovernmental in nature, meaning that it does not have unambiguous 
national interest which it is continually attempting to pursue. Instead, member- 
state interests are usually compiled by the Commission and presented as 
policy under the approval of the Council. The EC's collective agenda can thus 
be often fragmented and interests are diversified between each of the 
member-states. This is a poor basis for the pursuit of national interest, which 
is an assumption under the neorealist school, and could also mean that the 
EC's capacity to cooperate could be considered to be hampered in certain 
issues. Secondly and in contrast to the first point, the fact that the EC's 
common interest in commercial policy is guided mainly by the Commission 
has led to relatively coherent policies in this area, reflecting a desire to 
correlate and cooperate with other nations in economic matters. This also 
amplifies the fact that the EC's capacity to cooperate on economic issues, 
especially where high stakes are involved, are higher than political and 
security issues. Thirdly, the multilayered nature of the EC's policy-making 
mechanisms has actually made the Commission the most important actor in 
EC-East Asian bilateral relationships. History-making decisions are usually 
irrelevant as a direct factor in this partnership, a situation which sidelines the 
Council and its national position. Similarly, this has strengthened the 
Commission's capacity to make decisions on behalf of the EC, as well as its 
capacity to cooperate with the East Asians. As discussed earlier, however, the 
EC's history-making decisions such as the establishment of the Common 
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Commercial Policy, creation of a single market, and enlargement do have an 
indirect effect on the EC-East Asia partnership. 
The EC as an Interregional Actor 
The EC has indeed been prolific as a global actor and this has expanded to its 
activeness in proliferating regionalism and interregionalism. One of the 
clearest reflections of the EC's actorness has been its pursuit of regional and 
interregional partnerships which include attempts to speak with a single voice 
in multilateral for a such as the WTO, its neighbourhood policy and its ties with 
the developing world as well as unified strategies in creating global regimes 
(Langenhove and Costea 2005: 12). In similar fashion, the EU is able to reach 
agreements with other states (bilateralism), act within the UN and WTO 
framework (multilateralism) and also engage in constructing interregionalism 
(Soderbaum et al. 2005: 379). The EC has completed negotiations for PTAs 
with South Africa, Mexico, Chile, Croatia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) and a selection of Mediterranean partners. The EC is 
also currently in negotiations with Mercosur, Syria, India, the ROK, and the 
Gulf Cooperation Council Countries (Lamy 2002, Doctor 2007)10. 
This thesis expands on the EC's role as an interregional actor in East 
Asia and examines the EC's bilateral (with Japan, the ROK and China) and 
multilateral (ASEM) interregional partnerships. This exploration of the EC's 
bilateral and multilateral ties is expected to reveal further insights into the 
nature of interregional cooperation. An examination of the EC's motivations 
and rationale for being an interregional actor is an important foundation for 
this research because it assists us in understanding the EC's strategy 
formation and the rationale behind it. 
The previous section noted the manner in which the EC can act as a 
unitary global actor with complex policy-making processes, particularly in 
issues of trade in which the Commission has obtained full competency. A 
significant portion of the EC's characteristic as a global actor is inevitably 
reflected in and transferred to the manner in which it handles itself in its 
10 http: //ec. europa. eu/trade/issues/bilateral/index_en. htrn 
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interregional partnerships. In other words, we can expect the EC to be able to 
act as a unitary actor and in cases of bilateral partnerships, the EC would be 
considered one side of the partnership in itself. We can also expect the 
Commission and its focus on guarding European (not national) interests to 
lead the EC's decision-making process, although this would be conducted in a 
multilayered environment and national positions could sometimes be 
represented in the Commission's negotiating positions. 
Arguments have been made that interregional efforts are influenced by 
a complex set of factors, although economics continues to play one of the 
most important roles and are reflected in the contents of preferential 
agreements (Tharakan 2002: 1396). Current literature on regionalism shows 
that a variety of theoretical approaches ranging from realism to liberal 
institutionalism and social constructivism are useful in explaining EU 
interregionalism (Soderbaum et al. 2005: 368). The explanations for the EU's 
interregional efforts include the EU's desire to promote liberal internationalism, 
to build the EU's identity as a global actor and to promote the EU's power and 
competitiveness (Soderbaum et al. 2005: 368-377). 
An argument is made by Alecu de Fleurs and Regelsberger who noted 
that the EU's interregional policy relations are explained through a 
combination of its 'Eurocentric approach' as well as the EU's desire to 
counterbalance the American's influence in Latin America (2005), a strategy 
which combines institutional as well as neorealist roots. Making similar use of 
a number of traditions in international relations and comparative literature, 
Aggarwal and Fogarty put forward four hypotheses concerning the origins of 
EU interregional trade strategies. They argue that EU trade strategies are 
determined by the influence of specific interest groups within Europe, by 
bureaucratic attempts to maximise influence in the European policy-making 
arena, by international systemic constraints and opportunities, and by the 
need to forge a common European identity (Aggarwal and Fogarty 2004: 6- 
16). 
These eclectic explanations are by no means the only description of 
the - EC's motivations for interregionalism. In an assessment of the EU's 
interregional policy towards Africa, Farrell argues that the underlying EU 
motivation is in forwarding goals of economic liberalisation' rather than 
-89- 
democratisation, and proclaims the possibility of 'a triumph of realism over 
idealism' (2005: 263). With Mercosur, for example, the EU has been found to 
provide support for institution-building and region-building in its attempt to 
increase the EU's legitimacy and its role as a global actor through political 
dialogue, cooperation, and trade (Santander 2005). 
The idea that the EU is actively pursuing interregionalism has also 
been proposed by other scholars who explain that the EU's foreign policy 
strategy in promoting interregionalism could act as an alternative model of 
world order to the unipolar Pax Americana (Hettne 2001). A similar idea 
concerning institution-building and region-building to enhance the EU's 
influence as a global actor has also been evident in the creation of ASEM 
(Forster 2000: 796). Gilson takes on a social constructivist stance and sees 
ASEM as embedded with 'Western' norms and contends that the EU has 
utilised interregionalism as a means to manage economic and political 
relations with a region the EU is increasingly distant and unfamiliar to (2005: 
326). 
These popular explanations to the EC's interregionalism efforts 
demonstrate a mix of motivations which are once again suitable for 
explanation by mainstream IPE theories. The material desire to maximise the 
EC's economic power and influence, for example, could be explained by 
neorealism and neomercantilism, while the desire to promote liberal 
internationalism reflects the ideas of neoliberal institutionalism. Social 
constructivism would explain the EC's desire to create a common European 
identity, particularly through the promotion of European ideas, norms, and 
codes of conduct. The issues of material interest, institutions, and ideas are 
explored in greater detail throughout this thesis. 
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East Asia's Bilateral and Multilateral Partnership with the EC 
The primary methodological purpose of the bilateral and multilateral empirical 
cases presented in the next two chapters is to provide an initial understanding 
into the key elements of the relationships, specifically from an EC point of 
view, in order to provide further insights to cooperation. It does not attempt to 
provide detailed accounts into the history of the EC and the East Asian 
partnership but instead predominantly focuses on endogenous and 
exogenous effects on the relationship, the major fluctuations in cooperation 
throughout the partnership's history, and the pattern for interaction and 
cooperation in the partnership. It is also important to note that this is not a 
sweeping comprehensive study of every single East Asian state. The East 
Asian states chosen for this study were picked according to their economic 
significance in East Asia as well as their varying levels of political economic 
development, their continuous interaction with the EC, and their reputation as 
protectionist states. The final part of this section notes how the 'uniqueness' of 
the EC-East Asian partnership may generate atypical findings which generate 
further insights for the analysis of cooperation. 
In order to provide answers to the key questions and propositions 
proposed in Chapter 3 as well as the critical issues of material interest, 
institutions, and ideas in the evolution of cooperation, this research project 
first' analyses the bilateral relationships by undertaking a series of empirical 
studies in Chapter 5 of how the European Union (EC) appears to react in its 
bilateral relationship with three East Asian countries; Japan, the Republic of 
Korea (ROK), and China. The choice of these three is deliberate and is also a 
direct indication that this research does not attempt to make a comprehensive 
review of every single existing East Asian state. A comprehensive review of all 
East Asian states would be controversial in itself, mainly because current 
definitions of East Asia span anywhere from merely Japan, China and the 
ROK to coverage of the Asian region eastwards from the ten Southeast Asian 
states. 
Japan, the ROK and China were chosen for case studies as a test of 
the analytical framework for three main reasons. First, the states are 
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considered to be among the most powerful economic actors in East Asia and 
are at different levels of economic and political development". This makes the 
study of the EC's relationship with the three states very important since there 
is a possibility of the cooperation process being affected by the varied stages 
of political and/or economic development. If there are differences in the 
cooperation consequences, the different levels of political economic 
development in the East Asian states could be the cause of such 
consequences. This also helps in detecting whether the EC has shifted 
strategies from one state or another by learning from past mistakes or from 
evolving their understanding of how cooperation may work. This insight is also 
expected to yield different points of interest for the analysis of material 
interest, ideas, and institutions. 
The second reason these East Asian states have been chosen is 
because each of them have historically had a long and well documented 
period of constant interaction with the Europeans (Shambaugh 1996, Gilson 
2000, Kapur 1986). This is important for the research since the tests span 
from the beginning of the EC's (European Community) conception to the 
present date and 'measure' acts of cooperation or defection throughout 
different periods. Having three well documented historical accounts allows 
direct comparisons throughout the European's relationship with the East Asian 
states. Equally importantly, one can also determine how exogenous factors 
may have affected the evolution of cooperation as well as the balance 
between material interest, ideas and institutions. 
Thirdly, Japan, the ROK and China are considered, at one time or 
another, to be strongly protectionist states with centrally planned economies 
and trade policies which are relatively aggressively export-oriented (Dent 
1996). This kind of behaviour is expected to prompt a reaction from the EC, 
which would respond to any sign of unfair trading policies through the 
generation of various policies, strategies, or statements. These responses are 
expected to vary according to the historical period, but there is a wealth of 
records on how the EC has decided to react to notions of unfair trade which 
" Total GDP figures indicate that in 2005, Japan, China and the ROK ranked 2"d, 4`h and 11`x' in the 
world respectively. In Asia, they ranked 151,2"a and 3rd, respectively (World Development Indicators 
database, World Bank, 1 July 2006). 
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would usually be considered a strong sign of defection from rules and 
multilateral norms. Depending on the EC's action and reaction to states with 
strong protectionist tendencies, one could determine how the process of 
cooperation has evolved over time. Equally importantly is the manner in which 
one could analyse the EC's reaction and approaches to cooperation to states 
which may have decreased their protectionist tendencies over the years vis a 
vis states which have not had much improvement in the area. 
In order to gain a parallel insight to the multilateral dimension of the 
EC's relationship with Japan, the ROK and China, the EC's relationship with 
East Asia is analysed under the ASEM framework in Chapter 6. Chapter 5 
explores, on the one hand, the EC's attempt to multilateralise the relations, 
while on the other hand, extending the multilateral framework in which the EC 
is know to favour in its relationships. In these chapters, the coverage 
inevitably extends from Japan, the ROK and China to the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), whose membership was indispensable to 
the establishment of the framework (Krenzler 2002: 2, Forster 2000: 795),. This 
additional coverage of ASEAN is essential to the understanding of the 
multilateral framework, but once again, should not be understood as an 
attempt to cover every single East Asian nation. This analysis of the 
multilateral partnership is focused primarily on EC approaches to cooperation, 
and predominantly views how the EC has attempted to use multilateralism as 
a way of handling issues. Understanding how the ASEAN states have fared in 
the multilateral cooperation process as a result of the EC's attempt to 
multilateralise the relationship in which ASEAN states have been an important 
part of, in comparison to Japan, the ROK, and China, is important to 
understanding ASEM as a multilateral framework. In other words, taking 
notice of ASEAN's critical membership and how cooperation between the EC 
and the ASEAN members have fluctuated within the ASEM context is a 
foundation to understanding how cooperation works within ASEM. In addition 
to this, ASEAN has been considered as holding a key role in any attempts on 
Asian integration (Helsinki 2000: 191). Any research into ASEM which 
excludes ASEAN would simply be incomplete. 
While the significance of ASEAN within the ASEM multilateral 
framework cannot be discounted, Japan, the ROK and China are expected to 
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be major players due to their economic size and potential. This provides a 
continuous and necessary parallel analysis with the bilateral studies and 
serves to further our understanding of the possible shifts between bilateralism 
and multilateralism occurring within the evolution of cooperation. Another 
issue raised in these chapters is how the evolution of EC-East Asian 
multilateralism may have been a response to exogenous forces such as the 
rise of the Asian economy in the 90s, as well as the creation of the Asia- 
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). 
It is also a fair point to argue that in today's complex GPE, the 
distinction between bilateralism and multilateralism presented in chapters 4 
and 5 may be considered to be an artificial dichotomy. Within the GPE, lines 
between bilateralism and multilateralism have become increasingly blurred, 
and the two modes of cooperation continually overlap each other (Smith 
2004). In this thesis, however, this arguably artificial distinction is introduced 
as a control mechanism in order to extract as many characteristics of each 
mode of cooperation as possible. Not unlike the parsimonious nature of IPE 
literature from various schools of thought, it is sometimes useful to draw a 
very distinct line between bilateralism and multilateralism so that each can be 
analysed in more detail without confusing one for another. 
Chapters 5 and 6 provide an empirical examination for the EC-East 
Asian bilateral and multilateral partnership and are focused on a critical and 
conceptual focus. The chapters draw on the key elements of trade, 
institutional development and dialogue intensification and the EC's strategic 
documents for East Asia to test the questions and propositions made in the 
thesis. These key elements have been chosen specifically because they are 
considered to be the core elements affecting the fluctuation of cooperation 
between the EC and East Asia. Consequently, these three key elements 
serve as suitable `tests' to isolate the material, institutional, and ideational 
influences within the EC-East Asian bilateral and multilateral partnerships. 
Firstly, trade issues have been the core of EC-East Asian cooperation, 
and this thesis takes the view that issues of trade are directly linked to the 
material side of cooperation. The issues of trade deficits, in particular, are 
traditionally considered to be very dear to national interest and have prompted 
very vivid examples of both cooperation and defection. Throughout the history 
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of interaction between the EC and East Asia, there have been several 
occasions when the inability to resolve trade deficits led to direct retaliatory 
trade measures. Chapters 4 and 5 take into account trade statistics and 
analyse aggregate trade, trade deficits, and various trade data dynamics in 
order to see whether the material interest found in trade have any relations 
with the rise and fall in the evolution of cooperation. 
Secondly, the institutional development and dialogue intensification 
found in both the bilateral and multilateral cooperation process is tested in 
chapters 4 and 5. It is important to note that institutional development exists 
both internally and externally to the EC-East Asia partnership. Internally, the 
EC has evolved and a lot of the European integration process has resulted in 
the increase of the EC's ability to cooperate with its partners, particularly in 
issues of commerce. Externally, over the years of cooperation, the EC and 
East Asians have evolved a large number of fixed meetings, agreements and 
institutional structures, both bilateral and multilateral in nature, which may 
have helped in creating a standing dialogue between the partners. There are 
numerous arguments indicating that these frequent meetings have been a 
factor in improved cooperation although other arguments indicate that the 
meetings show an emphasis of quantity over quality. Chapters 4 and 5 test 
the institutional influence in the bilateral and multilateral partnership and see 
how institutions and the growing dialogue between the EC and East Asia have 
affected cooperation. 
Thirdly, as suggested in this Chapter as well as the empirical chapters, 
values, ideas and codes of conduct are important in the analysis of the 
evolution of cooperation. The EC, in particular, is known to be an exporter of 
values and ideas through soft power, and has attempted to expand its 
influence through this means. One of the best ways to see the manner in 
which the EC does this is to make use of the EC's reputation of being a 
"paper-producing machine". In other words, the EC has produced and made 
available numerous strategy papers, framework agreements and declarations 
which are excellent indications of how the EC visualises its relationship with a 
certain, or in which direction the EC would like the cooperation process to 
head. Chapters 4 and 5 analyse these strategic documents in detail in order to 
extract values, ideas, and codes of conduct inherent in the documents and 
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see how these factors have had an effect on the evolution of cooperation. It is 
important to note that not only the content of these strategic documents 
matter, but also the timing of the issues discussed. When the strategic 
documents are produced could be an indicator of whether the strategies are a 
reaction to a certain issue, or merely to anticipate future issues in cooperation. 
It is important to note that the EC-East Asian partnership is unique and 
could generate atypical findings which may not be mirrored in the EC's 
partnership with other regions. There are at least three main reasons the EC- 
East Asian partnership could generate findings which could be considered 
unique to this specific partnership. Firstly, the predominantly economic 
partnership is not reflected, for example, in the EC's partnership with the ACP 
or Mercosur. The EC does not have particularly strong historical or colonial 
ties with East Asia, and when it did, the ties were not developed to the extent 
that the EC's colonial ties with the ACP countries were developed. The East 
Asians are also adamant that the partnership with the EC be based on equal 
partnerships, providing the EC. with little opportunity to enhance its political 
ties with East Asia. A consequence of this is that when material interests are 
considered, the analysis needs to be limited to trade and cannot expand to 
issues of security, for example. 
Secondly, although the documentation of the EC-East Asian 
partnership throughout the past five decades has been detailed, the 
partnership is still young compared to the EC's other partnerships. EC interest 
in East Asia only really grew during the Asian economic miracle and actually 
waned, to a certain extent, thereafter. EC 'strategies' with East Asia started 
emerging after the Commission gained trade competency in the 70s and only 
become more fully developed in the 90s. This means that even in issues 
relating to trade, the EC experience with East Asia is still in its learning stages 
and the strategies generated for East Asia may still be in a trial and error 
phase. 
Thirdly, the fact that the selected East Asian states are centrally 
managed and are considered to be protectionist means that the EC is bound 
to react accordingly. One of the reasons the East Asian states can afford to 
sometimes ignore liberal rules is because the EC has not always been their 
most important trading partner. In turn, the stakes are much lower for the East 
-96- 
Asian's sometimes unwillingness to follow the EC's rules. For East Asia, as 
the empirical studies will show, the American and intra-regional partnership is 
often more important. This places the EC in an unprecedented position and 
could mean atypical reactions from the EC. 
The uniqueness of the EC-East Asian partnership means that there are 
at least three core strengths in the selection of this empirical study for the 
analysis of interregional cooperation. First, the emphasis on trade issues 
between the partners means that the EC-East Asian partnership is one of the 
best empirical cases for analysis if one is to study the EC's commercial 
partnerships with the world. The equal partnership idea insisted on by the 
East Asians has forbidden the EC from venturing far into the issue of politics 
and ideas, and makes this empirical case one of the few examples where one 
can study the EC's commercial interregional engagement when commercial 
issues take on the highest priority. Secondly, the fact that the EC-East Asian 
partnership is still in its learning stages offers us the opportunity to view the 
EC's trials and errors and its attempts to refine its strategies throughout its 
engagement with East Asia. The documentation on key strategies has been 
kept in its original form, is accessible, and is available even on the Internet. 
Thirdly, the East Asian's protectionist stance and the EC's reactions to them 
can be analysed in detail through trade statistics, strategic documents, and 
secondary literature. The East Asians states being analysed in this study are 
among the few who can claim. status as economic equals to the EC 
(particularly China and Japan), but are also finding their way into an 
increasingly liberalised trading economy. The EC, in turn, would be expected 
to use exceedingly careful strategies and to carefully balance its material 
interest, institutional, and ideational motivations in a very delicate set of 
partnerships. The study of these strategies and the balance of the EC's 
motivations and interests will shed much insight into how cooperation evolves 
and is achieved, particularly by the EC. 
The strengths of this set of empirical cases means that some limitations 
can, naturally, be expected. The study of a predominantly commercial 
partnership means that material interest will usually be limited to trade 
concerns. This could potentially make it very difficult to analyse the ideational 
side of the partnership, although this thesis will argue that at least an attempt 
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at placing ideas into the partnership by the EC is still evident. The short period 
in the EC-East Asian partnership also makes historical trends and trajectories 
slightly more difficult to analyse, and arguably more superficial, than when the 
Europeans have engaged in longer periods of transactions with its partners. 
This thesis will, however, argue that trends and trajectories can be seen in the 
EC-East Asian partnership, particularly at points when the EC shifts its 
strategies towards its East Asian partners. Finally, the East Asian's 
protectionist stance has often meant that the EC's strategies towards East 
Asia can be expected to be unenthusiastic. Historically, this has been 
reflected in the manner in which the EC and Asian partnership has been 
considered to be the missing side in the global trade triangle (between the 
Europeans, the Americans, and Asia). Recently, however, China has become 
the EC's largest trading partner and the EC strategy has shifted accordingly. 
This provides for a good opportunity to examine how the EC's more 
enthusiastic partnership with China compares to the EC's less enthusiastic 
partnership with Japan and the ROK. 
Exploring Interregional Cooperation 
The next two chapters take note of the EC's role as a global actor and its 
motivations for interregionalism and set this within the context of EC-East 
Asian interregionalism. To reiterate, this empirical analysis is conducted from 
the EC's perspective on interregional cooperation, including what the EC 
wants to gain from the partnership and how it attempts to achieve these goals. 
This empirical background is designed to isolate the trends and trajectories as 
well as the material interests, institutional influences, and ideas involved within 
the EC-East Asian bilateral and multilateral interregional process. As a result, 
we would expect to find a set of answers to some of the questions and 
propositions raised in Chapter 3 and consequently, provide further insight into 
the nature of interregional cooperation. 
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Methodology and Empirical Data 
Current literature on the EC and East Asia is often produced, broadly 
speaking, through a historical perspective (see Kapur 1997, Shambaugh 
1996, Kokko 2000 for example). Other approaches rely on a singular 
theoretical perspective and derive a set of hypotheses from the theoretical 
perspective (see Gilson 2000 or Forster 2000). In a few cases, such as in 
Christopher Dent's book (1997), each individual partnership is analysed under 
each classical IPE theory (neorealism/neomercantilism, neoliberalism, and 
dependency) and it is explained how each partnership can be analysed 
differently using each of those IPE theoretical perspectives. 
As stated in Chapters 2 to 4, this thesis proposes an eclectic approach 
to understanding interregional cooperation and is designed primarily to gain 
further insight into the nature and forms of interregional cooperation. It is not 
enough to analyse the EC and East Asian bilateral and multilateral partnership 
from history alone. It is also not sufficient to apply a single theoretical 
perspective to the partnerships and try to understand the partnerships through 
the. inclusions and exclusions that the IPE and interregional literature propose. 
As a result, this thesis expands on the analysis provided in existing literature 
on EC and East Asia as well as literature on interregional cooperation by 
observing material interest, institutional influence and ideas within the 
partnerships and using the results to gain further insight into interregional 
cooperation. 
The triangulation across three types of data is designed to provide 
further insights into the questions posed by IPE and literature on 
interregionalism presented in chapters 2 and 3. In other words, through the 
combined use of both primary and secondary sources which provide data on 
trade statistics, bilateral institutionalization, and EC strategies, we expect to 
find further insights into the interregional cooperation process between the EC 
and East Asia. The triangulation of empirical data used in this thesis, 
observing the effects of trade statistics, institutional development and rhetoric 
within strategic documents, is expect to yield more than the sum of its parts. In 
other words, the eclectic approach of combining theories is expected to give 
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rise to a number of insights which may have been excluded in a more 
parsimonious approach, and the combination of types of empirical data is 
equally designed to provide a robust basis for evaluation. 
Tnhle 10: Differences between Parsimonious andCombined Annroach 
Parsimonious with inclusions and exclusions Combined 
Neorealism/ Neoliberal Social Eclectic Approach 
Neomercantilism Institutionalism Constructivism 
EC-East Relative gains in How institutions The importance of How trade, 
Asia trade shape and form ideas and a holistic institutions, and ideas 
Empirical relationship understanding of the (found in strategic 
Focus relationship documents) shape 
and form cooperation 
Areas of Power, Balance of Power, Institutions to Ideas, social Balance between 
enquiry power, relative gains, restrain unilateral constructs, material interest and 
material interests pursuit of interest, agency/structure ideas, balance 
collective gains, analysis between collective 
material interests and relative gains, 
relevance of 
institutions 
The next two empirical chapters thus draw on the eclectic theoretical 
approach and observe the EC-East Asian bilateral and multilateral 
relationships to gain a further insight into the various balances which shape 
interregional cooperation. The main trends in the EC and East Asia's bilateral 
and multilateral relationships point towards three key elements which are 
clearly important for the status of the relationships at each key stage. The first 
key element is quantitative in nature and concerns trends and trajectories in 
the volume of trade involved and the trade deficits at each given period in 
time. Trade statistics as a key element have changed over time and appear to 
have affected the nature of the relationship as well as the broader interaction 
the partners have had with each other over time. This key element is an 
important test for the material perspective of the relationship, particularly due 
to the fact that trade balances have long been a serious problem in the EC- 
East Asian relationship and have been a key reason for some of the most 
tumultuous periods in the relationship. An analysis of these trade statistics is a 
necessary test of the analytical framework because it points towards 
measurable trends in material interest which clearly have affected the 
partnership. Trade statistics suggest that trends in the bilateral relationship 
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may have changed due to changing trade volumes and trade deficits, and 
these issues appear to have been important in leading to the various key 
historical highlights in the relationship between the EC and East Asia. 
While the first key element, trade data, is expected to serve as a good 
source of information for the nature of interaction between the partners, the 
quality of the interaction cannot be ignored. The second key element, the 
institutionalisation and intensification in the dialogue are qualitative indicators 
embedded in the partnership and are perceptible from the various key 
historical highlights between the EC and East Asia. The process of bilateral 
institutionalisation and dialogue intensification portrayed in the historical 
highlights is important qualitatively because it plays a role in verifying how the 
key policymakers and those affected by certain changes in trade statistics 
have responded to losses or gains in the material relationship. It is important 
to note how the EC and its institutions have had a leading role in setting the 
agenda as well as guiding the material and ideational direction of the 
relationship. In contrast to the material interests embedded in the trade 
statistics, consideration of bilateral institutionalisation and intensification of 
dialogue is expected to additionally allow a testing and measurement of ideas, 
values, and codes of conduct needed to sustain a cooperative relationship, 
and thus to link with key aspects of the evolution of cooperation as described 
earlier in the thesis. 
The final key element, closely related to the second key element, is the 
manner in which EC strategic documents and framework agreements have 
framed and reflected an overall picture of the EC-East Asian bilateral and 
multilateral relationships. A thorough analysis of the facts and the rhetoric 
used in the key strategic documents in the relationship put out by the EC 
Commission will help to put the relationship further into context. Throughout 
the history of the EC and East Asia, the European Commission, one of the 
key players from the EC side of the partnership, has designed a number of 
strategies which are expected to shape the general mood as well as reflect 
the problems within each partnership. These key strategic documents are an 
excellent indicator of the material or ideational interest involved and the 
attempt to fulfil those interests. The documents will contain rhetoric pointing 
towards desirable idea and values, although they are expected to also 
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conspicuously contain a highly material side of the relationship embedded in 
the demands and proposed agreements. This eventually becomes a good test 
of how material interest and ideas unveil themselves through negotiations and 
agreements and become a feature in the key strategic documents. 
These three key elements are designed specifically to draw out what 
material interest, institutional developments and ideas can tell us about 
cooperation in the EC-East Asian bilateral interregional partnership. 
Combined, this approach is expected to offer some important perspectives on 
the EC-East Asian bilateral interregional partnership which have not been 
covered in current literature on EC and East Asia's evolving relationships. 
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Chapter 5 
The Evolution of Bilateral Cooperation in EC-East Asia 
Relations 
In order to further understand the nature of interregional cooperation and the 
key questions and propositions presented in Chapter 3, this research first 
analyses the evolution of bilateral cooperation between the EC and its 
Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese partners. As noted in Chapter 3, the 
problematics IPE pose and propositions about interregionalism are directly 
linked and need to be observed under an empirical focus in order to fully 
understand the nature of cooperation. Relevant themes - as pointed out in 
chapters 2-3 include the nature of actors, the nature of the global political 
economy, the nature of actors' interaction within the global political economy, 
and the importance of ideas against structures. More specifically, these IPE 
themes have been translated into the question of whether interregionalism is 
led by states, whether it is a question of hierarchy or management of anarchy, 
how interregional FTAs coexist with global liberalisation efforts and the 
importance of the balance between material interest and ideas12. 
The two major sections in this Chapter are designed as empirical 
observations to provide further answers and insights into the nature of 
cooperation and interregionalism, specifically as noted in the bilateral 
interaction between the EC and East Asia. The first section encompasses 
what might be termed a vertical approach, which evaluates the highlights in 
each of the partnerships separately, while the second section engages in a 
combined horizontal analysis of the material, institutional, and ideational 
influences within the bilateral interaction across the three EC-East Asian 
partnerships. 
In the vertical approach, tracing and analysing the bilateral interaction 
between the trading partners is important in tracing the direct interactions they 
have had in the past, rather than what could be rather indirect or implied 
interactions through multilateral forums, for example. The first section of this 
Chapter thus focuses on a relatively objective observation of key events of 
12 For further details, please see the final section of Chapter 2. 
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cooperation occurring separately in the EC-East Asian relationship and 
focuses on some key elements of this relationship. It is explained how the EC 
is continually engaged in an exercise of balancing material interest and ideas 
in its relationship with the individual East Asian states. The assessment points 
towards an unevenness in the relationship due to the fluctuation in the EC's 
gains or losses concerning commercial issues while engaged with each East 
Asian state. Notably, the EC will be noted to have treated similar cases of 
losses in material interest (such as illustrated by vast trade deficits by Japan 
and China) in different ways. 
While the assessment of the EC's bilateral interaction with East Asia 
points towards a strong focus on material interest in the EC-East Asian 
bilateral relationship, this focus is not enough to explain how certain 
relationships have resulted in a more mature and sustained cooperation 
process than others. Alongside the deepening of commercial issues, the first 
section of this Chapter will also point towards bilateral institutionalisation, 
intensification of dialogue, and the formalisation of the relationship through 
numerous important framework agreements. 
In order to determine whether the EC-East Asian partnership has taken 
on a predominantly material or ideational form, the second part of this Chapter 
attempts to explore these aspects from the bilateral side of the relationship13. 
According to the key questions and propositions on cooperation noted in 
Chapter 3, there is a possibility that a relationship will take on a cooperative 
bilateral form once the partners feel that their relationship is based on mutual 
material interest. A necessary step in performing a test on the interests 
involved in a partnership is by identifying how material interest, ideas, and 
institutional elements have emerged in key aspects of the EC-East Asian 
relationship. 
The horizontal analysis in the second section of this Chapter makes 
use of three empirical sets of data ranging from 1950 to 2005: statistics for 
trade in goods, institutional developments as seen in primary and secondary 
literature and strategic documents generated by the European Commission. 
The purpose of this triangulation of data is to observe, as objectively as 
13 A matching exercise is mirrored in Chapter 6 for the multilateral side as seen in the ASEM process. 
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possible, the material interest, institutional influences, and ideational elements 
present across all three EC-East Asian bilateral partnerships. 
Table 11: Trends and Triangulation in EC-East Asian Bilateral Cooperation 
Japan ROK China 
Vertical Analysis Exogenous and Exogenous and Exogenous and 
(Section I) endogenous effects, endogenous effects, endogenous effects, 
trends and trends and trends and 
trajectories trajectories trajectories 
Horizontal Material Interest, Institutions, and Ideas 
Analysis 
(Section II) 
Key Questions Interregionalism led by states, Question of hierarchy or management of 
and Propositions anarchy? Do interregional FTAs coexist with global liberalisation efforts? 
in IPE and Balance between material interest, institutions and Ideas? 
Interregionalism 
Trends and Trajectories 
In the ongoing story of the EC and East Asia partnership, a very clear picture 
can be captured in a snapshot of its bilateral cooperation process. This 
research marks some of the defining features of the bilateral relationship 
between the EC and its Japanese, South Korean, and Chinese partners. 
Tracing the bilateral history between the trading partners is important in 
tracing the direct interactions they have had in the past, rather than what 
could be rather indirect or implied interactions through multilateral forums, for 
example. 
This section concentrates on a relatively objective observation of 
distinguishing features of cooperation occurring in each of the EC's 
partnerships with it East Asian partners. It argues that the evolution of 
cooperation between the EC and the individual East Asian states follows three 
different patterns. To begin with, this section notes how the nature of 
cooperation between the EC and Japan progressed from one of EC defection 
towards one, of mutual cooperation. This section continues to explain how EC 
and ROK interaction from 1952 to 2005 appears to have rarely evolved 
beyond that of defection. Finally, it is argued that the EC and China interaction 
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has broadly been cooperative with very few signs of defections in their history 
of interaction. 
In the tracing of historical events, it is essential to note a number of 
areas for observation. First, a mixture of endogenous (within the evolving EC- 
East Asian relationship) and exogenous effects (occurring from the constantly 
evolving GPE) are expected to influence the history of how the bilateral EC- 
East Asian relationship evolves. Consideration of the endogenous and 
exogenous effects is necessary because of the manner in which the 
cooperation process takes place and causes as well is as affected by the 
constant evolution of the actors 
Secondly, the fluctuation of cooperation and defection is expected in 
the historical progress between the EC-East Asia bilateral partnership. Europe 
has traditionally placed less priority on its relationship with Asia, and periods 
of indifference between the two would not be surprising. Given the partners' 
relative disinterest in each other, one would also anticipate some lack of 
understanding between the two, and in extreme cases, miscommunication. 
This will result in key events in the interaction history where the partners are 
clearly acting to further enhance cooperation or, in contrast, defect. This 
Chapter attempts to analyse how the partners gradually get to know and deal 
with each other through this very act of various degrees of cooperation versus 
defection. 
Thirdly, a pattern for bilateral interaction and cooperation is expected to 
be unveiled, including how the actors talk to each other, what means for 
communication the actors use, and the motivations behind chosen policy 
choices. A number of key elements are given emphasis in the following 
sections of the Chapter to assist in discovering this pattern for interaction and 
cooperation. This includes key areas of conflict, the creation of means, tools, 
or habits for cooperation, and any underlying reasons for conflict or 
cooperation. These are areas for observation which are meant to illustrate 
where the relationships have been, what important events have taken place, 
and broadly where the relationships appear to be going. 
Once a general tracing of the history and the key elements in the 
relationship has been completed, one may be given an idea of whether 
cooperation or defection has occurred in the relationship and which conditions 
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have led to cooperation or defection. This will provide a foundation to 
subsequently analyse (in the latter section) the factors and conditions leading 
or detracting from cooperation, including a more theoretical discussion linking 
back to the questions and propositions posed by cooperation and 
interregionalism. 
EU-Japan Bilateralism: From Defection to Cooperation 
An analysis of the evolution of cooperation between the EC and East Asia 
would simply be incomplete without a case study of cooperation between the 
EC and Japan. This relationship is not only the most developed, but is also an 
excellent guideline and benchmark for the following relationships between the 
EC and East Asia which would follow. To begin with, the relationship between 
the EC and Japan has been one characterized by a multitude of conflicts, 
misunderstanding, and power plays. It is also important to note that the 
periods of uncomfortable differences are also spaced with periods of genuine 
attempts for collaboration and cooperation14. 
Two main issues plagued the early history of EC-Japan interaction. The 
first issue is the early hostility and general distrust of Japan following the end 
of World War II.. Even before the start of World War II, the relations between 
Japan and Europe were in a sharp decline. In the 1930s, Japan's colonial 
interests were increasingly perceived as a challenge to Europe's interests in 
Asia. In addition, Japan practiced aggressive trade policies such as dumping 
on textile products in European markets, regular breaches of intellectual 
property rights, and maintenance of highly protected domestic markets (Dent 
1999: 87). Japan would eventually be defeated in World War II, an event 
which strongly curtailed its military, political, and economic power, but its 
character as a protectionist trader was to continue as soon as it recovered 
during the post war era. 
The period between the 1950s to the 1970s was a testing period in the 
relationship between Europe and Japan. Japan's pre-war neomercantilist 
14 These rationales for selection of Japan as a case study are in addition to the reasons provided for 
selection of the three East Asian states set out 
in Chapter 4. 
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policies had caused significant tension between the two and its being a former 
Axis power added even more wariness into the relationship. According to 
Dent, there was little doubt that Japan's post-war "developmental state" was 
adopting neo-mercantilist policies. Japan's re-entry into the international 
community was largely the result of American encouragement, and began 
with Japan's 1952 application to the General Agreement of Trades and Tariffs. 
Despite protest from the international community, particularly vociferous ones 
from major European powers, Japan managed to gain membership to GATT 
in 1955, with a lot of encouragement and help from the US (Drifte 1986: 96). 
The European powers were quick to respond, with fourteen incumbent GATT 
members including the UK, Netherlands, France, and Belgium refusing Japan 
MFN status on its entry by invoking Article 35, allowing them to impose trade 
restrictions against Japanese imports without compensation due to "injurious" 
competition (Dent 1999: 87). 
The second issue proving problematic for EC-Japan cooperation was 
Japan's rapid economic growth and industrialisation which eventually were 
responsible for Japan large trade surplus against the EC. The 1970s saw 
Japan become a. main source of trade, aid and investment for many Asian 
countries, especially East and Southeast Asia. By 1978, Japan's aid to Asia 
overtook the US and reached 80% of the EC's aid in the region (Wilkinson 
1983: 146,151). 
This was also a period which saw the beginning of what would become 
an extremely worrying trend in trade balances for the Europeans. From a 
trade deficit of $78m in 1968, Japan's trade surplus with the EC grew to 
$309m in 1970, $1344m in 1972 and'$3615m by 1976, despite the EC's trade 
balance with the rest of the world being in surplus during most of these years 
(Dent 1998: 88). This increase was mainly in specific sectors such as radios 
and TV sets, tape recorders, electronics, ship and automobiles. The rise of 
Japanese exports to the EC in these fields was due to export restrictions by 
the US, and it has been noted that the most controversial feature of Japanese 
exports to the EC until the 1980s was on the concentration levels of the 
mentioned Japanese exports rather than the actual amount of EC trade deficit 
(Abe 1999: 2). 
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This trade imbalance was met with hostility and criticism by the 
Europeans who demanded that the Japanese open their markets. Despite 
economic stagnation in Japan in 1977 and increased international calls for the 
Japanese to stimulate domestic demand, the Japanese only paid lip service to 
Commission President Jenkins' demands for an examination of Japan-EC 
balance of payments. This led to further criticism directed at Japan by the 
European Commission, especially when the 1979-1980 rounds of oil price 
increases came about and the world economy was slowing down. During this 
period, Japanese car sales in the EC jumped by 29 percent and Japanese 
industries were doing particularly well, despite the global economic troubles 
(Gilson 2000: 24). 
By 1980, Japan had become the number one automobile manufacturer 
and exporter (Wilkinson 1983: 178). It is important to note, however, that 
during this period, Japan's overall economic growth was actually being 
marked by domestic growth rather than a growth in its exports. It is also 
important to note that Japan's share in world exports has been small during 
this period (Meynell 1982: 104). Another noteworthy analysis of Japan's 
exports during this period is that European claims that Japanese exports were 
too concentrated on sensitive industrial product lines such as textiles, steel, 
ships, cutlery, and cameras may have been unfounded after a statistical 
analysis (Meynell 1982: 106-11). Nevertheless, the most significant areas of 
growth in Japanese import penetration in the EC and North America by 1976 
to 1977 were in the areas of transport equipment and machinery (Shepherd 
1982: 132). 
Despite the early obstacles to cooperation, literature on EC-Japan 
relations point towards some genuine attempts towards cooperation, 
particularly after the mid-1980s. Misunderstanding and indifference continued 
to be a major part in EC-Japan relations until the mid 1980s, when both sides 
continued to pay more attention to the US (Abe 1999: 3), but this period in 
general would see increased cooperation and compromise as well as growing 
mutual interests between the two nations. During the early part of the 1980s, 
the Commission established a four point common policy demanding voluntary 
export restraints by the Europeans to be as uniform as possible, pushing for a 
stronger yen, requesting the removal of NTBs protecting Japanese markets, 
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and insisting on the EC's right to similar treatment given by Japan to the US 
(Dent 1999: 92). The more significant role of the Commission in economic 
diplomacy was aided by a more cordial environment of relations evolving 
between the two powers as the 1980s progressed. This included the Plaza 
accord, when the yen was revalued, more convincing and proactive efforts to 
open up markets, and concessions by the Commission. Japan was also 
becoming more interested in the EC's Single European Act and trade deficits 
began to stabilise towards the middle of the 1980s. 
In 1985, the Commission admitted that tariff and quantitative 
restrictions emanating from Japan had been reduced, although this was 
plagued by Japan's low import tendencies and feeble European efforts to 
export to Japan. In any case, the Commission did manage to successfully 
negotiate for sectoral openings, desperately needed, in the Japanese market 
(Bridges 1999: 25). During 1987 to 1990, EC exports to JP grew at an estimate 
of 25% each year and trade balance stabilised in the late 1980s (Bridges 
1999: 28). 
Abe notes that Japan's realisation of the impact of the SEM programme 
helped to improve its attitude towards the EC. The SEM would make the EC 
the biggest single market, including the automobile sector and increase 
European competitiveness in the international economy (Abe 1999: 3). In 
addition, the SEM marked the end to any possibility of success for the 
Japanese "divide and conquer" economic diplomacy. According to Dent, "the 
gradual implementation of the SEM programme from the late 1980s onwards 
not only necessitated third countries and their companies to think more in 
terms of "one Europe", but also improved the relational and structural power of 
the EC in international economic affairs (1998: 95). Fear of a more integrated 
protectionist Europe saw Japanese exports stabilise in exchange with a sharp 
rise in Japanese FDI in Europe (Dent 1998: 93, Abe 1999: 3). 
The 1980s was a period which saw increasing FDI outflows from the 
world's major economic powers, with growth in FDI overtaking that of world 
trade. During this decade, Japan's FDI grew by seven fold and much of it was 
aimed towards Europe. Bridges explains that the EC was chosen because of 
present and possible barriers to trading and straight selling as well as direct 
encouragement from the European governments themselves (1999: 35). This 
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was especially apparent in British PM Margaret Thatcher's attempt to attract 
Japanese FDI beginning in the early 1980s which would eventually see Britain 
become a net exporter of colour televisions in 1991 and of cars in 1992 
(Bridges 1999: 35). 
The improvement in relations between the EC and Japan eventually 
culminated in 1990 with the announcement of the Hague Declaration. The 
1991 Hague Declaration appears to have been conducted as much by the 
partners to recognise each other's increasing identity in international affairs as 
it was designed to solve existing problems within the relation. After intense 
and often distrustful negotiations, it was asserted that the final text included 
several verbal compromises and amounted to a summarisation of the 
numerous channels of dialogue which were already in existence (Bridges 
1999: 43). In any case, it did set out new mechanisms for the dialogue, 
elevated the EC-Japan status as legitimate political dialogue partners, and 
improved their habits of interaction (Gilson 2000: 95, Bridges 1999: 43). A year 
late, the European Council of Ministers concluded that there had been a 
"qualitative leap in political dialogue as a result of the 1991 declaration. This 
was described by Bridges as "exaggerated", but showed how a political 
dialogue was unprecedented during this time frame (1999: 43). 
During the 1990s, multilateral frameworks such as the ASEM, G7, 
OECD and the WTO were already becoming extremely relevant in EC-Japan 
relations. By the early 1990s, Japan was already familiar with the notion that 
any problems concerning market access should be left for decision in the 
GATT negotiations. Indeed, agricultural and financial market issues became 
an important part in multilateral negotiations associated with the 1986 
Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations onwards (Bridges 1999: 25). 
2001 saw the approval of a comprehensive Action Plan which provided 
the basis for a grandly named "Decade of Japan-European Cooperation". This 
action plan pursued four main objectives, including promoting peace and 
security, strengthening the economic and trade partnership, coping with global 
and societal challenges, and bringing together people and cultures. If the 
Commission statements are any indication the developments ever since have 
been positive (see detailed analysis later in this Chapter). Market access in 
the insurance sector and the asset management business has widened. The 
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Japanese Diet had passed legislation in July 2003 which removed the 
prohibition against Japanese lawyers and foreign lawyers which prevented 
foreign law firms in Japan. Competition policy had also improved, since the 
Japanese Fair Trade Commission was transferred back to the control of the 
Cabinet Office in April 2003, with progress in correspondence to request 
made by the EC in previous years. 
This brief review of the key historical highlights of the EU-Japan history 
reveals a number of important balances in the aspects of this relationship into 
light. As noted earlier in this Chapter, the key areas to focus on are the effects 
of endogenous and exogenous influences, degree of cooperation and 
defection, and patterns of interaction and means for cooperation. 
Endogenous and exogenous influences have clearly had a strong role 
in the manner in which EU-Japan bilateral history has evolved. Changes in the 
Japanese economic growth had important effects in the various stages of its 
relationship with the EC/EU. Similarly, the EC's own internal development and 
institutional evolution meant that the Europeans were increasingly better 
equipped to handle Japan's economic growth. While these endogenous 
influences took shape, exogenous factors such as post-war economic 
conditions, the Asian economic crisis, and the conception of multilateral 
economic institutions played a role which constantly required the partners to 
adopt and adjust policies and preferences accordingly. 
This tracing of the bilateral history between the EU and Japan also 
suggests that while the partners experienced a rough start, the cooperation 
process has slowly taken shape into an increasingly mature one. Defection 
scenarios plagued the initial stages of the cooperation process, up until 1968. 
Even when Japanese attempts to cooperate started to become evident 
towards the late 70s, European trade deficits urged continued hostility towards 
the Japanese. It was only in the early 1980s when the partners appear to be 
mutually adjusting policy and preferences to suit each other in the cooperation 
process. After the 90s, and despite the Asian economic crisis, the EU-Japan 
cooperation continued to remain strong and extended beyond the economic 
realm into the broader areas of global governance. 
Finally, a developed pattern of interaction and communication is 
apparent in the EU-Japan bilateral history. It appears that the shaky start and 
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strongly antagonistic beginning of the relationship has urged the partners to 
continually communicate and to develop a strong degree of trust in each 
other. As a result a useful dialogue and an institutionalized relationship have 
emerged between the EU and Japan. This is well reflected in the Hague 
Declaration of 1991 which embodies the various dialogues, codes of conduct, 
and good practice into a single declaration which continues to act as the 
bilateral framework for the EU and Japan. 
In summary, this bilateral history section has noted that exogenous and 
endogenous influences have had important effects on the relationship, both 
cooperation and defection has marked the historical progress, and a system 
of interaction and communication has been developed in the EU-Japan 
bilateral history. This understanding of the bilateral history between the EU 
and Japan serves as a necessary background to the empirical 'tests' in 
Chapter 5 where the material interest, institutional development, and ideas will 
be observed in greater detail. 
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Table 12: EC-Japan Evolution of Cooperation 
Date EC's Stance Surrounding Circumstances Outcome 
1952-1955 Defection Post war conditions, Japan attempting re- Japan successfully gains membership to GATT, several 
entry into international community amid European countries invoke Article 35, Japan weakens 
distrust from the Europeans antitrust laws and readjusts import licensing scheme 
1962-1968 Defection Rising Japanese economic significance - Japan divides and conquers, gains a surplus on trade - 
EC newly integrated - three pillars EC insists, in vain, on a common trade policy to fight 
evolving Japan 
1968-1982 Defection (with Huge European trade deficits (especially in Beginning of a system of dialogue between the EC and 
some specific sectors), European integration Japan, increased hostility from Europe towards Japan, 
cooperation from becoming stronger, Japan becoming a increasing role from European Commission, trade wars of 
the Commission) major force in the world economy 1976 and 1980 
1982- 9990 Cooperation SEM beginning to form, increased European competitiveness vis a vis the 
1985 Plaza accord, Uruguay round, era of Japanese, more Japanese trust towards the EC. 
FDI outflows Increased negotiations in multilateral forum, trade 
balance stabilised 
1990-1994 Cooperation 1992 Maastricht Treaty, Increased 1991 Hague Declaration, 1994 Commission's Towards a 
international role of both the EC and New Asia Strategy+ASEM, 
Japan, increasing involvement in 
multilateral forums, continued economic 
and political strength of the US 
1995 - Cooperation Japanese economic recovery, ASEM, - EC realised Japan's role in the world and called for 
2005 Amsterdam Treaty, "Europe and Japan: increased reinforcement of political ties with Japan, 
The Next Steps" levelling of FDI outflows and inflows, cooperation in 
Japan's structural reforms, period of intense cooperation 
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EC-ROK: A Case of Constant Defection? 
The ROK's key economic strategies appeared to be enough to make it an 
unattractive trading partner for the EC. These key economic strategies include 
the ROK's decision to strongly depend on US aid and assistance, 
centralisation of the ROK economy by its early governments, and the eventual 
creation of Chaebols. To begin with, the ROK's close ties to US resulted in 
their relative indifference from and with the Europeans. The consequence of 
these key economic strategies resulted in the ROK's concentration on heavy 
and chemical industry. It is also led to an heavily export orientated ROK 
economy and an initially slow growing ROK economy. Close ties to US 
resulted in relative indifference from the Europeans. 
The early period of the EC's relationship with ROK is particularly 
striking when one considers the indifference each had for the other. The ROK 
only became independent in 1948 and was considered to be a new nation 
which was very much an aid recipient lacking in natural resources. 1950 to 
195.3 marked the period of the Korean War and yet another setback in the 
ROK's desire to develop. The Korean War, however, did set the tone of the 
next twenty years and how the ROK would form its relationship with the 
outside world. 
The 1950s were marked with Korea's comprehensive import- 
substituting strategy, which was mainly financed by US aid shortly after a 
truce in 1953. Statistics indicate that even when the average annual GDP 
growth rate during the rest of the 1950s reached about 5 percent, Korean 
continued to be one of the least developed countries in the world (Kokko 
2002: 7). In reality, the real value of the country's manufactured exports 
actually fell by about 80 percent between 1953 and 1959. Kokko notes that 
the 'ROK's lack of success in exports indicates the role of US aid to finance 
the necessary imports of technology, machinery, intermediates, and raw 
materials during this period (2002: 7). Needless to say, the 1950s was a period 
which confirmed the strong American influence in the ROK (Preston 
2001: 205). As Dent notes, "Europe has played the Cinderella" role in assisting 
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Korea's economic development", remaining a distant third in Korea's 
economic partnerships behind both the USA and Japan (1999: 196). 
This remained a reality over the 1960s and 1970s when the ROK's role 
changed positions from major import source and export market providers, with 
the Americans taking on the former role and Japan the latter. Korea's trade 
dependency on the US and Japanese economies were such in the early 
1970s, these two main trading partners made up over 70 percent of the ROK's 
trade (Dent 1999: 196). The partnership between the ROK, the US, and Japan 
remained strong despite changing circumstances in Korea's internal 
development plans and local politics. 
The student revolution in 1960 spurred on significant political changes, 
but the 1961 military coup bringing General Park Chung Hee to power would 
determine the political economy for the ROK until its present day. 
Centralisation of economic decision-making in Hee's rule including the 
establishment of an Economic Planning Board, the nationalisation of all 
financial institutions, and the planning of a state that would be able to bring 
along drastic changes to encourage their support success (Kokko 2002: 7-8). 
The sectors targeted for exports had "priority in acquiring rationed (and often 
subsidised) credits and foreign exchange, state investment funds, preferential 
tax treatments and other supportive measures including import protection and 
entry restriction" (Chang 1993: 141). These incentives were proposed in the 
Detailed Five year Plan covering 1962 to 1966 in order to boost productivity 
and export targets as quickly as possible. At this stage, it was clear that the 
role of the state was extremely dominant and the market structure was 
oligopolistic in nature (Cherry 2001). 
It is important to note the first signs of the Chaebol resulting from the 
government's policies during this period. Chaebols, or large conglomerates, 
are considered to be "large diversified business conglomerates that typically 
operate in several import substituting as well as export oriented areas, 
generally in tough competition with other Chaebol" (Kokko 2002: 11). Findings 
from the World Bank indicated that even when Korean trade provided strong 
support to exports from the early 1960s, it was roughly neutral with respect to 
the composition of exports until the early 1970s (1993: 128, Dent 1999: 189). 
In 1973 and with the 3rd Five Year Plan (1972-76), the Korean industry saw a 
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shift away from neutral export incentives to a strong bias in preparation for a 
possible North Korean attack in the fear that US military assistance would be 
withdrawn. Steel, petrochemicals, and non-ferrous metal were chosen to 
increase the ROK's self sufficiency in raw materials, while ship-building, 
electronics, and machinery industries were chosen as the ROK's future 
technology-intensive export base. Once again, these industries were given 
priority and supported with preferential access to cheap credits, tax credits, 
accelerated depreciation allowances, tax holidays, and import protection. 
In spite of short-term effects like the appreciation of the Yen and other 
major currencies, Korean enterprises were faced with a declining export 
competitiveness beginning in the end of the 1970s. This led to questions 
concerning the ROK's strategy in copying Japan's success in government-led 
development of heavy industry, with some saying that Korea's smaller size 
may have resulted in problems of competition, capacity utilization, and 
efficiency emerging sooner than it did in Japan (Kokko 2002: 12). 
At the beginning of the 1980s, the ROK was clearly still on its course 
towards development, although the economy continued to be very heavily 
controlled by the government. The poor performance of the ROK's export 
competitiveness during the last 1970s may have been the factor in President 
Chun Doo Hawn's attempt to once against restructure the Korean economy. 
The ROK took on a far more market-oriented approach from the early 1980s, 
and the reduction of the bias in favour of heavy industry helped to spur on a 
better economic performance beginning in the mid-1980s. By the 1980s, the 
ROK's exports were dominated by new products with higher value added such 
as colour TV sets, computers, and cars. Strict productive and allocative 
efficiency guideless and budget constraints leading to the 1980s sent a signal 
to companies that import protection, subsidies, and other privileges were at 
best temporary (Chang 1993). 
This period saw the continued rise of the Korean Chaebols despite 
serious attempts to bring them under control. Accounts indicate that Chun's 
attempts to reduce the power of the Chaebols may have actually benefited 
them. Among the most important movies were Chun's policies to reduce 
business concentration by forcing the largest corporations to sell off assets 
and the promotion of small and medium sized firms. The liberalisation of 
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cer t ain sectors meant that the increasingly powerful Chaebol were able to 
seize control of those sectors at once, while efforts to reduce the 
concentration of ownership were far from effective (Moon 1994: 146-162). 
Kokko notes that the financial sector's liberalisation meant that the Chaebols 
were allowed to become even more independent from state-controlled credits 
(2002: 12). 
During this period, the ROK had become economically viable enough 
to become an interest for the EC. Korea's first agreement with the EC was in 
the area of textiles, signed in 1977, when Korea agreed to restrict its exports 
to the EC. This was most likely to be the result of Korea's emergence as a 
major exporter of labour-intensive products in accordance with the Second 
Five year Plan. This, however, would have little bearing on the future of the 
EC-ROK relationship, since the structure of the Korean industry was quickly 
moving towards higher value added exports. 
Cho (1993) indicated that the earliest trade conflicts between the EC 
and the ROK started from three main areas in ROK's practice of domestic 
policy, including intellectual property rights (IPR) protection, 
telecommunication procurement, and taxes on alcoholic beverages. The EC's 
conflict with the ROK regarding the IPE and telecommunications procurement 
regimes appear to have existed more at the multilateral level than the bilateral 
level (Dent 1999: 198). Whereas the US successfully managed to force the 
Korean government to sign a bilateral deal on telecommunications 
procurement in 1992 and 1993 after threatening the use of US 301 
provisions15, the EC had to take the dispute to the WTO in June of 1996. An 
agreement was finally reached in November (Dent 1999: 198). 
1987 marked the year when the ROK's first democratically elected 
President, Roh Tae Wooh, came to power. Although Wooh's early years as 
president saw him follow Chin's anti-Chaebol policies, the big industries were 
becoming overwhelmingly influential. A few years later, heavy pressure from 
the industry forced Wooh to change his policies. The Democratic Liberal Party 
15 The Section 301 provisions of the Trade Act of 1974 are intended to address foreign unfair trade 
practices affecting U. S. trade. Section 301 may be used to respond to violations under bilateral and 
multilateral trade agreements that deny U. S. rights under those agreements. Section 301 also may be 
used to respond to unreasonable, unjustifiable, or discriminatory foreign government practices that 
burden or restrict U. S. commerce even if those practices do not violate the explicit terms of an 
international agreement. 
- 118- 
was later established in 1990 and government policies began to change in 
favour of the Chaebols. The period of 1987 to 1994 saw the formal end of the 
ROK's military rule, an arguably superficial boom in the economy, and the 
beginning signs of a rocky trade relationship which would drag on throughout 
the next decade. 
The policies of Roh Tae Wooh's predecessor, Chun Doo Hawn, may 
have started to bear fruit during the mid 1980s when the Korean exports to the 
EC jumped to US$7377 million in 1987 from only $4656 million the previous 
year. This was due to the mentioned reduction of privileges for heavy industry 
implemented during Chun Doo Hawn's regime, which led to improved 
economic performance, higher GDP growth rates, and export growth rates 
(Kokko 2002: 12). This market-oriented approach, including measures such 
as cutting subsidies to strategic industries and liberalisation of the ROK's 
trade regime, led to drastic growth in the Korean economy and also affected 
the trade surplus between the ROK and the EC. ROK's trade surplus to the 
EC jumped to an all time high of US$2311 million in 1987 and increased to 
US$2418 million in 1988 (figures accessed from Kita. org). From 1987 to 1988, 
EC-ROK trade grew by 21.7 percent and the ROK's export to EC markets 
grew at an annual average of 26.7 percent (Dent 1999: 200). 
Similar trends towards solving problems through multilateral channels 
occurred with the ROK's liquor tax and tariff regime. European exports to the 
ROK were hampered by favourable tax rates for the Korean local liquor 
industry and the soju. This time, direct action was not taken towards the ROK, 
but when the European Commission won its GATT panel dispute in 1987 with 
Japan over its similarly discriminative liquor laws, the ROK's negotiating 
power was compromised. Even then, it took a further five years before the EC 
managed to secure an initial agreement from the ROK. This eventually 
resulted in the 1993 EC-ROK Agreement on Tariffs and Taxes, although the 
problems did not end after this period since the Korean liquor industry 
continued to be heavily dominated by the Korean soju. Despite the relative 
lack of success in solving the problem through this agreement, it is noteworthy 
that individual negotiations between the EC and the ROK did not crystallise 
into anything substantial until the indirect impact derived from the multilateral 
framework of the GATT forced the ROK to negotiate with the EC. In other 
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words, without the indirect impact of the GATT ruling over liquor laws in 
Japan, the ROK may have chosen not to cooperate at all. 
During this period of unprecedented growth in trade between the two 
partners, Korean exports were immediately hit with a number of the 
Commission's anti-dumping investigations. From 1985 to 1990, eighteen anti- 
dumping investigations were started against the EC's imports from Korea, 
including important products such as consumer electronics (Dent 1999: 199). 
This added up to a significant number of investigations, only following those 
instigated against China and Japan which had nineteen each. A further 
illustration is that in 1990,29.5 percent of the total value of the ROK's exports 
to EC markets was subject to anti-dumping duties (Dent 1999: 199). To make 
matters even more serious, the EC's frustration over intellectual property 
rights, the telecommunications procurement, and liquor industry trade issues 
led the EC to suspend the ROK's GSP privileges from 1989 to 1992. This 
effectively shifted the trade surplus in the EC's favour, with results starting to 
show in 1991 when the EC managed to gain a small surplus of US$166 
million. This was poised to increase significantly until 1997, when the Asian 
economic crisis hit the ROK hard (figures from Kita. org). 
In 1990, the Korean won was depreciated to increase exports, and 
following Wooh's policy shift in favour of Chaebols, the various nominal 
restrictions on Chaebol expansion that had been introduced during Chun Doo 
Hawn's government were lifted. This meant that new problems would arise, 
and by the mid 1990s, Korea was beginning to experience problems with 
rising labour costs, a weak banking sector, debt and financial problems of 
some Chaebols, and several political corruption scandals. In early 1997, the 
30 largest Chaebols were facing an average debt-equity ratio of over 400 
percent and a financial crisis was inevitable (The Economist, March 7 1998: 6- 
7). 
The 1997 Asian economic crisis threw what already appeared to be a 
fragile economic relationship between the two into further distress as in 1998, 
Korean imports from the EC dropped by over 50 percent to only $10,928. With 
exports continuing to grow strong, the ROK had built up its first surplus 
against the EC since 1990 with a figure of $7243 million. This would gradually 
grow to $7635 million in 2000 before it would drop later on. Despite the drop in 
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the ROK's surplus against the EC in 2000 to $4705 million, the surplus was 
still large and warranted the EC's immediate attention. In 2004, the ROK 
surplus had grown to a staggering $13643 million. 
This period also marked the beginning of the tensions which were 
arising due to the ROK's shipbuilding industry. With mounting problems in the 
areas of shipbuilding, steel, and semiconductors, the EC accused Korea of 
providing financial aid to its shipbuilding industries using International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout funds (Korea Times 23/11/98). In October 1999, 
a Commission report asserted that excess capacities in the shipbuilding 
industry developed in the ROK was causing spiralling prices in the sector. 
Although the Koreans agreed to a Commission investigation in its shipyards, 
the -Commission 
claimed that a lack of cooperation and transparency on the 
part of some companies made a full conclusion impossible (CEC 8/5/2001). 
The Commission also commented on "Korea's intransigent refusal to accept a 
credible and effective solution to the unfair pricing problem". 
When discussions failed, the European industry (CESA) put forward a 
complaint under the Trade Barriers Regulation (TBR). The TBR investigations 
starting in 2 December 2000 showed that the Korean government had granted 
substantial amounts of subsidies through methods such as exports schemes 
by the government's EXIM bank, debt forgiveness, and dept to equity swaps 
initiated by the government (CEC 8/5/2001). By May 2001, another 
Commission shipbuilding report indicated that South Korea was building on its 
lead in the sector, and the same practice of driving prices down were still 
being deployed by Korean shipbuilding companies (CEC 2001e, 2001f). On 
the 30th of September 2002, EC Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy decided 
to take Korea to the WTO over unfair shipbuilding practices as well as to 
immediately begin a temporary defensive mechanism which would protect the 
European shipbuilding sector (CEC 2001e, 2001f). The Koreans subsequently 
put in complaints against the EC on countervailing duties against dynamic 
random-access memory chips (DRAMS), temporary defence mechanisms in 
the shipbuilding sector, and shipbuilding subsidies. 
Amid the shipbuilding problems, the Framework Agreement on Trade 
and Cooperation was inauspiciously born on the 1st of April 2001 and 
continues to be in force today. The agreement strongly emphasises the 
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important of free and fair trade, especially taking note of the shipbuilding 
industry in Article 8 where both parties agreed not to "take any action to 
support their shipbuilding industry which would distort competition or allow 
their shipbuilding industry to escape from any future difficult situation" (Official 
Journal of the European Communities 3/2001). The Agreement also took note 
of the area of Agriculture and Fisheries, another sensitive area for both 
parties, and agreed to encourage cooperation in the mentioned areas. 
The EU-ROK bilateral history reveals many significant contrasts to the 
EU-Japan case. This is not unexpected, as the economic development of the 
ROK has been significantly less advanced than that of Japan's. The same is 
true about the overall size of the ROK economy. One would also expect that 
the European reaction and policy behaviour towards the ROK would be 
similarly adjusted to suit the situation. As noted in the introduction to this 
chapter, issues of exogenous versus endogenous influences, degree of 
cooperation and defection, and patterns of interaction and communication are 
key to understanding the background to the bilateral sets of history between 
the EU and East Asia. 
First, and as expected, both endogenous and exogenous influences 
have had a strong effect on the manner in which the bilateral history between 
the EU and the ROK has developed. In the EU-ROK instance, it appears that 
a very strong set of endogenous factors, particularly involving the nature of 
the ROK's economic development, have shaped the ROK's actions towards 
the EU. In the ROK's initial stages as a developing economy, a state 
controlled economy was geared very strongly towards heavy industry exports. 
The Korean government, particularly during the early 60s, focused strongly on 
ship-building, electronics, and machinery industries. This was also coupled 
with policies which facilitated the growth of Chaebols, centred on an industry 
based on technology intensive exports. Ongoing problems regarding trade 
protectionism and Europe's bilateral trade deficit with the ROK illustrated 
several times in this section are clearly a result of the structure of the ROK's 
export oriented, large conglomerate industries. 
Equally noteworthy is how the literature on EU-ROK relationship 
appears to treat European action as collective right from the 60s (Cho 1993, 
Dent 1999, Cherry 2001). This suggests that the EC member states appear to 
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have agreed to have given competency in dealing with the ROK directly to the 
European Commission very early on. An explanation for this is possibly 
because the size of the Korean economy simply led to indifference among the 
European member states, particularly during the beginning of the relationship. 
The pattern of behaviour appears to have perpetuated throughout the history 
of interaction, with the European Commission handling most of the 
relationship on behalf of the EU member states. 
The historical evidence in this section suggests that the main 
exogenous effects were the 1997 Asian economic crisis which aggravated the 
EU's bilateral trade deficit with the ROK, as well as the evolution of global 
multilateral institutions. The EU-ROK case is very unique in that almost every 
single dispute has been taken to GATT or WTO dispute settle mechanism, or 
at least indirectly influenced by it. This appears to point towards the failure of 
bilateral dialogue although this will be discussed in more detail in the following 
Chapter where contrasts to China and Japan can be made. 
The second main feature of the EU-ROK partnership follows on from 
this point, and the degree of EU-ROK cooperation appears to have been on 
the low side, often verging on defection. The early periods, until the early 
1980s, was mainly marked by indifference on both sides. When the Korean 
export-oriented economy began to take shape, it resulted in a range of 
disputes ranging from IPE, telecommunication procurement, alcoholic 
beverages taxes, and ship-building practices. Particularly because the EU- 
ROK disputes have mainly been taken to GATT or the WTO serves as proof 
that there has been little attempt to reconcile policy differences or to 
cooperate. 
The third main feature directly relates to the second, and draws on the 
historical evidence to suggest that a pattern of interaction and communication 
remained relatively underdeveloped, even at the start of the new millennium. 
A strong code of conduct or a system of dialogue as is evident in the EU- 
Japan Hague Declaration does not exist, and the EU-ROK 2001 Framework 
Agreement on Trade and Cooperation is littered with clauses emphasising the 
problems of trade between the partners such as ship-building and agriculture 
and fisheries. This underdevelopment of dialogue, codes of conduct, and trust 
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presents a puzzle for this research and is also discussed in further detail later 
in this Chapter. 
Tahle 13: EC-ROK Evolution of Cooneration 
: Date EC's Stance Surrounding Circumstances Outcome 
1960-1979 Defection Strong US influence, centralisations of the ROK's concentration on heavy and chemical 
(Indifference) ROK's economy, creation of Chaebols industry, ROK economy heavily export 
orientated, slow growth of ROK economy 
and close ties to US resulted in relative 
indifference from the Europeans 
1980-1994 Defection Rapid rise of Chaebols, bigger ROK Numerous ROK government policies 
economy, European integration favouring Chaebols, increased EC trade 
becoming stronger through SEM and deficit, several disputes taken to the GATT, 
Maastrict Treaty, rise of global suspension of ROK's GSP preferences 
multilateral institutions, formal end of (1989-92), beginning of a number of high 
ROK military rule (1987), some attempt level consultations between the partners, 
at stemming Chaebols by Roh Tae Wooh the protection of Korean Chaebols and their 
primary industries becoming a serious 
problem for the EC 
1998-present Defection Asian economic crisis, restructuring of the Numerous complaints taken from the EC to 
ROK's corporations, revival of ROK the WTO, 1996 Joint Framework 
economy Agreement, beginning of ROK's large trade 
surplus against the EC, tensions mounts 
concerning ROK's shipbuilding industry 
EC-China: A Case of Evolving Cooperation 
One of the main features which set the EC-China partnership apart the EC- 
Japan and the EC-ROK partnerships is how the EC and China were able to 
establish an early partnership devoid of the direct involvement of the 
Americans. The 1954 Geneva conference may have proven to be one of the 
major landmarks which had a positive impact on the relationship between 
China and Europe. During a period when China urgently needed a number of 
goods the Soviet Union were unable to provide, the West Europeans held a 
friendlier attitude towards the Chinese than the Americans. The positive 
attitude the Europeans appeared to offer might have been critical in improving 
subsequent commercial and political relationships. The French and British 
sincerely believed that China could possibly have a role in maintaining peace 
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and elections in Indochina. Following the Geneva conference, trade quickly 
increased between China and West European countries with West Germany, 
Britain, and France being the largest traders with China (Shambaugh 1996: 5). 
At this stage, the USA had already terminated all commercial ties with China 
after Mao's accession to power. The USA also tried to influence its Western 
allies to restrict the export the strategically sensitive products to communists 
through the Paris Co-ordinating Committee (COCOM) (Dent 1999: 129). 
The 1960s Sino-Soviet split was the next crucial period in the 
European's early relationship with China. When the Sino-Soviet relationship 
parted ways in 1960, China found itself increasingly dependent on West 
European commerce. In 1964, French President Charles de Gaulle gave 
French diplomatic recognition to China. Kapur describes a "three-pronged 
policy" whereby the Chinese under the leadership of Liu Shaoqi and Den 
Xiaoping used public relations, economic initiatives and diplomacy to improve 
its relationship with the West Europeans, particularly the members of the EEC 
(1986: 8-15). 
The years between 1971 and 1985 proved a critical time for both 
Chinese domestic reform and its interaction with the international community. 
To begin with, this marked a period when China finally became fully accepted 
by the international community and the Western blockade against China 
ended. This was also a period when Deng Xiaoping's market reforms started 
to take place, thus enabling China to enter the international trading arena with 
a renewed vigour. Finally, this period was when the international trading 
community finally. realised the possible impact the Chinese trading capacity 
could have, and this was marked by increased signs of protectionism against 
China's products. 
When the Cultural Revolution ended in China, it gave the opportunity 
for the moderates in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to have a larger 
role in the domestic policy making process. It is assumed that Mao Zedong's 
assent to separate foreign affairs from internal issues might have been the 
key to China's friendlier attitude towards the world community (Kapur 
1986: 23), and this opened up the opportunity for the West to engage China in 
a friendlier manner. China was officially admitted to the United Nations in 
October 1971 and this was followed by the normalisation on Sino-US 
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relations, highlighted by President Nixon's visit to China in February 1972. 
The resumption of normal ties between the Americans and the Chinese meant 
that China's foreign relations with other countries would also be altered 
accordingly. 
China welcomed the EC enlargement in 1973, because it allowed a 
challenge to the bipolar status quo, even when Beijing recognised that the 
grouping could bear more economic power than political power in the global 
arena (Dent 1999: 132). It appears that due to the EEC's leveraging of the 
bipolar status quo, the group's autonomy from the US, the possibility of 
military autonomy, and the general lack of any controversial conflicts with 
China, the EEC had become one of the most attractive partners for China as it 
looked outwards (Kapur 1986: 24-25). This put the EEC in perfect position to 
extend recognition to China in 1975, while China also became the first 
communist country to recognise the EEC (Shambaugh 1996: 12). Kapur 
describes a transition from "communicatory diplomacy" between China and 
the EC to "exploratory diplomacy" and "operational diplomacy" (1986: 26-30). 
These were a series of developments which started from favourable 
communications between the two partners, which later developed into high- 
level meetings, and later yielded results to full fledged cooperation starting 
from European Commission Vice-President Sir Christopher Soames' visit to 
Beijing in 1973 (Kapur 1986: 26-30). 
The fruits of this quick transition in the relationship between China and 
the EC were quickly visible. As bilateral trade agreements between individual 
member states and China were due to end in 1974, the European 
Commission was given the duty of conducting future trade negotiations with 
China in accordance with the EC's Common Commercial Policy (CCP). This 
assignment of competence to the EC yielded a quick progression in the 
formalised relation and resulted in the EC's first bilateral trade agreement with 
an Asian country in 1978. The 1978 EC-China Trade Agreement subsequently 
became the first agreement that the EC had agreed with a NME, and became 
the most institutionalised component of the EC's interaction with China (Wong 
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2005: 5)16. It is noteworthy that constant political problems between China and 
individual EC states convinced the EC states to give their support to the Trade 
Commissioner in order to improve their economic leverage as a powerful 
trading force in the Chinese market (Wong: 2005: 6). 
The 1978 framework was later extended to the hotly debated 1979 
Textile Agreement. After talks between the Americans and the Chinese on 
textiles had broken down, the Chinese, who were very eager to reach some 
sort of agreement, backed down and accepted a quota for 40,000 tons of 
textile. This was down from the 60,000 tons the Chinese had insisted on from 
the. EC in the beginning stages of negotiation (Kapur 1986: 62-63). The fact 
that the EC and China managed to reach an agreement while this was not the 
case with the Americans is an indication of a high degree of willingness to 
cooperate between the Chinese and the Europeans. 
By the 1980s, the EC was already beginning to feel pressure from the 
Chinese rise in economic power and a number of protectionist forces were 
being put into place. According to Dent, China attracted an average of two 
Anti-Dumping Duties per year from the EC, considered to be a rather high 
number in relation to its other trading partners (1999: 134). Safeguard 
measures were also being used against low-cost Chinese exports considered 
to have "injurious competition" effects against industries in the EC. China's 
export to the EC had increased from Ecu628m in 1975 to Ecu1786m in 1980, 
and Ecu 3936 in 1975 (Dent 1999: 134). 
The 1978 Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation between 
the EC and China continued to point towards trends of protectionism by the 
EC against Chinese imports (CEC 1978). This included a safeguard clause 
allowing the EC to take unilateral action against sudden influxes of Chinese 
imports, a restrictive most-favoured nation treatment clause whereby the 
Chinese were not given the treatment as the GATT countries, and a clause 
which protected against Chinese sales at low prices (CEC 1978, Kapur 
1986: 47-48). The content of the 1985 revision to this agreement remained 
essentially the same (CEC 1985), which is not surprising considering the 
16 The details of this bilateral framework agreement are to be discussed in greater detail later in this 
Chapter. 
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extent of China's economic growth during the period spanning the two 
agreements. 
A number of factors may have been the cause for the cooling of the 
relationship between the EC and China over the years from 1986 to 1993. To 
begin with, the EC was suddenly finding itself a less important partner for the 
Chinese. Additionally, the EC's internal changes marked by the 1986 Single 
European Act and the Single European Market may have drawn its attention 
inwards instead. The steady rise of trade interaction between the EC and 
China saw Chinese exports to the EC triple to reach Ecu9.1 bn from 1986 to 
1989, resulting in the beginning of a trade deficit problem (Dent 1999: 136). 
Finally, the Tiananmen Square massacre also saw the brief disruption of a 
steadily maturing relationship. 
While these were critical times for the relationship between the EC and 
China, it was clear that the institutionalisation of the relationship as well as 
established dialogue between the partners were at a strongly developed level. 
At this stage, regular contacts were in place to resolve any trade issues in the 
China-EC Joint Committee, in accordance with the 1985 framework 
agreement. When the EC launched its 1995 Communication of the 
Commission: A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations, the Chinese 
was already making positive moves to liberalise its economy (Kokko 2002: 
25). According to Kokko, China had several unilateral import tariff rates since 
the early 1990s, and several reforms were resulting in an increased degree of 
current account convertibility (2002: 25). 
The EC's vociferous support for China's early entry in the WTO may 
have been one of the turning points of the EC-China relationship. The EC 
supported China's entry as a developing nation, and these offered far more 
preferential entry terms than the Americans would have wanted. This was 
reaffirmed in writing in the Commission's 1995 Communication where it 
stressed that China was "yet to become a developed economy" (CEC 1995 
C3)". In March 1994, the European Commission and China initiated bilateral 
discussions under the GATT Working Party on China to encourage reduction 
of NTBs and what was considered to be a monopolistic foreign trade regime in 
" Details of the communications and framework agreements are extensively discussed later on in this 
Chapter. 
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China (Shambaugh 1996: 23). The EC clearly saw itself as having a major part 
in China's impending membership to the WTO, indicating in writing that the 
"EC consistently sought to accelerate progress towards a decision on Chinese 
membership" since China's application to return to the GATT in July 1986, 
and that the EC had a "leading role in the negotiation" (CEC 1995 C3). This 
has also been reflected in bilateral trade discussions since 1992 which, 
according to the Commission, have promoted China's economic and trade 
reforms, helped China into the multilateral trade system, and achieved better 
market access for European goods and services (1995 C4). 
In 1996, the EC made the critical proposal that China be given 
transition periods to implement certain WTO obligations after WTO accession. 
This was eventually accepted by the WTO members. In 1997, China agreed 
to phase out its trading monopoly and give full trading rights to all Chinese 
and foreign individuals within three years of accession. China also agreed to 
fully implement the WTO TRIPs agreement upon accession. This was 
followed by China's announcement that it would undergo an overall 
restructuring of the state enterprise sector, as well as some measures of 
privatisation. 
Given the clear intentions of the European Commission, it is to be 
expected that some sort of breakthrough would be achieved soon. In October 
1997, the European Commission referred to a "conceptual breakthrough" in its 
bilateral accession negotiations which China, and a provisional deadline of 
December 1998 was set for China's WTO accession (Dent 1999: 147). During 
these critical periods, the first EC-China Summits were held in 1998 and 1999, 
bringing along an expansion of the political as well as the economic dialogue. 
The actual signing took place on May 2000, allowing China to accede to the 
WTO. It should be noted that this did take place slightly after the US 
concluded its own bilateral agreement with China in 1999. 
While the maturing relations and dialogue between China and the EC 
went on between 1995 and 2000, the deficit between the trading partners 
continued to grow. EC imports increased from Ecu26.4bn in 1995 to Ecu69, 
6bn in 2000, while EC exports only added up to Ecu14.6bn in 1995 and 
Ecu25.4 in 2000. This meant that the EC Member States trade deficit with 
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China had quadrupled from Ecul1.6bn in 1995 to a staggering Ecu44.6bn in a 
mere period of only five years (Allen 2002). 
In 2003, China had become the EC's 2nd largest biggest trading 
partner after the US, but at this stage, the EC had already amassed its biggest 
bilateral trade deficit of Ecu64bn against the Chinese. This was, according to 
the Commission, continuing to widen (CEC 2005). Between 1998 to 2003, the 
EC's FDI in China had increased so that the EC was becoming a major player 
in China (MOFCOM/MOFTEC). 
In the Commission's Policy Paper of 2003, praised China for making 
considerable efforts to keep up its WTO accession commitments although it 
notes substantial concerns concluding the intransparency of economic 
governance, restrictive regimes in certain sectors, and introduction of new 
non-tariff barriers. The EC clearly stated that a year and a half after China's 
WTO accession, the EC continues to counter problems with market access, 
services, the enforcement of intellectual property rights, and the respect of 
international standards (CEC 2003: 15-16). 
If a single feature were to mark the difference between the EC-China 
partnership against the EC-Japan and EC-ROK partnership, it would be the 
manner in which the EC-China partnership has been marked with continuous 
cooperation right from the beginning of the EC's history. Issues of exogenous 
against endogenous effects and patterns of interaction and communication 
continue to play extremely important roles in the EC-China cooperation 
process, but in this particular case, dialogue appears to have resulted from 
familiarity and continuous dialogue rather than from conflict as was the case 
with the EC's partnership with Japan and the ROK. 
The first main feature of the EC-China partnership is based on 
exogenous effects, and focused mainly on the lack of US involvement in the 
partnership. The US's refusal to engage with China after World War II 
provided the Europeans with an unique opportunity to engage with the 
Chinese. This was not the case with Japan and the ROK where the US had 
exceptionally close ties to the East Asians. West Europe were quick to 
engage with the Chinese during this period of US hostility against the Chinese 
and at the 1954 Geneva conference, this provided the Europeans with the 
opportunity to engage in a healthy trade relationship with the Chinese. 
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Eventually, it appears that the EC-China trade partnership has become based 
on this long and steady cooperative relationship which began from the 50s. 
When the US finally attempted to re-establish trade with the Chinese, it had 
an important impact by reducing the EC's trade share with China, but the 
cooperation remained and the examples in this Chapter have shown how EC- 
China hostilities were resolved quickly, perhaps due to the familiarity and 
long-standing dialogue between the two. 
The second main feature is the manner in which endogenous effects 
appear to have been handled in a far more cautious manner by the 
Europeans. Endogenous effects, particularly China's opening of its economy 
during Deng Xiaoping's rule, has resulted in a widening trade gap between the 
EC and China. The EC's trade deficit against China is unprecedented, 
although in 2005 where this analysis ends, the effects of the ever-widening 
trade gaps are yet to be seen. On the European side, the Commission's 
collective action in dealing with the Chinese has proven to be effective, with 
most of the European countries preferring to hand over competency to the 
Commission ever since the Geneva conference. This competent trend has 
broadly continued, apart from perhaps a minor incident involving textiles 
exports to the EC in 2005 (commonly referred to as the bra wars) which was 
later resolved amicably. 
The third main feature of the EC-China relationship relates directly to 
the first and second features and suggests how a long history of interaction 
and communication has resulted in an optimistic and cooperative attitude 
between the partners. Numerous communications by the Commission portray 
an exceptionally cooperative and patient undertone. This is despite some 
reference to China's alleged violation of human rights. This Chapter has also 
some instances of conflict resolution between the EC and China which were 
successfully resolved bilaterally without the need to bring disputes to the 
WTO. This provides a marked difference with the EC-ROK partnership and is 
an issue which is explored in further detail in the latter section of this Chapter. 
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Table 14: EC- China Evolution f Cooperation 
Date EC's Stance Surrounding Circumstances Outcome 
1950-1970 Cooperation Communist and USSR dominance, China's 1954 Geneva conference established friendly ti, 
anti-American attitude, US embargo on trade between Europe and China, continued frienc 
with China, Sino-Soviet split in 1960s, relationship and increase in trade throughout tl 
Chinese dependency on Europe imports period 
1971-1985 Cooperation End of Western blockage against China, end China admitted to UN, EC extended recognition 
of China's Cultural Revolution, establishment China, 1978 EC-China Trade Agreement, amicat 
of EC's CCP, resolution of textile dispute, rising EC defi 
against China, some EC safeguard clauses agair 
China (but well accepted by China) 
1986-1993 Cooperation Tiananmen Square, establishment of SEM, Temporary suspension of trade due to Tiananmi 
growth of China-US relationship, China's Square but quick resumption, continued ai 
application to GATT, 1992 Maastricht Treaty drastically increasing EC bilateral trade deficit, 
1994-Present Cooperation Increased role of the EC Commission, EC 1995 Commission Communication, China's W1 
helping China to join the WTO, accession, first EC-China summits, largest ever E 
trade deficit against any partner, China became tl 
EC's 2nd largest trading partner after the US 
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Reflections on the Evolution of Bilateral Cooperation between the EC and 
East Asia 
This brief examination of the vertical dimension of the EC and its three main 
East Asian partners has provided this research with some highly significant 
snapshots of the evolution of cooperation in-the EC-East Asian history. The 
studies have identified, in slightly different ways, a steady creation of a habit 
of interaction between each of the relationships. This has been created very 
successfully through high level meetings between the European Commission 
and the respective East Asian governments. The habit of interaction has 
appeared to have led on to numerous framework agreements which have 
helped to shape the relationship between the EC and the East Asians, as well 
as to improve trust between the trading partners. 
The study has also identified the numerous conflicts between the EC 
and the East Asian governments, although the conflict resolution methods 
appear to have been critically different from case to case. In the case of the 
EC and the ROK, these trade conflicts do not seem to have been resolved 
amicably, and often have been referred on to the WTO for further 
adjudication. In the other two cases of the EC with Japan and China, while 
some issues have been problematic, negotiations seem to have been more 
successful. This raises the question of whether multilateralism is a last resort 
means for conflict resolution when bilateralism has become deadlocked. With 
the ROK being the least powerful economy in the comparative pilot studies, it 
also flags the issue of the unequal status of partners within the global political 
economy and whether this might mean a more heavy handed approach to 
negotiations by the more influential economy. 
The vertical dimension analysis also shows clearly different patterns in 
the EC's dealings with the East Asian economies. While the EC history of 
bilateral interaction with Japan points towards a trial and error phase in the 
EC's development of external economic policies, the other two East Asian 
states have been faced with different reactions. The ROK may have become a 
victim of defection by the EC, an act evidenced by the constant referral of 
cases to the WTO and ongoing conflict in the case of the ship-building 
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industry. The EC may, however, have attempted to shape the mode of 
cooperation with China by aiding Chinese entry into the WTO. These are 
significant points to remember as this research continues. 
The analysis of the vertical dimension in the EC-East Asian bilateral 
interregional interaction has brought out the intense significance of material 
interests in bilateral relationships. Several highlights in the relationships, 
including major periods of cooperation or defection, appear to have been 
brought about due to material interests. A case in point is when the bilateral 
trade deficit the EC continually faces against the booming East Asian 
economies unfailingly brought about spouts of defection and negotiations, 
which often lead towards cooperative habits such as the habit of interaction 
mentioned earlier. The mutual dependence of the EC and the East Asians as 
important trade partners has also helped most of the relationships to result in 
cooperation. Material interest appears to have driven these bilateral 
relationships, and while rules can be constantly revised in such a relationship, 
willingness to cooperate due to mutual material interest could possibly be the 
key to an evolution in cooperation. Whether material interests truly have such 
a key role in the evolution of bilateral relations is an issue which is explored in 
further detail in this Chapter. 
Material, Institutional and Ideational Influences in Bilateral 
Interregionalism 
The principal aim of the analysis of the horizontal dimension of EC-East Asia's 
interregional bilateralism is to identify the role of material interest, institutions 
and ideas from the three key elements which include trade data, 
institutionalisation and dialogue intensification, and rhetorical elements 
extractable from the various strategic documents and communications. The 
first part will go through the bilateral trade statistics between the EC and East 
Asia in detail and attempt to discover how changes in the pattern of trade and 
the number of contacts may have affected the relationship. This section is 
primarily an analysis of the material interest in the partnership and how much 
importance the partners attach to material interests identified with trade. 
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The second part focuses on the process of bilateral institutionalisation 
and dialogue intensification of the bilateral relationship between the EC and 
East Asia. This section attempts to single out the key highlights concerning 
institutionalisation in the relationships and view similarities and differences in 
the. manner in which both the EC and their East Asian counterparts have 
engaged in intensified dialogue to deal with the problems as well as the 
successes in cooperation. It is expected that material interest and ideas will 
have its own role to play in this second key element. This test of bilateral 
institutionalisation and dialogue intensification will be a key determinant in 
verifying the material interest or ideas involved in the EC-East Asian bilateral 
relationship, as well as serve as a test of how institutions have played a 
mediating role between material interest and ideas. 
The final part goes through each of the main framework agreements in 
each of the relationships and examines the rhetoric and meanings, which 
could be derived from these key documents. Through the rhetoric in this third 
key element, it is expected that the balance between material interest and 
ideas will also emerge. By the end of the Chapter, the EC-East Asian bilateral 
relationship will have gone through a triangulation of the three key elements, 
which is expected to portray how the balance between material interest, 
institutions and ideas has helped us to gain further insight into bilateral 
interregional cooperation. 
Trade and Material Interest 
Current Aggregate Trade Volumes 
One of the key determinants of how significant a relationship is centres on 
how much economic interaction occurs between trade partners. This first part 
sets out three important issues concerning trade aggregates. The first issue is 
the individual East Asian states' significance as the EC's trading partners. The 
second issue involves how long the partners have been trading with each 
other and when this trade started to spark interest between each other. The 
third issue concerns the relative importance between the EC-East Asian 
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partnerships over different periods of time. These three issues directly involve 
aggregate trade volumes between the EC and the individual East Asian states 
and are designed to broadly highlight how trade volumes largely affect the 
material side of the relationship. 
Examination of the East Asian states' significance as EC trading 
partners, the first issue in question, draws out the material dimension of power 
asymmetry. In other words, the chance for cooperation is much higher if the 
partners are on equal standing and if reciprocity can be provided. Japan, 
China and the ROK all have different standings in their significance as an EC 
trading partner and the bearing the different standings have on the bilateral 
relationships can be clearly indicated from the aggregate trade volumes. 
Despite being Asia's fourth largest economy, the ROK is only the EC's 
18th largest export market and its 8th largest source of imports18 placing the 
ROK at a marginally inferior position to its counterparts when discussing 
overall economic significance for the EC. Japan, while being one of the main 
pillars of the world economy and the largest economy in Asia, is the EC's fifth 
largest export market and also fifth largest source of imports19. Overall, 
China's recent economic realisation has seen them become the EC's second 
largest trading partner after the US20. 
The opposite side of the equation and whether the EC is an equally 
significant market for the East Asian nations is also an important 
consideration. Japan is currently the fourth largest source of imports into the 
EC and owns a 7.2% share of the EC import market21. For China, the EC 
would hold considerably more significance trade-wise, since in 2004, the EC 
became China's largest trading partner22. The same could probably be argued 
for the EC's significance for The ROK, since the EC is currently The ROK's 
third largest trading partner and its largest investment partner23. 
18 http: //europa. eu. int/comm/extemal relations/south the ROK/intro/eco trade relat. htm (accessed 
23rd June 2005) 
19 http: //europa. eu. int/comm/external_relations/Japan/intro/eco_trade_relat. htm (accessed 23rd June 
2005) 
20 http: //europa. eu. int/comm/extemal_relations/china/intro/index. htm (accessed 23rd June 2005) 
2' http: //europa. eu. int/cOmm/external_relations/J*apan/intro/eco trade_relat. htm (accessed 23rd June 
2005) 
22 http: //europa. eu. int/comm/external_relations/china/intro/index. htm (accessed 23rd June 2005) 
23 http: //europa. eu. int/comm/external_relations/south_the ROK/intro/eco_trade_relat. htm (accessed 
23rd June 2005) 
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These figures put the ROK firmly last and in the position of arguably the 
least significant trading partner among the three East Asian economies 
chosen for this study, meaning that materially, the ROK has the least to offer 
the EC. This also means that the power asymmetry between the EC and the 
ROK is also the greatest. Whether statistically, the Japanese or the Chinese 
are more significant for the EC is debatable. Japan is clearly the larger 
economy by far, but the priority each side of the partnership places on the 
trade relationship appears to be less, especially when considering that the 
total trade between the EC and Japan only added up to ECU116950 million in 
2004. In contrast, the total trade between the EC and China amounted to 
ECU175040 million in the same year. Even though the Japanese economy is 
a more significant one in Asia, the peaking trade relationship between the EC 
and China and the priority the partners give to each other may put China in 
front of Japan. The EC and the ROK presents a clear case of disparity 
between their relative significance for each other. While the ROK is far behind 
Japan and China in terms of its trading status with the EC, the EC is one of 
the ROK's most important trade partners. 
Tohl 15- FC Trade main partners 2004 (Eurosaat) 
Rank Major 
imports 
Mio euro % Rank Major Exports Mio euro % Rank Major Trade Mio euro % 
China 126912 12.3 3. China 48 131 5.0 2. China 175 043 8.8 
i" Japan 73 745 7.2 5. Japan 43 210 4.5 5. Japan 116 955 5.9 
3" The 
ROK 
30 251 2.9 13. The ROK 17 815 1.8 8. The ROK 48 066 2.4 
The second issue under consideration in trade aggregates concerns when the 
relationship became more substantial and the partners began to take an 
increased interest in each other. Once again, this draws attention to the 
material side of the partnership and draws on the idea of reciprocity and 
power symmetry. In other words, one would expect the partnership to 
gravitate towards indifference, or even defection, when the partners have little 
material interest to offer each other. The contrast is also true, and if there is a 
move towards more material reciprocity and power symmetry, one would 
expect enhanced cooperation, or at least an active attempt to cooperate. 
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Aggregate trade figures measured over the years are an objective way of 
measuring this power symmetry and material reciprocity and its effects on 
cooperation between the EC and East Asia. 
Japan's economic development was felt throughout the world as early 
as in 1963 and this was reflected in the relationship with the EC when in 1970 
it was already trading ECU3292 million with the EC, while the Chinese and the 
ROK were still trading ECU809 and ECU214 respectively. It took China and 
the ROK almost a decade to reach an equally significant level in imports and 
by 1980 Japan's trade with the EC had already grown to ECU17893 million, 
compared to China's ECU3641 million and The ROK's 2967 million. At this 
stage, the EC's focus was almost entirely with Japan, while it was indifferent 
with China and the ROK. 
The indifference in China quickly changed 22 years later, in 2002, 
when China had caught up and overtaken the Japanese in terms of aggregate 
trade with the EC and was trading ECU124470 million while the Japanese 
dropped behind to ECU116740 million. While EC trade with China has 
steadily risen, the sharpest rise appears to have begun from 1999 onwards 
with trade more than doubling between 1999 and 2004. 
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stands at ECU175040 million in 2004 compared to ECU116950 million and 
ECU48060 million for Japan and the ROK respectively. ROK trade with the 
EC in particular appears never to have taken off in the spectacular manner in 
which the Japanese and Chinese trade with the EC did at different periods of 
time. It appeared to gain momentum between 1998 and 2000 where 
aggregate trade almost doubled, but the level of trade has levelled off since 
2001 (also see Figure 5). At no point has trade between the EC and the ROK 
ever reached the levels of the EC-Japan and EC-China partnership, perhaps 
accounting for the relative indifference the EC has continually had towards the 
Koreans. 
Figure 6: Aggregate Trade with EC - ROK: Not Taking Off? (compiled from Eurostat) 
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The third issue to note concerns how at certain stages over the period of 
study, some of the East Asian economies were faring relatively well compared 
to their counterparts when considering aggregate trade volumes. This issue is 
important because if one is to consider trade to be purely material, one would 
expect similar levels of material interest and power asymmetry offered by the 
East Asians to prompt a similar reaction from the EC. On the other hand and 
importantly, if similar levels of material interest and power asymmetry do not 
prompt a similar reaction from the EC, it could well mean that ideational or 
institutional factors may have had an effect in the partnership prompting the 
different reactions. 
  Japan 
  China 
ROK 
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Between 1976 and 1990, it is important to note that EC-ROK trade 
was more or less on a par, or less by just a few percent, with EC-China 
aggregate trade volumes. In 1977 and 1978, EC-ROK aggregate trade 
volume even overtook the EC-China trade volume. Contrary to expectations 
that the cooperation levels between the EC-China and the EC-ROK 
relationship would be similar due to similar levels of trade aggregates (see 
Figure 7), Chapter 4's historical accounts showed that the defection by the EC 
from cooperation with the ROK during 1976 to 1992 was far more pronounced 
than in the EC-China relationship. 
Figure 7: The ROK and China Aggregate Trade with the EC Compared: Same Aggregates, 
Different Treatment? (compiled from Eurostat) 
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Instead, the EC-China relationship was held rather steady and without major 
cases of EC defection to speak about. A similar trend took place with the EC- 
Japan and EC-China relationship between 2000 and 2004 when both 
partnerships became virtual equals as concerns aggregate trade volume, 
although it is significantly different in that the EC-China trade volume has 
continued to rise sharply. In this instance, the historical story in Chapter 4 
appears to point towards continued cooperation in both partnerships, and 
even an enhanced level of maturity in the EC-Japan relationship. 
These three issues, the current significance as a trading partner, the 
"taking-off' of significant trade relationships, and the relative economic 
importance between the EC-East Asian partnerships over periods of time, 
1ii1111Iuil 
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must be called to attention because trade figures appear to have caused 
certain impacts in the levels of cooperation in each of the partnerships being 
discussed. The factors draw attention to the material side of the EC-East 
Asian partnerships and raise the possibility that the unevenness in 
cooperation may be due to rises and declines in trade. This analysis of the 
statistical factors offers specific years when a relationship takes off as a point 
of interest. It also offers specific periods when two relationships should be of 
more or less equal economic importance, and also specifies points in time 
when the relationships started to become unequal. Finally, the relative 
economic significance of each country as a trading partner and the possible 
disparity of one country's trade dependence on another might possibly cause 
an unequal relationship. Certain timeframes with rises or falls in aggregate 
trade volumes coincide with actions of cooperation or defection between the 
partners discussed in Chapter 4. This could be considered evidence of a 
strongly material relationship. Likewise, the manner in which one partner 
(such as the ROK) might be less significant, or unequal, leading to changes in 
trends of cooperation or defection could also signify materialism at work. 
This last issue presents a slight puzzle for the suggestion that only 
material interests hold the bilateral partnerships together. While the first two 
issues (current significance as a trading partner and 'taking-off of significant 
trade relationships) pointed out towards materialism affecting the relationship 
quite clearly, the final issue (relative economic significance of trading partner) 
shows a disparity in that equal economic significance sometimes does not 
translate to the EC treating the partners in the same way. This was evident 
from 1976 to 1992 when the ROK and China had similar economic 
significance, and yet the EC showed more instances of defection from the 
ROK while continuing to enhance cooperation with China. This could be due 
to two variables, one being that institutional and ideational factors could be 
responsible for the EC's varied treatment of its two East Asian partners, an 
issue discussed in detail later in this Chapter. The second variable is dealt 
with in the next section, and deals with the highly significant issue of trade 
balances. 
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A Question of Trade Deficits 
Any discussion of the bilateral trade relationship between the EC and East 
Asia, reflecting the material side of the partnership, cannot be complete 
without mentioning trade deficits. This has been the major problem in the EC- 
East Asia trade relationship and several high level discussions are centered 
mainly on the level of trade deficits as well as how to reduce it. The EC's trade 
balance with the East Asian states being studied can be used in a similar 
manner to the aggregate trade volume discussed previously. Periods when 
the EC trade deficit started to become an issue and a comparative trade 
balance analysis between each of the EC-East Asian relationships are 
important because if this relationship is to be considered as shaped by 
material considerations, one would expect the issue of trade balances to be a 
factor in cooperation or defection. To be precise, the larger the imbalance, the 
more we would expect defection to take place. 
This section proposes a number of issues concerning trade deficits. 
First, one might expect trade deficits experienced by the EC to cause the EC 
to defect from the relationship, according to the simple rules of the Prisoner's 
Dilemma due to one side of the partnership losing out from the deal (Axelrod 
1984). Secondly, the EC might choose to sustain the relationship in the face 
of trade deficits due to the "shadow of future" where the EC feels that they 
cannot avoid gaining contact with a partner in the future (Axelrod 1994, 
2001 a). In other words, cooperation could take place without reciprocity if one 
player sufficiently "believes" in another player enough to cooperate with 
him/her (Axelrod et al 2001: 441-443). Thirdly, there is a possibility that ideas, 
codes of conducts, and values might sustain the relationship even though the 
EC is facing sharp trade deficits (discussed in Chapter 3). It is important to 
note in this third scenario that though the relationship may be sustained, the 
partnership may have cooled off or even drifted into slight indifference due to 
the lack of reciprocity. 
The first scenario, suggesting the EC's defection from the relationship, 
is most obvious in the case of its relationship with the ROK. The ROK has 
enjoyed a long history of trade surpluses with the EC beginning in as early as 
1975, although the amount has fluctuated throughout the period. Drastic leaps 
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came from 1995 to 1996 (ECU 1584 million to ECU4917 million) and 1998 to 
2000 (EC surplus of ECU6059 million to deficit of ECU100000 million). The 
ROK seems to have been more drastically affected by the 1997 Asian 
Economic Crisis, but it has since recovered and in 2004, enjoyed its highest 
trade surplus against the EC of ECU12440 million. As suggested in Chapter 4 
and to be re-emphasised in Chapter 7, the EC-ROK relationship has been a 
troublesome one with several unresolved trade conflicts and few instances of 
mutual cooperation. 
Traces of the second scenario, with a non-reciprocal trade relationship 
being sustained due to "shadow of future" can be seen in the EC's relationship 
with China. China's trade surplus with the EC began only in 1988 but 
continued to rise sharply afterwards with only slight signs of levelling off from 
1991 to 1993. Afterwards, it began to rise drastically until in 2004, China's 
trade surplus of ECU78780 million became the EC's largest trade deficit with 
any partner24. Surprisingly to observers, the EC has not reacted negatively 
and has made attempts to integrate China into the world economy further by 
helping China to enter the WTO as well as framing numerous strategic 
documents with the Chinese (see next section and Chapter 4). 
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Comparatively, Japan's trade surplus over the EC has been the norm and it 
stood much higher and formed a more significant issue for the Europeans until 
1995. It was only in 1996 when the Chinese trade surplus got anywhere close 
to the Japanese trade surplus against the EC. China's trade surplus with the 
EC eventually overtook Japan in 2000 and eventually more than doubled that 
of Japan's. A comparison between the ROK and China from 1958 to 1989 is 
less straightforward due to the fluctuation of the trade balance between the 
EC and China. Nevertheless, one might suggest that the EC may have seen 
its trade deficit with the ROK to be more of a problem than its trade with China 
due to the fact that at several stages from 1958 to 1989, the EC actually had a 
healthy surplus with China. 25 
The EC-Japan bilateral relationship is a good demonstration of the third 
case, where ideas, codes of conducts, and values appear to have sustained a 
relationship where. the EC has clearly been losing out on. The EC-Japan trade 
wars of 1976 and 1980 are justifiably centred on trade deficits with the EC 
suffering a deficit of ECU4316 million in 1976 and sharply rising to ECU8719 
million in 1980. Despite numerous attempts to ameliorate the situation, the EC 
has never managed to abate the trade deficit and throughout the years, the 
EC trade deficit against Japan has continued to steadily rise. 
This rise, however, is not without some very interesting exceptions, 
most likely caused by a series of discussions and negotiations stemming from 
the EC and Japan's increasingly institutionalised relationship in the 90s. The 
EC's trade deficit against Japan faced major periods of reduction in 1990, 
1993,1995,1996 and 2001. The sharpest drops occurred from 1995 to 1996 
(from ECU21403 million to ECU16787 million) and 2000 to 2002 (from 
ECU46380 million to ECU 29880 million). These drops in the EC's trade 
deficits against Japan all occur after 1990, during the period leading up 
towards and after the Hague Declaration, which (as discussed in Chapter 4) 
was the accumulation of dialogue intensification which has developed over the 
past four decades of interaction between the partners. 
25 This case is interesting because it offers a scenario when two countries with similar trade volumes 
with the EC, particularly between 1976 and 1992, are facing different situations concerning trade 
balances. This allows an opportunity to analyse the European response towards two countries of similar 
trading statuses, with one of the variable factors being the trade balance they are facing against the 
particular countries. 
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Figure 9: Japan's surplus with the EC (compiled from 
Japan's Rocky Surplus with the EU 
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The 1996 trade deficit was the lowest that the EC had with Japan since 1984 
(ECU11643). The 1994 Regulatory Reform Dialogue (see Chapter 4) has 
resulted in sincere attempts on Japan's part to deregulate as well as to 
improve European business access (CEC 2004). A Commission initiative saw 
the EC gain equal access to the US with regard to Japan's market openings 
(Gilson 2000: 101). Consequently, the EC became the major source of FDI to 
Japan over 2000 to 2003, while the EC remained the most important recipient 
for Japanese FDI (CEC 2007). 
Figure 1 0: EC's Bilateral Trade Deficit with East Asia (compiled from Eurostat 
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The study of trade deficits is crucial to this research due to it being one of the 
crucial material factors in the volatility of a trade relationship. General 
historical events point towards trends of the EC-East Asia relationship 
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becoming extremely sensitive in the event of trade imbalances and the 
periods of critical trade imbalances highlighted in this section need to be 
compared to historical trade highlights to examine if they have had any 
bearing on each other. It is, however, also important to note how ideational 
factors have also tempered the material side of the relationship and has 
helped to sustain as well as to enhance certain partnerships. 
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Dialogue Intensification and Institutionalisation 
Throughout the history of the EC-East Asian relationship, it is clear that there 
have been specific periods of intensive cooperation as well as signs of 
determined defection. This has resulted in a number of key highlights in the EC- 
East Asian relationship that include contentious and sustained periods of trade 
disputes interspersed with some very genuine attempts at negotiations in order to 
improve the trade relationship between the two partners. An analysis of these 
key highlights are necessary to uncover any underlying ideas, values or codes of 
conduct which might be the basis of either cooperation or defection in the EC- 
East Asian bilateral relationships. It is also important in identifying how the 
institutional factors just examined may have affected the bilateral relationship. By 
discussing the various intense periods of cooperation or defection, it is possible 
to see how a partner's "ideational" background might lead towards their attempts 
at resolving a problem. On the other hand, if the behaviour of either partner is not 
consistent and possibly selective according to trading conditions, one might also 
be able to raise the possibility that ideas, values, and codes of conduct matter 
less than material interests such as trade volumes and balances. As noted 
above, the EC institutions' capacity to cooperate and its policy coherence are 
also expected to have an influence on the relationship. 
This section examines the role of institutions throughout different historical 
stages of the EC-East Asian relationship with clear events of cooperation or 
defection. While drawing comparisons, a number of. issues need to be 
addressed. First, it is important to note the possible parallels between the 
occurrence of a trade conflict or acts of trade cooperation and the current trade 
balance as well as the current aggregate trade volume. This exercise directly 
addresses the question of how much impact the aggregate trade volume and 
trade balances might have on a partner's decision to cooperate. Institutional 
factors at each of the historical stages are also expected to explain the EC's 
institutional capacity to cooperate as well as to temper its member states' 
instinctive tendency to act on solely material factors. Secondly, the manner in 
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which the dispute or the cooperative process was treated as well as the trading 
principles that might be involved need to be examined. The EC and its 
institutions have long presented themselves as the champion of free trade, and if 
this value is to go beyond rhetoric, there should be clear signs of this in the 
negotiation process. This examination is also a way to verify whether material or 
ideational influences are more important in the bilateral relationship, and whether 
institutions have a role in enhancing either of these influences. Finally, any 
disparities in the cooperation process between the EC and its East Asian 
partners must be raised. At certain points in history, particularly between the 
ROK and China, the two countries have traded in equal volumes with the EC. 
One would expect EC treatment of its two East Asian partners to be consistent. If 
there is apparent inconsistency in the treatment, it is important to note how the 
differing treatment stems from ideational principles, material interest, or 
institutional elements. 
The Early Stages: Material Interest Domination and Weak Institutionalisation 
The lack of enthusiasm between the EC and its East Asian partners during the 
early stages of the relationship is in fact a critical exercise for the analysis of 
cooperation and defection in the relationship. This section will explore the early 
episodes in the EC-East Asian relationship with the first part examining Japan's 
GATT Entry and comparing it to the amelioration of the EC-China conference at 
the Geneva conference. This early stage of rather clear signs of defection by 
Europe towards Japan and a rather different approach towards China may give 
more clarity to how cooperation takes place and under which circumstances. The 
second part analyses the European reaction towards the Japanese trade boom 
from 1963 to 1975, the 1960s Sino-Soviet Split and the reduction of US grant aid 
towards the ROK during the same period. Once again, these landmarks in EC- 
East Asian partnership might provide further indications on the cooperative 
process. In each of these sections a consideration is given to material interest, 
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ideational principles, and institutional elements according to how influential they 
appear at each stage. 
The lack of institutions appeared to allow the priority on material interests 
to dominate the early EC-East Asian partnerships. The European responses to 
Japan's 1955 GATT entry and the Chinese role in the 1954 Geneva conference 
were in sharp contrast, and material interest appears to explain these events. 
First, while the Americans had a role in both, they enthusiastically supported 
Japan's GATT entry while holding a markedly hostile view towards any good 
relationships with China. In certain aspects, this certainly had an effect on the 
European response towards Japan and China. With help from the Americans, 
Japan managed to gain entry to GATT in 1955 despite protests from the major 
European power, only to have Article 3526 invoked against Japanese imports. 
This was often explained to be an act of defection due to "old fears" of Japanese 
products flooding the European market (Wilkinson 1980, Ishikawa 1990). This 
was' particularly because of memories of the 1930s dumping of Japanese cotton 
textiles in the world market as well as the famous "watches by the kilogram" 
(Ishikawa 1990: 14). There was, however, evidence that these fears were indeed 
founded in reality. Even though the Japanese did begin to liberalise upon GATT 
entry, it also imposed other measures such as weakening anti-trust laws and 
changing its import licensing scheme (Dent 1999: 87). To fight against European 
protectionist measures as well as fears of an exclusionist trading club, some 
might explain how Japan successfully struck up bilateral trade relationships with 
individual European nations (Wilkinson 1980: 169, Conte-Helm 1996: 28), while 
others would argue that it amounted to an ingenious tactic of divide and conquer 
(Dent 1999: 88). Another explanation was that the Japanese preferred to deal 
with individual nations rather than with the EC due to "familiarity, the emotional 
factor, and organizational considerations" (Conte-Helm 1996: 28). At this stage, 
one might also note that institutional factors were important, but that the EC was 
26 GÄTT article allowing affected nations to impose trade restrictions against imports without 
compensation due to "injurious" competition 
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simply not ready to act coherently due to its lack of institutional capacity in 
dealing with the Japanese. 
While the Japanese assimilation into the world economy was being firmly 
rejected by the Europeans, the Chinese were quickly being greeted by the 
Europeans into the world market despite US hostility towards the communist 
regime. Partly because the French and British believed that China might have a 
role' in maintaining peace in Indochina, trade rapidly increased between China 
and West Europe following the Geneva conference (Shambaugh 1996: 5). When 
the US started an embargo on China, the latter turned its interest towards West 
Europe as an important source of technology, capital and markets. This 
dependency constantly grew towards the late 1950s and in the period leading to 
the Sino-Soviet split in 1960 (Dent 1999: 129). 
It is important to note that from 1958 to 1960, aggregate trade between 
the EC and Japan and the EC and China stood at roughly the same volume, but 
the disparity in the EC's treatment of the two once again points to the influence of 
material interests and the lack of institutional controls. During this period, the EC 
experienced a small trade deficit with Japan while gaining a surplus with China. 
There may be a number of factors on display in this disparity of European 
treatment of its East Asian partners. The perception the Europeans had towards 
Japan was that of a neo-mercantilist predator due to its pre-war history. Japan 
was politically secure and firm allies with the Americans and bound only to self- 
defense, making it a stable political power in Asia. In other words, the European 
connection with the Japanese would have been purely commercial, and it was 
clear that few material gains could have been made in that sense. 
In contrast, the Europeans may have felt that having China as an Asian 
political power as an ally might be useful and that its economic ties with China 
may lead to increased democracy and good governance. This has been a 
strategy the current EC has been using to a large degree of success in its 
influence in stabilising its neighbours, as well as in creating links with Latin 
America and the Asia-Pacific, which have contributed to the EC's strategic 
positioning as an actor (Smith 2001: 797). Another example is the manner in 
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which such strategies were used for the transition countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe where external commercial policies and prospects of 
membership have helped to shape internal policies (Tsoukalis 1997: 258), often 
leading to the adoption of EC values and ideas. In the 1960s, the Europeans 
continued to play a defining role in China's economic diversification strategy, and 
by 1965, Europe had become China's main trade partner. This was despite 
China being unable to offer West Europe any worthy commercial opportunities 
(Dent 1999: 129) pointing to the notion that the region could have been 
attempting to politically influence China through commercial incentives. In 1975, 
the EC extended formal recognition to China. 
From 1963 to 1975, the EC would see significant rises in aggregate trade 
with its East Asian partners and while China's dependency on the EC was 
growing, Japan's economy took off in a spectacular manner. This resulted in a 
seven-fold leap in total trade between the EC and Japan from ECU1040 million in 
1963 to ECU7442 in 1975. The EC's trade deficit with Japan also increased 
dramatically from only ECU8 million in 1963 to a staggering ECU2928 million in 
1975, setting a trend which would continue throughout the next decade. With 
institutions still weak, the EC's loss of material interest set the stages for major 
cases of defection in the following years. 
Advanced Stages: Institutional Deepening and Generation of Ideas 
Significant material loss in the EC-Japan partnership inevitably led to strong 
negative European reaction towards the Japanese and led to the "trade war" 
period from 1976 to 1980. Two main issues need to be highlighted regarding this. 
First, it appears that the Japanese success was deserved due to exceptionally 
high production efficiency and there is a possibility that Japan might have simply 
been too competitive for the Europeans to handle. The Europeans, still 
developing their institutional capacity and losing out on material gains, found it 
necessary to defect from cooperation during this stage. This was despite the fact 
that-the Japanese may not have been actively trying to take advantage of the 
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European's lack of readiness. During this period, Japan's overall economic 
growth was generated by domestic growth rather than exports and Japan's world 
exports were considered to be relatively small. Statistical analysis also found that 
Japanese exports were actually not heavily concentrated on sensitive industrial 
product lines such as textiles, steel, ships, cutlery and cameras which were areas 
the EC felt were major causes for their trade deficits (Meynell 1982: 106-11). 
Secondly and importantly, the EC's institutional capacity was clearly 
growing and becoming readier, and some ideational principles implying trust and 
an accepted code of conduct were being introduced into the EC-East Asian 
relationship. The EC's enhanced institutional capacity was also reflected in the 
manner by which bilateral institutionalisation of its relationships with its East 
Asian counterparts started to become evident. The period from 1976 onwards 
was' one marked by sincere attempts at cooperation by the European 
Commission and the Japanese government. The European Commission actively 
tried to convince EC member states to remove bilateral safeguard clauses in 
exchange for Japan to have their NTBs removed, although this failed and led to 
confrontations between the Commission and the EC member states (Bridges 
1999: 22). On Japan's part, the Doko shock led the Japanese government to 
quickly put voluntary export restrictions into place in the problem sectors. After 
the 1976 and 1980 trade frictions, Japan also attempted to ease regulations 
governing imports and removing NTBs (Wilkinson 1093: 210). Bridges also notes 
that it is widely accepted by outside governments that the Japanese may have 
been slow in deregulation, but their formal trade barriers have been steadily 
reduced and are in most cases below those maintained by Europe and America 
by the late 90s (Bridges 1999: 25). 
There is strong evidence of bilateral institutionalisation of the EC-Japan 
partnership at this stage. The establishment of the European Commission as the 
trading spokesperson for the entire EC in 1970 meant that it allowed the 
institutionalisation of the EC, and consequently, the EC's external trade 
partnerships. A high level consultation with the Japanese government began in 
1972 after a Paris Summit and would take place every six months. In 1973, the 
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EC and Japan agreed to hold high level consultative talks on an annual basis 
(Gilson 2000: 26-27). In 1974, a delegation of the European Communities was 
established in Tokyo. It is notable that towards the beginning of the 1980s, Japan 
was also beginning to make use of the EC's increased institutional capacity by 
having the Commission as an `interlocutor' in trade negotiations as well as its role 
as an 'intermediate bureaucracy' (Drifte 1986: 97). The 1st EC-Japan Ministerial 
meeting took place in 1984. The 1st EC-Japan Summit took place with the 1991 
signing of the Hague declaration. These mechanisms, as well as head of state 
and ministerial visits, continued and today include 35 consultation frameworks 
which meet as often as twice a year and at least once a year (Dent 1999: 99). 
This extensive framework and constant interaction has been an important feature 
in the EC-Japan bilateral institutionalisation process, and has contributed to an 
ever improving relationship between the two partners in the present day. 
Although the EC's institutional capacity was growing and ability to 
cooperate consequentially improved (see Chapter 4), the Commission was 
unable to completely prevent scepticism towards Japan, particularly during the 
early periods. This points towards the issue of institutional complexities within the 
EC which may have prevented the Europeans from conducting optimal 
negotiations with Japan. This is strongly noted by the manner in which the 
Commission's positive attempts in 1970 at cooperation were undermined by 
France and Beneluxs insistence to main their bilateral safeguard clauses against 
Japanese imports (Dent 1998: 90, Wilkinson 1983: 171). There was little which 
seemed to be able to change the air of mutual distrust and disinterest at the 
domestic level between the EC and Japan (Gilson 2000: 28). In 1980, similar calls 
from the European Commission for reduction of the EC's quantitative restrictions 
in exchange for Japan's VER on key sectors were once again rejected by the 
European Council. The Council eventually accepted a tougher proposal which 
urged the cutting down of Japanese exports to the EC, revaluation of the Yen, 
and a policy to increase Europe imports into Japan. Predictably, the Japanese 
government rejected these proposals (Wilkinson 1983: 193-194). 
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The EC-China relationship, perhaps due to China's relatively slow growth 
during this period, moved in an opposite direction to Japan's and is an excellent 
example of how the EC's growing institutional capacity could have worked 
without member states' scepticism of, its partners. After ongoing political 
problems between China and individual EC states, the individual EC states 
decided to empower the European Trade Commissioner in his duty to improve 
their economic leverage as a powerful trade force in the Chinese market. In 
1973, the European Commission was given full power in conducting future trade 
negotiations with China, leading to a 1978 EC-China Trade Agreement, the first 
agreement the EC had agreed to sign with a NME. Further negotiations between 
the EC and China appear to have been rather fruitful, with the successful 
negotiation of the 1979 Textile Agreement, a process which had previously 
broken down between the Americans and the Chinese (Kapur 1986: 62-63). 
The 1978 agreement was later revised into a 1985 Framework Agreement 
on Trade and Economic Cooperation. It is noteworthy that in the seven years 
between the agreements, and with significant changes in both the trade volume 
and the EC enjoying an increasingly healthy surplus, China still agreed to 
conclude an agreement which remained basically the same. This included a 
safeguard clause for the EC against sudden influxes of Chinese imports, a 
restrictive MFN treatment clause, and a clause which protected against Chinese 
sales at low prices (CEC 1978, Kapur 1986: 47-48). In 1985, in particular, the 
EC's surplus with China had risen sharply to ECU3244 million compared with 
only ECU442 million in the year before. A lot of credit for the EC's smooth 
relationship with China can be attributed to China's moves towards cooperation. 
China's application to the GATT in 1986 was a demonstration of its willingness to 
follow GATT regulations. These signs of China's readiness to cooperate actually 
resulted in the EC hardliners relaxing their positions in the 1988 rounds of the 
Multi-Fibre Arrangement (Gilson 2001: 181). 
Once again, there is overwhelming evidence of EC-China bilateral 
institutionalisation, even more so than in the case of EC-Japan. The EC's first 
official economic interaction with China began from 1974 when the EC proposed 
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the future conduct of all trade negotiations with the European Commission. China 
accepted this, on the condition that future negotiations would not include the 
issue of Taiwan. The 1978 Trade Agreement led to the creation of an EC-China 
Joint Committee. In 1979, the first EC-China Joint Committee met in Beijing. In 
1984, the first ministerial consultation took place between China and the EC in 
the -framework of political cooperation. In 1988 a delegation of the European 
Commission opened in Beijing. In 1994 a new bilateral political dialogue was 
opened between the EC and China. In 1998 relations were taken to a new level 
through the establishment of the annual EC-China summit, the first of which 
would take place in London. In 2000, a particularly important bilateral negotiation 
took place between the EC and China on China's accession to the WTO. In the 
same year, the first EC-China High-Level consultation on fighting illegal migration 
and trafficking in Human Beings took place in Brussels. In 2004, EC 
Commissioner for Enterprise and Information Society Erkki Liikanen went on to 
launch the EC-China Programme to support China's integration to the world 
trading system. These critical developments were interspersed with reciprocal 
EC-China high level visits between heads of states, ministers, and European 
Commissioners. 
Dent comments that the process of formalising economic diplomacy 
between the EC and the ROK was one of the most delayed among the East 
Asian group, with only the exception of Taiwan. It has been argued that while EC 
level economic diplomacy with Japan, China, and even ASEAN went back as far 
as the 1960s and 1970s, formal EC-ROK economic relations did not materialise 
until the late 1980s (Dent 1999: 200). This comment appears to not have taken 
into consideration the fact that The ROK was actually one of the first East Asian 
nations to sign a trade agreement with the EC, in the 1977 EC-the ROK Textile 
Agreement. As early as 1963, there was an establishment of diplomatic relations 
between the EC and the ROK as well as an accreditation of ROK Ambassador to 
the Community in Brussels. In addition, continued growth between the EC and 
ROK led to the establishment of their first regular Ministerial in 1983, even before 
the first EC-China and EC-Japan ministerial meeting. In 1986, the first regular 
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annual meeting between senior officials of the EC and the ROK were 
established, and would later be called the EC-Korea High Level Consultations. 
An EC Chamber of Commerce was established in Seoul in the same year. This 
was followed by the 1989 establishment of the delegation of the European 
Commission in Seoul. The 2001 Framework Agreement also set up an inaugural 
joint committee between the EC and the ROK. In between these years, there 
have been some reciprocal high level visits although the frequency has not been 
as high as the EC reciprocal high level visits with China and Japan. In the case of 
the EC-ROK partnership, formal institutionalisation may have actually formed 
earlier, although this did not mean an enhancement in cooperation27. 
It is extremely important to remember that bilateral institutionalisation, 
without the critical incentives of material interest or ideational elements, does not 
guarantee cooperation. The EC-ROK partnership exemplifies this argument, 
which was made in Chapter 3. Apart from. enhancing cooperation, the EC's 
growing institutional capacity meant that the EC could choose to defect when 
they felt that the relationship was failing on both the material and ideational 
fronts. The EC also signed a textile agreement with the ROK in 1977 although 
diplomatic interaction between the two partners remained limited until increased 
contact began to take place from 1980 onwards (Dent 1999: 196). This coincided 
with' a sharp leap in the ROK's trade surplus with the EC, doubling to ECU1067 
in 1980. The ROK had a patchy relationship with the EC between 1980 and 
1987, and this included disputes concerning IPR protection, telecommunications 
procurement, and taxes on alcoholic beverages, which were often taken to the 
WTO or at least threatened with taking to the WTO (Dent 1999: 198). In contrast 
to the Japanese, ROK government and industries did not appear to take an 
initiative in resolving the trade disputes. While both the Japanese and Koreans 
and their relative industries felt that it was the European's industries' poor 
productivity which was to blame, this section has shown evidence of Japan's 
sincere attempt to cooperate. In contrast, the ROK state has been said to 
consider dumping a legitimate competitive strategy and that the Commission's 
27 The Conclusions to this thesis also discusses this puzzle in greater detail. 
- 157 - 
process of applying ADDs were an unfair attempt to politicise the natural 
mechanism of a free market (Dent 1999: 199). This is an indication of how the 
ROK failed to cooperate with the EC on both the material and ideational sides. 
This Japan-ROK contrast in East Asian cooperation versus defection was 
more evident as the 80s progressed and the establishment of the Single 
European Market. (SEM), which increased the EC's institutional capacity even 
further. The 1985 Plaza accord meant that the yen was finally re-valued and 
there was evidence of Japan making more convincing and proactive efforts to 
open up its markets (Bridges 1999: 25). The effects were almost immediate, with 
the trade balance stabilising from 1986 to 1990. Abe notes that Japan's 
realisation of the impact of the SEM programme helped to improve its attitude 
towards the EC. The SEM would make the EC the biggest single market, 
including the automobile sector and increase European competitiveness in the 
international economy (Abe 1999: 3). In addition, the SEM marked the end to any 
possibility of success for the Japanese "divide and conquer" economic 
diplomacy. According to Dent, "the gradual implementation of the SEM 
programme from the late 1980s onwards not only necessitated third countries 
and their companies to think more in terms of "one Europe", but also improve the 
relational structural power of the EC in international economic affairs (1998: 95). 
Fear of a more integrated protectionist Europe saw Japanese exports stabilise in 
exchange with a sharp rise in Japanese FDI in Europe (Dent 1998: 93, Abe 
1999: 3). 
The SEM was a key institutional development which further enhanced 
Japan's readiness to cooperate. It further stimulated a habit of interaction which 
intensified cooperation between Japan and the EC and eventually led up to the 
1991 Hague Declaration, a landmark in EC-Japan relations and the product of 
numerous contacts between the 1950s and 1970s as well as patterns of bilateral 
behaviour during the 1980s (Bridges 1999: 44, Gilson 2000: 38). It was also 
clearly a declaration which marked the end of the Cold War and was intended to 
set out the strategy for cooperation between the EC and Japan in a new global 
political environment. The Declaration set out new mechanisms for the dialogue, 
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elevated the EC-Japan status as legitimate political dialogue partners, and 
improved their habits of interaction (Gilson 2000: 95, Bridges 1999: 43). A year 
later, the European Council of Ministers concluded that there had been a 
"qualitative leap in political dialogue as a result of the 1991 declaration. This was 
described by Bridges as "exaggerated", but showed how a political dialogue was 
unprecedented during this time frame (1999: 43). 
Institutional factors, while deepening cooperation between the EC and 
Japan, had the exact opposite effect on the EC-ROK relationship and the EC's 
increased institutional capacity meant that they could defect further in what was 
increasingly becoming a deadlocked relationship. While the EC's history of 
deepening integration was grounds for increased cooperation between the EC 
and Japan, it only led to a more united European front against the Koreans. In 
1987, the Commission took Japan to a GATT panel dispute over liquor tax and 
tariff, and only five years later did the EC manage to secure an initial agreement 
from the ROK. This led to the 1993 The ROK-EC Agreement on Tariff and Taxes, 
although disputes in similar areas continued. In 1990,29.5 percent of the total 
value of the ROK's exports to EC markets was subject to ADDs (anti-dumping 
duties). EC frustrations over IPE, the telecommunications procurement, and 
liquor trade issues led the EC to suspend the ROK's GSP privileges all together 
between 1989 and 1992. It was only after such measures that the EC's trade 
deficit had reduced to ECU183 million in 1993 from an all time high of ECU2848 
million in 1988. As soon as the GSP privileges were reinstated, the trade balance 
resumed its normal pattern in favour of the ROK. In June of 1996, the EC once 
again had to take the IPE and telecommunications procurement with the ROK to 
the WTO. An agreement was eventually reached in November (Dent 1999: 198). 
This section clearly shows that ever since European Commission had 
taken on the role of the trade spokesperson for the EC, it has actively played the 
role and established numerous and consistent patterns of contact with the 
discussed East Asian partners. Clearly, the actual number of contacts has been 
greater with Japan. due to the overall volume in the history of EC-Japan relations. 
With the increased amount of trade and the unprecedented trade deficit the EC is 
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suffering with China, one could easily expect the dialogue to increase particularly 
in the near future. One evidence of this is the sectoral dialogues between China 
and Europe, or areas of exchange on sectoral policies and technical issues, 
which cover a wide range of areas, many of which concern trade such as 
competition policy, customs cooperation, regulatory and industrial policy, trade 
policy, textile trade, and macro-economic and financial sector reforms. 
Another issue to take note of is that the EC has established high level 
summits and ministerial meetings with all three East Asian partners discussed in 
this research. Not only have the very same high levels of regular contact been 
established in all three East Asian partners, but the framework for regular contact 
was actually created at virtually the same time. The Ministerial meetings, for 
example, were all established between 1983 and 1984. It is important to see how 
a consistent pattern of interaction established by the EC has actually received 
different reactions from the EC's East Asian trade partners. Throughout the trade 
history between the EC and East Asia previously discussed, there have been 
varying degrees of cooperation by the East Asians, with Japan appearing to be 
more conducive to cooperation in problem resolution than The ROK at several 
stages of the relationship. It appears that greater institutional density may not 
necessarily lead to increased cooperation. The actual factor which might lead to 
increased cooperation might possibly be the maturity of the relationship, an issue 
which will be explored in further detail in the following section. 
Ideas 
Research on the EC-East Asian trade relationship is far from straightforward, 
particularly because of its rather subtle nature. While the historical trade 
highlights may offer a means of understanding certain conflicts and problems, 
this is deceptive since highlights focus largely on disputes and genuine attempts 
at and trends in cooperation are rather conspicuous. This section attempts to 
explore the EC's discourse with its East Asian counterparts in order to see how 
the relationship has evolved over time. This is conducted through an analysis of 
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the EC-East Asian discourse by means of examination of each key strategic 
document the European Commission has dispensed throughout the years. The 
key strategic documents, including communications, declarations, and trade 
framework agreements serve as a good summary of the EC's historical 
interaction with a particular partner as well as where the EC feels the relationship 
stands. The key strategic documents are also expected to-encapsulate several of 
the key economic and political dialogue between the EC and its trading partner, 
making it an excellent source of information on how cooperation might have 
taken place in a relationship. 
EC Strategic Documents 
The only firm conclusion that patterns of contact and bilateral institutionalisation 
may offer is that the partners have been talking to each other and that there have 
been attempts at cooperation at the bilateral level. The previous section has 
explained how the EC has been continually consistent in the treatment of its East 
Asian partners, at least as much as it concerns the regular formal and 
institutionalised contacts. These institutionalised contacts have almost always 
reflected in EC strategic documents in the form of framework agreements, 
communications, action plans, and conclusions. An examination of these 
documents is necessary for a thorough examination of the type and level of 
cooperation EC policy-makers have assumed at different phases of these 
relationships. These strategic documents are also expected to reveal either 
material interests or ideational principles which might have had a role in 
improving the cooperation process or led to the start of defection in the bilateral 
relationship between the EC and East Asia. 
This section follows in the same style of analysis as the previous sections 
by analysing the balance between material, ideational, and institutional 
influences in the EC-East Asian partnerships. One would expect that rhetoric 
would embody a larger number of statements of ideational principles than 
anything else and this is an important factor to consider during the following 
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analysis. This section argues that other influences, such as material interest and 
institutional elements are actually more obvious than ideational principles in 
these strategic documents written by the EC. This is very strong evidence that in 
the EC-East Asia bilateral relationship, material interests framed by institutional 
elements are actually more important than ideational principles. 
Similar to the consistency of the patterns of interaction established by the 
EC with East Asia, the EC strategic documents have been equally consistent. It 
appears that in almost every single year that the EC had signed an agreement 
with one East Asian partner, it also managed to conclude another agreement 
with the other East Asian partners. One notable exception is between 1976 and 
1991 when a formal institutionalised strategic document was not formed between 
the EC and Japan. This comes as little surprise as the two partners were 
engaged in a series of trade wars between 1970 and the early 1980s, and 
numerous attempts to ameliorate the situation by the European Commission 
were met with heavy resistance by the individual member states. This was not 
helped by the Japanese government's refusal to concede to any of the 
Commission's proposals which did not include reciprocal removal of protectionist 
measures. 
Table 17: LC/IU strategic Documents 
1977 EC-The ROK agreement on textiles 
1978 EC-China Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
1985 EC-China Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation 
1991 Political Declaration on relations between the European Community and its Member States and Japan (Hague 
Declaration) 
1995 Communication "A Long Term Policy for China Europe Relations" 
1995 Communication from the European Commission to the European Council 'Europe and Japan: The Next Steps' 
1996 EC-The ROK Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
1998 Communication "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China 
1998 Communication on EC relations with the Republic of The ROK 
1999 EC Council of Ministers adopts Conclusions on The ROK Peninsula 
2000 Report on the Implementation of the (1998) Communication "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China" of 
September 2000 
2001 Framework Agreement on Trade and Cooperation with the Republic of The ROK entered into force on 1st April 2001 
2001 Communication "EC Strategy towards China: Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a 
more Effective EC Policy" 
2001 'Shaping Our Common Future: an Action Plan for EC-Japan Cooperation" 
2003 "A maturing partnership: shared interests and challenges in EC-China relations" endorsed by the European Council 
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The 1985 EC-China Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation requires 
specific examination for a number of reasons. First, it was written while the EC 
had' a considerable trade surplus with China, in sharp contrast to the trade 
deficits it was facing with Japan and The ROK. In 1985 the EC's surplus with 
China had risen to ECU3244 million compared to only ECU442 million in the 
1984. Secondly, it was clearly designed to favour the EC, but more importantly, 
the Chinese agreed to terms which probably would have been unacceptable to 
the Japanese (see Chapter 4). 
Article 6.2 of the EC-China 1985 agreement provided a provision which 
allowed "in any exceptional case, however, where the situation does not admit 
any delay, either Contracting Party may take measures" which was a safeguard 
clause against possible dumping of Chinese exports to the EC. It did state, 
however, that the parties "must endeavour as far as possible to hold friendly 
consultations before doing so" (CEC 1985). Article 5, while requiring "favourable 
consideration to imports from the EEC", also stated that the EC would only "strive 
for an increasing liberalisation of imports from the People's Republic of China" 
and that it would "endeavour progressively to introduce measures extending the 
list of products for which imports from China have been liberalized and to 
increase the amount of quotas" (CEC 1985). This was yet again another 
restrictive MFN treatment clause. Finally, Article 8 was designed to protect 
against Chinese dumping of the EC market with low prices, indicating that "trade 
in goods and provision of services between the two Contracting Parties shall be 
effected at market-related prices and rates". 
The 1991 Joint Declaration on Relations between The European 
Community and its Member States and Japan was a different exercise and rather 
than initiating action, it was rather to ratify and formalise past interaction (Gilson 
2001, Dent '1999). It formally institutionalised the regular consultation 
mechanisms including annual summits, an annual ministerial level meeting, and 
six month consultations between the Foreign Ministers of the Community and the 
EC external relations troika with the Japanese Foreign Ministry. This is a 
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reflection of how strongly institutional elements have held together the EC-Japan 
partnership. 
Article 3 on the objectives of dialogue and cooperation of this EC-Japan 
1991 Joint Declaration highlighted several issues which have been obstacles to 
full cooperation between the EC and Japan, and are surprisingly strongly 
material in nature. The article reads like a statement of ways to cooperate, 
making use of mutual material interest incentives, and includes, for example, 
"rejecting protectionism and recourse to unilateral measures". Constructive 
measures included an agreement to make "equitable access to their respective 
markets and removing obstacles whether structural or other, impeding the 
expansion of trade and investment, on the basis of comparable opportunities". It 
also included "strengthening their dialogue and co-operation on various aspects 
of multifaceted relations between both Parties in such areas as trade, 
investment, industrial co-operation, advanced technology, energy, employment, 
social affairs and competition rules" (CEC 1991). In significant contrast to the 
1985 EC-China Agreement, few specifics were mentioned. 
Apart from provisions on the issue of trade and economic exchange, it 
must be noted that the other half of the Hague Declaration appeared to 
encourage Japan to take a greater role in world affairs. This included 
suggestions of possible cooperation in taking "common diplomatic action" and 
"promoting negotiated solutions to international or regional tensions and the 
strengthening of the United Nations and other international organisations". This 
extended to international security matters such as "non-proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons, the non-proliferation of missile technology and 
the international transfer of conventional weapons" (CEC 1991). 
The 1995 Communication "A Long Term Policy for China Europe 
Relations" is a fascinating document, once again highlighted by the EC's material 
interest concerns, which makes some very frank comments on the status of EC- 
China relations as well as recommendations to sustain the EC's enthusiastic 
backing of Chinese entry to the WTO (CEC 1995a). To begin with, it suggests 
that the Chinese economy is widely accepted by "most observers, including the 
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IMF and the World Bank" that on the basis of purchasing power parities, the 
Chinese economy is similar in size to Japan and second only to the USA (CEC 
1995a). It also comments on how the EC-China trade has increased by over 
fourteen times and that the surplus in the 1980s has been turned into a bilateral 
trade deficit. No direct mention was made of China's protectionist measures, but 
the Communication instead focuses on how EC direct investment in China was 
very low compared to Hong Kong, US, and Japan (CEC 1995a). 
There were numerous references to "helping" China's liberalisation of the 
economy even though one section went as far as to assert that China had "made 
enormous strides to liberalise its trade regime over the last years" (Article C2 
CEC 1995a). This would immediately extend to aiding China's entry into the 
WTO, with the paper indicating that "both China and its trading partners must 
now show additional political commitment to progress is a deal is to be reached" 
and that "full integration of China into the WTO system is in the interest of all 
parties concerned". This, the document continues would "guarantee the 
continuation of China's reform process until a mature market economy is 
established". The Communication also makes mention of "a sustained trade 
dialogue which has also enabled Europe to avoid any risk of discrimination and 
to ensure that EC economic operators enjoy the same treatment as their 
competitors in China (Article C4 CEC1995a). While reflections of Europe's 'ideas' 
of global free trade are seen here, it is also clear how the EC has laid down the 
material interest preconditions which need to be satisfied in order to obtain real 
cooperation. 
The sensitive subject of human rights was also mentioned in this 
document although the proposals to improve human rights in China were at best 
modest, perhaps placing ideational concerns second to the prevailing material 
interests. The communication recommended that the EC's goal should be to 
provide support of the public management system in China based on civil society 
and the rule of law as well as to develop a programme of effective and 
coordinated cooperation in the legal and judicial fields. The document, however, 
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admits that concrete action by the EC to encourage cooperation with individuals 
in the legal and judicial systems have been small-scale (B2, B4 CEC 1995a). 
The 1998 European Commission Communication on Building a 
Comprehensive Partnership with China built on the 1995 communication and 
continued to highlight the progress China had made from being a centrally- 
planned economy towards becoming a market-driven economy. It is extremely 
important to note that this communication was written during a period when the 
EC's trade deficits against China had ballooned to unprecedented levels and was 
showing continued signs that it was growing (see Chapter 4, section on trade 
deficits). The issue of human rights appears to have been given more priority, 
with the document boldly stating that China was "still far from meeting 
internationally accepted standards on human rights" while emphasising that "a 
commitment to universally recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms 
lies at the heart of the EC's policy world-wide" (Article B CEC 1998). A more 
specific set of proposals was made on improving the human rights situation in 
China, including urging China to comply with UN covenants and ILO conventions, 
reinforcement of bilateral human rights dialogue, concrete cooperation 
programmes, promoting the rule of law, and strengthening China civil society 
(Article B2 CEC 1998). This raises questions on whether the EC is actively 
attempting to compensate for its losses in material interest, incurred through its 
trade deficits, with a gain in ideational principles, achieved through these ideas- 
centred articles. 
The proposed initiatives in the 1998 Commission Communication on 
China document were also far bolder than the 1995 document, and are an 
important indicator of how concerned the EC was with the material side of the 
trading relationship. This included an elaborate set of proposals on liberalising 
China's trade regime in order for it to comply with WTO rules, encouragement of 
further bilateral trade talks, adoption of the Commission's proposed new anti- 
dumping regulation towards China and Russia, pursuit of a gradual and 
reciprocal removal of EC and Chinese quantitative restrictions, and liberalisation 
of China's financial services. The key WTO principles emphasised were those of 
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transparency, national treatment, and non-discrimination. China was also urged 
to open its markets for industrial and agricultural goods by "cutting tariffs 
significantly" as well as to "rapid remove the current monopolies on foreign trade" 
in China, open up China's services market and financial sector, and establish a 
liberalised procurement regime (Article C CEC 1998). 
Interestingly, the first EC-ROK Trade and Cooperation Agreement was 
borne from conflict rather than cooperation, and was clearly based on a conflict in 
material interest. Bilateral negotiations over IPE and telecommunication 
procurements beginning from the early 1980s dragged on until 1996 and were 
eventually taken to the WTO. An agreement was finally secured by the EC in 
November 1996, and resulted in the Joint Declaration and Framework 
Agreement which resolved the dispute. Apart from resolving this long-standing 
dispute, the Agreement also encouraged further two way trade and investment 
and'encouraged cooperation initiatives in the areas of justice and home affairs, 
science, technology and culture. The Agreement also had a political declaration 
attached to it which aimed at intensifying political dialogue between the two sides 
as well as setting up a Joint Committee, frequent Summit meetings, and a 
Ministerial Troika (CEC 2001). The 1997 Agreement on telecommunications 
procurement was eventually cancelled by both parties since they agreed that with 
the opening of the procurement procedure by telecommunications operators, the 
agreement had become obsolete (CEC 1998). 
Amid the EC-ROK shipbuilding problems, the Framework Agreement on 
Trade and Cooperation was established on the 1st of April 2001 and continues to 
be in force today. The agreement strongly emphasises the important of free and 
fair trade, especially taking note of the shipbuilding industry in Article 8 where 
both parties agreed not to "take any action to support their shipbuilding industry 
which would distort competition or allow their. shipbuilding industry to escape 
from any future difficult situation". Article 8 also provides for "consultations on the 
implementation of the OECD Agreement on Shipbuilding, exchange of 
information on the development of the world market for ships and shipbuilding 
and on any other problem arising in this sector" (Official Journal of the European 
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Communities 3/2001). The Agreement also took note of the area of Agriculture 
and Fisheries, another sensitive area for both parties, and agreed to encourage 
cooperation in the mentioned areas. The issue of ship-building has continued to 
be a sensitive issue and with the EC taking The ROK to the WTO on this issue, it 
is clear that the EC considers that Article 8 has been breached. 
While the issue of ship-building has become the centre of attention today, 
the 2001 EC-ROK framework agreement makes mention of several outstanding 
problems which appear not to have been resolved yet. The article on trade 
cooperation continues to urge improvement of marketing access for industrial, 
agricultural and fisheries products as well as financial services and 
telecommunications services. Article 7 on maritime transport also requires 
commitment to moving towards unrestricted access to the international maritime 
market and traffic based on fair competition on a commercial basis. (Official 
Journal of the European Communities 3/2001). Article 23 also allows 
"appropriate measures" to be taken in the case of non-execution of the 
agreement, although a provision for consultation is also given (Official Journal of 
the European Communities 3/2001). 
Despite the evidence of material interest concerns in most of the strategic 
documents presented in this section, there is some indication that ideas might 
become more important with an increased maturity in the relationship. In 2001, 
the dialogue between the EC and Japan stepped up another level from the 
Hague Declaration a decade ago when the 10th EC-Japan Summit adopted the 
2001 "Shaping our Common Future: an Action Plan for EC-Japan Cooperation" 
(CEC 2001d). Its four basic objectives were clearly based on ideational principles 
and included the promotion of peace and security, strengthening of the economic 
and trade partnership, coping with global and societal challenges and bringing 
people and culture together. Most notable is how the action plan, designed to be 
a bilateral document, actually made an emphasis on how the two could play a 
mutually significant global role in both politics and economics. The document 
notes how closer cooperation is a "true necessity" and that "as global partners, 
accounting for major share of world GDP, and the world's largest donors of 
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development assistance" the two partners "have a special responsibility to the 
global community" (CEC 2001d: 2). The political part of the action plan covered 
cooperation on most global issues and possible hotspots, including the Korean 
peninsula, the Balkan, Russia's stability, China, the Middle East Peace Process, 
African conflicts, East Timor and Cyprus. 
The Economic and Trade Partnership objectives in the EC-Japan 2001 
dialogue were also rather focused on mutual support for the multilateral trading 
system, again stressing the ideational principles in commercial issues. This 
included an acknowledgement that the partners had already cooperated closely 
to strengthen the multilateral trading system and a commitment to continue 
efforts to further liberalise trade through WTO rule, mutually overcome any 
challenges which emerge during the 21st century, support of sustainable 
development, and integrate developing countries in the world economy. Bilateral 
issues which emerged centred on reinforcement of the regulatory reform 
dialogue by "making better use of consultations" with an aim to encourage self- 
sustained growth by removing obstacles and barriers to trade and investment. 
Standards and conformity assessment and the telecommunications, 
environment, energy supply, commercial transport services and construction 
sectors were also highlighted for further cooperation to develop a consistent 
regulatory approach in the future (CEC 2001d: 10). 
If the thesis that increased focus on ideational principles comes along with 
greater maturity is valid, perhaps the EC-China partnership has also become 
more infused with ideas. The 2001 Commission Communication on EC Strategy 
towards China acknowledged China's growing global economic and political 
significance as well as its increased partnership with the EC. It notably had some 
very strong words concerning human rights, indicating that while dialogue has 
been satisfactorily open, "the European Union remains seriously concerned 
about the human rights situation in China". It also stated that "while the EC-China 
human rights dialogue is the European Union's preferred channel for working to 
improve the situation in the various areas of concern it is clear that dialogue is an 
acceptable option only if progress is achieved on the ground" (Article 5.2 CEC 
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2001 a). The action points are clearly aimed towards making the human rights 
dialogue more "effective and results-oriented" as well as carry on the original 
objectives of improving China's law and legal reform as well as its civil society. 
Despite these ideational principles, the 2001 Commission Communication 
on China inevitably mentioned the material side centering on the ECU44.4 billion 
EC deficit with China which was at record levels, increasing from 2000 by almost 
50%. While the EC in 2000 had become the largest foreign direct investor in 
China, excluding Hong Kong, the Communication explained that the EC's share 
of FDI in China remained relatively low compared to its share in other emerging 
markets. The document stresses that in order to overcome this deficit, China's 
integration in the world economy and the implied opening and reforming of 
China's markets was a necessity. To this end, some of the EC's action points 
remain firmly committed to finalising China's WTO accession "as rapidly as 
possible", having the EC be ready to "make an additional effort to help China to 
adhere to its WTO commitments" and to "seek close cooperation for the 
development and liberalisation of world trade" (Article 5.3 CEC 2001 a). 
The EC strategic documents highlighted in this section provide an 
insightful perspective on the manner in which the EC-East Asian relationships 
have been shaped and developed. The first issue which needs to be 
reemphasised is the overwhelming evidence that material interest is the EC's 
primary concern. This is reflected over and over again in the strategic documents 
and, is often exacerbated during periods when the EC's trade deficit against its 
East Asian counterparts appears to be growing. The second issue requiring 
emphasis is how some strategic documents clearly reveal tensions between the 
simultaneous pursuit of material interest and ideational principles, goals which 
are often incompatible with each other despite the rhetoric suggesting otherwise. 
It is clear, for example, that the ROK's refusal to address the material interests 
embedded in the EC's strategic documents may have led to defection on the 
EC's part. The third issue requiring some further expanding is the manner in 
which the maturity of the relationship may have a bearing on an increase in 
ideational principles in the relationship. As the partnership progresses, such as 
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seen in the EC-Japan bilateral tie, both partners appear to be more receptive to 
ideational principles. This may mean that in the cases of the ROK and China, 
more time and interaction is required before the same receptiveness to ideas can 
be witnessed. 
EC-East Asian Bilateral Interregionalism: Material Interests Framed 
by Institutions 
This chapter has attempted to provide some empirical understanding of 
cooperation and interregional ism through two interlinked methods. It first 
identified the trends and trajectories in the EC's bilateral interaction with East 
Asia by proving some highlights to its interaction. Secondly, it identified the role 
of material interest, ideational principles and institutional elements from the key 
elements of the EC-East Asian relationship which include trade data, 
institutionalisation and dialogue intensification, and rhetorical elements 
extractable from the various strategic documents. These key elements have 
been analysed as objectively as possible and there are some recurring themes 
which appear to describe the EC-East Asian bilateral relationship very explicitly. 
As noted in the introduction to this Chapter, the combined analysis provided by 
the horizontal and vertical dimensions provide a more comprehensive means of 
observing interregional cooperation between the EC and East Asia than current 
literature on EC-East Asian relations can offer. As a result, a number of further 
insights can be derived from the investigation carried out in this Chapter. 
The first insight concerning bilateral interregionalism notes how states 
have indeed led the interaction between the EC and the individual East Asian 
states. While the Commission may have been granted full competency by the 
member states in issues of trade, the historical section has noted the influence 
the member states have had on the Commission. On the side of the East Asian 
states, the historical section has indicated how a centrally managed economy 
has meant that the trade partnership has been exclusively the domain of the 
state. 
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The second insight is that material interests, reflected in the trading data 
and the consequences of the trading data, have guided and shaped the EC-East 
Asian bilateral relationship. This has not only been reflected in the trade data, but 
also in the strategic documents as well. In fact, material interest concerns appear 
to be the guiding factor on whether bilateral institutionalisation and dialogue 
intensification even takes place. This might be one of the explanations as to how 
either indifference or defection has governed the EC's attitude towards the ROK, 
which has little material value to the EC, as opposed to the Chinese or the 
Japanese. There is also evidence that ideas actually have a rather secondary 
role to material interests in the bilateral trade relationship between the EC and 
East Asia. This is perhaps unsurprising in a relationship dominated by 
commercial incentives, but one would have at least expected the EC to pursue, 
to some extent, the rhetoric in the strategic documents. Instead, the strategic 
documents reveal some very uncomfortable contradictions between material 
interest and ideational principles, and appear to indicate that the importance the 
EC places on ideational principles might actually be related to how little or much 
of the material interests are being fulfilled. 
The third insight into bilateral interregionalism reached through the 
analysis of the EC-East Asian bilateral partnership is that bilateral 
institutionalisation matters. It matters because firstly, the EC's capacity to 
cooperate appears to depend on this bilateral institutionalisation. This has, in 
turn, resulted in the intensification of dialogue between the EC and its East Asian 
partners which has been extremely important in sustaining the respective 
relationships. Throughout the history of the relationship, there is solid evidence 
that as soon as the EC's institutional capacity increased, it resulted in the 
creation of a process of intensified dialogue and bilateral institutionalisation with 
its East Asian partners. This process of bilateral institutionalisation has in turn, 
tempered and regulated the pursuit of material interest within the relationship. It 
has also meant that in cases when the EC loses its material interests in the 
partnership, developments towards intensified dialogue and bilateral 
institutionalisation can hold the relationship together. 
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Finally, the bilateral interregional agenda, at least as seen in the empirical 
evidence in this Chapter, has produced some evidence on the management of 
anarchy even when the emphasis has been on material interest rather than 
ideas. The EC assistance in bringing China into the WTO could be perceived as 
an attempt to manage anarchy and shape global governance, not unlike the EC's 
encouragement for Japan to play a more active global role. This Chapter has not 
produced conclusive evidence on whether the nature of the EC-East Asian 
partnership is an issue of hierarchy. The lack of hierarchy may be because of the 
economic significance of the East Asian states, particularly Japan and China. 
There is an argument to be made that the ROK's relationship partnership with the 
EC indicates some degree of hierarchy, but taken collectively, the East Asians 
are a significant economic force. This indicates how interregionalism in the 
context of EC-East Asian bilateral partnership entails at least an attempt to 
manage anarchy, if not hierarchy. 
An inconclusive issue which needs to be explored in further detail both in 
the following Chapter as well as the Conclusions is the issue of how PTA efforts 
and global liberalization efforts have coexisted. Regarding the issue of whether 
bilateral interregional efforts have overshadowed multilateral efforts, there has 
been evidence to support both sides of the argument. In the case of the ROK, 
conflict resolution has continually been made at the GATTNVTO level. The EC's 
assistance in helping China with its WTO membership as well as its insistence in 
bringing Japan further into the global development community also suggest 
attempts towards multilateralism. Yet, this Chapter clearly shows how the EC has 
continued to promote individual PTAs with a clear emphasis on material 
interests. 
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Table 18: Insights Provided by EC-East Asian Bilateral Relationship 
Cooperation Questions posed EC-East Asia Bilateral 
by IPE and Interregionalism Relationship 
Nature of Actor State-led or led by non-state Mainly state led. EC 
actors? Commission heavily influenced 
by member state preferences 
Nature of the Global Small countries linking up to Evidence of management of 
Political Economy large countries (hierarchy), anarchy, but little evidence of 
emphasis on shaping global hierarchy except for the case of 
governance the ROK 
(managing anarchy? ) 
Nature of Actors' Trade liberalisation and how to Needs to be investigated further 
Interaction within the GPE make regionalism and global in conjunction with a multilateral 
liberalisation institutions coexist. empirical observation. Evidence 
Gains between two partners or points to coexistence of PTAs 
absolute global gains? and global liberalization efforts 
Ideas versus Structures Material interest (as reflected in Strongly based on material 
trade issues) or ideas? interest 
The horizontal and vertical dimensions offered in this Chapter have served to 
enhance our understanding of cooperation and interregionalism to a large extent. 
In other words, the combined approach of extracting the material interests, 
institutional influences, and ideas involved in the EC-East Asian bilateral 
partnership has helped us to further understand the balance the EC has chosen 
to take in its partnership with East Asia. As these conclusions note, the balance 
is overwhelmingly in favour of an interregional partnership based primarily on 
material interests, with institutions and ideas taking on secondary supporting 
roles. Despite the importance of bilateralism, the insights offered in this Chapter 
only tell half the story on interregional cooperation. The next Chapter continues 
with a similar analysis for the multilateral EC-East Asian partnership as 
witnessed in ASEM. 
-174- 
Chapter 6 
The Evolution of Multilateral Cooperation in EC-East 
Asia Relations 
The. history of EC-East Asia interregional multilateralism as observed in the Asia- 
Europe Meeting (ASEM) provides a view of the cooperation process and ongoing 
dynamics which are no less significant than the history of EC-East Asian 
interregional bilateralism. Similar to the bilateral chapters of this research, the 
multilateral history of the EC and East Asia is expected to yield periods of highs 
and lows in the cooperation process. It also expected that the multilateral 
interregional partnership will possess a balancing act between material interest, 
institutional considerations, and the pursuit ideas. This Chapter is designed to 
explore these issues in order to provide further answers and insights into 
propositions provided by IPE theories on cooperation as well as the questions on 
cooperation posed by interregionalism. 
A clarification needs to be made at this stage on the argument that 
ASEM's interregionalism may not be considered to be truly multilateral in nature 
due to the fact that it could be perceived as technically only a region to region 
contact. This thesis takes on another widely accepted view and argues that the 
"quality" of the relationship between the EC and East Asia as observed in ASEM 
is, for all sense and purposes, a multilateral one. Ruggie explains that 
multilateralism represents a 'highly demanding institutional form' (1993: 12) and is 
distinguished by the manner in which it `coordinates behaviour among three or 
more states on the basis of generalised principles of conduct' (1993: 14). 
To this end, ASEM scholars have also referred to the interregional 
grouping as being in the position to undermine global multilateral institutions and 
in the position of possessing "multilateral utility" functions (Hwee 2003, Dent 
2004, Rüland 2006). In other words, ASEM would contain the capacity to act as a 
multilateral forum on its own, not unlike the United Nations or the WTO, although 
its membership is exclusive to the EC and ASEAN+3. ASEM has been similarly 
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regarded as a "rationaliser of multilateral fora" and to "inculculate cooperative 
principles and norms" which are important qualities found in multilateralism 
(Roland 1996: 72-73). The foundations the EC strategic documents have laid out 
for ASEM are also overwhelmingly multilateral in quality in the sense that the 
strategies strongly affirm the use of multilateral mechanism to achieve principles 
such as free trade, global governance, and consensus building (CEC 1994, 
1996). This preliminary assessment indicates that ASEM as a multilateral forum 
for the EC and East Asia contains within itself structures, norms, and institutions. 
. 
ASEM is hence defined in this thesis as a form of multilateral 
interregionalism. This Chapter continues to ask the same questions and 
advances the same key propositions that were introduced in chapters 2 and 3. In 
addition to the examination of material interests, institutions and ideas, the 
questions emanating from literature on interregionalism have been adjusted 
slightly to fit in with the multilateral theme. As a reminder, the key themes being 
explored include the nature of the actor, the nature of the global political 
economy, the nature of actors' interaction within the global political economy, and 
the importance of ideas against structures. The question of the nature of the 
actor and whether it is state-led becomes a debate on whether the ASEM 
process is led by states or if the process has become so sufficiently 
institutionalised that ASEM can be identified as an institutional actor in its own 
right. A question which needs to be answered concerning the EC-East Asian 
partners' interaction within ASEM is whether ASEM adds up to an institution 
which manages anarchy, or whether it accentuates the common theme of 
hierarchy. In ASEM's multilateral interregionalism process, a key question asked 
is whether it undermines global liberalisation processes such as that of the 
WTO's or whether it actually promotes the growth of further interregional FTAs. 
These questions on interregionalism as well as the proposition on the importance 
of material interest, institutions and ideas in shaping cooperation are studied 
under a multilateral setting in this Chapter. 
Although this Chapter takes on the same methodological rationale as 
Chapter 5's analysis of interregional bilateralism, the nature of ASEM requires a 
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slightly different approach in the observation of its vertical and horizontal 
dimensions. Current scholars of ASEM, with a few very notable exceptions (see 
Helsinki 2006), tend to take on either a historical view or take a single theory and 
try to explain the claimed rise and decline of ASEM through those views. This is 
a trend which mirrors the methodology of bilateral studies of the EC-East Asian 
partnership. This Chapter attempts to avoid methodological inclusions and 
exclusions through a comprehensive examination of the trends and trajectories 
within ASEM as well as the material interest, institutionalisation, and ideas 
inherent in the process. 
The first section of this Chapter explores the evolution of multilateral 
cooperation as perceived in ASEM, from the period when there appeared to be 
few incentives for European cooperation with the East Asian states of Japan, the 
ROK and China (plus Southeast Asia) as a grouping until the rapid boom of the 
East Asian economy, the Asian economy's sudden decline, and the 
consequences to the cooperation process after the Asian economic crisis. Similar 
to the vertical dimension analysis in the previous Chapter, the aim of the first 
section of this Chapter is to highlight three issues. It attempts to underline the 
periods in cooperation and defection in the ASEM relationship, identify the 
external conditions which may have led to cooperation or defection, and discuss 
the evolution of EC-East Asian multilateralism. The analysis of these issues 
focuses specifically on how the EC has interacted with the three East Asian 
states of Japan, the ROK, and China within the ASEM context. As noted in the 
Introduction, some mention of ASEAN will be made in order to frame the context 
for the three East Asian states working within ASEM. 
This observation of the trends in cooperation serves as a background for 
further analysis in the observation of EC-East Asian multilateralism's horizontal 
dimension. A number of issues are carried forward from the vertical dimension of 
cooperation in the. multilateral cooperation process, including how the process 
fluctuates between bilateralism and multilateralism, the true "net" effect of ASEM 
on cooperation between the EC and East Asia, and how the institutional nature of 
ASEM may have affected the multilateral evolution process. Similar to the 
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bilateral study, this multilateral study conducts an analysis of the balancing act 
between ideational and material interests as well as a focus on the institutional 
nature of the relationship. In order to understand the direction of evolution in the 
EC-East Asian multilateral process a material, institutional, and ideational 
analysis is applied to the study in the second section of the Chapter. By the end 
of this Chapter, we can expect to find some important insights into the nature of 
cooperation as well as some answers to the questions interregionalism poses 
about multilateral cooperation. 
Table 19: Trends and Triangulation in EC-East Asian Multilateral Cooperation 
Vertical Analysis 
(Section I) 
Progression from bilateralism to multilateralism and trends and 
trajectories from ASEM Ito V. 
Horizontal Material Interest, Institutions, and Ideas as seen in ASEM 
Analysis 
(Section II) 
Key Questions ASEM led by states or is it sufficiently institutionalised? 
and Propositions Accentuates hierarchy or manages anarchy? Does ASEM 
in IPE and undermine global liberalisation efforts? Balance between 
Interregionalism material interest, institutions and Ideas? 
When studying multilateral interregionalism, an issue which cannot be avoided 
any longer is the inseparability of bilateralism and multilateralism. This thesis 
initially analyses these two processes separately, as is the purpose of chapters 5 
and 6, but the fact that one cannot be mentioned without the other demonstrates 
their interdependence on each other. This is a theme analysed in depth in the 
Conclusion, but an example is once again presented in the very next section 
which shows how bilateralism gradually transitioned towards multilateralism in 
the 1990s. 
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From Bilateralism to Multilateralism in the 1990s 
As was outlined in Chapter 5's analysis of EC-East Asian interregional 
bilateralism, the EC had a constant and intensive bilateral engagement with the 
East Asian states of Japan, the ROK and China, but prior to the 1990s, little 
attempt was made to engage these important East Asian states in a multilateral 
framework. The most apparent attempts to set up the framework for regular 
institutional contact between Asia and Europe in a multilateral context started 
with the establishment of ASEAN in 1968. The ability for region to region 
negotiations allowed for informal contacts to be created during the period ranging 
from 1976 to 1980 (Forster 2000: 790). An institutional link originated in 1972 
when ASEAN members Malaysia and Singapore expressed concerns that 
market access might be reduced due to loss of preferences resulting from 
Britain's impending membership of the European Community. This grew into 
formal consultations which resulted in the beginning of a full dialogue 
relationship, with regular attendance, at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meetings 
(ASEAN-PMC) with other industrialising states from the Asia Pacific in November 
1978 (Leifer 1998: 200). During this period, there is no evidence that the EC had 
any' plans to incorporate Japan, the ROK, or China into the multilateral 
framework. 
During the period before 1980, it appears that motives and incentives for 
European multilateral cooperation with East Asia were negligible. Despite Asia's 
relatively large propensity for development, it was showing no signs of the 
economic boom which would characterise the region's development during the 
1980s onwards. The rise of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) generated 
some conflict of interest between the EC and East Asia, with Taiwan, Hong 
Kong, Singapore and South Korea becoming a serious threat to important areas 
of European production (Holland 2002: 60). 
It is hardly surprising that while escalating EC costs and disputes among 
member states during the early 1980s stalled progress in the EC, the attention of 
the Europeans were turned away from the beginning of the Asian economic 
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boom. While the period from the 1970s to the 1980s saw the rise of Taiwan, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea being joined by the leading countries in 
Southeast Asia, the EC could only come up with the EC-ASEAN Economic and 
Commercial Cooperation Agreement which was generally perceived as 
maintaining the status quo of static cooperation between the two regions 
(Holland 2002: 62). 
The first truly significant multilateral milestone in the EC-Asia Pacific 
relationship was the 1994 European Commission's "Towards a New Asia 
Strategy", which aimed at increasing the EC's economic presence in Asia and 
was, the first document to present a coherent strategy for the EC to deal with Asia 
as a region. It focused on development issues, extending political dialogues, and 
promoting democracy, good governance, and the rule of law (CEC 1994). 
Notably, although not unexpectedly due to the decreasing significance of ASEAN 
vis a vis Japan and the NICs,. ASEAN was relegated to "one of the key elements 
of its (the EC's) Asia policy (CEC 1994). This problem was later fixed by the 
"Creating a New Dynamic in EC-ASEAN Relations" communication in 1996 (CEC 
1996), although the Burmese accession to ASEAN quickly created obstacles for 
the relationship. 
The 1994 strategy, like much of Europe's strategy towards Asia, appears 
to have been more of a reaction to the escalating significance of the Asian 
economy, rather than a pre-emptive effort in establishing a strong relationship 
between the two regions (Murray 2006: 6). It was, however, important in the 
sense that it introduced a more positive and proactive approach to Asia and the 
growing significance of the region (Hwee 2006: 3). The 1994 strategy was the 
first document to deal with Asia as a region, and also appeared to present an 
understanding of both the concept of Asia and a broader sense of engagement 
with the region as a whole (Wiessala 2002). It also was significant because it 
specifically mentioned the need for multilateral cooperation between the EC and 
Asia, although suggestions were initially that they should be conducted within the 
context of existing multilateral forums such as GATT and the UN (CEC 1994: 
Section II). Perhaps the most important aspect of this document with respect to 
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multilateral issues is to raise the significance of trade liberalization within the 
multilateral system as well as placing an emphasis on the EC's need to place 
great emphasis on marketing opening for trade in goods and services. The 1994 
Asia Strategy makes a note of the need to "integrate into the open, market-based 
world trading system" a number of Asian countries, including China, which was 
moving from state controls to market-orientated economies (CEC 1994: Section 
V). 
East Asia's economic progress, its propensity for protectionism, the nature 
of its corporatist economy, and the EC's increased level of integration and 
institutional capacity all appear to have played a role in the EC's attempt to draw 
the East Asians into a multilateral cooperation process. After over 30 years of 
trial and error at the bilateral level, particularly in trying to open the Asian markets 
and'to improve the EC's trade deficits, it is perhaps unsurprising that the 1994 
Asia Strategy makes explicit mention of trade liberalization based on the existing 
market-based world trading system. 
ASEM I- Drawing East Asia Into a Multilateral Framework? 
Chapter 5 indicates that three trends are observable in the EC's bilateral 
relationships with East Asia during the mid 1990s. First, it was clear that the EC 
was having serious difficulties handling the East Asians' increasing economic 
growth through a purely bilateral framework. The direct consequence of this is 
the manner in which, despite constant negotiation and attempts at cooperation, 
the EC's trade deficit against the Asians have continued to grow due to most of 
the Asian's extremely rapid economic growth (see bilateral trade data graph 
1990-1996). Secondly, there was an attempt to draw the East Asians into a 
global multilateral framework, either with China through the WTO or Japan with 
the Hague Declaration, or to a lesser extent the ROK through WTO dispute 
settlement mechanisms. Thirdly, from the early 90s to mid 90s, the bilateral 
cooperation process between the EC and East Asia appears to have been facing 
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an early period of stagnation, noted by cooling enthusiasm for each other as 
economic partners (see Chapter 5). 
For a number of reasons, it is obvious that the EC could not afford to lose 
access to the three East Asian states along with ASEAN as major trading 
partners. Its lack of presence in Asia meant that it was at a severe disadvantage 
to the United States, a fact reflected in the high amount of trade and investments 
between Asia and the US as well as a more long-standing relationship between 
the two regions (Dent 1997). A developing distrust of the Asians towards the EC, 
often perceived as "fortress Europe", meant that the relationship and prospects 
for cooperation were even lower. By 1996, and despite the "Creating a New 
Dynamic in EC-ASEAN Relations" communication, relations further deteriorated 
with ASEAN's willingness to permit the accession of Myanmar to ASEAN. The 
EC's decision to enforce industrial and agricultural sanctions in response to the 
use of forced labour further marred relations (Forster 2000: 9). 
By this time, the global political economy could be seen as three sides 
creating a triangular relationship. The first, and strongest, side is the Western 
Europe and North America side. The second strongest side is between North 
America and East Asia. Despite the third side, the EC and East Asia, being the 
oldest one historically, it had proven to be the weakest one in political, economic, 
and cultural and intellectual exchange (Krenzier 2002: 2). 
Realising both that the third side of the angle had to be reinforced 
(Krenzler 2002: 2), as well as recognising the threat of further deterioration in 
relations between Asia and the EC (Forster 2000: 795), it was Singapore's Prime 
Minister Goh Chok Tong who eventually came up with the idea of ASEM (Lim 
2001: 91). Europe was attracted to the ASEM format because it offered a way 
out of a completely deadlocked relationship with ASEAN without having to revise 
the Cooperation Agreement and Europe's new economic, political, and strategic 
priorities. It helped to widen EC involvement in the region and offered non-legally 
binding arrangements based upon a high degree of informality (Forster 2000: 
796). In addition to this, the economic incentive for the EC was far from 
negligible, with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
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figures stating that in 1995, Asia made up 23.2% of the EC's external trade 
(Gilson 2004: 186). The 1996 Bangkok Declaration, established at ASEM I, could 
also be considered a rather muted reaction to the American's active involvement 
in the region, beginning in 1989 with the establishment of the APEC, an 
international economic organisation Europe was inconspicuously missing from 
(Hwee 2002: 21). 
The desire for cooperation between the EC and Asia is obvious, although 
the extent to which cooperation would be taken is, and has always been quite 
ambiguous. The Asian initiative for ASEM, spearheaded by Singapore, clearly 
showed that ASEAN saw a strong potential in its ties with the EC. The fact that 
ASEM *eventually included Japan, Korea, and China in the forum, however, 
positively indicates ASEAN awareness that its attractiveness alone was not 
enough for EC to seriously engage with. In fact, the inclusion of these three 
critical East Asian states was considered to be the core distinction between the 
previous multilateral engagements (such as the EC-ASEAN dialogue) which 
were already in place (Gilson 2004: 313). The inclusion of the large Japanese 
economy as well as potential benefits of access to China's market was also 
regarded as incentives for cooperation (Holland 2002: 64). The multilateral, 
flexible, nature of ASEM, aided with the attraction of access to Japan, Korea, and 
China's economic potential, appears to be the real driving force behind the EC's 
enthusiasm to initiate cooperation in the form of ASEM. 
The deteriorating relationship between ASEAN and the EC might have 
been the reason that moved the Singaporean Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong to 
propose the formation of ASEM (Camroux and Lechervy 1996). Forster explains 
that'ASEM was a novel means for the EC to get out of an increasingly obsolete 
relationship with ASEAN and also allows the EC to have an larger involvement in 
the region (2000). Allen and Smith further state that a more balanced regional 
approach between the EC and ASEAN could be reached, with ASEM providing 
for comprehensive, big picture issues, while ASEAN allows for more specific 
focus as well as political issues (2002: 101). 
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Table 20: Initial Motives and Expectations for EC-East Asian multilateral cooperation as seen in 
ACF. M 
EC ASEAN +3 
get out of deadlocked relationship with ASEAN continued economic relationship with a major trade bloc 
increased presence within Asia-Pacific and counterbalance US increased channels of access with the EC 
dominance in region counterbalance to US hegemony within the region 
increased trade with the Asia Pacific, especially with Japan, group to group means of negotiations based on "Asian 
China, and Korea values" (informality) 
opportunity for a flexible and multilayered, although structured, 
relationship with Asia 
The inaugural ASEM I meeting in Bangkok included 25 Asian and European 
countries and the Commission. The main objective of the meeting, attended by 
heads of government from twenty states, Foreign or Home Affairs Ministers from 
four EC states, and the Chinese Prime Minister, was to establish mutual 
confidence in the process and to set guidelines for future meetings. The 
"Chairman's Statement" from Bangkok is the main guiding document for the 
ASEM process and establishing three pillars: one pillar is concerned with 
fostering political dialogue, one with re-enforcing economic co-operation, and one 
with promoting co-operation in the social and cultural fields. It was at ASEM I 
where its key characteristics of informality, multidimensionality, and high level 
focus were established (CEC 2002b). The general conclusion gathered from both 
the EC and Asian participants was that ASEM I had clearly achieved it goals and 
set up high expectations for future cooperation (Dent, 1997). 
Even as there was consensus that ASEM I had accomplished its set 
targets, the very principles which characterise the forum - informality, 
multidimensionality, and high level focus - may have set up a poor foundation for 
future cooperation due to the manner in which it "risks slumping further into a 
bureaucratic arrangement in which process becomes as important as outcome" 
(Gilson 2004: 195). The weakness of the process revealed even during this early 
stage when it was being heralded as a success when the "Trade Facilitation 
Action Plan" and the "Investment Promotion Action Plan" were clearly found to be 
non-controversial and evasive of possibly contentious economic issues (Dent 
2004, Hwee 2004: 28). Economic interests did not mean only market access for 
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the EC, but it appears that the EC also had an interest in protecting its domestic 
market through trade defence weapons. 
Table 21: Agrees Key LnaracterIsncs of the AýIEIVI rrocess 
its informality (complementing rather than duplicating the work already being carried out in bilateral and 
multilateral fora); 
its multidimensionality (carrying forward political, economic and cultural dimensions equally) 
its emphasis on equal partnership, eschewing any "aid-based" relationship (taken forward under our bilateral 
relations) in favour of a more general process of dialogue and cooperation 
and its high-level focus, stemming from the Summits themselves. 
(CEC 2002A) 
One of the key conclusions of the inaugural Bangkok Summit was that the 
relationship be based on reciprocity. As an informal process, there was also a 
general agreement that ASEM need not be institutionalised. Instead, it was 
expected to promote dialogue between governments, between the business and 
private sectors of the two regions, and between peoples of the two regions (CEC 
1996). Despite the difficulties in trade protectionism pointed out above, leaders 
involved in the ASEM process hoped that this cooperation based on partnership 
and reciprocity would result in mutual benefits that would often be intangible. 
ASEM II - Does Money Matter? 
Ironically, the strongly mutual cooperation process lasted only a year before the 
Asian economic crisis hit Thailand and snowballed to South Korea. This 
effectively turned the tables around with Europe suddenly finding itself with a 
larger trade deficit against Asia than ever before due to Asia's currency 
devaluations and being subject to a test of whether the ASEM process would 
flourish under a considerably less prosperous Asia. The balance of trade 
favouring ASEM at 30 billion ECUs before the financial crisis tripled by the end of 
the 1990s (Holland 2002: 65). Despite the European side's announcement of 
commitment towards aiding the Asian economy, ASEM 11 and III offered little 
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promise of any substantial action or policies between the two regions. 
Interestingly, despite the hype of two years previously, the British Foreign Office 
Minister Derek Fatchett wrote that 'ASEM should not and will not replace or 
overshadow our various bilateral relationships with Asian partners' and that 
ASEM should instead foster the respective bilateral ties (Fatchett 1999: 25). 
The principle of reciprocity was not easy to uphold at the 1998 ASEM II 
summit in London, held shortly after the 1997 Asian economic crisis. Though by 
June 1997 the EC had already established a range of technical and financial 
support linkages and was voting in favour of the main multilateral support 
initiatives, still some media on both sides challenged the relevance of ASEM. 
Despite some criticism from the media, the leaders convened at ASEM II 
reaffirmed their pledges of mutual support and addressed the cohesion of the 
ASEM process and its long-term implications (Holland 2002: 77). 
There were concerns that at ASEM II, held right after the Asia crisis, EC 
officials were quick to raise the issue of Burma and human rights, an issue 
previously classified as highly sensitive in the EC-ASEM relationship. The Asia 
economic crisis may have dulled the EC's enthusiasm for a relationship with the 
EC, particularly when trade deficits rose and the Asian economic miracle were 
stunted (Helsinki 2006: 32). The notion of "neutrality", intended to facilitate the 
discussion of potentially contentious issues, was challenged at this second 
summit and a subsequent report by a vision group eventually demonstrated how 
much more ASEM could do with regards to human rights and the opening of 
markets (Gilson 2005: 314). When the issue of human rights was raised despite 
the Asian ASEM members protests, it appeared that the degree of reciprocity 
and equality previously promised at the Bangkok Declaration was no longer in 
place. Placing conditionality on the EC-ASEM relationship, however, has been 
rather unsuccessful in the past due to the heterogeneity of the Asia-Pacific 
region, the economic parity between the two regions, and the informality of the 
ASEM dialogue which prevents formal establishment of the conditionality into the 
relationship. 
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While an ongoing dialogue was institutionalised, the potential for greater 
cooperation was not being realised. As previously mentioned, an important 
consequence of its informality is that each ASEM Summit usually did not have a 
fixed official agenda, and each representative was allowed to bring their agenda 
to the table as long as it was not previously specified as a taboo topic (Hwee 
2002). The informal process and focus on dialogue meant that little was put on 
paper and a means to enforce the agreements were lacking. Even before ASEM 
III convened, the Commission was already warning of "fatigue" in the ASEM 
process if there was not more substance in the discussions (CEC 2000: 2). This 
very institutional flaw, sometimes dubbed "soft institutionalization", meant that the 
Europeans were only able to express their concerns and commitments to aid 
Asia in its financial (Helsinki 2006: 32). 
In January 1999 the European Commission's DG1 for External Relations 
attempted to confirm the relevance of ASEM and published an overview of 
Europe's material and political commitments to Asia, as compared to that of the 
US. Making use of the publication, Schmit notes: 
"The figures illustrating the EU's commitments in Asia 
put the question of relevance into proper perspective. 
Together EU countries account for some 30% of the IMF 
quota, 27% of the subscribed capital of the World Bank 
and 14% of that of the Asian Development Bank. The 
total value of financial support from Europe to Asia stood 
at almost Euro 27 billion, which is 18% of the total as 
compared to an American share of 15%. In 1998 Europe 
has seen a negative effect on the trade balance with Asia 
amounting to some Euro 50 billion as compared to USD 
45 billion cushioned by the USA. The figures for overseas 
development aid and humanitarian aid from the Union to 
the region triple and double those of the USA. Of the total 
value of debt relief schemes the European share was 
75% compared to a 10% share for the USA. Meanwhile 
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Europe's paid up share in UN dues is proportionally 
higher as compared with the partly overdue share of the 
US estimated at USD 1.3 billion". (Schmit, 2002: 42) 
Despite the EC's reaffirmation of Asia's importance, Gilson notes that the most 
substantial move to help the Asian's in this time of need was made through 
ASEM II's Trade and Investment Pledge and the Trust Fund at the World Bank 
from June 1998 (2004: 194). This has not been considered to be a helpful 
package and only promised a total of ECU 42 million to assist the seven 
countries most affected by the Asian financial crisis for technical assistance, 
advice on restricting their financial sectors, and measures to deal with the 
growing social problems caused by the crisis (Gilson 2004: 194). The sum is 
considered to be "paltry" considering the seriousness of the crisis, and 
"essentially revealed the lack of EC 'trust' in East Asia" and was a "passive, not 
proactive" action, Dent states (2003: 231). This particular failure to aid the ailing 
Asian economy was considered to have disappointed several Asian member 
countries which hoped that ASEM would be a "solidarity instrument': ' (Park 
2005: 35). Other observers have called ASEM's failure in this instance "typical 
examples of fair weather cooperation" and that the failure of the institution as 
crisis management mechanism is due to its low level of institutionalization and 
"aversion to hard law and binding agreements" (Rüland 2002: Section 1). 
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ASEM III - More Politics, Less Economics? 
To avoid risking the ASEM process derailing, the ASEM leaders agreed that the 
main challenge in the 2000 ASEM III Summit in Seoul was to confirm the real 
value of the ASEM process, both for governmental participants and for the 
broader public (CEC 2000). The EC's goals for ASEM III was to be an affirmation 
that Asia remained the EC's largest trading partner, a reassurance than despite 
the EC's transformations, it continued to remain outward-looking, and an attempt 
to broaden and deepen political dialogue with Asia. In the words of Michael 
Reiterer, the Commission's ASEM Counsellor, the third summit in Seoul "needed 
to demonstrate that there need not be dramatic events occurring to justify 
meetings of European and Asian heads of state or government" (2000: 1). In 
other words, ASEM needed to be seen as an institution, not just as a crisis 
management mechanism. This justification may have eventually have been 
founded in the manner in which ASEM III evolved to see politics take a more 
prominent position at the summit than economics. 
It appears that if there were no dramatic events, one would be instigated 
in any case, just for the sake of having an agenda for discussion at the summit. 
Reiterer admitted that from an ASEAN perspective, the "Summit might have been 
overshadowed by the DPRK" (2000: 3). In this instance, attempts to develop a 
more tangible political focus were interrupted by events on the Korean Peninsula. 
The ASEM partners offered to facilitate confidence-building measures, enhance 
regional stability, and eventually aid in the reunification of North and South 
Korea. Not too surprisingly, the EC was unable to take a common response to 
the question of establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea. 
The Seoul Summit managed to adopt the Asia-Europe Cooperation 
Framework (AECF), the Seoul Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula, 
and the chairman's statement. At China's and some other Asian nations' request, 
a clause on weapons of mass destruction was deleted from the Seoul 
Declaration for Peace on the Korean Peninsula, showing a clear divide in 
interests as far as security matters are concerned (Shin 2000). Some observers 
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felt that the Seoul meeting was groundbreaking because of the additional focus 
on the political pillar over the economic pillar although other analysts felt that this 
was due to a decreased European interest in Asia after the financial crisis 
(Helsinki 2006: 32). 
The Asian economic recovery took place amid a period of a cautious 
global economy, experiencing generally slow overall growth. Although signs of 
economic recovery were present, the world was unexpectedly hit by the events of 
September 11 and eventually the war against terrorism took over the global 
agenda as well as that of ASEM. 
ASEM IV -Towards or Against Global Multilateralism? 
Hwee described the 2002 Copenhagen Summit to be "as good as it gets", and 
explained how the presence of twenty two out of twenty six leaders and the fact 
that' political leaders came properly briefed by their officials on what to expect 
were a sign of ASEM's political significance (2003: 52). Other signs of a "good 
forum" were reflected in how there was good interactive discussion rather than 
prepared statements and how no issues were off-limits (Hwee 2003: 53). While 
these may have been markers for good dialogue to some degree, it was clear 
how. low expectations had become for ASEM IV. Gilson instead describes this 
summit as "a somewhat muted affair" (2005: 315). The issue of multilateralism, 
however, came to the foreground of the summit and was meant to promote 
ASEM as a forum for pre-emptive discussion on WTO issues became a key 
focus of discussion. Expectations at this stage appeared to be that ASEM 
needed to evolve to serve a global multilateral purpose, but whether it was 
capable was a strong point of contention. 
The key economic development at the Copenhagen Summit was an 
agreement among the summit leaders that the ASEM process is an effective 
instrument for consultation on the WTO DOHA Development Agenda. The Fourth 
ASEM Economic Ministers' Meeting in 2002 met within ASEM's context to 
discuss in advance items on the WTO's Doha Development Agenda (Gilson 
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2004). It was agreed that two rounds of consultations by WTO experts would 
help in preparations for the WTO mid-term Ministerial Meeting in Cancun in 
autumn 2003 (CEC 2002). The Chairman's statement actually predicted a fresh 
assessment after a successful end to the Doha Development Agenda, so that 
Region-to-region cooperation should then be enhanced "including new steps 
aimed at furthering economic integration between the two regions" (CEC 2002). 
To prepare for this in more detail, the ASEM economic leaders asked the ASEM 
coordinators to set up an action-oriented Task Force which would encourage 
closer cooperation in the areas of trade, investment, and finance (Krenzler 
2002: 8). 
At the Fifth ASEM Economic Ministers Meeting, where Krenzler had 
hoped that ASEM could play an "important role as a catalyst for action in other 
action oriented fora" (2002: 11) an apparent loss of interest in the process on the 
part of Europeans was evident. During July 23rd to 24th, only economic ministers 
from France, Luxembourg, Ireland and the EC trade commissioner participated in 
the meeting while most Asian nations sent their ministers. The other EC 
members sent only deputy economic ministers or their representatives. An Asian 
participant actually observed that "Most read notes in the meeting which added 
nothing to cooperation" (Pongvutitham 2003). The indifference of the EC 
representatives in ministerial meetings leading up to ASEM V may also serve as 
a degree of proof that Europe's interest in Asia was diminishing, although it was 
noted by an observer that the forum fatigue usually manifests itself at lower 
levels rather than at summit attendances (Reiterer 2004: 10). 
In addition to this, the establishment of a new task force was agreed on to 
find tangible routes to enhance the EC-East Asian economic relationship. Macro- 
projects within the framework were encouraged and ASEM was encouraged to 
look at closer coordination of activities across its three pillars. At ASEM IV, 
members were also encouraged to take a closer examination on how it could 
interact positively and proactively with other multilateral organisations (Gilson 
2004: 196). Some observers feel that this attempt at global multilateralism was 
doomed from the beginning as the Doha round trade agenda had been "both 
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overloaded and accelerated by the EC, and the US and its allies" and that 
developing countries had not been given the opportunity to fairly negotiate at the 
WTO (Kwa 2002: 26). Kwa argued that the developing Asian ASEM member's 
lack of technical expertise in negotiations and the unfairness of the Doha 
discussions had served as a fateful backdrop of the Copenhagen summit 
(2002: 26). The eventual failure of interregional multilateral forums such as ASEM 
and APEC to make an impact on the Doha round was some proof of Kwa's 
predictions, and the manner in which the G-21 coalition included key members of 
APEC and ASEM meant the value of these forums for global multilateral forums 
such as the WTO was limited (Economist 20 Sep 2003: 26-28). Some analysts 
went as far as to state that ASEM's aim to promote trade liberalisation looks 
"complete unrealistic for the near future" due to the members' inability to 
reconcile fundamental differences (Maull and Okfen 2003: 245). 
The Asia-Europe Cooperation Framework (AECF) was not a framework 
seriously discussed in the fourth ASEM Summit in Copenhagen two years later. 
Issues on the fight against terrorism rose high on the agenda after the events of 
September 11. The Bali attack, occurring not long after the September 11 events, 
also urged ASEM coordinators to establish an ad hoc informal consultative 
mechanism enabling ASEM coordinators and senior officials to "confer 
expeditiously on significant international events" (Krenzler 2002: 5). This appeared 
to be a particularly bold move in the political pillar of ASEM where agreements 
among nations concerning political events are scarce, both on the side of the EC 
and their Asian counterparts. It has been pointed out that that the political talks, 
normally unwelcome particularly on sensitive issues at ASEM, may have been 
the lifeline of ASEM in this case because the ASEM economic justification after 
the Asian economic crisis may not have been enough to sustain the process (Lim 
2003: 132). 
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ASEM V- Enlarging ASEM 
If for nothing else, ASEM V will be remembered as the enlargement ASEM, with 
the new 10 EC member states being added to ASEM's membership. Along with 
the EC's enlarged membership came the troubling issue of Burma's membership, 
whereby the Asian members of ASEM argued that Burma should be allowed to 
join the forum simply due to the fact that it was an active member of ASEAN. 
While ASEM IV was called a muted affair, Asem V was, in similar vein, 
considered a "transition summit" (Helsinki 2006: 33). 
The fifth ASEM Summit held in Hanoi, Vietnam, 7-9 October 2004, under 
the theme 'Further Revitalising and Substantiating the Asia-Europe Partnership', 
was inevitably affected by the issue of Burma (CEC 2004). Instead of growing 
into a mature and structured framework for cooperation in its upcoming fifth 
summit, the Asian and European counterparts of ASEM were instead fixed in a 
struggle over the inclusion of Burma in ASEM. A conference of EC foreign 
ministers in Luxembourg cancelled a meeting of ASEM finance ministers in 
Brussels in July and a meeting of economic ministers in the Netherlands in 
September, apparently due to Asian ASEM members' insistence that Burma be 
included in the upcoming summit. Here, there was division amongst the 
Europeans themselves with the UK and Netherland pushing for a harder stance, 
while France was supporting more mediation (Perreira 2005: 18). Indonesia and 
Thailand had already criticised the decision to cancel the two ministerial 
meetings, which they said had been made without proper consultation with 
ASEAN. Reiterer argues that an imbalance exists in ASEM's enlargement logic, 
since the degree of EC integration almost obliges automatic inclusion of the EC's 
new member states into the ASEM process (2004: 9). In effect, this puts the 
European in control over ASEM enlargement on the EC side (Reiterer 2004: 9). 
Ironically, ASEM V's success may have been that despite cancellations of lower 
level meetings and the haggling over enlargement, the summit even took place 
(Helsinki 2006: 33). 
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This seems to point toward increasing indifference toward ASEM by its 
European members. The focus of the ASEM process has been mainly economic, 
and trade figures show that the Asian half of ASEM has been the main 
beneficiary of closer channels of access to their European counterparts (see 
trade figures 1996-2004). Even at that stage, the EC's trade deficit with its Asian 
ASEM partners remained an issue on the table at ASEM summits. Figures show 
the EC's external trade with China, one of the main motivations for cooperating in 
the ASEM process, experiencing a widening deficit, one that quadrupled from 
ECU11.6 billion in 1995 to ECU44.6 billion in 2000 (Eurostat 2000). Similar 
albeit less-drastic trends existed in figures for EC trade with the rest of the Asian 
ASEM members. 
. 
If the EC's interest in ASEM had waned due to the Asian economic crisis 
and continued trade deficit with Asia, it would have decreased further with 
ASEAN+3's almost complete refusal to discuss sensitive political issues, denying 
the EC a coveted position in becoming a major player in the region. Since ASEM 
I, human rights have constantly been a European concern, whereas Asian 
participants have preferred an exclusive focus on trade. The European partners 
only agreed to Burma's accession a month before the Summit, and only under 
the condition that it would be represented at a level lower than the head of state 
or the head of government. ' 
The European members used this. opportunity to express their concerns 
over the issue of human rights in Burma, and urged for a successful national 
reconciliation process as well as the reestablishment of Burma's political party 
freedom. In a Foreign Minister's meeting held later on October 11, a set of new 
measures were agreed on including: (i) an expansion of the visa ban; (ii) 
prohibition of EC companies financing state-owned Burma/Myanmar enterprises; 
(iii) extension of loans by international organisations to Burma/Myanmar (vote by 
EC Member States) (Perreira 2005: 18). 
It has been accepted that ASEM V can be considered a "transition 
summit" with no landmark decisions (Perreira 2005: 19), although similar 
conclusions could perhaps be reached concerning the past few ASEM summits. 
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While the issue of Burma dominated issues on one front, the other half of the 
effort was spent discussing issues which were brought to. attention due to the 
changing global political economy. This included the ongoing issue of terrorism, 
environment, global diseases, and regional themes of common interest. 
On the economic front, most of the discussion centred around energy 
issues, an issue particularly relevant due to the current rise on world oil prices 
(Perreira 2005: 19). As a result, the leaders established a Hanoi Declaration on 
Closer ASEM Economic Partnership, a document aimed at reiterating the 
principles of ASEM economic cooperation, recognising the economic potential of 
the two regions, encouraging the. improvement of the Asian economy, and 
reaffirming the commitment to work together to overcome challenges in the 
global political economy (CEC: Hanoi Declaration 2004). Once again, this 
declaration merely embodied a set of principles and intent rather than a set and 
actionable work plan. 
The Task Force for an Asia-Europe Closer Economic Partnership did, 
however, manage to present five concrete proposals including the creation of a 
virtual ASEM Secretariat, an ASEM Bond Market and Bond Fund, incorporation 
of regular consultations on energy issues into the ASEM Economic Pillar, 
creation of an ASEM Virtual Promotion for Trade, Investment and Tourism, and 
creation of an ASEM Business Advisory Council. 28 
The issue of forum fatigue nevertheless resurfaced once again in a 
document entitled "recommendations for ASEM working methods" whereby a set 
of recommendations have been made for the Foreign Ministers' approval. Some 
of the recommendations included requests for means to facilitate a fuller 
participation by Foreign Ministers, suggestions that the Senior Official's Meetings 
(SOMs) should become a place for substantial policy discussion, and increasing 
the visibility of ASEM through generalised use of the ASEM logo (CEC: Annex 2 
of Statement). This may indicate how the forum is struggling for recognition and 
perhaps, to justify its existence. 
28 http'//www realinStitutoelcano. ore/especiales/asem/docs/20040914ASEMTaskForceFinalReportpdf (Accessed: 12th September 
2006) 
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Tahln 22" FC-Fact Asia Multilateral Evolution of Cooneration 
Date EC's Stance Surrounding Circumstances Outcome 
1994-1996 Cooperation East Asia's rapid economic Great enthusiasm for the launching of ASEM 
(ASEM I) growth, bilateral trade deficits project, the Asian side's economic strength meant 
large and some stagnation of that they were able to talk to the EC on their own 
bilateral cooperation, terms - this meant that informality was accepted as 
establishment of APEC, trend an ASEM principle from the beginning 
towards multilateralism in general 
1996-1998 Indifference 1997 Asian economic crisis Clear signs that EC and East Asian partners were 
(ASEM II) effects, some momentum not on equal economic strengths any longer, EC 
maintained from ASEM I, some trade deficits became wider due to currency 
sign of forum fatigue fluctuation, no fixed official agenda at summit, little 
help from Europe to assist with the Asian financial 
crisis, 
1998-2000 Indifference Forum fatigue still a problem, Summit focused mainly on resolving existing 
(ASEM III) Asia still recovering from problems in the Korean peninsula, issues proposed 
economic crisis at meetings in between and summit were 
intangible and vague, the ASEM process was 
turning increasingly bureaucratic 
2000-2002 Indifference September 11 and other terrorist EC moves towards making ASEM a supporting 
(ASEM IV) activity, WTO Doha rounds forum for the WTO, struggle to justify ASEM's 
existence, most of the summit dominated by the 
issue of global terrorism 
2002-2004 Defection/ EU enlargement leading to Asian Transition summit, no landmark decisions, 
(ASEM V) Indifference members' insistence that cancellation of two ministerial meetings prior to the 
Myanmar be included in ASEM summit due to the issue of Myanmar inclusion, 
enlargement agreed - but forum fatigue and 
justification of ASEM existence was still a problem 
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Material, Institutional, and Ideational Influences 
In order to examine the material, ideational, and institutional influences within the 
EC-East Asian multilateral relationship as seen in ASEM, this Chapter takes on 
the same process as Chapter 5. The same key three elements; trade, 
institutional development and dialogue intensification, and strategic documents 
are observed in order to extract the material, institutional, and ideational 
influences within the multilateral framework. As argued in Chapter 5, one can 
expect either a predominance of material, institutional, and ideational influences 
to be present in each of the key elements, or an equal mix of each. 
First, the examination of trade statistics will analyse the trade flows 
occurring between the EC and the Asian ASEM members. The dynamics taking 
place as shown by these trade statistics could be both an indicator of why the 
relationship has taken the form that it has and a test of whether ASEM may have 
become dominated by a material focus. Not unlike the bilateral trade 
examinations, any fluctuations in the multilateral relationship occurring due to 
trade deficits and imbalances are expected to be an indicator of the 
predominance of material interest. Likewise, if the multilateral relationship is 
comfortably sustained despite noticeable lack of reciprocity in trade figures, it 
could indicate towards the influence of institutional or ideational influences. 
Secondly, the multilateral institutionalisation and dialogue intensification 
examination focuses on the key historical highlights in the creation of multilateral 
institutionalisation and the dialogue occurring during ASEM's short history. Over 
the years, ASEM has become an increasingly complex interregional forum 
involving a very large number of high level meetings as well as working groups. 
The "institutionalisation" of the relationship could possibly point towards an 
increased consideration of ideational factors, although the nature of interaction 
during ASEM activities could also point towards increased material interest. It is 
important for this section on institutions to observe the nature of interaction within 
the ASEM framework to determine whether the increased institutionalisation of 
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the process has been a factor in leading towards, restraining, or framing 
ideational or material gains. 
The institutional examination also needs an analysis of the key historical 
junctures and directly links back to the material examinations. This is an 
important examination particularly because they could point towards how key 
policymakers among the ASEM members have decided to react to constantly 
shifting trade statistics. The historical junctures would. be a measure of how idea, 
values, and codes of conduct might have been applied as a response to 
constantly shifting material interests. This examination is once again applied to 
measure the balance between material and ideational interest in the ASEM 
process. 
Finally, a rhetorical analysis of the numerous key strategic documents and 
statements in the ASEM process will be undertaken in order to determine the 
level of material, ideational, and institutional influences within the relationship. In 
the past decade, the summits and ministerial meetings have resulted in several 
statements and documents which is expected to serve as an indication of the 
direction the EC 'thinks' the relationship is taking. The documents produced at 
and between ASEM summits are a examination of the balance between what the 
ASEM partners might consider to be desired ideas and values or embedded 
vested material interests. This rhetorical analysis would help to ascertain how 
material, ideational, and institutional influences may have become a part of 
ASEM and a result of its various sessions of negotiations. 
The observations are designed to examine exactly how materialism, 
ideas, and institutions are considered important in this multilateral relationship, 
and consequently, how this might result in cooperation or defection within the 
relationship. By the end of this Chapter, the balance between material interest, 
ideational values, and institutional influences and how this has affected 
multilateralism as is witnessed in ASEM should become clear. As a 
consequence, the evaluation of the influences within the ASEM cooperation 
process will help us to enhance our understanding of cooperation within 
multilateral interregionalism. 
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EC-East Asia Multilateral Trade: Indifference Due to Loss of Material 
Interest? 
Current Aggregate Trade Volumes 
As shown in the bilateral studies, the current aggregate trade volume is an 
important examination of the intensity of the interaction as well as the material, 
ideational, or institutional propensity between the trading partners. A number of 
detailed examinations into the current aggregate trade volume between the 
European members of ASEM and the Asian ASEM members are essential in 
determining whether the multilateral forum might have helped to stimulate trade 
as intended. This section will first see whether there is a substantial rise in the 
trade flow between Europe ASEM and Asia ASEM members. Then, it will 
determine the increase in percentage in the share of total EC global trade. 
Finally, it will determine the EC's gains or losses against the individual Asian 
ASEM members. The primary aim in this section is to examination ASEM's 
possible significance in stimulating and facilitating trade as has been the aim of 
the forum leaders. The secondary aim would be to detect any anomalies in the 
trade figures, particularly any imbalances which might lead to decreased 
cooperation between the partners. 
In 1995, immediately before ASEM's conception, the aggregate of EC 
trade with Asian ASEM countries was 223245 million euros while a decade later, 
the total had more than doubled to 493434 million euros (Eurostat 2006). There 
has been a clear and steady rise in the trade interaction between the EC and 
Asian ASEM partners. This is to be expected and does not provide any 
conclusive evidence that the ASEM forum might have contributed to this 
success. The two drops in the total aggregate, once taking place in 1998 and the 
other in 2002, however, are an excellent indicator of how the Asian Economic 
crisis and the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 have had a substantial 
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impact on the rise between trade between the EC and the Asian ASEM 
members. 
Figure 11: EC Total Trade in Goods with ASEM (million Euro) - Eurostat 2005 
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Despite these fluctuations, there appears to be rather clear evidence that the 
volume of trade between the EC and Asia ASEM members has steadily been on 
the increase. Eurostat figures detailing Extra-EC/EU imports by main partner 
countries indicates a larger and growing relative proportion of imports to the EC 
from ASEAN, China, and Japan. This appears to have come at the expense of a 
decreased relationship between the EC and OPEC (Eurostat 200: 144). Extra- 
EC/EU exports by main partner countries to ASEAN, Japan and China also 
shows signs of increased interaction between the two regions, although the 
growth in exports to the Asians are smaller than the Asian exports to the EC. 
This has resulted in the EC's growing trade deficit with their ASEM partners, an 
issue which remains to be solved at the ASEM summits or possibly at the 
bilateral level (Eurostat 200: 144). 
Strong signs of how material interest influence the EC-East Asian 
multilateral relationship clearly lie in the all important statistics of imports, 
exports, and trade balances. Between 1995 and 2005, EC imports from Asian 
ASEM had almost tripled with an increase of 264 percent in the same time span. 
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EC exports to Asian ASEM members, however, only had an increase of 164.9 
percent in the same time period (Eurostat 2006). This is a trend clearly reflected 
in the trade deficits the EC has experienced against the Asian ASEM members. 
Figure 12: EC trade balance with ASEM in Mio Ecu (compiled from Eurostat) 
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1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
EC Imports EC Exports EC Balance (million 
Year (million euro) (million euro) euro) 
1995 126237 97008 29229 
1996 132433 105872 26561 
1997 156910 112743 44167 
1998 176094 88457 87637 
1999 194518 97112 97406 
2000 252262 127014 125248 
2001 255193 135446 119747 
2002 253836 136161 117675 
2003 267867 137549 130318 
2004 299731 152005 147726 
2005 333391 160043 173348 
  Imports 
  Exports 
  Balance 
As concerns trade balances, there appears to be three periods of particular 
significance. The first one is the imbalance increase between 1996 to 1998 which 
could generally be explained by Asia's boom and bust economy. This resulted in 
an increase in the EC's deficit by 329.9 percent in merely two years and a 
serious cause for concern for the Europeans (Eurostat 2006). The second period 
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of interest in the trade imbalances is the levelling of the imbalances between 
2000 and 2002 which may have been the result of a general global economic 
slowdown. The final period of significance is 2004 to 2005 which once again saw 
a relatively large rise in the imbalance, possibly due to China's increased 
economic significance and realisation of its trade potential (Eurostat 2006). This 
final period could point towards a trend of further trade deficits for the EC against 
Asian ASEM members and shows how China's growing economy has been a 
key contributor to the EC's continued deficit against ASEM. 
Figure 1 3: EC Bilateral Trade Deficit Against East Asia (compiled from Eurostat 
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An analysis of the current aggregate trade volumes occurring within the ASEM 
framework needs to take into consideration the nature of the unequal economic 
status of member nations, particularly on the Asian side. The Asian ASEM 
members include the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), Japan, 
South Korea, and China. The three East Asian economies are far more 
significant in economic terms on their own, while the ASEAN members need to 
be considered together to gain an economic significance close to the individual 
significance of Japan, South Korea, and China. This, in itself, might present 
complications into the ASEM process, particularly after the Asian economic crisis 
when the economic progress of some very promising economies in South East 
Asia was clearly hampered. It is expected that such unevenness in the economic 
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significance of each of the Asian member states could affect the evolution of 
cooperation. 
A European Background Study by the University of Helsinki points out 
some very important facts about Asia ASEM's significance as a trade partner and 
the trade imbalances. First, from 1995 to 2004, the Asian ASEM share of total 
EC exports decreased by 1.16 percent while EC imports from Asian ASEM rose 
by 6 percent of the EC total imports. Equally illuminating is how the share of EC 
total exports to Asian ASEM actually decreased despite EC exports to China 
more than tripling during the given time period. Similarly, exports to South Korea 
had risen by almost 45 percent. Exports to Japan over the ten year period 
showed an overall increase of 31 percent, a figure notably decreased by 
declining EC exports to Japan between 2000 to 2004 (Helsinki 2006: 108). 
ASEAN's economic significance within the ASEM framework could prove 
to be most worrisome for the Europeans in this context. 1995 to 2004 indicated 
the smallest increase of just over 15 percent in EC exports and a 2.03 percent 
decrease in the share of EC total exports, the largest drop amongst the Asian 
ASEM members with Japan being second (-1.26 percent). Coupled with a 
healthy 99.3 percent increase in EC imports from ASEAN, this presents an 
unhealthy trend in imbalances which shows little potential for improvement for the 
EC (CEC 2002A). Similar troublesome trends for the EC in the trade imbalance 
dynamics are evident with China and Korea, although China trade deficits for the 
EC might be offset by the trend towards and the potential for increased EC 
exports. Korea and ASEAN, on the other hand, clearly do not portray the same 
potential. 
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Institutions, Policy and Policy-Making 
The previous section provided suggestions that material interests observable in 
trade were a strong influence in the multilateral evolution of cooperation between 
the EC and East Asia. Despite the significance of material interests in trade, the 
ASEM process has only cooled down to a point of indifference, not defection by 
an EC which was losing out on material interests in its multilateral participation in 
ASEM. The EC's apparent desire to continue participation in the multilateral fora 
suggests that ASEM holds more than material interest for the EC. To this end, 
this section continues with examinations of ASEM's institutions, policy-making, 
and dialogue intensification to observe how in addition to material interest, 
institutional and ideational factors may be important influences in the evolution of 
EC-East Asia multilateral cooperation. 
The European Commission lists being a dialogue facilitator, a policy- 
making laboratory, and managing growing Europe-Asia relations as the main 
achievements of ASEM. These are divided into the political field, the economic 
and financial field, and the cultural and intellectual pillars (CEC 2005). Despite 
these aims, ASEM has been described as "not institutionalised, yet at the same 
time formalised and even bureaucratic" (Helsinki 2006). Despite this evaluation 
against ASEM's institutionalisation, one would still argue that ASEM's aim for 
comprehensiveness, the system for formal contact it has created, and its 
institutional structure points towards a very strong degree of institutional density 
which has resulted in the intensification of dialogue and facilitation of policy- 
making between the European and Asian partners. This section explores 
ASEM's process of institutionalisation in greater detail and observess how ASEM 
as an institution may, or may not have affected, accentuated or constrained the 
degree of either material interests or ideational values placed within the 
relationship. 
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ASEM's Process of Institutionalisation 
ASEM is the only existing formalised institution to maintain a regional exclusive 
multilateral relationship between EC and Asia. At first sight, it appears to be a 
suitable solution, due to its nature of informality which complements the Asian 
preference for a looser institutional relationship (Dent 1997: 163). It was designed 
to be based on informality, multidimensionality, equality and evolution, and to 
deal with political, economic, cultural and security topics. The main pillars of the 
relations were the political, economic and financial, and culture and technical 
cooperation (Hwee 2003: 229). The Commission expected that the ASEM's 
interregional framework of relations was to be mutually compatible at the 
bilateral level. While was not certain how this would work, analysts were waiting 
for ASEM to be further developed to weigh if it provided a more suitable 
approach than bilateral channels in dealing with certain issues (Dent 1999: 31). 
This may have been early signs of the hope that ASEM would become what 
Dent describes as a multilateral utility (2004). This would have allowed ASEM as 
a forum for multilateral deference whereby problematic issues at the bilateral 
level would be put forward to ASEM at the multilateral level for debate and action 
(Dent 2004). 
An important consequence of its informality was that each ASEM usually 
did not have a fixed official agenda, and each representative was allowed to 
bring their agenda to the table as long as it was not previously specified as a 
taboo topic (Park 2004: 350, CEC 2000b). Even as early as the run-up to the 
inaugural Bangkok summit, it was clear that the objectives and agendas were 
different between the Europeans and the Asians, quite possibly due to the lack 
of common values and cultural differences (The Asia-Europe Summits 1996, 
Hwee 2004: 21). The EC preferred a focus on political and social issues while 
Asian members preferred a focus on economic issues such as the expansion of 
trade and investments. Even when their agendas were the same, there were 
differences in the details. On the WTO, the EC wanted further support for 
negotiations in information technology and telecommunications, financial 
services, and promotion of multilateral investments. The Asian side preferred 
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discussion on issues of protectionism, anti-dumping measures, and the 
possibility of "open regionalism" (Hwee 2002: 2-3). 
On the other hand, the London ASEM Summit could also be viewed as an 
extension of the institutionalisation process which began at the Bangkok ASEM 
Summit. It adopted long-term plans for cooperation through an Asia-Europe 
Cooperation Framework and created an Asia-Europe Vision Group. This 
scheduled a lengthy list of meetings which institutionalised an ongoing dialogue, 
a necessary precondition for greater cooperation (Holland 2002: 77). These were 
made at the level of Foreign Ministries, two representatives from ASEM and two 
from the EC (the Presidency and the Commission), and through senior officials 
meetings where issues of foreign affairs, trade, investment, and finance are 
discussed. It was hoped that regular bureaucratic contact would help to foster 
ties and it has even been argued that due to this building of dialogue, the East 
Asian crisis did not diminish ASEM's importance (Thiel 2000: 89). It has, 
however, been difficult to hope for personal political relationships at the elite 
level, because leaderships are constantly facing changes. In ASEM I to ASEM 
III, spanning 1996-2000, there were major changes in the political elite level in 
the highly important EC member states of UK, France and Germany. This has 
made the ASEM aim of building confidence through personal political 
relationships virtually impossible (Holland 2002: 77). 
At ASEM III, it appeared that there was some consensus that ASEM had 
to evolve into a more substantive body. The leaders from both continents at the 
summit agreed to discuss just one or two topic at future meetings, rather than to 
continue lacking in focus as in the past summits. Observers indicated that this 
agreement would help ASEM to develop from a "ceremonial gathering of 
leaders" into a "consultative body dealing with bilateral pending issues" (Shin 
2000). A diplomatic observer also indicated that the AECF helped to produce a 
blueprint for the ASEM process which helped to lay the groundwork for closer 
cooperation between the two continents (Shin 2000). 
Despite the enthusiastic call for increased cooperation, tangible 
agreements were lacking in even the highly acclaimed AECF. Much of the 
document details continual dialogue between the two continents, a process 
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which had already been established since ASEM I (Dent 1997: 163). Its nature 
was also extremely broad and the three established pillars of economics, politics, 
and culture were proving to become difficult. Sweeping improvements in all 
imaginable areas were proposed (Dent 1997: 163). Meanwhile, the key priority 
continued to be a focus on issues of common interest through step-by-step 
consensus building and increasing mutual awareness and understanding 
between partners. In addition there appeared to be a mismatch in issues which 
the two partners wished to discuss (Hwee 2003). While the Commission seemed 
to prefer increased discussion on the political dialogue, the Asian members of 
ASEM wanted to focus on the economic and cultural pillars of ASEM. A more 
optimistic view of this is that ASEM had now opened new "channels through 
which bargaining takes place and leverage can be exerted" (Smith 1998: 312). 
Krenzler argued that the ASEM IV had "reached a certain level of 
maturity" due to the fact that it is based on reciprocity and even more contentious 
issues, with no guaranteed consensus, could be discussed (2002: 10). He also 
argued that ASEM could play an important role as a catalyst for action is other 
forums, such as the Doha Development Agenda. At some levels, this could hold 
true, although the Copenhagen Summit continued to display signs of forum 
fatigue (Reiterer 2000). While, as Krenzler argued, ASEM is a valuable 
instrument for formalising structures of regional economic integration in Asia, it is 
apparent that the forum, only in its fourth summit, still requires more time to 
evolve into a truly structured framework for cooperation which could yield 
tangible results (2002: 10). By this time, the "forum fatigue" the Commission had 
feared appeared to already be present in the ASEM cooperation process (ASEM 
Chairman's Statement 2000). 
Evaluating ASEM Institutionalisation 
There are three sets of rationales to evaluate ASEM institutionalisation and to 
observe how institutions affect material and ideational influences within the 
multilateral process. It is argued that each of these rationales has its own weight 
of material, ideational, and institutional preferences. The first rationale, 
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demonstrating how institutions can be responsible for sustaining ideas, argues 
that the EC prefers to institutionalise its relationships in the form of 
multilateralism in order to mirror its own institutions, ideas and policy-making 
procedures in the EC's external relations. The second rationale is strongly 
material and proposes that the Asian ASEM side's pragmatism and strong desire 
to increase trade with the EC has had a strong influence in increasing dialogue 
side of ASEM, but also in diluting its institutional evolution through their 
insistence on informality and non-binding rules. The final rationale for the form of 
institutionalisation embodies an equal mix of material, ideational, and institutional 
influences. It argues that the form ASEM has taken on has been strongly 
affected by the evolution and diversification of interests of the EC and East Asia 
occurring over the changes in the global political economy and that ASEM has 
not been able to optimise its institutions and processes because of these 
reasons. 
The first rationale for the form of institutionalisation ASEM has taken on is 
that the EC, as a trading state, often prefers stability established through 
institutions, regulations, and rules, both internally and externally (Smith 2004). In 
this vein, although ASEM is a joint venture between the Europeans and the 
Asian member states, its institutional form mirrors that of the EC's own 
institutional format, although clearly diluted. International arrangements such as 
ASEM are known not only to given a general framework to the relationship, but 
often provide grounds for indirect influence on the members (Aggarwal 2000: 
174-175). Gilson, for example, argues that the ASEM framework has been 
heavily dependent on terms used in fora such as the WTO, APEC, and the 
triadic global economy (2004: 191). These are norms, principles and codes of 
conducts which the EC favours and the mirroring of its own deeply 
institutionalized framework to ASEM is a way of transferring its own norms and 
preferences to its East Asian counterparts. If this first rationale takes 
The ASEM structure certainly cannot be accused of being anything less 
than comprehensive. At the very top lies the summit and the ultimate decision- 
making level where the heads of state and government as well as the President 
of the European Commission meet every two years (CEC 2005). The Summits 
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are a process which is supported by a more frequent set of meetings held by the 
Foreign Ministers, the Finance Ministers, and the Economic Ministers, 
respectively. These ministerial meetings, normally held once a year (although 
current plans might decrease the frequency to once every two years30), are 
supported by a meeting of senior officials from the respective ministries. The 
senior officials meeting (SOM, SOMTI, and FINDEPS) are expected to meet at 
least once a year and current plans target these meetings for twice a year (CEC 
2005). 
Table 24: Frequency of ASEM meetings (compiled by author) 
Level Frequency (years) 
Summit 2 
FMM 1 
FinMM I 
EMM 1 
SOM 0.5-1 
SomTi 0.5-1 
FinDeps 05. -1 
Coordinators (informal) at least 0.5 
ASEP 2 
The European Commission plays a permanent role as the European 
representative in each of these meetings, a status quo which, aided by the 
prominent role of the minister's senior officials, enhances the bureaucratic nature 
of ASEM. At the government to the bureaucratic level, the Ministers and the 
SOM (Senior Official's Meeting) work closely together to set policies for use at 
the summits. At the government level alone, three Asia Europe Parliamentary 
(ASEP) meetings have been held (to 2005) although very little publicity had been 
given to these meetings. The commitment to the ASEP is also in question as the 
meeting skipped six years from 1996 to 2002 before biennial meetings were 
reconvened. The next ASEP meeting was not held until Helsinki in May of 2006 
(CEC 2006). 
Every two years, arguably the most important policy statement in ASEM, 
the Chairman's statement, is declared. This is intended to provide the future 
30 Recommendations for ASEM working methods - Draft Proposals for FMM 6 (CEC 2005) 
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direction of ASEM in a very similar fashion to the EC's own summits and often 
embodies lengthy paragraphs on issues concerning human rights, civil society, 
and free trade. The main difference between the EC and ASEM's summits is that 
the EC's summits are most often far more tangible and substantive, reflected in 
the history-making decisions made at the EC summits (Peterson and Bomberg 
1999: 6-9) which is not emulated at ASEM. This is hardly surprising, since the 
EC's decision-making procedures are already considered to be extremely 
complex (Wallace&Wallace 2005), but the individual treaties at least require a 
promise to commit from its members. ASEM's Bangkok Declaration does not 
include such provisions and requirements to commit to any decision (ASEM 
Declaration 1996). 
The ASEM process standing on its own is hardly impressive and despite 
its complex and comprehensive structure, the policy creation mechanism is still 
far from the standards the EC appears to have set for it. Each of the summits 
results in a non-binding Chairman's Statement often characterised by vagueness 
and intangibility (see section 3). Apart from some very boisterous talk of a EC- 
ASEM free trade area, suggestions which are yet to be seriously discussed, the 
only tangible result of each of the Summits are "commitments" to further engage 
in'trade, political issues, and social issues. 
The ASEM process may however, fulfil some of the EC's desire to 
multilaterally institutionalise its relationship with East Asia, particularly through 
ASEM's economic pillar and in the creation and intensification of dialogue. It has 
developed from "a mere summit to an . entity that encompasses a certain 
structure, generates numerous initiatives, and maintains a certain momentum" 
(Hwee 2003: 28). The multi-layered relationship (Forster 2000), offers several 
levels of contact which allow for further cooperation to be conducted. The ASEM 
meetings, as opposed to formal summits, would allow agreements to, be forged 
without the usual lobbying processes at high level meetings. On the other hand, 
there have been fears, recognised even by the ASEM members and the 
Commission (Chairman's Statement, 2002, CEC 2002,2004), of forum fatigue 
due to the numerous meetings held over the years (see Chapter 6). 
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The ASEM meetings result in a consultative process (rather than a 
negotiation process) based on a non-binding approach which uses the pressure 
of peer groups. and political obligation rather than legal obligations (Forster 
2000: 796). The EC-ASEAN relationship continues to be an important group-to- 
group level relationship, while bilateral government-to-government contacts 
continue to be an important aspect of relations (Forster 2000: 797). This type of 
informality may well be the best means of engaging with Asia, a region 
especially wary of the unfamiliar structure of the EC's institutions and 
governance system. 
Apart from the EC preferring stability built by institutions, there is also a 
strong argument indicating that ASEM has been established as an European 
response to APEC and the trend towards regionalism in general (Lim 2001: 91, 
Rüland 2002: 2). Theoretically, Rüland proposes that this should lead to the 
ability for institution-building which allows agenda-setting, rationalizing, and 
identity-building (2002: 2-3), all of which are significant for the EC's preference in 
exporting its own norms, principles and codes of conduct. This is reflected very 
strongly in the manner in which a more deepened and binding structure appears 
to be the direction the EC, in particular, wants ASEM to take on. 
As such, analysis of the ASEM process may not be entirely 
straightforward. It is by no means a conventional regional grouping in that it is 
relatively informal and does not enter into legally binding agreements. Its main 
use is the nature in which it encourages leaders from ASEM member states to 
regularly engage in active dialogue as well as draft plans, however vague, for 
future cooperation. Under these terms, the ASEM cooperation process may 
include some indication of ideational influences in its policy-making process. The 
ASEM summits, as well as the smaller Ministerial meetings, represent Axelrod's 
"cluster of individuals basing cooperation on reciprocity" which have helped to 
initiate cooperation (Axelrod 1984: 21). The regular meetings have resulted in 
sustained cooperation, whereby there has been clarity of behaviour, multilateral 
negotiations have become more orderly, and there has been an increase in the 
symmetry and quality of information governments received. While ASEM has yet 
to become an institution with deepened substance, it already has encouraged 
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international agreements and decentralised enforcement of agreements between 
two parties that are not always necessarily in harmony. 
The value of a framework of continual and regular meeting between top 
officials in foreign policy, trade, and economics may also have been 
underestimated by analysts. Trade figures clearly indicate a rise in trade 
interaction between the EC and Asia ASEM. The ASEM Summits on their own 
offer little in way of formal, legally binding agreements, but the economic 
engagement between the two regions saw a clear rise from 1995 onwards. Apart 
from awareness between the two regions, it has also raised Asia ASEM's 
awareness about their own respective groupings. Negotiations on an ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement with China began in 2004 and promise to create the 
largest free trade area in the world. Japan has similar concluded its Free Trade 
Agreement with Singapore and is continually observing other possibilities for 
bilateral or multilateral free trade agreements in the region. 
Despite the arguments provided in the first institutional rationale and 
some very positive indications that ASEM's institutionalisation may help the EC's 
proliferation of its ideas, ASEM's institution building has been described more as 
"shallow institutionalization" and bound by only "soft law" (Kahler 2000, 
Abbot&Snidal 2000). The second institutional rationale, firmly backed by the 
Asian ASEM members and strongly reflected in the final ASEM organizational 
and principle structure, is the very pragmatic and material desire to increase 
dialogue for the purpose of increased trade and investment. The requirements 
for informality, multidimensionality, equal partnership, and a high level focus 
(CEC 2000) reflect very "Asian" social constructs and appear to be an obstacle 
to deepened institutionalization. Following this rationale, the ASEM institutional 
structure should mainly follow the desire to open a channel of regular dialogue 
and promotion of greater understanding between regions (Hwee 2002: 5), rather 
than any form of binding, deepened institutionalisation. Similarly, Ofken notes 
that the instrumental role of Asian countries in creating ASEM was to influence 
the working methods and to make it informal and based on mutual 
understanding rather than on agendas and procedures (2001: 12). 
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Informality may have been guilty of breeding further incoherence in the 
policy-making of ASEM because each ASEM summit lacks a fixed agenda. The 
non-binding nature also means that coherent policies are simply impossible to 
adopt because the dialogue at each individual summit usually requires further 
development on a bilateral level. The fact that commitment is not required, while 
allowing for a high level of flexibility, means that agreements adopted at the 
summits are not universally applied to each of the ASEM member states. 
It has been impossible for members of ASEM to meet the initial 
expectations set out in 1996 of becoming an important multilateral force. The 
expectations have been extremely high due to the fact that the grouping includes 
the entire EC, Japan, Korea, and China as well as some very dynamic 
economies in ASEAN. ASEM's largest capabilities-expectation gap appears to 
be linked to the issue of policy coherence in that the cooperation process has 
aimed for extremely ambitious policies in economics, politics, and social issues 
without the proper enforcement mechanisms. The problem lies with the very 
foundations of both the EC and the Asian side of ASEM. The EC is known to be 
able to act collectively most efficiently when dealing in external commercial 
policy. The EC's continued failure to speak with one voice through a coherent 
CFSP has hindered its progress in conducting external relations, not least 
notably when it embarrassingly failed to adopt a common position on North 
Korea during ASEM Ill. The EC's fragmented CFSP means that its impact on 
Asia through ASEM has been limited. Although the Commission is capable of 
presenting a single EC voice on matters concerning commercial relations, its 
influence has been significantly hindered by the enlarged trade deficit after the 
Asian economic crisis. Similarly, its attempts to place conditionality into its 
relationship with Asia have faced a tough resistance by some very strong and 
influential voices such as China and Malaysia. 
This has been further hampered by ASEAN+3's almost complete refusal* 
to discuss sensitive political issues, denying the EC a coveted position in 
becoming a major actor in the region. Both the European and Asian ASEM 
members have portrayed evidence that despite any kind of institutionalisation, an 
issue of lack of commitment continues to plague ASEM as an institution. Since 
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ASEM I, human rights has constantly been a European concern whereas Asian 
participants have preferred an exclusive focus on trade (Holland 2002: 68). At 
ASEM II, Europe informally raised the issues of human rights, labour practices, 
arms control and non-proliferation issues. It received little cooperation from 
countries such as Indonesia, China, and Myanmar, on the issues of East Timor 
and internal affairs, respectively (Holland 2002: 69-70). At ASEM III, the EC 
embarrassed itself by not being able to take a common response to the question 
of establishing diplomatic relations with North Korea, despite the "Declaration for 
Peace" announced in Seoul. The Copenhagen Summit yielded little beyond 
issues of economic cooperation, as the Council of Minister was only able to 
express its dissatisfaction with the slow progress of democratic restoration in 
Burma, but little else (Krenzler 2002: 12). 
While the Commission has been actively engaged in enhancing 
relationships with Asia, both through bilateral and multilateral ties, and showing 
an obvious policy presence in Asia, policy coherence is not as apparent. The 
2003 "A new partnership with Southeast Asia" Commission Communication 
makes a fair representative analysis of the ASEM relationship so far and could 
be an indicator on the usefulness of the ASEM process (CEC 2003). "Thirty 
years of official relations between Europe and the ASEAN have improved mutual 
awareness, but they have so far failed to realise the true potential of this 
relations. Today, there is a widespread perception in both Europe and Southeast 
Asia that the coherence, impact, and political visibility of our relations has not 
matched the ambitions of the long-established partnership, " the communication 
states (CEC 2003). It appears that while both the EC and the Asian ASEM 
members view each other as important trading partners, the EC appears to be 
dictating less of the events, and their Asian ASEM partners appear to be 
benefiting more from the relationship. 
This may prove to be a challenge for the future of ASEM and the evolution 
of cooperation as the EC may be perceived as going into a retreat. One of the 
reasons the relationship with Asia has been so late in forthcoming, and has so 
far appeared incoherent and lax may possibly be attributed to the general lack of 
active interest on the side of European businesses towards Asia. Although 
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European corporation's commitment to Asia is becoming more real than 
rhetorical, the problems of poor knowledge about Asia exist. Top personnel of 
European corporations regard positions in East Asia as inferior, resulting in less 
than ideal personnel being posted in the area (Lehman 1998: 81). 
Even during Asia's economic boom, Dent noted how European 
businesses had to be more proactive in their approach towards Asia, and to 
create network links through Foreign Direct Investment and alliance-making 
(1997). At this same period, the insufficiency of European direct investment in 
the region has long been considered the biggest weakness of European 
business in East Asia, where American investment is usually about twice as high 
(Lehman 1998: 83). Clearly, Asia deserves a much higher profile among 
European corporations than has been given, but the Asian economic crisis may 
have become another dampener in European business interest towards Asia. As 
long as European businesses continue to lack active material interest in the 
region, chances are that the same loose form of trade and investment 
relationship will continue between EC and Asia. In other words, material interests 
also appear to play a role in buttressing institutions. 
Asia's diversity and different levels of development obligates ASEM as a 
whole to resort to informality and flexibility. This, in itself, presents a capability 
limitation for the institution. Firstly, as previously mentioned, Asia's diversity 
prevents it from speaking with a single voice. Secondly, the level of diversity 
means that Asians must resort to Asian values in order to inject further 
informality and flexibility. Given the differences in culture, levels of development, 
and governing systems, ASEM's Asian side seems to have their hands tied and 
prevented from searching a more effective policy direction. This is in sharp 
contrast to the EC with institutions and policy-making procedures where 
collective action is more of a possibility (see Chapter 5). 
The third rationale for the form of institutionalisation ASEM has taken on 
is that due to the evolution and diversification of interests of the EC and East 
Asia occurring over the changes in the global political economy, ASEM has not 
been able to optimise its institutions and processes. Differently from the first and 
second rationales where either material interests, ideas, or institutional factors 
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were dominant, this is an indication of a difficult mix of unfulfilled material 
interest, ideas, and incomplete institutionalisation in this demonstration of the 
EC-East Asian multilateral evolution of cooperation. In 1994, Asia accounted for 
23.2 percent of the Union's total external trade, and this was a trend which was 
expected to continually rise (CEC 1996). When the East Asian economic crisis 
broke out, numerous lucrative infrastructure projects in East Asia were 
postponed, making several European businesses lose out. In order for an 
economic recovery to take place, the United States and the European Union 
became the primary target for increased exports (Dent 1999, also see Chapter 
4). The Asian economic crisis was followed by the EC's own process of 
enlargement, the growth of global terrorism, a general trend towards increased 
global multilateralism, and the clear rise in China's economic might - all of which 
had a strong effect on ASEM's institutional development. This was due to the 
manner in which the issues blunted the EC's interest in a number of ASEM Asian 
members (such as ASEAN), diverted interests, or influenced a European 
strategic shift from multilateralism towards bilateralism. 
The Asian partners in ASEM could learn a lot from the EC's evolving 
cooperation process with the ACP, which has seen a gradual phasing out in 
cooperation, not unlike in ASEM. Years of ACP failure to strengthen its economy 
has gradually resulted in an increasingly uninterested EC. Because the 
European industry is now less dependent on a regular supply of industrial raw 
material (Grilli 1993: 40) and there has been no improvement in the balance of 
EC-ACP trade (Holland 2002: 400), it appears that the EC member states are 
attempting to reform the relationship so that there is increased trade efficiency 
and an increase in reciprocity, free trade, as well as partnership status. Notably, 
apart from an attempt at increased reciprocity, the EC has also placed a high 
level of conditionality into the relationship, as is witnessed by the latest Cotonou 
agreement, which attaches political and social conditionality to the entire 
relationship. 
The EC's own internal institutional changes have also been important to 
its commitment to ASEM institutionalisation, and possibly both responsible for 
and an indicator of the EC's decreased interest in ASEM. The EC's 2004 round 
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of enlargement is unprecedented, and is most likely to stimulate a number of 
evolutions concerning the structure of the EC institutions, its policies, and future 
enlargement efforts. There has been overwhelming evidence that widening of 
the EC often leads to its deepening as well (Wallace&Wallace 2005). Adding ten 
member states to the existing fifteen not only has the effect of drastically 
increasing the total EC population, but the new acceding countries are also 
among the least developed in the enlarged EC. This brings in critical questions 
about how key policies such as the Common Agricultural Policy and Structural 
Funds might be reformed to accommodate enlargement (Brenton 2002). It also 
raises issues on how enlargement might force increased efforts for institutional 
reform and decision-making mechanisms (Weise 2002). These suggested 
reforms are bound to have an effect on the EC's external relations and 
commercial policies. 
The total cost of enlargement to the present members of the EC is 
minimal, since the bargains at Copenhagen was mainly the shifting of money 
from one part of the budget to another (Brenton 2002). While the total costs of 
enlargement are small, it is becoming increasingly obvious that the enlarged 
Union will require new policies and reformed institutions in its new constitution 
(Weise 2002). 
This attention towards enlargement, and the eventual reform of both 
policies and institutions, is bound to put a heavy toll on the cooperation process 
between the European and Asian members of ASEM, particularly in terms of 
institutional capacity. A high degree of uncertainty looms large in the ASEM 
cooperation process after the pending addition of the CEEC member-states to 
the EC's profile. The CEEC economies have created increased heterogeneity in 
the EC (Zysman&Schwartz 1998), and in several respects, are similar to the 
developing countries of ASEAN, a factor which will seriously complicate 
commercial relations within ASEM. The dynamics of policy-making within the 
EC, as well as the dimensions of external relations, are also bound to change 
after enlargement takes place. Several of the acceding countries, with 
economies and political significance far smaller than the current key member 
states, hold a significant portion of the weighted vote (Weise et al 2001). The 
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acceding countries will also be allowed to participate, with full rights, in the 
intergovernmental conference on the reform of the EC treaties scheduled to 
begin in autumn 2003. The new treaties will not be signed until after their 
accession in May 2004. If anything, the new, more heterogeneous enlarged EC, 
means that the process of negotiations in the 2003 IGC should be even more 
complicated than ever due to the changed dynamics of the weighted vote (Weise 
et al 2001). This is an EC institutional development which puts a heavy toll on 
the EC's external relations and with ASEM, since it affects the EC's capacity for 
cooperation. 
Even at present, there are signs that the Asian cooperation with the EC 
might evolve in a similar direction with the ACP and that material interests are 
strongly responsible. Although there exists signs of EC uncertainty towards the 
ASEM cooperation process, ASEM is collectively more diverse than its ACP 
counterparts, with different levels of development. Within ASEM, it appears that 
the EC has been more firmly focused on developing its relationship with China, 
while possibly phasing out cooperation with the ASEAN countries. This is most 
evident in EC FDI received by ASEAN which has steadily declined by 3.3% of 
aggregate FDI in 1998 to 2.6% in 1999,1.6% in 2000, and 1.8% in 2001 (CEC 
2003a: 9). This has taken place against a steady increase of EC FDI in China. 
The Commission urges that China's growing importance should be considered 
an opportunity, rather than a threat, and that Southeast Asia should attempt to 
benefit from the new division of labour in East Asia (CEC 2003a: 9). 
The terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 acted as a further diversion for 
the EC from the ASEM process. To make issues particularly pertinent to the East 
Asian region, the Bali attacks occurred shortly after the New York attacks. The 
ASEM IV Summit became mainly dominated by a discussion of terrorism 
(Chairman's statement 2002, Krenzler 2002: 5). Few other objectives or 
agreements were reached in that particular summit, although a far from 
groundbreaking agreement was made to ensure that the members would work 
together to prepare for the WTO Cancun Ministerial meetings as well as to take 
a closer examination on how to comply more effectively and actively with other 
multilateral organisations (Gilson 2004: 196). This may have marked an attempt 
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to move ASEM's institutions closer to global multilateralism, but observers note 
that the efforts have been futile (see Chapter 6, Kwa 2002: 26, Economist 20 
Sep 2003: 26-28). 
While this section has seen some material interest and institutional 
difficulties stemming from the EC's latest round of enlargements and 
diversification of interest, it is also important to note how ideas and material 
interest may have become entangled in this third institutional rationale. Isolating 
the ASEAN partners of ASEM, and separately viewing the 2003 "A New 
partnership with South East Asia" Commission Communication illustrates how 
issues of political conditionality have been clearly placed into the relationship. 
The conclusion states that the framework for bilateral agreements need to go 
beyond development cooperation and expand to political and economic areas. It 
also argues that "matters of trade and investment are inherently linked to issues 
of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, reduction of poverty 
and the rule of law" (CEC 2003a: 26). Although the document states that the 
mentioned issues are to be analysed on a flexible basis, the communication 
deals substantially in an area rarely mentioned before, and which has been 
frowned on by Southeast Asian governments. The communication also makes a 
suggestion for a more effective use of the 1980 EC-ASEAN regional agreement, 
which continues to see biannual meetings of EC-ASEAN Foreign Ministers and 
EC-ASEAN Economic Ministers, as well as various joint cooperation committees. 
This urging by the Commission is taking place despite the ASEM regional 
cooperation framework, which is a sign that the EC might currently find it more 
appealing to deal with the group of Japan, Korea, and China, separately from the 
even more diverse ASEAN. 
This third institutional rationale, points towards a failure of ASEM in all 
three sides equally with material interests, ideas, and institutions not being 
successfully pursued. While it was hoped that the ASEM cooperation structure 
would help to increase the EC's bargaining power vis a vis the United States in 
the WTO (Lee et al. 2002), the talks in Cancun and the rise of the G-22 is ample 
evidence that the ASEM framework may have failed in creating a functioning 
dialogue between Asia and Europe. Notably, three members of ASEM including 
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China, Thailand and the Philippines are in the G-22, which have been formed to 
make sure subsidies and trade barriers on farm goods are eliminated. While the 
G-22 bargained at the Cancun talks for the elimination of agricultural subsidies, 
the EC instead insisted on discussion on investment, competition policy, 
government purchases, and customs clearance (Maul and Okfen 2003: 245). 
Japan also held. on to its own agricultural protection program, although there are 
no signs that its policies and negotiating tactics are congruent to the EC's. The 
fragmentation between members of ASEM at the Cancun trade talks painfully 
illustrated how the ASEM cooperation process had failed to build a consultative 
process for the WTO's development agenda (Kwa 2002: 26). 
Rhetorical Analysis 
The ASEM forum is mainly aimed at informal discussion and any resulting 
documents are ultimately non-binding. Given this situation, rhetoric found within 
the various statements and declarations is important to the analysis of the 
material, ideational and institutional influences embedded within the institutional 
framework. Among the largest sources of information for the ASEM dialogue are 
a collection of 40 chairman statements from various levels of the ASEM 
institutional framework. This includes among others the Summit statements as 
well as one from each of the " ministerial meetings and senior official meetings 
convened during the past decade. These statements, declarations, and action 
plans are the backbone on which ASEM has been built on. 
It is important for these statements be analysed in order to develop an 
understanding of the level of cooperation taking place within ASEM as well as 
how to see how much importance the EC appears to place on material, 
ideational or institutional influences. Similar to the analysis of bilateral 
relationship where the Commission's key strategic documents proved an 
excellent indicator of the EC's commitment to East Asia, the EC commitment to 
ASEM can also be determined through the evolving undertones of the ASEM 
documents. This commitment will also be underlined by the EC's desire for 
gaining material interest, proliferation of ideas, and mirroring of its own 
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institutions. Unlike the bilateral relationship strategic documents, the ASEM 
documents will often not signify any binding commitment or intention to strike 
truly tangible steps in. the relationship. On the other hand, it will serve as a better 
reflection of the EC's perspective on the direction the relationship is taking. 
Finally, an objective analysis of these important documents will be considered an 
important examination of the degree of ideas, institutional elements, or material 
interest embedded within the ASEM process. 
The 1994 strategy marked the beginning of the EC's multilateral strategy 
towards Asia and reflected a balance between material interest, ideas, as well as 
institutional components. It could be argued that this is more of a reaction to the 
escalating significance of the Asian economy, rather than a pre-emptive effort in 
establishing a strong relationship between the two regions (Murray forthcoming). 
It was, however, important in the sense that it introduced a more positive and 
proactive approach to Asia and the growing significance of the region (Hwee 
2006: 3). The 1994 strategy was the first document to deal with Asia as a region, 
and also appeared to present an understanding of both the concept of Asia and 
a broader sense of engagement with the region as a whole (Wiessala 2002). It 
also was significant because it specifically mentioned the need for multilateral 
cooperation between the EC and Asia, although suggestions were initially that 
they should be conducted within the context of existing multilateral forums such 
as GATT and the UN (CEC 1994: Section II). Perhaps the most important aspect 
of this document with respect to multilateral issues is to raise the significance of 
trade liberalization within the multilateral system as well as placing an emphasis 
on the EC's need to place great emphasis on marketing opening for trade in 
goods and services. The 1994 Asia Strategy makes a note of the need to 
"integrate into the open, market-based world trading system" a number of Asian 
countries, including China, which was moving from state controls to market- 
orientated economies (CEC 1994: Section V). 
Strong mutual respect was the general atmosphere during the setting up 
of the ASEM forum, a feeling reinforced by the "Regarding the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) to be held in Bangkok on 1-2 March 1996" Commission 
Communication (1996a). The European Commission acknowledged the constant 
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bilateral contact between the EC and the Asian ASEM members, while 
emphasising that "the rapid and sustained growth of the Asian economies and 
their increased weight in world trade and investment flows" made it necessary for 
the EC to strengthen this economic relationship in its political dialogue (CEC 
1996a: 2). This 1996 Communication also explained that ASEM was necessary 
as a force to respond to the establishment of APEC in 1993 (1996a: 2). 
At this early stage, some tension was already being felt in the ASEM 
forums about the disparity in the EC's desire to add ideas to the multilateral 
process against the Asian's wish to keep it out and maintain focus on material 
interest. Indifference to political themes by the East Asian side, something which 
has been an annoyance to the EC for the past decade, was always an issue and 
it is evident in this Communication as well. It was agreed that the discussion be 
informal and some sensitive points such as human rights could be discussed as 
long a sit did not "compromise the atmosphere of the meeting". To add to this 
"the ten countries do not all attach the same importance to the political themes 
that were included on the agenda on the request of the European Union" (CEC 
1996a: 3). Nevertheless, the conclusive section of the Communication indicated 
again that the need to maintain and strengthen the political dialogue was actually 
more important than any urgent and important themes which can be treated 
within an economic dialogue (1996a: 10). The Communication also stressed how 
the Asian members should "reinforce the political weight" of Asia on the 
international political scene and "contribute to a world of multipolarity". This 
would be achieved by "enhancing Euro-Asia political dialogue", investigation into 
possible areas of international cooperation, and promotion of peace and stability 
(CEC 1996a: 5). The EC's political position was clearly a result of not only the 
Commission's insistence but the Council's as well, as indicated in a Council 
Report to the European Council in Madrid, where the Presidency Conclusions 
added up to similar demands (CEC 1996a). 
Discussion on trade and economic issues was simpler, since the Asians, 
not surprisingly, were in favour of promotion of an open multilateral trade system 
and open regionalism (CEC 1996a: 3,6). Despite this multilateral talk, it was 
expected since ASEM's conception that "existing bilateral channels would be 
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used for the implementation of the results of ASEM" while the forum itself would 
just be "seen as a means to politically invigorate economic ties" (CEC 1996a: 6). 
This view was stressed over again by indicating that ASEM would intensify 
dialogue rather than displace existing dialogue at both bilateral and subregional 
level (CEC 1996a: 11). This may have aided the non-binding and informal nature 
of ASEM but would have limited the project's ambition. 
The EC's desire to enhance the political dialogue continued well into the 
ASEM I summit although the wording of the Chairman's statement in March 
1996 was far less straightforward than the previous Commission 
Communication, naturally since it was a negotiated document. In paragraph 5 of 
the section entitled "Fostering Political Dialogue", there was only an 
understanding that the dialogue be based upon "mutual respect, equality, 
promotion of fundamental rights and in accordance with the rules of international 
law and obligations, non-intervention, whether direct or indirect in each other's 
internal affairs (The Asia-Europe Summits 1996). Very importantly, the Asian 
ASEM members clearly had a say in the talks and issues such as non- 
intervention, mutual respect, and equality may have reflected more of an Asian 
than a European stance given sensitive issues such as human rights. 
As far as economic cooperation was concerned, the diversity of the two 
regions was actually celebrated in Paragraph 9 of the 1996 ASEM Chairman's 
Statement. It was acknowledged in this Chairman's statement that Asia's 
emergence as a large market had stimulated growing demands for consumer 
goods, capital equipment, financing and infrastructure (The Asia-Europe 
Summits 1996). ' Article 12 of this 1996 Chairman's Statement stated an ASEM 
aim for trade barrier reduction and the need to increase European investments in 
Asia from the clearly low levels at that stage. Several comments were made 
about having the ASEM members adhere closely to WTO multilateral rules of 
trade liberalisation (The Asia-Europe Summits 1996). 
The 1998 ASEM 2 Chairman's Statement, despite indicating a good 
degree of satisfaction in the evolution of the process, clearly indicated a strong 
concern for the economic situation in Asia. This put ASEM II's focus very 
strongly on material interest. Article 4 indicated how the leaders "attached high 
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importance to remedying the financial and economic situation in Asia and 
reaffirmed their commitment to working together to address this global concern" 
(The Asia-Europe Summits 1998). Despite the economic crisis, Article 10 
emphasised that ASEM cooperation in the economic field was the very basis for 
a strong partnership between Asia and Europe. Once again, a commitment 
towards the WTO trade liberalisation rules were reemphasised as a way for to 
restore the Asian economy (The Asia-Europe Summits 1998). As stated in 
Chapter 6, ASEM II's Trade and Investment Pledge and the Trust Fund was the 
sum of Europe's aid to Asian ASEM members at this troubling time and was far 
from being useful. 
Keeping in theme with ASEM H's material interest focus, the section 
entitled fostering political dialogue was reduced to a single paragraph (9) from 
four paragraphs in ASEM I and noted the expansion of Asia-Europe dialogues 
on general security issues. The political issues addressed in the London 
Chairman's Statement vaguely covered general security issues as well as the 
situation in Cambodia, the Korean peninsula, Bosnia, and enlargement of the 
EC. Even more vague was ASEM's "opposition to all forms of racism and 
xenophobia" and their agreement to contribute to peace, stability and prosperity 
through cooperation between Asia and Europe (The Asia-Europe Summits 1998) 
ASEM III's 2000 Chairman Statement remarked that the "leaders noted 
with particular satisfaction the clear signs of recovery in the Asian countries" and 
"acknowledged that ASEM had played a crucial role in bringing Asia and Europe 
together to work in conjunction to address this crisis" (The Asia-Europe Summits 
2000). Credit was given to several of ASEM's initiatives to resolve the Asian 
economic crisis, including the ASEM Trust Fund and the European Financial 
Expertise Network which addressed problems in the financial and social sectors. 
As for reinforcing economic and financial cooperation, the leaders also 
expressed their satisfaction for the Trade Facilitation Action Plan, the Investment 
Promotion Action Plan, and endorsed the work programme annexed to the Trade 
Facilitation Action Plan. As was done in the previous two summits, Article 11 
made a lengthy note on the ASEM members' commitment to the WTO (The 
Asia-Europe Summits 2000). This would have been congruous with the 
-225- 
Commission Working Document "Perspectives and Priorities for the ASEM 
Process into the new decade" which noted the need to push the WTO agenda in 
ASEM (CEC 2000b). Nevertheless, this same document warned that although 
the forum was successful, it was already at a risk of losing momentum if it could 
not confirm and maintain its clear relevance to public and business interests 
(CEC 2000b: 5). 
The wording in ASEM 4 Chairman's Statement in 2002 appeared to move 
from enhancing the dialogue to justifying ASEM's existence, and appeared to 
show the EC's strong will and determination to insert ideational components into 
the process. The political dialogue statement noticeably remarked that since the 
consultative meeting of ASEM partners in the UN General Assembly was 
successful, "Leaders agreed that ASEM partners should continue this political 
dialogue", subsequently agreeing to create an ad hoc informal consultative 
mechanism to enable ASEM Coordinators and Senior Officials to meet quickly 
should international events warrant it (The Asia-Europe Summits 2002). In a 
section entitled "Unity in Diversity", the leaders noted that the ASEM process 
"merits further development" due to the manner in which it brought together 
people of various cultures and from different civilizations - something the world 
needed after September 11 although the wording remains very vague (The Asia- 
Europe Summits 2002). 
In trade, ideas on free trade became a much stronger focus, pointing 
towards the EC's increased attempts to add its ideas on trade into the ASEM 
process. Trade and investment, a section which was usually titled more 
positively was instead worded as "closer economic partnership". In this section, 
the commitment towards the WTO work programme launched at Doha as well as 
adherence towards the multilateral trading system's liberal rules were once again 
noted (The Asia-Europe Summits 2002). More optimistic was the statement that 
the "Leaders appreciated the progress in increasing mutual understanding and 
transparency, the overcoming of barriers to trade and investment between the 
two regions, achieved through the implementation of the Trade Facilitation and 
Investment Promotion Action Plans during the past two years" (The Asia-Europe 
Summits 2002). The 2002 Chairman's Statement eventually noted that the 
- 226 - 
relations between Asia and Europe had become "closer, more extensive, and 
more important than ever" (The Asia-Europe Summits 2002). The statement 
ended on a note that ASEM cooperation was committed towards further 
deepening understanding, expanding common ground and further enhancing 
cooperation (The Asia-Europe Summits 2002). 31 
ASEM V Chairman's statement in 2004 was exemplary of rhetoric, 
considering the difficulties faced by the organising committee prior to the Summit 
due to the issue of accepting Myanmar as a member. It may also have been a 
reflection of the EC's frustration in their inability to achieve material interest, 
insert ideas, or build increased institutional capacity in the ASEM process. This 
made the leaders "warmly" welcoming of 13 countries, including Myanmar, into 
ASEM rather unexpected. On the issue of political dialogue, leaders 
acknowledged the need to "reinforce multilateral dialogue and cooperation" as 
well as the need to "further strengthen ASEM consultation, cooperation and 
coordination in the fight against terrorism" (The Asia-Europe Summits 2004). A 
surprisingly wide range of political issues were discussed at Hanoi including 
numerous global challenges, terrorism, transnational crimes, AIDs and the 
environment. They resolved to fight these challenges through a "multilateral 
approach and collective actions through intensive dialogue and close 
cooperation on the basis of mutual understanding, equality, and mutual benefit 
(The Asia-Europe Summits 2004). 
On the section entitled Closer Economic Partnership in the ASEM V 
chairman's statement, the leaders declared their determination to bring the 
economic partnership to "a new stage of comprehensive and forward-looking 
cooperation" and adopted the Hanoi Declaration on Closer ASEM Economic 
Partnership. This was nothing more than a declaration to commit themselves to 
the existing frameworks such as TFAP, IPAP and other forms of economic 
31 Isolating the Southeast Asian partners of ASEM, and separately viewing the 2003 "A New Partnership 
with South East Asia" Commission Communication illustrates how issues of conditionality have been 
clearly placed into the relationship as well as demonstrates a shift in the mode of cooperation to 
accommodate the EC's priorities. The conclusion states that the framework for bilateral agreements need 
to go beyond development cooperation and expand to political and economic areas. It also argues that 
"matters of trade and investment are inherently linked to issues of good governance, democracy, respect 
for human rights, reduction of poverty and the rule of law" (CEC 2003: 26). This was difficult to discuss or 
enforce under the ASEM multilateral framework, possibly forcing a shift to a more direct bilateral 
approach with each of Southeast Asia's different countries. 
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cooperation. The Hanoi Declaration also included encouragement in further 
dialogue in finance, trade and investment, and cooperation in other sectors. It 
also reaffirmed its support for the WTO (The Asia-Europe Summits 2004). These 
were initiatives which were closely mirrored in the Chairman's Statement and 
added very little new to the economic partnership between Europe and Asia. 
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Multilateral Interregionalism 
Trends and Trajectories 
This preliminary observation of the vertical dimension in the interregional 
multilateral ASEM process and the global economic environment surrounding it 
has clearly seen an evolution of specifically multilateral cooperation divided into 
three distinct stages. Importantly, these stages provide some important insights 
into the nature of cooperation and answers some questions posed by 
interregionalism. The trends and trajectories witnessed in the ASEM process 
provide some important insights into the reasons partners may choose to shift 
between bilateral and multilateral strategies. 
The first stage includes the period leading up to the 1990s when both 
sides appeared uninterested in developing a multilateral relationship in any 
sense and any interaction was conducted predominantly at the bilateral level. 
This is, once again, clear evidence of the priority of states in being key actors in 
the EC-East Asian partnerships. Key European member states were at best 
indifferent towards East Asia. At worst, they were distrustful of what was then 
perceived as Japan's neomercantilist policies. The East Asian states, some 
suffering from trade barriers, began to build the perception of the EC as a 
fortress. This created a feeling of mutual distrust which may have resulted in a 
low level of cooperation by the Europeans and the East Asians. 
Before long, the consequences of mutual distrust began to take its toll, 
particularly on Europe. The lack of a formal, multilateral dialogue with the East 
Asians meant a gaping hole in the EC's profile as both an economic and political 
power. During this period, the East Asian economies grew speedily and the 
European trade deficit against the East Asian economies mirrored this growth. 
There also appeared to be a cooling enthusiasm in the prevailing bilateral 
cooperation process between the EC and East Asia (see Chapter 5). This was 
made more obvious with an increased American presence within the region in 
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the form of APEC, which the EC was not a part of. Asia similarly lacked the 
access to EC markets that other groupings, such as the ACP, were enjoying. By 
this time, a formal multilateral relationship between the EC and East Asia 
appeared to be long past due. 
The second stage started with the EC's 1994 Asia Strategy, which was the 
beginning of signs that the EC was interested in engaging Asia as a whole, and 
possibly through multilateral channels. The Asian economy was at a high, and 
the Bangkok Declaration held several promises of further cooperation between 
the two regions. Had the dynamics of the international political economy not 
changed in the very next year, it is perhaps possible to conjecture that 
cooperation between the European and Asian members of ASEM would have 
continued fruitfully along the guidelines drawn by the Bangkok Declaration. 1996, 
and the period leading up to the Bangkok Declaration has undeniably seen the 
most promising period in the ASEM evolution of cooperation. 
The second stage provides some important insights towards 
interregionalism as well as poses some additional questions. It appears that the 
EC's strategy was to begin institutionalising the process and to sidetrack the role 
of states as much as possible through the process. The strategy of 'mirroring' of 
the EC's own institutions and the use of institutions to create stability (see 
Chapter 4) was used as actively to draw in the East Asians. While initially 
successful, it is extremely important to be able to answer the question of why this 
strategy flourished only in the beginning. Another important question which 
needs to be answered in the Conclusion is why states were, at first, willing to 
give up some of their control over the interregional process to institutions. 
July 1997 and the arrival of the Asian economic crisis saw a shift in the 
cooperation scenario and the beginning of the third phase of cooperation 
evolution. The trade deficit between the EC and Asia, already in Asia's favour, 
tripled as Asian currencies devalued. Since the establishment of ASEM, trade 
between the EC and Asia had already increased substantially, although the EC 
did not view this as particularly helpful due to the increased trade deficit. 
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The third phase of the evolution of cooperation in the ASEM process 
highlights several important facts about the entire relationship. First, it shows that 
ASEM clearly has the potential to succeed as an alternative method to 
bilateralism and global multilateralism in conducting a multilateral relationship 
between the two regions. Despite the informality of the process and its non- 
binding nature, there is clear evidence that trade between the two regions have 
significantly increased since the establishment of ASEM. 
Secondly, the third phase of the multilateral evolution of cooperation in the 
ASEM process indicates that if both sides of the ASEM equation do not feel that 
they are equally benefiting from the cooperation process, either the EC or 
individual East Asian member states of ASEM could refuse to extend its full 
cooperation. This clearly amounts to the accentuation of hierarchy, or at least an 
attempt to accentuate hierarchy, whereby the EC tries to take control of the 
process particularly when smaller states are involved. Once again, the informality 
of the ASEM process acts as a double-edged sword and this time offers the 
defecting side an easy excuse to leave the cooperation process. Instead of 
attempting to renegotiate the terms of treaty, as an institutionalised process 
would encourage, the Europeans appear to be phasing out cooperation in ASEM 
in favour of bilateral talks. The inability to advance conditionality in the ASEM 
process may appear to the Europeans as another deadlock in the relationship, 
and 2003 "New Partnership with Southeast Asia" communication from the 
Commission appears to be an alternative means of dealing with the ASEAN 
members of ASEM. It also offers a way out for the EC, which would be more 
reluctant in placing conditionality into its relationship with China than it would with 
ASEAN member states. 
Thirdly, suggestions that ASEM might play an important role as a catalyst 
for action in other international forums and be a valuable instrument for 
formalising structures of regional economic integration in Asia (Krenzler 2002: 10) 
might be rather unfounded. The 2003 Cancun trade talks indicate that ASEM 
members are extremely fragmented in their stand towards trade liberalisation, 
and- that the ASEM process has done little in improving communication or 
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cooperation between Europe and Asia in matters concerning multilateral trade in 
the WTO (Gilson 2004, Kwa 2002, Maull and Okfen 2003: 245). The implication 
for multilateral interregionalism is that ASEM may not be an adequate supporting 
process of international liberalisation efforts, particularly if the partners have not 
yet reconciled and agreed on their interests. 
The Role of Material Interest, Institutions and Ideas 
This chapter has attempted to identify the role of material interest, ideational 
principles and institutional elements from the key elements of the EC-East Asian 
multilateral relationship as seen in ASEM which include trade data, 
institutionalisation and dialogue intensification, and rhetorical elements 
extractable from the various strategic documents. These key elements have 
been analysed as objectively as possible and there are some recurring themes 
which appear to describe the EC-East Asian multilateral relationship very 
explicitly. They also provide important insights and answers into the questions 
IPE 'theory and interregionalism pose. Some of these insights on interregionalism 
include the continued importance (despite institutionalisation) of the state in 
developing key interactions, ASEM's ineffectiveness in proliferating trade 
liberalisation, some evidence of anarchy management through institutions, and 
the continued struggle between ideas and material interest. 
Three issues need to be clearly highlighted as a preliminary conclusion 
into importance of the trade data as an examination of the material, ideational, 
and institutional influences within the ASEM framework. The first insight is that 
although the data clearly indicates that there has been an increase in economic 
interaction between the EC and Asian ASEM members, the material data alone 
does not stand as conclusive evidence that the ASEM forum has been a 
stimulator for this increased interaction. If anything, the material data actually 
indicates the decreased significance as EC trade partners of certain Asian ASEM 
members such as Japan and ASEAN. This failure also points to the institutional 
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inefficiency of ASEM, considering that the multilateral forum was created with the 
intention of collectively enhancing the relationship between EC and East Asia. 
Instead, ASEM as an institution has seen increased interaction with only certain 
member states (like China), while maintaining stagnant relationships with others 
(Japan and ASEAN). 
Secondly, a long history of steadily rising EC deficits might be expected to 
take its toll on the European commitment to the ASEM forum. As was indicated 
earlier in Chapter 5, trade deficits are one of the crucial material factors in the 
volatility of a trade relationship. In this Chapter, it was suggested that ASEM's 
history did not display volatility as much as it displayed indifference. The EC's 
indifference is a surprising outcome, considering that the EC could clearly opt for 
outright defection in the face of reduced material interest, and could point 
towards institutional and ideational influences which are sustaining the 
multilateral relationship. If this is indeed the case, trade deficits as witnessed in 
ASEM and the material interests involved might have been controlled by 
increasing dialogue led by strengthening institutionalisation, as well as an 
increase in ideational values. Had material interests been left uncontrolled, one 
would have expected far more action taken by the EC to control trade deficits. 
This is an issue which will be further examined in the Conclusion. 
Finally, disparities in trade significance between the Asian ASEM 
members are relevant to this analysis and need to be taken into consideration 
when analysing reasons to how ASEM has taken the shape that it has. The trade 
data presented in this suggestion clearly indicate that the relatively reduced 
significance of Korea and ASEAN has resulted in their decreased economic 
interaction with the EC. The possibility that the EC ASEM members might 
consider the ASEM forum, as a uniform method to engage most of East Asia's 
largest economies, to be a wasted effort needs to be analysed. If the ASEM 
forum is considered to be lacking in advantageous material results for the EC 
ASEM members, it is likely that the forum could be abandoned or sidetracked in 
order for it to be replaced with a bilateral form which could yield more tangible 
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results. This would eventually be reflected in the EC shifting its strategy to 
actively deal with each of the Asian members on a bilateral basis. 
These three insights provided by trade statistics in the ASEM process 
suggest that when it comes to multilateral interregionalism, the process of 
institutionalisation has not worked efficiently enough to curb the importance of 
material interests within the ASEM process. Literature on interregionalism notes 
the tension between states and institutions, but the failure of ASEM in enhancing 
absolute gains through the process of institutionalisation means that states have 
continued to hold their primary importance in the EC-East Asian partnership. The 
fact that states are still in pursuit of material interests could broadly explain the 
failure of the ASEM process as a form of multilateral interregionalism. 
The institutional examination of ASEM's institution and history of 
multilateral evolution has provided an examination of the material and ideational 
direction of the forum. When material interests are involved, one clearly notes 
the EC's concern, particularly over the constant increase in the trade deficits it is 
facing from the Asian ASEM members. Equally important is the diversity of the 
Asian ASEM members and how this has had an effect on the EC's ability or 
willingness to continue cooperating with each of the Asian ASEM members. The 
different rationales for institutional evolution, particularly the conflicting ones from 
the European side against the Asian ASEM members, may have resulted in an 
institutionally structure which is at best disappointing for both sides of the 
partnership. 
As a result of the institutional examination, further insights into the nature 
of multilateral interregional institutionalisation can be developed. Not unlike 
several multilateral forums, the lack of a requirement to commit, the informality, 
and the bureaucratisation of the institutions may have served as an institutional 
stumbling block of an otherwise ideationally successful forum. While the dialogue 
has led to increased understanding between the ASEM members, the informality 
means that any set agendas could be ignored. Enforcement and commitment to 
a cooperation process is particularly important to affirm the relationship's 
usefulness. The establishment of ASEM clearly increased the amount of trade 
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conducted between Asia and the EC (although at varying degrees from partner to 
partner), as well as provided for increased grounds for constant contact. The 
economic pillar of ASEM is today considered to be by far the most developed 
and substantive, possibly due to it being the most significant "lowest common 
denominator between the two regions (Dent 2003: 230). Even so, ASEM's role as 
an economic stimulus has not been conclusive as the institutional data in this 
Chapter has pointed out. 
In other words, in the development of multilateral interregionalism, 
institutionalisation on its own is not sufficient for development of cooperation, 
particularly when states continue to be the key actors in strategy formation. 
ASEM's relative informality and lack of enforcement mechanisms mean that both 
sides are capable of backing out of the cooperation when a player feels that the 
process is not as beneficial as it used to be. The preferable alternative is for both 
players to negotiate and work on the relationship, but the process's flexibility 
allows for easier defection. Ironically, the assurance of continued contact and the 
ASEM process's flexibility ensures ASEM's survival because when both players 
are not obliged to follow a set of enforceable rules, the incentives to defect are 
not as strong. On the other hand, the frustration over the lack of commitment, the 
long drawn decision-making process, and eventually, forum fatigue from the 
numerous dialogues, may have led the members to treat the forum with less 
significance and an increased sense of indifference. This is apparent in the EC's 
altered focus in attention, particularly evidenced after the EC's latest round of 
engagements which may have drawn its attention away from further engagement 
with ASEM. 
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Table 26: Insights Provided by EC-East Asian Multilateral Relationship 
Cooperation Questions posed EC-East Asia Multilateral Partnership 
by IPE and Interregionalism 
Nature of Actor State-led or led by non-state Institutional by nature, with very strong role 
actors? played by states. Institutionalisation process 
generally inefficient and secondary in 
importance to states preferences. 
Nature of the Global Small countries linking up to Evidence of management of anarchy 
Political Economy large countries (hierarchy), through institutions, evidence of hierarchy 
emphasis on shaping global as small states of Southeast Asia link up to 
governance (managing large countries 
anarchy? ) 
Nature of Actors' Trade liberalisation and how to ASEM as a multilateral interregional entity 
Interaction within the GPE make regionalism and global has been ineffective in proliferating trade 
liberalisation institutions coexist. liberalisation. Evidence that efforts are being 
Gains between two partners or overshadowed by bilateral efforts for gains 
absolute global gains? between two partners. Relative gains still 
more important. 
Ideas versus Structures Material interest (as reflected in Designed to be based on ideas, but lack of 
security and trade issues) or agreement between the Europeans and the 
ideas? Asians on whether material interest of ideas 
matter more. Constant dialogue formed 
through institutionalisation. 
Unlike in the bilateral case, the ' rhetoric analysis from the ASEM documents 
appears to offer more insight into the ideational side of the multilateral 
interregional relationship than the material. Yet, despite the EC's preference to 
make ASEM a multilateral forum more based on ideas, it has come up against 
the preference for material interests on the part of its East Asian partners. The 
trade statistics and institutional observations offered in this chapter have 
indicated a number of problems within the relationship including a serious case of 
trade balance problems, a gradually increasing feeling of indifference, and a 
diversification of interest from the forum. This has not been reflected within the 
ASEM documents which appear to ignore the issue of forum fatigue and the 
clearly decreased momentum of the process. 
The issues of increased dialogue, commitment towards a peaceful global 
community, and adherence towards trade liberalisation through multilateralism, 
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however, are recurring themes which point towards a clear level of ideational 
intensity within the relationship. This is clearly an European attempt to insert 
increased ideas, values, and codes of conduct into the relationship and as long 
as dialogue remains between the partners, it is probable that ASEM will continue 
to hold some value for the EC. In this case, ideational factors may be the 
predominant element in sustaining the ASEM process despite the EC losing out 
on material interests. 
One might also argue that this set of rhetoric is simply what one could 
expect from an informal and non- binding forum whose intention was merely to 
support the bilateral process. This has been the set goal right from the beginning 
and arguably, there is simply no need for ASEM's critics to be so disappointed 
that the process has not resulted in more tangible efforts. If this argument about 
ASEM being merely a rhetorical forum to support tangible efforts in the bilateral 
process, then one would expect bilateral ties to be tightened as a consequence 
of the dialogue made in ASEM. This is an issue which needs to be further 
examined in the next Chapter. 
This set of insights into interregionalism offered by the examination of the 
ASEM multilateral interregional process enhances our understanding of 
cooperation by urging us to look at material interests, institutions, and ideas as 
combined factors in the pursuit of cooperation. Despite our expectation that a 
multilateral interregional process would be dominated by the process of 
institutionalisation and ideas, it appears that successful multilateral 
interregionalism also requires an agreement among members that they are in 
common pursuit of institutionalisation and ideas. In the ASEM process, the 
conflict between the EC members' desire to promote ideas and the East Asian 
members' overwhelming preference for material considerations has possibly led 
to a failing multilateral interregional forum. This has not been helped by ASEM's 
loose institutionalisation, which has allowed states to continue as key actors in 
pursuit of their own vested interests. 
While these insights into cooperation in multilateral interregionalism are 
useful on their own, this thesis continues to further analyse the questions and 
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propositions by examining the bilateral and multilateral combined in the 
Conclusion. As is evident at several stages in this thesis, the bilateral and 
multilateral interregionalism process appears to be interlinked with gradual 
transitions between each other. The Conclusion analyses this phenomenon in 
detail as well as revisits the key questions and propositions advanced in chapters 
2 and 3. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
The main aim for this thesis has been to discover the nature of interregional 
cooperation, why actors cooperate, under which conditions, in which forms, and 
how cooperation evolves. In order to understand cooperation and the various 
factors which influence cooperation, traditional IPE theories were combined with 
Axelrod's research on the evolution of cooperation as a basis for understanding 
cooperation within IPE. A set of questions and propositions based on the balance 
between material interest, institutions and ideas (on the one hand) and 
bilateralism and multilateralism (on the other hand) was subsequently set out for 
further empirical exploration. An additional series of questions related to the 
same theoretical basis was also generated by literature on interregionalism (see 
Chapter 3). Consequently, Chapter 4 examined the EC's role both as a global 
actor and as an active promoter of interregionalism and argued for the suitability 
of exploring the EC-East Asian interregional partnership as a foundation to gain 
further insight into how actors cooperate within an interregional setting. Chapters 
5 and 6 analysed the. EC-East Asian partnership both from the bilateral and 
multilateral perspectives and was designed to bring out the importance of 
material interests, institutions, and ideas as well as any other surrounding issues 
which could act as a catalyst for cooperation or defection. 
This thesis has resulted in an analysis involving the various dimensions 
interregional cooperation is based on. The theoretical basis, as well as the 
empirical findings, has introduced the first dimension of factors influencing 
interregional cooperation, where actors are presented with a mix of material 
interest, institutions, and ideas. The second dimension is that of the mode of 
interregional cooperation, where actors must find a suitable balance between 
bilateralism and multilateralism. To add to the complexity of handling these 
balances, the evolving nature of actors, the GPE itself, and modes of cooperation 
present a third dimension of dynamism to the evolution of interregional 
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cooperation. The fourth dimension revolves around the critical questions 
interregionalism raises on the role of rational actors within interregionalism, the 
role of values trust and codes of conduct, and its role in managing hierarchy and 
creating rules. The fourth dimension also asks how the nature of interregional 
cooperation changes in its bilateral and multilateral forms. These issues need to 
be re-examined in the light of the empirical basis provided in chapters 5 and 6. 
The EC and East Asia have been presented with the challenge of these 
existing balances which determine the evolution of cooperation between the 
partners. As the empirical chapters have shown, there is hardly a clear cut choice 
between actors to settle on either side of the balances. Material interest, 
institutions and ideas are mixed, even when one would not expect it to be. The 
availability of both bilateral and multilateral modes of cooperation have presented 
its own set of opportunities and challenges, and the arguably artificial analytical 
division between bilateralism and multilateralism has served to accentuate the 
fact that actors operate under both modes of cooperation rather than just a single 
one. 
This Chapter provides an opportunity to re-examine the questions and 
propositions as well as to look at the EC's bilateral and multilateral interregional 
partnership in conjunction with one another. First, the question of how the EC 
and East. Asia have dealt with the balance between material interest, institutions 
and ideas must be answered. Secondly, one needs to determine, from looking at 
the EC-East Asian partnership, how the dynamic elements of cooperation 
affected the cooperation process. Thirdly, the EC-East Asian partnership needs 
to be reconsidered to analyse how the partners have dealt with the two available 
modes of cooperation and what compromises the partners have reached 
regarding the balance between bilateralism and passive multilateralism. Finally, 
we need to re-examine how much insight the questions and propositions in 
Chapter 3 has provided in our understanding of cooperation, particularly against 
traditional theories of IPE. 
Chapter 4's evaluation of the EC's global actorness and its motives for 
interregionalism emphasised the unique nature of the EC's institutions and 
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policy-making process. The EC's unique nature also meant that the its motives 
for interregionalism were far from straightforward and Chapter 4 suggested that 
various scholars on EC interregionalism have interpreted the motives differently. 
These motives, as noted in Chapter 4, ranged from material (as seen in its 
pursuit of economic power and trade), institutional (as seen in its attempt to 
mirror its institutional settings in other regions), and ideational (as seen in its 
attempts to be a normative power). The eclectic approach used in this research, 
backed up by an analysis of the trade data, institutional development, and EC 
strategic documents within the EC-East Asian interregional relationship has 
confirmed a number of issues already available in present literature, but also 
adds a further insight concerning the balances between the material, institutional, 
and'ideational motivations. 
Taking these issues into consideration, this Chapter argues on the basis 
of the evidence assembled that the different balances present within the GPE 
have obliged the EC to take on the direction of active bilateralism against passive 
multilateralism in its partnership with East Asia. This entails, as this Chapter will 
explain, a strong preference towards material interest and bilateralism, but 
moderated by institutions and ideas as well as the availability of multilateralism 
as a potential choice. This Chapter will also argue that making use of a combined 
approach of neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, social constructivism, and 
Axelrod's ideas on cooperation, provides some very important insights into EC- 
East Asian interregional cooperation which was previously difficult, particularly 
with the inclusions and exclusions IPE theory insisted upon. 
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Influencing Factors of Cooperation in EC-East Asian Partnership 
This thesis has argued how IPE problematics as well as Axelrod's research on 
cooperation have noted how material interest, institutions, and ideas have been 
the key influencing factors for cooperation (see Chapter 2). Chapter 2 also 
explained how dynamic elements of cooperation incorporate a number of 
endogenous and exogenous factors (evolutionary nature of actors, the 
hierarchical and constantly evolving GPE, and the evolving modes of bilateral 
and multilateral cooperation). Chapter 2 went on to explain how the key 
questions IPE theory raises are the same ones literature on interregionalism is 
concerned with. Chapter 3 specifically noted how material interest considerations 
may favour a bilateral mode of cooperation, while ideational considerations 
appear to be associated with a predominantly multilateral mode of cooperation. 
These material and ideational considerations are also shaped and tempered by 
institutional influences, in both a bilateral and multilateral sense, within the 
relationship. Chapter 4 considered how the EC, as a leading global actor and 
promoter of regionalism, has been involved in strategies which take into account 
these various considerations and influences. Chapters 5 and 6 consequently 
undertook an empirical exploration by using the EC-East Asian bilateral and 
multilateral interregional partnerships as case studies to gain further insights and 
answers to the questions IPE and literature on interregional ism raises. 
The following section re-examines the empirical evidence in the EC-East 
Asian partnership and notes how the three influencing factors for cooperation 
(material interest, institutions, and ideas) have indeed guided the evolution of 
interregional cooperation between the partners. Equally important, however, is 
the manner in which material interest, institutions and ideas are indivisible from 
each other. In other words, there cannot be a partnership based solely on 
material interest, or one grounded purely on ideas. The delicate balance between 
each of these influencing factors for cooperation is the key determinant of how 
cooperation evolves. 
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Material Interest 
Chapters 5 and 6 noted aggregate trade volume, trade imbalances, and 
comparative trade data as representative of the changes in material interest 
(Piening 1997: 14) that have contributed to changes within the interaction of the 
EC-East Asian partners. This very direct interpretation of trade as a 
representation of material interest is true not only for the East Asians, which 
depend strongly on the Europeans as a market for exports, but also for the EC 
which engages in very little interaction with East Asia apart from for trade. 
Chapter 5 demonstrates exactly how heavily trade affects the bilateral 
evolution of cooperation between the EC and East Asia. The conclusions 
reached in Chapter 5 include how the interaction between the partners increased 
relative to the aggregate trade volume. Similarly, any incidence of trade deficits 
quickly resulted in an almost immediate reaction, particularly from the EC, within 
a year or two at most. Finally, the treatment of the EC towards its East Asian 
counterparts as "equal partners" strongly depended on how powerful an actor the 
respective East Asians were in the global economy. The fact that trade issues 
appeared to lead the EC-East Asian bilateral agenda confirms that bilateralism is 
strongly grounded in material interest. 
The fluctuation of cooperation and defection between the EC and East 
Asia due to trade issues provides strong empirical evidence that the rise and fall 
in cooperation occurs predominantly through material interests (see Chapter 5 
and 6). The empirical evidence points towards sharp rises in aggregate trade 
volume from 1963 to 1975 for Japan, the ROK, and China. This was during the 
rise of the Asian economies, and European trade particularly with Japan was not 
only booming, but the Europeans were also faced with a significant trade deficit. 
This deficit eventually led to the two trade wars between the EC and Japan 
between 1979 and 1980, due to a sharp hike in the EC-Japan trade volumes 
which more than doubled in the mere space of four years. These trade wars 
initiated by the Europeans, indicate a strong reaction towards a threat to material 
interest in their relationship with the Japanese. The two highly publicised trade 
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wars quickly resulted in a flurry of activity between the EC and Japan (Wilkinson 
1983: 190,210, Bridges 1999: 25, Gilson 2000). There is also strong evidence to 
support the suggestion that increase in cooperative activity might be mirrored in 
the present EC-China relationship where the partners are experiencing similar 
growths in trade, and the EC suffering similar vast increases in trade deficits 
(Allen 2002, Dent 1999: 147). In the case of the EC-Korean relationship, the two 
partners have been on a steady warpath over the entire history of the partnership 
(Dent 1999) and most recently, over shipbuilding (CEC 8/5/2001, CEC 2002). 
A strong implication which material interests have on literature on 
regionalism is the manner in which clashes of material interest appear to be most 
manageable when dealt with under bilateralism. Chapter 2 noted. how 
interregionalism literature debated whether the nature of the GPE was one of 
maintaining hierarchy or the management of anarchy. Bilateral institutionalisation 
resulting from phases of conflict implies, to a certain extent, successful 
management of anarchy. 
The same cannot be said for multilateral interregional ism and its success 
in managing anarchy. When issues touching on material interests such as trade 
become more problematic, the multilateral mode of cooperation provides for 
insufficient enforcement mechanisms to solve the problems at hand. Enthusiasm 
for ASEM cooled down significantly as soon as the Asian economic crisis set in 
and halted the steady economic progression of East Asia and increased the 
already large EU trade deficit (Helsinki 2006: 32, CEC 2000). This similar loss of 
enthusiasm never seemed to occur in the cases of the EC's bilateral ties with 
Japan or China, even when the trade deficit the EC was faced with was 
extremely high (see Chapter 5, Material Test)32. If anything, the problems taking 
place in the EC's relationships with Japan and China encouraged further bilateral 
dialogue and bilateral institutionalisation (Gilson 2000: 22, Bridges 1999: 43) in 
order to manage the material interest which defined the partnership. Today, the 
32 An exception may be the highly publicised `bra-wars' occurring in 2005 when the EC placed temporary 
limits on Chinese textiles imports, citing WTO rules. Despite member state disagreements, the EC has 
reached an amicable deal with China, to release half the blocked goods unconditionally, with the other half 
to count against 2006 quotas. 
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EC is instead concentrating on setting up bilateral framework agreements with 
each of the individual East Asian nations while keeping ASEM as merely a 
ground for mutual, albeit indifferent, dialogue. This indicates towards a 
preference for bilateralism as the most effective means of conducting a highly 
material based relationship. To successfully manage anarchy in EC-East Asian 
interregionalism, it appears that bilateralism based on mutual material interests is 
a requirement as well. 
If the pursuit of material interest results in further institutionalization or 
dialogue, it is very important not to mistake the progress as being led by either 
institutions or ideas. Sceptics of the importance of material interest could argue 
that the degree of bilateral institutionalisation as well as the manner in which the 
EC has attempted to bring its East Asian partners into the global economy to 
share the values of fair trade stems from the influencing factor of ideas. Empirical 
evidence, however, points out that EC attempts to bring the East Asians into the 
global economy and to encourage a free market are usually for motivations which 
are far from ideational. The most obvious case of this, the EC's ambition to bring 
China into the WTO, started in 1995 and continued in 1996 when the EC's trade 
deficit with China had almost doubled from ECU 8236 million in 1993 to ECU 
15292 in 1996, with the trend to continually increase. This attempt to 
multilaterally institutionalize the Chinese within the WTO was conducted during a 
period when the EC was clearly losing out materially against China, and inclusion 
of the Chinese in the WTO would bring them under multilateral economic rules 
and safeguard the EC from further material losses (Shambaugh 1996: 23)33. EC 
strategic documents from 1995 detailed in Chapter 6 also accounted for an 
increased call for improved human rights and civil society in China, a subversion 
towards ideas which the EC often makes use of when it is losing out on material 
interests. 
33 The success of this strategy may be debated by the fact that the EC continues to encounter problems with 
market access, services, the enforcement of IPE, and the respect of international standards (CEC 2003: 15- 
16) 
- 246 - 
The case for materialism in the EC's bilateral relationship with Japan and 
Korea is much easier to argue without confusing material interest with ideas. In 
the EC's relationship with Japan, the bilateral institutionalisation of the 
partnership actually stemmed from the negotiations over means to solve the 
ongoing trade problems34. The EC hardly tried to disguise its desire for fairer 
trade practices from Japan with any indication of the notions of a free global 
market. The Korean alleged unfair trade practices have meant that the strong 
conflict in material interest has led to the collapse in cooperation. In the case of 
Japan, mutual material interests were upheld through fruitful negotiation. In the 
Korean case, this did not occur, and apart from material interest achieved 
through trade, it is clear that the EC and Korea hold little else in common (Dent 
1999: 2000). 
Institutions 
Apart from the internal and external institutionalisation occurring separately in the 
EC and East Asia in accordance with evolutions in the global political economy, a 
process of constant institutionalisation has occurred directly within the EC-East 
Asian relationship. This thesis has raised the possibility that institutions can help 
to temper material and ideational considerations, and could sustain cooperation 
in a partnership where material interests and ideas are not being fulfilled by 
either side of the relationship. The institutional side of the partnership offers a 
further insight into how cooperation may have been managed, how conflicts have 
been mediated, and- how institutions may have been a factor in balancing the 
modes of cooperation. 
While material interest and ideational values offer some explanation for 
the evolution of cooperation in the EC-East Asian relationship, they do not 
account for several episodes of deepened cooperation despite some periods of 
34 The EC-Japan section in Chapter 4 describes in detail how conflict led to negotiations throughout the 
history of the partnership. 
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strong conflicting material interests and relatively unsuccessful attempts to insert 
ideas into the partnership. These periods have marked the EC-East Asian 
relationship at varying times, particularly the EC-Japan trade wars and the long 
period of China's communist rule. 
The fact that these periods have resulted in a relative degree of continued 
negotiation, dialogue and cooperation while the EC-Korean relationship appears 
to have reached a stumbling block may well have been a result of the relative 
degree of institutionalisation in the relationship as well. Empirical evidence points 
out that dialogue between the EC, Japan, and China started well before any 
meaningful dialogue with Korea (Dent 1999: 2000, also see Chapter 5: Key 
Junctures section). The 1954 Geneva Conference boosted ties between the EC 
and-China well before even the US could get involved in the relationship. This 
would later result in the 1978 EC-China Agreement on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation a feat which would take the EC and Korea until 1996 to achieve. An 
ongoing level of calm followed in the EC-China relationship followed, 
unblemished by relatively balanced trade, and would intensify as the EC realised 
the importance of having the Chinese economy integrated into the WTO. Kapur 
has noted similar levels of increased communication and diplomacy between the 
Europeans and China which led on to a high degree of cooperation between the 
two (1986: 26-30). Chapter 5 additionally points towards the various EC strategic 
documents outlining its relationship with the Chinese, including two framework 
agreements, and at least six European Commission Communications showing a 
highly institutionalised relationship. 
Similarly, the European's love-hate relationship with the Japanese obliged 
the two to engage in negotiations ever since Japan's entry into GATT. The 
apparent levels of bilateral institutionalisation have been documented extensively 
in the EC-Japan relationship with each set of conflict creating increasingly mature 
dialogue procedures (Dent 1998, Gilson 2000). The EC's relationship with Japan 
became sufficiently institutionalised that it only required the 1991 Hague 
Declaration as an affirmation of its ongoing dialogue and commitment to the 
partnership. It reaffirmed the regular consultation mechanisms formed over the 
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past three decades of intense interaction between the two partners to such a 
degree that a framework agreement was simply not necessary. 
The relative delay in institutionalisation of the EC-ROK relationship 
presents a puzzle for this research. While the ROK has presented as many 
trading problems for the EC as the Japanese have, the ability to negotiate and 
reach a mutually satisfying agreement for the partners has been low. The 
predominantly important trading issues between the EC and the ROK have 
included IPE, telecommunications procurement, taxes on alcoholic beverages, 
and, ship-building (Cho 1993, Dent 1999). Each of these problems has been 
taken, or at least threatened to be taken, to the GATT or the WTO (Dent 1999: 
198). One of the reasons may have been the ROK's relative lack of attempted 
cooperation, compared with the Japanese. Another reason may be that while 
Japanese competitiveness may have been extremely high during the periods of 
the EC-Japan trade war (Meynell 1982: 106-11), the same does not hold true for 
the ROK which has allegedly practiced subsidies to strategic industries and 
"unfair" pricing (Kokko 2002: 12). The ROK's unwillingness to cooperate with 
regard to the shipbuilding problem has been described in the strongest terms by 
the European Commission as an "intransigent refusal to accept a credible and 
effective solution" (CEC 8/5/2001). The 2001 EC-ROK Framework Agreement, 
while maintaining a friendly and cooperative tone, struck a severe note on trade 
issues which is simply not present in the other bilateral agreements (CEC 2001). 
At a multilateral level as seen in the ASEM process, institutionalization 
appears to have been a factor for cooperation which has been included by 
default. ASEM is, in itself, a multilateral institution. It is important to note, 
however, that the ASEM agreement was relatively intangible and based on 
principles (CEC 2002), leading to a looser degree of institutionalisation which 
may have carried on until the present date. Compared to the levels of 
institutionalisation achieved in the bilateral ties, this informality, intangible nature, 
and lack of enforcement mechanism may have had an effect on the future course 
of the relationship (Kahler 2000, Helsinki 2006). This thin level of 
institutionalization has been described by Kahler as 'shallow institutionalisation' 
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(2000) and by Abbot and Snidal as 'soft law' (2000). It has become such an 
accepted feature in the EC-East Asian multilateral partnership that analysts have 
urged further understanding of ASEM as an arena to promote regular dialogue 
and understanding between regions (Hwee 2002: 5) as well as a meeting to 
influence working methods based on mutual understanding (Ofken 2001: 12) 
Institutions in the EC-East Asian relationship, therefore, have been 
generally been a sustaining factor in cooperative partnerships. The EC's bilateral 
relationship with Japan and China indicates how an institutionalised relationship 
may have maintained strong levels of dialogue which have sustained cooperation 
even during extremely difficult times. The bilateral institutionalisation process 
may have proven to be more effective than the looser, informal, although 
carefully designed multilateral institutionalisation as seen in ASEM. The lack of or 
delay of institutionalisation, as witnessed in the EC-ROK case, may actually 
mean that the forces of material interest and any lack of success in carrying out 
ideational values may result in full fledged defection by both partners. 
Ideas 
Even in a strongly trade-based relationship which appears to have been strongly 
dictated by material considerations, ideational values have their own significant 
role in an interregional partnership. In the case of the EC and East Asia, 
empirical evidence appears to suggest that the side losing out on material 
interest due to issues of trade imbalances may try to compensate through 
insertion of ideational values into the process (see Chapter 5). The EC, as the 
more powerful economic and political partner, has been rather persistent in its 
attempts to ideationally shape the partnership into one where its own values and 
ideas are more prominently featured (Forster 2000: 789, Smith 1994: 462). In its 
interregional ties, the promotion of ideas has been at the centre of the EC's 
interregional strategy (Santander 2005, Hettne 2001, Forster 2000, Gilson 2005). 
After the analysis of the EC's role as a global actor and promoter of 
interregionalism conducted in Chapter 4, one would expect ideas to feature 
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prominently in the EC-East Asian partnership. Empirical evidence points out that 
the EC has been at best inconsistent with its attempts to carry out its ideational 
strategies. 
While the East Asians have emphatically tried to avoid all attempts at what 
is usually labelled political interference, or interference in local affairs, the EC has 
gradually attempted to introduce values held dear in West Europe to Asia35. With 
the issue of human rights and democracy in Myanmar and China still a sore 
issue among the Europeans, this has caused. some disruption in the cooperation 
process between the EC and East Asia. This was most prominently displayed in 
the lead up to ASEM V in Hanoi where talks broke down on the issue of ASEM 
enlargement which would have had to include the military regime of Myanmar 
(Helsinki 2006: 33, Reiterer 2004: 9). 
In sharp contrast, the EC has been less adamant about swift political and 
social reforms in China, instead opting to integrate the Chinese into the global 
economy by inclusion in the WTO. Each and every one of the European 
Commission documents, however, mentions the need to improve human rights 
and encourage a civil society in China (see Chapter 5, Rhetorics section). The 
only instance when a direct confrontation on this issue was carried out was 
during the Tiananmen Square Massacre when trade between the EC and China 
was aborted for several months. The effect on trade during this period was 
minimal (Shambaugh 1996: 17). So far, the EC's insistence on improvements in 
Chinese human rights and democracy has not led to any outright conflicts 
between the EC and China, although this could potentially become a problematic 
issue should China's record on human rights and democracy deteriorate. 
The bright side to the inclusion of politics in the EC-East Asian dialogue is 
that- the EC's insistence on a heightened Japanese global role may have 
reinvigorated the bilateral tie and brought it to a new level of maturity. It appears 
that while the EC-Japan commercial relationship may have become relatively 
less important, the EC's encouragement of Japan as another global political 
35 This has been discussed in detail in Chapter 6, particularly in the rhetoric analysis section. 
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leader to counter the American political power has made the EC and Japan 
partners in more than economic issues. This is significant since it implies a 
strong degree of trust and a highly strengthened dialogue procedure where high 
politics can also be discussed. This sophistication and sincerity in dialogue is not 
necessarily present in the other EC-East Asian relationships. 
Apart from being an EC tool to expand interregionalism, ideas have 
actually proven to act as a distraction to further cooperation. At ASEM, the global 
war on terror has played a role in sidelining any attempts to make the talks more 
substantial. Political and security issues have become the centre of the last two 
summits and dominated most of the discussion while very little was mentioned on 
how to make members less indifferent towards the ongoing multilateral process 
(Krenzler 2002: 5, The Asia-Europe Summits 2002). Any resulting action has 
been mainly rhetorical and intangible (see Chapter 5 and 6). Notably, this same 
diversion of issues has not occurred on a bilateral level, with economic issues 
clearly taking on more significance in each of the bilateral dialogues. 
Ironically, the thread which holds the ASEM multilateral forum together 
loosely is probably the ideational side which has failed the EC-Korean 
relationship so devastatingly. The ASEM forum was founded on ideas and 
values, and for all its ineffectiveness, it is ideas and values which have kept 
ASEM from completely falling apart. Straight from its conception, ASEM 
members agreed on four key characteristics including its informality, 
multidimensionality, equal partnership and its high level focus (CEC 2002a). Its 
three pillars, including the fostering of political dialogue, re-enforcing economic 
cooperation, and promoting cooperation in the social and cultural fields, extolled 
the very values of maintaining a peaceful political world, promoting a free market, 
and being a socially stable member of the global community. These are ideas 
held dear by members of the EC and have been successfully included into this 
multilateral forum (Commission 2003: 26). 
Similarly, although perhaps to the detriment of the multilateral process, the 
Asian ASEM members have also been successful in including the ideational 
elements of informality, multidimensionality, and equal partnership into the ASEM 
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process. These values have been representative of the manner in which the East 
Asians have conducted their own external relationship and possibly in conflict 
with the European's own values or preferred code of conduct. 
The ASEM process continues to exist, despite housing two conflicting sets 
of ideas and values. Furthermore, empirical evidence suggests that ASEM 
survival continues, despite the clash in material interest. The preliminary 
conclusions of the trade data in Chapter 6 indicate that despite an overall rise in 
the trade interaction between the EC and Asian ASEM members, it is usually 
attributable to a sharp increase in the interaction between the EC and just a 
couple of the Asian ASEM members. Among some Asian ASEM members such 
as Japan and ASEAN, their relative importance as trade partners has actually 
decreased. A trend of widening EC trade deficit against the Asian ASEM 
members has also persisted, threatening the material interest in the relationship. 
The Asian economic crisis has presented further complications to the material 
interest involved in the ASEM process and particularly in 1997 and the next few 
years of Asian economic recovery, East Asia's promising economic growth had 
been thwarted and once again threatened the material interests involved. 
The evidence indicating that the material interests involved in the ASEM 
process are becoming less attractive, particularly for the EC, is compelling. Even 
as such, the ASEM process has not slipped into defection, as it did in the EC- 
Korea relationship. Instead, ASEM members are mechanically performing their 
institutional duties, in a perfunctory and indifferent manner. This may not be 
indicative of defection, and although the involved members are less interested in 
each other, it may be that the manner in which ideas and values hold more 
importance in a multilateral relationship has played a critical role in sustaining the 
ASEM process. It is arguable, however, that the sustained ASEM process has 
been conducted in an atmosphere of indifference, rather than either outright 
cooperation or defection. 
To be precise, the EC members may continue to see some value in even 
an informal discussion of the promotion of free trade, human rights, and social 
exchanges. This in itself constitutes some proof that in the EC-East Asian 
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partnership, ideas are not completely irrelevant and holds some value to the 
sustenance of interregionalism. In addition, the ASEM forum has been 
responsible for forming numerous high level dialogues, resulting in several 
declarations and statements of purpose from the members. The forum's 
increasingly bureaucratic nature, while arguably more tedious, has ensured that 
increased institutionalisation has been introduced into the process. This may 
have ensured a higher degree of trust between the members as well as instilled a 
sense of familiarity which are essential elements in the evolution of cooperation. 
The main stumbling block, however, may be the manner in which the EC and the 
East Asian members' ideas and values, both inserted into the ASEM forum, are 
not entirely complementary. 
Beyond Material Interest, Institutions, and Ideas: Role of Reciprocity, 
Commitment, and Codes of Conduct in Interregionalism 
While the previous sections provided some expected answers on interregional 
cooperation, the role of commitment and codes of conduct proposed by Axelrod's 
research on the evolution of cooperation unveils some of the most refreshing 
insights into interregionalism. While the factors of material interest, institutions 
and ideas are absolutely critical in determining the evolution of cooperation in a 
partnership, Chapter 3 noted how a number of considerations on cooperation 
proposed by Axelrod are also relevant to how cooperation evolves. Among these 
two is the manner in which Axelrod's propositions mix elements of material 
interest and ideas to provide a further emphasis on the role of commitment and 
the role of codes of conduct. Questions were also raised with regard to 
interregionalism and includes the role of rational actors within interregionalism, 
the role of values trust and codes of conduct, its role in managing hierarchy and 
creating rules, and how the nature of interregional cooperation changes in its 
bilateral and multilateral forms also need to be re-examined in the light of the 
empirical basis provided in chapters 5 and 6. 
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The nature of commitment is an extremely important component in the 
cooperation process as has been suggested by Axelrod's conditions for the 
evolution of cooperation (Axelrod 1984). Commitment to a relationship 
guarantees that actors continue to work on a relationship despite any problems 
arising, defines the actors as allies, identifies the underlining values and ideas 
they consider to be important, and adds to familiarity and trust. In the EC-East 
Asian relationship, commitment has developed differently in the bilateral and 
multilateral relationship. This has led on to distinctly different practices as can be 
verified by the nature of eventually established working institutions as well as the 
partners' ability to draft binding agreements in the bilateral and multilateral 
modes of cooperation. 
The forces of an interregional bilateral relationship oblige two partners to 
work together in cooperation and especially in conflict. This has been confirmed 
over and over again in the EC-East Asian bilateral cooperation process, 
particularly over highly contentious issues such as fair trade practices and the 
trade imbalances. Put simply, a bilateral relationship does not require binding 
agreements to make certain the partners are working together and are committed 
to each other. 
The first important insight on interregionalism provided by Axelrod's 
research on cooperation is that rational actors are indeed affected by memories 
of past interaction and the development of commitment and codes of conduct. 
Bilateralism between the EC and Japan was plagued with conflict during its 
earlier days, but commitment towards the relationship has been so strong that an 
atmosphere of cooperation can be perceived in the present. In 1976, during the 
peak of the EC-Japan trade problems, Doko Toshio, President of Japan's 
Keidanren, was so shocked at the degree of anti-Japan sentiment in Europe that 
he returned and insisted that the Japanese government create plans of action 
which would counter this sentiment. The Japanese government immediately 
began a program of voluntary export restraints as well as trade barrier reductions 
which were considered to have been sincere measures to please the Europeans 
(Wilkinson 1983: 190). This was despite the fact that today, it has been noted 
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that Japan's competitiveness was so high during the period that unfair trade 
practices may not have been the main reason for the large trade imbalances 
(Meynell 1982: 106-11). It has also been argued that though the Japanese were 
slow in deregulating, their formal trade barriers have been steadily reduced and 
are,, in most cases, below those maintained by Europe and America (Bridges 
1999: 25). 
The second important insight on interregional ism provided by Axelrod is 
the role of reciprocity in sustaining cooperation, despite the tendency towards 
conflict. The European Commission may have taken note of these genuine 
attempts at cooperation and initiated discussion among member states for a 
reciprocal removal of bilateral safeguard clauses (see Chapter 4, EC-Japan 
section). This initial move towards reconciliation failed, but still demonstrated a 
strong desire for cooperation by both the European Commission and Japan. 
During the period of conflict and eventual reconciliation between the EC and 
Japan from the 1970s to the 1990s, a steady string of institutionalisation in the 
relationship was carried out and has amassed into a strong consultative 
framework which has been confirmed with the 1992 Hague Declaration (Gilson 
2000: 95, Bridges 1999: 43). This atmosphere in EC-Japan cooperation has been 
maintained until today, and one would also note that the main source of conflict, 
the EC's trade deficit, has stabilised. 
The two important insights on interregionalism with regard to reciprocity, 
commitment, and codes of conduct are indeed carried forward to the EC-China 
interregional partnership. While the evolution of cooperation in EC-Japan 
relations has stemmed from conflict, the EC-China relationship has differently 
evolved from a strong degree of commitment and cooperation between the two 
partners. Ever since the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s, the European relationship 
with the Chinese has been extremely healthy. The rational choice explanation for 
this may be because the EC's large trade deficits against China did not arise until 
much later than the other bilateral relationships. Social constructivists might 
instead attribute it to the fact that the Europeans saw their own identity as a force 
to balance the communists as well as American unilateralism later on. This view 
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would have been mirrored by the Chinese, who also saw the Europeans as a 
possible force for a more multilateral world. 
A mutual degree of respect and understanding resulted in an extended 
period of successful negotiations, even over the extremely controversial issue of 
textiles. Highly notable is how the EC and China managed to agree on a 1979 
Textile Agreement when talks had previously broken down between the US and 
China (Kapur 1986: 62-63). After this period, the trade imbalances started to 
become a factor in the EC-China relationship, and were noted time and again in 
the trade framework agreements (see Chapter 5, rhetoric). The EC solution to 
this appeared to be to persuade China to integrate smoothly into the world 
economy, a move which began as early as 1995 and resulted in China's WTO 
accession in 2000. It has already been noted, however, that China had already 
made several unilateral import tariff rate cuts since the early 1990s, and 
numerous reforms were starting to have a positive effect on the current account 
convertibility (Koko 2002: 25). 
Bilateral commitment need not necessarily mean cooperation, as has 
been witnessed in the case of the EC and Korea. Trouble started early in this 
relationship and Korea's unwillingness or inability to cooperate may have 
resulted in the current phase of trouble between the two partners. Problems in 
the ROK's practice of domestic policy, including IPE, telecommunications 
procurement, and taxes on alcoholic beverages were the early problems which 
plagued the relationship from the 1980s. This was later compounded by 
mounting problems in the areas of the shipbuilding industry, steel, and 
semiconductors (Moon 1994: 146-162). Each of these cases were taken, or 
threatened to be taken, to either the GATT or the WTO and very few of them 
were solved bilaterally (Dent 1999: 198). In the meanwhile, the EC's trade deficit 
against the ROK continued to grow. This observation does not mean, however, 
that the two are not committed to each other. It appears that the partners are now 
obliged to work together to improve their relationship and resolve the ongoing 
trade problems. 
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To look for an area where commitment appears to be most lacking in the 
EC-East Asian relationship, one needs to take a look at the multilateral mode of 
cooperation occurring within ASEM. Unlike the bilateral mode, the East Asians 
have insisted on a process which is non-binding, informal, flexible, and based on 
an equal partnership (CEC 2002A). Considering the EC's economic might, an 
equal partnership is simply a set of principles and certainly not grounded in 
reality. ASEM's nature has instead offered the partners opportunities to avoid 
commitment to each other. Empirical evidence points towards rhetorical 
declarations and meetings which have failed to produce substantial outcomes 
(Gilson 2004: 195). This has been reflected in the European's feeble efforts to aid 
their East Asian partners through the Asian Economic crisis (Gilson 2004: 193, 
Dent 2003: 231), the dismissible evolution in trade between the EC and ASEAN 
(Helsinki 2006), the lack of coherent policies, and avoidance of dialogue on 
sensitive economic and political issues (see Chapter 6). 
The number of actors involved in a multilateral relationship is arguably one 
of the most important factors in decreasing enthusiasm to commit. ASEM as a 
multilateral relationship attempts to be as institutionalized as possible, meaning a 
painstaking and extremely bureaucratic system which makes it very difficult to 
reach an agreement (Gilson 2004). This could have been another factor in the 
increasing indifference the EC has had towards the ASEM process. 
The evolution of cooperation in EC-East Asian relations and the 
coexistence of cooperative modes has not only brought out an interesting 
balance in material and ideational values, but this very balance appears to have 
resulted in the emergence of accepted principles of conduct between the 
partners. These accepted principles of conduct cannot be clearly distinguished 
by either rational choice arguments or social constructivist explanations. Instead, 
the accepted principles of conduct between the EC and East Asia in both the 
bilateral and multilateral modes of cooperation display the mixed symptoms of 
both material interest and ideational values. This mixture of possibly either 
opposing or complementary components has been accepted by the partners as 
an acceptable means to carry on the evolution of cooperation. 
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According to Axelrod, promotion of cooperation can occur by ensuring that 
continued contact with both players will continue, changing the payoffs, teaching 
people to care about each other, teaching reciprocity, and improving recognition 
abilities (1984). Similarly, Ruggie stresses the importance of reciprocity in 
bilateralism and his ideas on a society of states outline the importance of 
commonly accepted values, rules and institutions to promote cooperation 
between states (1992: 11). These methods are widespread within the politics of 
the global economy. The EC and East Asia will continue to interact politically, 
economically, and socially as members of the global community, which, 
according to Axelrod, would encourage both sides to continue with the 
cooperation process. The cooperation in this case, however, has the clear 
tendency of evolving and transforming to accommodate circumstances and the 
interest of each player. 
Making use of suggestions on cooperation derived from the rational 
choice, social constructivist, and evolution of cooperation camps (see Chapter 3), 
three very clear observations can be derived on the developed of accepted 
principles of conduct in interregional ism as observed in the EC-East Asian 
relationship. Importantly, these observations on accepted codes of conducts are 
not exclusively linked to either material interests, institutions or ideas. First of all, 
the evidence assembled shows that the issue of reciprocity is strongly relevant in 
interregionalism, and is a key to the promotion or collapse of the cooperation 
process. Secondly, dialogue between the partners results in the critical issue of 
caring, trust and familiarity between the partners. Thirdly, a reputation is created 
during the course of interaction and perception of whether a partner is 
considered to be, in Axelrod's terms, 'nice' or not, is developed during the history 
of interaction between the two (Axelrod 1997: 21). 
These three accepted principles of conduct may have been responsible 
for the thriving relationship between the EC and China and for the maintenance 
of a relatively maturing cooperation process between the EC and Japan. The 
three principles have been clearly maintained in the EC's relationship with Japan 
and China, where the balancing of economic might and ability to reach 
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satisfactory conclusions to negotiations has been prevalent within two reciprocal, 
albeit sometimes uneven, partnerships. During the course of the relationship, as 
mentioned in previous parts, constant dialogue has been established leading to a 
high degree of institutionalisation. A high degree of caring, trust, and familiarity is 
observable in the constant dialogue and numerous strategic documents. Most 
importantly, the fact that cooperation is relatively smooth between the EC and its 
partnership with China and Japan despite the ballooning trade deficit against 
China, and a constant deficit with Japan, points towards a very high degree of 
trust and familiarity. Japan's reputation for'being nice' has been established over 
the years and its propensity for cooperation is regarded as strong. For China's 
case, perhaps a high degree of familiarity and trust may serve as a better 
explanation than possession of a 'nice' reputation, particularly because the EC's 
relationship with China has been extremely strong over the past four decades 
and has been relatively pacific. 
The accepted principles of conduct differ when analysing the EC's bilateral 
relationship with the ROK and with ASEM. The Koreans have developed an 
extremely poor record in cooperating with the EC, consequently creating a poor 
reputation which has been reflected in the EC's strong wording in its strategic 
documents as well as break down in bilateral talks necessitating the adjudication 
of the WTO. The degree of institutionalisation between the EC and the ROK has 
been relatively low, with dialogue lacking compared to the EC's relationship with 
Japan and China. Finally, the relationship is far from reciprocal, with the Korean 
economy far less powerful than the EC's and the EC-ROK aggregate trade 
volume low compared to the other East Asian partnerships. In other words, the 
accepted principles of conduct between the EC and the ROK have not been set 
into motion effectively, possibly accounting for the failure of the relationship. 
The ASEM case is more challenging to analyse because of its multilateral 
nature. It presents an excellent example of dialogue and a strong, albeit possibly 
rhetorical, display of caring, trust, and familiarity. Asia's diversity and different 
levels of development, however, force the entire group to resort to informality and 
flexibility (Hwee 2003,2004). Firstly, as previously mentioned, Asian ASEM 
- 260 - 
members' diversity prevents them from speaking with a single voice. Secondly, 
the level of diversity means that Asian ASEM members must resort to their own 
set of values in order to inject further informality and flexibility. Given the 
differences in culture, levels of development, and governing systems, ASEM's 
Asian side seems to have its hands tied and prevented from searching a more 
effective policy direction. 
. The establishment of reputations in this multilateral relationship is vague 
due to its non-committal nature, but the ASEM forum's reputation itself is one of a 
fatigued, bureaucratic, and often ineffective set of partnerships. The issue of 
reciprocity is similarly confusing, since the economic power of each of the East 
Asian members differs and fluctuates strongly. Reciprocal acts or niceties have 
been lacking in the ASEM process, as have been any reciprocal acts of 
defection. This adds up to a highly confusing set of observations and further 
questions on exactly what the accepted principles of conduct in the multilateral 
relationship might actually be. Lack of a set of lacking principles of conduct may 
actually have led to the disinterest and indifference seen in the ASEM process 
today. 
Dynamic Elements of Cooperation in the EC-East Asian partnership 
The determinants of cooperation are not alone in setting out the direction 
for cooperation in the GPE, because the dynamic elements of cooperation often 
will vary the balance in material interest, institutions, and ideas. One of the 
strongest themes to emerge from the vertical analysis in chapters 5 and 6 is that 
the fluctuation of cooperation depends very strongly on the dynamic elements of 
cooperation presented in Chapter 2. This thesis has argued that the evolutionary 
nature of actors, the hierarchical and constantly evolving GPE, and the evolving 
modes of bilateral and multilateral cooperation are elements which need to be 
taken into account while analysing cooperation. The vertical analysis in chapters 
5 and 6 demonstrated how these dynamic elements of cooperation played a very 
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obvious role in influencing the direction of cooperation. This section highlights 
these elements and compares and contrasts the dynamic elements of 
cooperation in the EC's bilateral and multilateral partnership with its East Asian 
partners. 
Evolving Nature of Actors 
The constantly changing economic strength of the East Asians and the EC's own 
evolution have a strong effect on shifting the material, institutional, and ideational 
balance. Firstly, we can explicitly note how the periods of rise and fall in the East 
Asian countries' economic strength led to fluctuations in cooperation. Chapter 5 
clearly indicated how material interest dictated the tone of the relationship. In a 
similar fashion, East Asia's economic dynamism led to changes in the balance of 
material interest which consequently caused the fluctuation in cooperation itself. 
This was clearly portrayed in the manner in which the EC was engaged in a very 
intense relationship with Japan in the 1950s, at the period when Japan's 
economic rise was beginning to show. Similar trends followed with the ROK and 
China as the 90s approached. During periods when the individual East Asian 
economies' progress began to stagnate, it appeared that the intensity of the 
cooperation process also stagnated along with it. This was evident with the EC 
and Japan during the early 1990s as well as the rest of the region at the end of 
the 1990s as a result of the Asian economic crisis. This downward trend in the 
economic progress of the East Asian actors was eventually reversed from 2000 
onwards, and this resulted in the return towards a trend of an intensive 
relationship, particularly between the EC and China. 
Secondly, apart from the East Asian states' dynamism, the EC has also 
seen an evolution in its capacity to cooperate. One of the most important results 
of the EC's evolution is the European Commission's ability to speak on behalf of 
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the EC on matters concerning trade from the 1970s onwards36. The formal 
establishment of the Common Commercial Policy and the rise of the European 
Commission's executive powers saw the Commission deal directly with the 
Japanese government between the 1970s to the 1980s (Gilson 2000: 26-27, 
Drifte 1986: 97). In 1974, and amid European confusion on how to deal with 
China effectively while bilateral trade agreements between individual European 
member states were due to end, the European Commission stepped up and was 
given the duty of conducting all future negotiations with China (Wong 2005: 6). 
This, resulted in the 1978 EC-China Trade Agreement and the first agreement the 
EC had agreed with a non-market economy. The individual member states were 
also happy to allow the European Commission to similarly negotiate with the 
ROK and address the numerous trade problems which have continually 
occurred. 
There has been a surprising period of calm during the EC's latter 
evolution, unlike during the preliminary establishment of the EC and the feared 
Fortress Europe, and the diplomatic and communicatory role of the European 
Commission may have had a large part to do with this. By the end of the 1970s, 
a structured system of dialogue was already set in place between the EC and its 
East Asian counterparts. This included regular 6 month and annual meetings at 
various levels as well as permanent representatives from both the EC and the 
East Asian side in Brussels and the East Asian capitals. This enhanced mutual 
trust with the constant communication meant that there was no panic with each 
of the changes which occurred during the EC's recent and continued evolution. 
36 Chapter 5 includes analysis at several stages of the EC-East Asian's bilateral relations when the 
European Commission's role increases as a result of its increased competency. 
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Evolving GPE 
Three changes in the global economy appear to have had a strong effect on the 
EC-East Asian relationship, and each of these episodes is based mainly in East 
Asia. The three events include the changes in the American economic 
importance in Asia, the rise of the Asian Economic Miracle, and the fateful Asian 
Economic Crisis. Each of these events caused serious shocks within the EC-East 
Asian relationship and proved to be both extremely strong stimuli in changing the 
balance between material interest, institutions and ideas. 
The American post 2nd World War role in Asia had strong effects on the 
material considerations of the EC-East Asian economic partnership. Its continued 
security interest in Japan and Korea meant that the US-Japan and US-Korean 
relationships were very tight, particularly because security and economic 
concerns were still tied together. During the 1950s, the US played an extremely 
important role in integrating the Japanese back into the international community 
and was instrumental in Japan's successful application into the GATT (Drifte 
1986: 96). The US even went on to offer tariff concessions to countries which 
gave MFN status to Japan, although this was met by strong resistance from the 
Europeans who were extremely wary of Japan's reputation as a protectionist 
trader (Gilson 2000: 15). During this same period, the ROK also found itself 
relying mainly on US grant aid to sustain itself. There have been suggestions that 
this reliance on US aid may have actually caused so much Korean dependency 
on the US that it may have prohibited development in the ROK (Preston 
2001: 205). 
When the Americans relinquished a number of opportunities within East 
Asia, it meant that the Europeans were able to increase their material interests 
within the region. This was the case, particularly with China. The Americans' 
close friendship with Japan and the ROK meant that in the beginning, there was 
very little space for any European involvement with the two Asian countries. 
While American ties with Japan and the ROK were extremely strong after the 2nd 
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World War, this was not true with China. China's own strong ties to the USSR 
antagonised the Americans and denied the Chinese any opportunity for further 
communication with their ideological opposite (Dent 1999: 129). It is extremely 
important to note how the Europeans jumped on the chance to strengthen their 
ties with China, starting from the 1954 Geneva conference, and how quickly 
West Germany, Britain, and France became China's largest trading partners 
during the subsequent period. By the middle of the 1960s and despite their 
ideological differences, West Europe had become Chinas most important trade 
partner (Shambaugh 1996: 5). 
It is remarkable how the changes in the US-East Asian relationship 
accompanied fluctuations in the EC-East Asian relationship, once again marked 
very strongly by material considerations. The 1963 US grant aid reduction to the 
ROK caused the Koreans to find an alternative means to balance their 
dependency and this meant looking towards Europe (Cherry 2001). This 
admittedly did not cause an immediate effect on increasing trade between 
Europe and the ROK, but at least obliged the two to begin looking at possibilities 
towards creating a substantial relationship. On the other hand, the 1971 
normalisation of Sino-US relations imposed a strong threat to the thriving Sino- 
Europe trade relationship. Between 1975 and 1985, the US share of China's 
imports rose from 5.1 percent to 12.. 2 percent and was a strong factor in reducing 
the EC's importance in China during that specific timeframe (Dent 1999: 134- 
135). Equally noteworthy is how the American's strong trade relationship with 
Japan has been maintained and the manner in which the EC has continually 
been overshadowed by the US with regards to its own trade relationship with 
Japan. 
The Asian economic crisis, one of the most significant shifts in the GPE, 
altered the conditions for cooperation in both a material and an institutional 
sense. It is necessary to take note that while the ASEM process may have been 
marked with indifference since 1997, the Asian economic crisis did not cause a 
dramatic pause in the bilateral relationships between the EC and East Asia. A 
relatively strong trade relationship between Europe and East Asia had already 
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been established by this time, and a failing Asian economy meant that the trade 
deficit the EC was suffering against East Asia would only grow larger. The EC 
pushed forward with its plans to integrate China into the world economy through 
the WTO. A new framework agreement with the ROK was also formulated in 
2001 which clearly emphasised, in the strongest terms, the problem of ship- 
building which was plaguing the EC-ROK partnership (CEC 2001B). An Action 
Plan for EC-Japan Cooperation was initiated in the same year, although with 35 
consultation frameworks between the EC and Japan meeting as often as twice a 
year or at least once a year, this ensured that the two partners were in constant 
contact (CEC 2001C). 
The manner in which the evolution of GPE affected the ideational balance 
can be found in areas which are less directly concerned with trade - although 
how these issues are dealt with can subsequently affect trade. Issues of Asia's 
democratisation process, human rights issues, and the global war on terror 
provided perhaps an unwelcome diversion to the trade issues the EC and its 
East Asian partners were predominantly interested in. Global changes in areas of 
politics and security have always found their way into the cooperation process 
and appear to have introduced a degree of complexity and confusion into the 
relationship, not necessarily by the partners' choice. 
To begin with, East Asia's choices in the evolving GPE have usually been 
in conflict with the ideas the EC considers to be important (Hwee 2004: 21). The 
East Asians are known for their diversity, but their political diversity in particular 
introduces some serious complications into the EC-East Asian relationship. The 
EC insists on trading with countries with no less than a clear record on human 
rights and a democratically elected government. After all, these have been 
insisted on at the highest degree possible in its own enlargement process. 
Myanmar and China, especially the former, continue to introduce the most 
severe potential for problems, with regard to political and security events. 
Myanmar's continued refusal to democratise and its membership to ASEAN has 
introduced a strong shock to the ASEM process and has even threatened to 
derail the process. China's record of human rights was marred with the events of 
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Tiananmen Square, an episode which caused a period of disruption in its 
bilateral and multilateral ties with the EC. 
One must also note that each of these political and security events quite 
often has a strong impact on the global political economy and can cause a shift in 
concerns over material interest, institutions and ideas. The September 11 attacks 
on America launched the entire world into a period of economic uncertainty which 
was clearly reflected in the trade data between the EC and East Asia. The EC 
embargo on China during the events of Tiananmen Square also produced a 
similar effect for the two partners. 
The global war on terror has had a rather indirect impact on the EC-East 
Asian relationship, although it may have been responsible for a strong diversion 
of interest away from the cooperation process. ASEM's post 9/11 summits have 
often been dominated by issues of terrorism prevention, sidetracking trade issues 
in a very obvious manner. The EC has also insisted that Japan share a larger 
responsibility in global governance as both a support and a balance to the US 
dominance (Hague Declaration 1992). Similarly, the problem of containing North 
Korea has been one of the most important talking points, with the relevant issues 
constantly being referred to in the framework agreements as well as producing a 
1999 EC Council of Ministers Conclusions on the Korean Peninsula (CEC 1999). 
Evolving Modes of Cooperation 
Like the other dynamic elements of cooperation, the evolving modes of 
cooperation in the EC-East Asian partnership are also responsible for altering the 
balance between material interest, institutions, and ideas. By design, the 
coexistence of the bilateral EC-East Asian relationships and multilateral ASEM 
process should not have posed a problem. The ASEM process clearly states that 
the forum should only be used as an area to promote further bilateral ties. In 
other words, the existence of this EC-East Asian multilateral mode is merely to 
accommodate the existing bilateral ties between the EC, ASEAN and East Asia. 
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The conclusion one would come to when analysing ASEM's statement of 
purpose is that the bilateral mode should certainly take precedence over the 
multilateral mode of cooperation. 
The coexistence of bilateralism and multilateralism within the EC-East 
Asian relationship is, however, more problematic when put into practice. It is 
problematic, in the first instance, because it has the propensity to overshadow 
other efforts in improving cooperation by partners who give undue attention to an 
extremely informal multilateral cooperation process. While this has not been a 
problem among the three East Asian states within the case studies, in the case 
of the EC's relationship with ASEAN, the ASEM process has effectively taken 
over any dialogue which occurs between the two regions. The EC-ASEAN 1980 
Cooperation Agreement, in itself a very broad and intangible agreement, has not 
been superseded with any other framework agreement for over two decades. As 
such, the EC-ASEAN relationship has been strongly reliant on the ASEM 
framework in order to advance cooperation. Empirical evidence indicates that the 
ASEM framework has done very little for ASEAN's relationship with the EC, with 
trade only increasing marginally and its relative importance as an important EC 
trade partner significantly reduced. 
In other instances, the two cooperative modes send out mixed messages 
on the status of the relationship and the balance of interests within the 
relationship, which threaten any accepted principles of conduct established in 
one mode of cooperation. ASEM's ideationally-based principles of informality, 
multidimensionality, equal partnership and its high level focus are simply not 
complementary with the bilateral principles of conduct which are often highly 
based on material interest. A good reputation in ASEM, to take the ROK as an 
example, does not translate to a similarly healthy reputation for cooperation in 
the bilateral relationship. ASEM's policy of non-interference and equality also 
contradicts the strong struggle for both economic and political leverage which is 
symbolic of the bilateral relationships. The EC's continued insistence on an 
improved record of human rights in China and an increased role for Japan, for 
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example, are issues rarely discussed directly in the multilateral ASEM forum, but 
are one of the main features in the bilateral level discussions. 
In addition to this the benefits of institutionalization are marginalized 
because of the manner in which, the forum fatigue presented in the ASEM forum 
(Reiterer 2000, ASEM 2000) may actually spill over to forum fatigue at the 
bilateral level, or vice versa. Some of the relationships, such as the EC's 
partnership with Japan and China, are so highly institutionalised that the 
bureaucratic nature of ASEM only acts as an unwelcome burden. The EC has 
had to handle both the institutionalisation of the bilateral. ties as well as those in 
ASEM and it appears that priority has been provided to the more effective 
bilateral institutionalisation. This is hardly surprising, since ASEM's own objective 
states that the bilateral ties should take precedence, but the Europeans' 
unwillingness or inability to cope with the increased dialogue may have rendered 
the evolution of cooperation in the multilateral mode rather useless. Yet, the 
mere existence of a multilateral mode of cooperation despite the lack of interest 
in it could provide mixed messages concerning the EC's commitment to the 
multilateral partnership. 
The evolution of modes of cooperation also means that when material 
interests have not been met through one mode of cooperation, partners have the 
choice to defer it to another mode37. The GATT rounds and the establishment of 
the WTO are important to the EC-East Asian relationship because this 
multilateral forum is exactly where failed negotiations are taken to. This is most 
prominent in the EC-Korea partnership, where everything from 
telecommunications, liquor, and ship-building has been brought to the WTO for 
dispute resolution (Dent 1999). The Japanese have also had their own fair share 
of cases taken to GATT's negotiating mechanisms, although the EC and Japan 
seem to have had far fewer problems since the establishment of the WTO due to 
a constantly maturing relationship and a proper dialogue framework. For the EC- 
China relationship, integration into the WTO has clearly brought the two partners 
" Also see multilateral deference (Dent 2004). 
- 269 - 
closer together. The EC's role in helping China make a case of WTO entry has 
clearly bought them favours with the Chinese, a fact reflected in the two 
becoming mutually each other's most important trading partners in recent years. 
Finally, other regional integration efforts have also had some mixed effects 
on the EC East Asian relationship, also varying the balance in material interest, 
institutions and ideas. ASEAN has proven to be a respected political integration 
process among the members of Southeast Asia and has been responsible for the 
stability of the region ever since its conception in 1967. The grouping has allowed 
the EC to deal collectively in a relatively effective manner with a group of 
extremely diverse nations, establishing a dialogue which led'on to the creation of 
ASEM and the inclusion of Japan, China and the ROK. The establishment of 
APEC in 1989 signalled a blatant exclusion of the EC in East Asia and possibly 
was a stimulant in the creation of ASEM in 1996. ASEAN's enlargement to 
include Myanmar had strong political effects on ASEM, and consequently ASEM 
enlargement. The inclusion of Myanmar into the dialogue presents some serious 
complications and has threatened to stall the multilateral ASEM process. The 
ASEAN Regional Forum and the inclusion of the European Union in the forum 
might have instilled a further degree of mutual trust and a continuing framework 
for a dialogue between the EC and East Asia as well. 
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Re-evaluating Cooperation 
Coexistence of Bilateralism and Multilateralism - Obscurity and Confusion 
The questions and propositions raised in Chapter 3 noted how the evolution of 
cooperation could be put at risk when either the mode of cooperation or mutual 
interests is unclear (or when they coexist). The problems of obscurity over modes 
of cooperation and mutual interest are particularly obvious in the ASEM process, 
perhaps leading to stagnation in the EC-East Asian multilateral evolution of 
cooperation. It also appears to have plagued the EC-ROK partnership to some 
extent. The opposite, however, is true with the EC's bilateral partnership with 
China and Japan where both sides appear to have settled on material interests to 
govern the cooperation process. 
The presence of a multilateral ASEM introduces particular confusion, due 
to its highly ideational nature. The existing confusion over the mixture of 
European and Asian ideas and values already present in the ASEM process is 
already problematic in one sense. The fact that these strongly varied ideas and 
values are also mixed with the material side of bilateral relationships presents an 
increased complication because it creates high expectations which are not 
grounded in reality. 
The lack of clarity and confusion due to the mix of material interest and 
ideational concerns is particularly detrimental to the ASEM multilateral 
relationship. Despite providing the opportunity to base the partnership on ideas, 
indifference has plagued ASEM, and this is due to the East Asians' 
misunderstanding that the strongly ideational forum would actually lead to further 
gains in material interest. The ASEM forum may well increase dialogue, 
encourage democratisation, and promote human rights, all through equal 
partnership, but expectations have always been that overall trade interaction 
needs to increase (Hwee 2002: 2-3). This has been East Asia's expectation of 
ASEM, although it has not been realised because Japan (and ASEAN) has 
actually lost out in terms of its relative importance as an EC trading partner 
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(Helsinki 2006). As noted in Chapter 6, a similar sense of dissatisfaction over 
ASEM also exists on the EC side, which has hoped to increase the political 
dialogue with East Asia to a more significant level. The Asian ASEM members 
have firmly refused to enter into any discussion on sensitive political issues, 
effectively blocking any attempts for an evolution of cooperation in terms of ideas 
in the ASEM process. 
This clash between material interest and ideational advances within the 
ASEM process due to different priorities among the partners has thwarted, to a 
certain degree, the opportunity for the evolution of cooperation in multilateral 
terms. The main reason for this is clearly due to the disagreement, confusion and 
progressively reduced clarity on exactly what the main purpose of ASEM is 
(Hwee 2003,2004). This disparity between the European and East Asian views 
on the ASEM objective is a serious challenge for the future progression and 
cooperation in the ASEM forum. 
A similar dilemma appears to exist in the bilateral mode of cooperation 
due to the strong material incentives clearly present in the EC-East Asian 
bilateral relationships. In bilateral relationships, ideas and values are gradually 
introduced as a part of the maturing and institutionalising partnership. In each of 
the East Asia cases, particularly in the EC's partnership with China and Japan, 
material interests have led the evolution of cooperation and subsequently 
resulted in further institutionalization as well as some insertion of ideas into the 
partnership. The ideational side of each partnership has not proven to be a threat 
to any material interests and in most cases, has usually proven conducive to the 
promotion of further material interests. The EC's encouragement for China's 
WTO entry is a case in point, where integration of the Chinese into the world 
trade system benefited both sides of the partnership, materially, institutionally, 
and ideationally. Human rights issues have been increasingly discussed in the 
EC's strategic documents on China, although the approach has been relatively 
unobtrusive and the focus on trade is maintained (see Chapter 6: rhetorical 
analysis section). In the case of the EC and Japan, a maturing relationship has 
subsequently developed the political dialogue, although any talks on ideas and 
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values have been extremely cautious and limited. The EC's desire for Japan's 
increased participation as a global leader has been gradually introduced into the 
partnership and is. far from being a binding condition for cooperation to continue 
between the partners. As for the EC-ROK partnership, the EC's lack of relative 
material interest has meant that the evolution of cooperation has been equally 
slow on the institutional and ideational sides. 
The questions and propositions presented in Chapter 3 concentrated on 
balances in the material, institutional and the ideational elements and the shifting 
of balance between bilateralism and multilateralism according to those elements. 
The questions and propositions also allowed for the explanation that partners 
may be engaged in both bilateralism and multilateralism together simultaneously, 
or that both modes of cooperation could survive and coexist. In the real GPE, a 
clear divide between bilateralism and multilateralism is a false dichotomy since 
actors are usually expected to engage in both modes of cooperation. Due to the 
role of commitment, trust, and codes of conduct, actors are expected to continue 
to engage in cooperation even when they feel that their material, institutional, or 
ideational pursuits are not being achieved. In other words, even if a mode of 
cooperation has been disappointing for a partner, commitment and codes of 
conduct developed throughout the years of interaction will have a role in 
sustaining a stagnating mode of cooperation. 
The 'imaginary' analytical divide in modes of cooperation has however 
helped us to explain under what conditions one mode of cooperation may take on 
a more active form while the other mode remains passive. Commitment and 
codes of conduct are enough to sustain a partnership in the case that it has failed 
on the material, institutional, and ideational fronts, but they are not sufficient to 
foster further evolution of cooperation. This section notes how the EC-East Asian 
partnership has taken on the direction of active bilateralism dominated by 
material interest with passive multilateralism simultaneously remaining as an 
alternative, should ideas become more important in the partnership. 
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Active Bilateralism 
EC-East Asian relations have certainly evolved over the past five decades and 
the form they have taken is a certain reflection of the various balances in 
conscious and unconscious police choices made between shifting modes of 
cooperation and material or ideational interests. These choices are affected 
strongly, as suggested earlier, by the dynamic elements of cooperation 
(evolutionary nature of actors, the evolutionary nature of a hierarchical 
international system, and the bilateral and multilateral modes of cooperation). 
Finally, the establishment of accepted principles of conduct has also been 
derived from the history of interaction between the EC and the East Asians, often 
resulting in a mixture of material interest and ideas being used in the cooperation 
process. The result of the evolution of EC-East Asian cooperation has been one 
which currently sees a period of active bilateralism juxtaposed with passive 
multilateralism. 
The evolution of cooperation in the EC-East Asian relationship has seen a 
strong material basis right from the beginning of any remote interest the partners 
may have had in each other. A strong degree of institutionalisation in both the 
bilateral and multilateral relationships explains how the desire for unconstrained 
material achievement has been controlled. Neorealism and neoliberal 
institutionalism explicates the EC-East Asian relationship well to a certain extent 
but fails to provide a justification on how the ASEM multilateral -forum has still 
managed to be sustained. Rational choice also fails to conclusively point out how 
the EC-Japan relationship, seriously troubled at its initiation, managed to mature 
and its cooperation sustained despite serious periods of high tension conflict and 
trade imbalances. Similarly, the EC's ambition to enter into an early friendly 
partnership with China, despite its fledgling economy in the 1950s and status as 
a non-market economy, cannot be entirely argued through neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalism alone. 
Principles of cooperation embedded in Wendt's form of social 
constructivism as well as Axelrod's evolution of cooperation theory serve to 
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explain some of these rational choice anomalies. The EC's desired identity as 
both an economic and a political powerhouse has been a factor in its attempts to 
make certain that its conduct of external relations is not only based on material 
factors, but ideational ones as well. The propensity and reputation of certain East 
Asian states to cooperate, as in the case of Japan, mean that additional trust has 
become a part of the relationship and contributes to the sustainability of 
cooperation. The opposite has been true for the EC and the ROK. In the case of 
the EC and China, a friendship has been established based on the partner's long 
term acceptance of each other. Meanwhile, the sustainability of the multilateral 
ASEM process has been based on a strong degree of ingrained ideas as well as 
its strong institutional nature. 
Despite the rational choice anomalies in the EC-East Asian relationship, 
the partners appear to have opted toward placing priority on their common 
material interest, an exercise which has seen them head towards a period of 
active bilateralism. The EC-East Asia relationship has proven, over the years, to 
be based almost entirely on the common ambition for increased trade between 
the regions. While some politicisation of the process has taken place, this has 
been mainly a consequence from the influences of trade. Similarly, any 
established dialogue or institutions are created as a mechanism to carry out the 
primary common material interest and to ensure that both sides are guaranteed 
reciprocal treatment. 
Given the empirical evidence, a period of active bilateralism has ensued 
whereby trade issues hold priority in the evolution of cooperation and reciprocity 
is a requirement. The issues of institutions, values and ideas are factors which 
might enter this active bilateralism as a secondary influence in order to sustain 
the evolution of cooperation. More importantly, whether cooperation thrives in the 
evolution of active bilateralism depends strongly on accepted principles of 
conduct which include the partners' reputations, the consistency of dialogue, and 
whether negotiations usually conclude in a reciprocal manner. These have been 
factors which have consistently sustained the EC-Japan and EC-China 
relationships in the past. The failure to meet the accepted principles of conduct, 
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compounded with reduced material interest on the part of the EC and the lack of. 
common ideas or values means that the EC-ROK bilateral relationship has 
receded into defection. 
Passive Multilateralism 
While an active and ongoing bilateral cooperation process dominates the EC- 
East Asian relationship, the ASEM process can only be described as passive 
multilateralism. During the course of the relationship and the creation of great 
expectations for ASEM during the Asian economic boom, the partners may not 
have acknowledged that the true purpose of ASEM. may have simply been to 
encourage bilateralism. As such, one might suggest that ASEM as a passive 
multilateral forum may well not be considered a failure, since its role has always 
been to stimulate and sustain growth in bilateral interaction. 
ASEM's "failure" is up to interpretation, and it has failed more severely in 
some areas than it has in others. While trade interaction between the EC and the 
Asian ASEM members has only increased marginally, leading to its poor 
reputation as a multilateral forum, a steady process of increased 
institutionalisation and dialogue has been kept active. The European and East 
Asian partners are continually engaged in a series of meetings between top level 
bureaucrats and political leaders, convening as often as twice a year. At ASEM 
summits, sensitive political dialogue is undertaken, as well as economic issues, 
and this is rarely seen at the bilateral level. ASEM is, hence, . the only forum 
where the EC could actively engage the East Asians in a dialogue on issues 
which would be almost impossible to address bilaterally. 
The suggestion that passive ASEM multilateralism may have led to a 
relatively successful set of EC-East Asian bilateral relationships is misleading for 
several reasons. First, trade data indicates that Japan (and ASEAN) has actually 
declined in importance as a trade partner for the EC. Secondly, the ASEM forum 
has not had any role in ameliorating or mediating any major bilateral trading 
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conflicts, with the instance of the EC-ROK shipbuilding conflict being one of the 
most striking cases. Thirdly, the successful and maturing relationships between 
the EC vis a vis Japan and China have been attributable more to bilateral 
institutionalisation developed long before the initiation of ASEM than to any 
initiatives started by the multilateral forum. 
For these reasons, ASEM is a passive multilateral mode of cooperation 
which has had limited benefit, particularly in the material sense, for both sides of 
the partnership. The passiveness, however, has meant that the European and 
Asian ASEM members have been able to enter into at least a rhetorical dialogue 
on political issues. It has also ensured that accepted principles of conduct are 
agreed on and that both sides are familiarised with each other's sets of ideas and 
values. These ideas and values have been introduced by both the European and 
Asian ASEM members into ASEM, and the ASEM process has been conducted 
around these ideas and values. Last and not least, an extremely intense degree 
of dialogue and institutionalisation, possibly leading to the dreaded "forum 
fatigue", might actually be one of ASEM's most useful features. The lack of 
understanding of ASEM's purpose and value has been the primary factor 
keeping this multilateral forum from further progression. 
The concise summary of the significance of this multilateral mode of 
cooperation is that while only marginally important, the evolution of cooperation 
between the EC and East Asia would have been different without ASEM. The 
relationship would have been one with a- smaller degree of trust, much less 
dialogue, and a low level Of caring and familiarity for each other. Although 
passive, the presence of the multilateral mode of cooperation in the EC-East 
Asian evolution of cooperation is justified just because of the manner in which 
ASEM has gradually introduced ideational values into the relationship. These 
have been important in shaping the behaviour of the partners as well as to 
ensure that dialogue continues, even amid instances of conflict. 
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Revisiting the Key Questions and Propositions 
Limitations of the Study 
Before going on to. revisit the key questions and propositions, a little needs to be 
said about the limitations of this study. There are four key areas which need to be 
clarified and concerns the lack of theoretical parsimony, the necessarily broad 
nature of this research, the singular focus on the EC's perspective on solely the 
EC-East Asian relationship, and the artificial divide between bilateralism and 
multilateralism. 
Firstly, the lack of theoretical parsimony would come under strong criticism 
from devout neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists. In other words, this 
research could be accused of not being able to take a definitive theoretical 
stance and to develop a confident set of proposals based on that stance, an 
accusation which has also been placed on scholars of social constructivism. 
Legro and Moravcsik noted the importance of parsimony, or inclusions and 
exclusions, by arguing that theoretical paradigms need to be kept distinct from 
each other in order to encourage further debate. They explain that this is the only 
way 'we can speak meaningfully of testing theories and hypotheses drawn from 
one paradigm against one another, or about the empirical progress or 
degeneration of a paradigm over time' (Legro and Moravscik 1999: 11). Having 
said this, Moravscik also argues for the need of theory synthesis, stating that 'it is 
not only possible and desirable but is constitutive of any coherent understanding 
of international relations as a progressive and empirical social science' 
(Moravscik 2003: 131). The key issue, he elaborates, is 'whether pluralism 
among existing theories ought to be preserved for its own sake' or 'whether 
theories ought to be treated as instruments to be subjected to empirical testing 
and theory synthesis' (Moravscik 2003: 131). Moravscik encourages the latter 
approach, which is the direction this thesis has taken. 
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Secondly, this thesis has covered effectively what could be counted as 
four different interregional relations (three EC-East Asian bilaterals and ASEM) 
and the vast material which needed to be covered has meant that this research 
could not have gone to further depths. The research has been designed to cover 
as much as possible, the highlights in these relationships through vertical (across 
the relationships) and horizontal (between the relationships) examinations. The 
questions raised about the evolution of interregional cooperation could be taken 
into far greater detail on the various partnerships offered. For material interests, 
for example, sector trade data could be used to enhance our understanding of 
which areas the actors may feel are most important to their material interests. 
Strategic documents analysis in this thesis has been primarily from the EC point 
of view and although it has been argued that some of the documents are 
negotiated, it would be interesting to examine the East Asian strategic 
documents and specific policies for the EC to see how the East Asian side 
perceives the material, institutional, and ideational balances. The analysis could 
also be expanded to include security issues, which are becoming increasingly 
important, particularly with China. This thesis has, however, taken the view that 
at the present stage, trade issues are far more important than political issues in 
the EC-East Asian partnership. 
Thirdly, the limitations of this thesis means that although the questions 
asked about cooperation and interregionalism might be applied to a number of 
interregional partnerships in the world, the empirical evidence assembled cannot 
be used to make claims beyond the EC-East Asian bilateral and multilateral 
interregional partnerships. Potentially, the questions asked could help us to 
understand why multilateral entities such as the UN and the WTO as well as 
regional cooperation efforts such as APEC, AFTA, the African Union, and 
Mercosur are becoming increasingly stagnated. As neorealists and neoliberal 
institutionalists would note, material interests continue to be the primary concern 
of most actors and the GPE's turn towards bilateralism is a proof of this claim. 
While this turn towards bilateralism appears to be a trend in the GPE and the 
third wave of regionalism, a great deal of in-depth empirical studies on other 
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interregional partnerships needs to be conducted. This thesis has only been able 
to use the EC-East Asian partnership to provide further insights into interregional 
cooperation. 
Finally, the research's aim in trying to find the balance between 
bilateralism and multilateralism has necessitated a dichotomous analysis of these 
two modes of cooperation. It is clear, both from emerging literature and the 
findings of this research, that the two modes are nested within each other and 
need to be considered in parallel to each other. This Conclusion chapter has 
been able to consider bilateralism and multilateralism together as a parallel 
process, but the empirical parts of the thesis were methodologically prevented 
from doing so. As a result, any study of this nature would have benefited from a 
direct empirical study of the ways in which the two modes of cooperation are 
indeed nested in each other. An example would be Smith's analysis of the EU- 
US bilateral interregional partnership where it was argued that the multilateral 
setting eventually led to further bilateral engagement (Smith 2005). 
Despite these limitations, a number of further insights have indeed come 
out from the eclectic theoretical approach and these are proposed in the 
following section. 
Further Insights to Interregional Cooperation 
In raising the key question and propositions, this thesis argued a number of 
closely linked ideas. Firstly, it was argued that the central problematics of IPE 
had overlapping ideas which noted how material interest, institutions and ideas 
were the primary factors which appear to dictate cooperation processes and 
outcomes. Secondly, this thesis proposed Axelrod's findings on cooperation as 
explicit means to derive propositions on the nature of cooperation and 
interregionalism as well as to evaluate the conditions under which actors will 
cooperate. Finally, a set of questions and propositions suggested further 
empirical exploration on whether the best condition for cooperation would be 
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located either in bilateralism, framed by material interest, or possibly in 
multilateralism, framed by ideas. A further issue to be explored was whether 
partnerships existing in the GPE would fall somewhere in between these optimal 
conditions, and the more clear-cut the mode of cooperation and the mutual 
interests are, the more the evolution of cooperation would take place. Also 
requiring empirical. observation is the suggestion that failing an agreement on the 
mode of cooperation and mutual interests, institutions would help to sustain the 
evolution of interregional cooperation. 
After the empirical tests, it appears that an eclectic approach to 
understanding interregional cooperation which combined neorealism, neoliberal 
institutionalism, social constructivism, and Axelrod's ideas on cooperation has 
helped to increase our insights. By avoiding inclusions and exclusions, one could 
argue that the rational choice and predominantly material concerns inherent in 
neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are far from being the only correct way 
to understand cooperation. Likewise, the questions raised by IPE and 
interregionalism also helped to provide concrete propositions on cooperation, 
something which social constructivists refuse to do. 
The insights based on the empirical evidence assembled from the EC- 
East Asian bilateral and multilateral interregional cases suggest that cooperation 
needs to be understood through the various 'balances' between material interest, 
institutions, and ideas. The EC-East Asian partnership, for example, will lean 
towards either materialism or ideas. Through these conditions for cooperation, a 
bilateral or multilateral mode of cooperation was be pursued. Traditional IPE 
theory makes some indirect links to this balance, but the theories do not explicitly 
explain how bilateralism is closely linked to material interest and multilateralism is 
sustained through ideas. This understanding helps us to further analyse, for 
example, the increasing trends towards framing of bilateral free trade 
agreements between the EC and East Asia. 
The empirical evidence assembled from the EC-East Asian case studies 
also generates further propositions to how ideas influence cooperation within the 
GPE. Social constructivism urges us to consider ideas as an important factor 
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within the cooperation process, but does not make explicit proposals on how 
ideas or the social construct of agents can affect cooperation. This thesis has 
instead argued that under the correct conditions within the EC-East Asian 
interregional partnership, ideas can indeed sustain cooperation, although 
multilateralism as conducted through ASEM is the preferred mode of cooperation 
suited to the sustenance of ideas. When the partners are interacting within a 
bilateral environment, which will normally be based very strongly on material 
interest, the introduction of ideas into the balance could serve to confuse the 
actors and become an obstacle to cooperation. 
We are also presented with an increased understanding of the role of 
institutions for cooperation in the EC-East Asian partnership. Firstly, they can 
exist alongside material as well as ideational concerns. Neoliberal institutionalism 
makes little mention of ideas, although values and codes of conduct can be 
considered to be closely linked to the notion of ideas. Importantly, institutions 
play a central role in constraining material interest and ideas in a partnership as 
well as to sustain failing partnerships. Secondly, and in contrast to ideas 
presented by neoliberal institutionalists, institutionalisation does not guarantee 
cooperation. If the mode of cooperation and the mutual interests are not set out 
clearly enough, institutions will only serve to sustain the partnership to a certain 
extent. In other words, for cooperation to truly thrive, institutions must be coupled 
with the partnering actors' agreement on whether to pursue material interests or 
ideas, and consequently, bilateralism or multilateralism. 
With the presentation of the various balances in the evolution of 
cooperation, it is also clear that EC-East Asian interregional displays the 
indivisibility of material interest, institutions and ideas as well as bilateralism and 
multilateralism. To be precise, the factors influencing cooperation and the modes 
of cooperation exist alongside each other and affect one another. It would be 
distorting the analysis of cooperation if one were to claim that only a single factor 
among material interest, or institutions, or ideas affects cooperation. Unlike some 
claims derived from IPE theory, our understanding of cooperation needs to 
consider all of these factors together and note how the balances affect the 
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evolution of cooperation. This thesis has also taken note of how bilateralism and 
multilateralism can coexist as well as how a failing mode of cooperation can be 
sustained through the role of commitment and codes of conduct. The questions 
raised by IPE and interregionalism have helped in understanding how, if both 
modes of cooperation exist together, a partnership may take a preference 
towards one either bilateralism or multilateralism depending on the material, 
institutional and ideational influences involved. 
Finally, our understanding of the fluctuating nature of cooperation is 
further enhanced by the notion of the dynamic elements of cooperation present 
within EC-East Asian interregionalism. The evolutionary nature of actors, the 
evolutionary nature of a hierarchical international system, and the available 
modes of cooperation play a very important role in shifting the balance between 
materialism, institutions, and ideas. This means that cooperation does not stay 
constant. It also means that when one considers the fluctuation in cooperation, 
we can point towards a number of dynamic elements which may have caused the 
shift. This enables us to directly understand why, how and when cooperation has 
fluctuated. 
Apart from balances, this thesis has made use of precise focusing on 
ideas on cooperation generated by IPE theory as well as trends and trajectories 
in the empirical focus. This focus has been necessary to enable this research to 
manage a wide range of IPE theories as well as four case studies (bilateral and 
multilateral). The purpose of this focus has been to provide answers to questions 
and propositions raised by IPE and interregionalism through the use of historical 
highlights, trade statistics, institutional developments, and strategic documents. 
Finally, applying the same questions and propositions on cooperation and 
interregionalism to other interregional relationships would serve to enhance our 
understanding of cooperation to a greater degree. An analysis based on the 
same questions and propositions generated by IPE and interregionalism of 
ASEAN's partnership with the EC, China, and Japan would provide some 
alternative insights into cooperation, especially since ASEAN has a long history 
and a much less integrated institutional structure than the EC. There have also 
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been suggestions that the EC-Mercosur partnership has stagnated due to the 
strengthening of the EC-Brazil partnership, an issue which may link to the 
increased weight on the material interest elements in the EC's Latin America 
partnerships. Similarly, the EC's revised Cotonou Agreement for the African, 
Caribbean, and Pacific states show the use of conditionality, a clear sign of an 
attempt to focus more strongly on the ideational elements of the partnership. 
Applying the same questions on the evolution of cooperation presented in this 
thesis to interregional partnerships other than the EC-East Asian one would 
equally provide further insights into cooperation and interregionalism. 
- 284 - 
Bibliography 
Official Documents 
ASEM Foreign Ministers (1997a), "Chairman's Statement", Singapore. 
ASEM Finance Ministers (1997b), "Chairman's Statement", Bangkok. 
ASEM Economic Ministers' Meeting (1997c), "Chairman's Statement", Makuhari. 
ASEM Foreign Ministers (1999a), "Chairman's Statement", Berlin. 
ASEM Finance Ministers (1999b), "Chairman's Statement", Frankfurt. 
ASEM Economic Ministers' Meeting (1999c), "Chairman's Statement", Berlin. 
ASEM Foreign Ministers (2001a), "Chairman's Statement", Beijing. 
ASEM Finance Ministers (2001b), "Chairman's Statement", Kobe. 
ASEM Economic Ministers' Meeting (2001c), "Chairman's Statement", Hanoi. 
ASEM Foreign Ministers (2002a), "Chairman's Statement", Madrid. 
ASEM Finance Ministers (2002b), "Chairman's Statement", Copenhagen. 
ASEM Economic Ministers' Meeting (2002c), "Chairman's Statement", Copenhagen. 
ASEM Foreign Ministers (2003a), "Chairman's Statement", Bali. 
ASEM Finance Ministers (2003b), "Chairman's Statement", Bali. 
ASEM Economic Ministers' Meeting (2003c), "Chairman's Statement", Dalian. 
ASEM Foreign Ministers (2004), "Chairman's Statement", Kildare. 
ASEM Foreign Ministers (2005a), "Chairman's Statement", Kyoto. 
ASEM Finance Ministers (2005b), "Chairman's Statement", Tianjin. 
Commission of the European Communities, (1977), "EC-Korea Agreement on Textiles", 
(Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (1978), "Agreement on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China", 
(Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (1985), "Agreement on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation between the European Economic Community and the People's Republic of China", 
(Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (1991), "Joint Political Declaration on relations 
between the European Community and its Member States and Japan", (Brussels: European 
Community). 
- 285 - 
Commission of the European Communities, (1994), "Towards a New Asia Strategy: 
Communication from the Commission to the Council", Com(94) 314 (Brussels: European 
Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (1995a), "A Long Term Policy for China-Europe 
Relations: Communication of the Commission", Com(279) final (Brussels: European 
Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (1995b), "Communication from the European 
Commission to the European Council 'Europe and Japan: The Next Steps", (Brussels: 
European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (1996a), "Regarding the Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) to be held in Bangkok on 1-2 March 1996 Communication of the Commission", 
(Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (1996b), "Agreement on Trade and Economic 
Cooperation between the European Union and the Republic of Korea", (Brussels: European 
Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (1996c), "Creating a New Dynamic in EC-ASEAN 
Relations "I (Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (1998a), "Communication from the European 
Commission to the European Council 'Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China-, 
(Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (1998b), "Communication from the European 
Commission to the European Council on EU relations with the Republic of Korea", (Brussels: 
European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (2000a), "Report on the Implementation of the 
(1998) Communication "Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China", (Brussels: 
European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (2000b), "Perspectives and Priorities for the ASEM 
Process into the New Decade", Working Document, COM(2000) 241. Final, 18 April. 
Commission of the European Communities, (2001a), "EU Strategy towards China: 
Implementation of the 1998 Communication and Future Steps for a more Effective EU Policy: 
Communication of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament", Com(265) 
final (Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (2001b), "Commission Working Document Country 
Strategy Paper: China", (Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (2001c), "Framework Agreement for Trade and 
Cooperation between the European Community and its Member States, on the one hand, and 
the Republic of Korea, on the other hand", (Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (2001d), "Shaping our Common Future: an Action 
Plan for EU-Japan Cooperation", (Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (2001e), background and procedures on trade 
barrier regulation and Investigation/Korea shipbuilding [Homepage of Commission of the 
- 286 - 
European Communities], [Online]. Available: 
http: //europa. eu. int/rapid/pressreleasesaction. do? reference=MEMO/01/167 [17th February 
2005,2005]. 
Commission of the European Communities, (2001f), Commission's shipbuilding report shows 
South Korea has consolidated its lead [Homepage of Commission of the European 
Communities], [Online]. Available: 
http: //europa. eu. int/rapid/pressreleasesaction. do? reference=IP`/01/630... [17th February 
2005,2005]. 
Commission of the European Communities, (2002a), An Introduction to the Asia-Europe 
meeting, Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Commission of the European Communities, (2002b), Fourth Asia Europe Meeting Summit in 
Copenhagen September 22-24 2002 (ASEM4): Unity and Strength in Diversity, Commission 
Staff Working Paper, SEC (2002)874,23 July. 
Commission of the European Communities, (2002c) , EU to take Korea to the WTO over unfair 
shipbuilding practices [Homepage of Commission of the European Communities], [Online]. 
Accessed: http: //europa. eu. int/comm/external relations/south korea/news/ip02 1395 [17th 
February 2005]. 
Commission of the European Communities, (2003a), "A maturing partnership - shared 
interests and challenges in EU-China relations: Communication of the Commission to the 
Council and the European Parliament", Com(533) final (Brussels: European Community). 
Commission of the European Communities, (2003b), 50 Years of Figures on Europe, 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Commission of the European Communities, (2003c), "A new partnership with Southeast Asia: 
Communication from the Commission", COM399/4 (Brussels: European Community) 
Official Journal of the European Communities, (2001). 3. Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities. 
The Asia-Europe Summits, (1996), "Chairman's Statement of the First Asia-Europe Meeting", 
Bangkok. 
The Asia-Europe Summits, (1998), "Chairman's Statement of the Second Asia-Europe 
Meeting", London. 
The Asia-Europe Summits, (2000), "Chairman's Statement of the Third Asia-Europe Meeting", 
Seoul. 
The Asia-Europe Summits, (2002), "Chairman's Statement of the Fourth Asia-Europe 
Meeting", Copenhagen. 
The Asia-Europe Summits, (2004), "Chairman's Statement of the Fifth Asia-Europe Meeting", 
Hanoi 
- 287 - 
Secondary Documents 
References 
Abbott, K. W. and Snidal, D., 2000. Hard and Soft Law in International Governance. 
International Organization, 54(3), pp. 421-456 
Abe, A., 1999. Japan and the European Union : domestic politics and transnational relations, 
Athlone Press. 
Acharya, A., 2003. Will Asia's Past Be Its Future? International Security, 28(3), pp. 149-164. 
Aggarwal, V., Fogarty, E., eds. 2003. EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and 
Globalism. Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan. 
Aggarwal, V., Fogarty, E., 2005. The Limits of Interregionalism: The EU and North America. 
Journal of European Integration, 27(3), pp. 327-346. 
Albin, C., 2003. Negotiating International Cooperation: Global Public Goods and Fairness. 
Review of International Studies, 29, pp. 365-385. 
Alker, H. R., 2000. On Learning from Wendt. Review of International Studies, 26, pp. 141-150. 
Allen, T., 2002. EU Trade with China and Russia. Eurostat Statistics in Focus, Eurostat: 
European Communities. 
Allen, T., 2002. Trade between the European Union and Japan. Eurostat Statistics in Focus, 
Eurostat: European Communities. 
Allen, T., 2001. European Union Trade with the Dynamic Asian Economies. Eurostat Statistics 
in Focus, Eurostat: European Communities. 
Allen, D. and Smith, M., 2004. External Policy Developments. Review of International Political 
Economy, 42(Annual Review), pp. 95-112. 
Allen, D. and Smith, M., 2002. External Policy Developments. Review of International Political 
Economy, 40(Annual Review), pp. 97-115. 
Amin, A. and Palan, R., 2001. Towards a Non-Rationalist International Political Economy. 
Review of International Political Economy, 8(4), pp. 559-577. 
Anderson, K., 1997. On the Complexities of China's WTO Accession. The World Economy, 
20(6), pp. 749-772. 
- 288 - 
Anderson, S., 2001. The Changing Nature of Diplomacy: The European Union, the CFSP and 
Korea. European Foreign Affairs Review, 6, pp. 465-482. 
Axelrod, R. and Dion, D., 1998. The Further Evolution of Cooperation. Science, 24(2), pp. 
1385. 
Axelrod, R., 1984. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books. New York. 
Axelrod, R., 1997. The Complexity of Cooperation : Agent-Based Models of Competition and 
Collaboration. Princeton University Press. Princeton, N. J. 
Axelrod, R., 2001. Theoretical Foundations of Partnerships for Economic Development, World 
Bank Conference on Evaluation and Development - The Partnership Dimension, July 23-24 
2001, . 
Axelrod, R., 2000. On Six Advances in Cooperation Theory, Analyse and Kritik 22, pp. 130- 
151. 
Axelrod, R., 1995. A Model of the Emergence of New Political Actors. In: N. GILBERT and R. 
CONTE, eds, Artificial Societies: the Computer Simulation of Social Life. 1 edn. London: 
University College Press, . 
Axelrod, R., Riolo, R. L. and Cohen, M. D., 2002. Beyond Geography: Cooperation with 
Persistent Links in the Absence of Clustered Neighborhoods. Personality and Social Psychology 
Review, 6(4), pp. 341-346. 
Axelrod, R., Riolo, R. L. and Cohen, M. D., 2001. Evolution of Cooperation without Reciprocity. 
Nature, 414, pp. 441. 
Barnett, M. N., 2005. Social Constructivism. In: J. BAYLIS and S. SMITH, eds., The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations, 3rd edn., Oxford 
University Press: Oxford, pp. 251-269. 
Barnett, M. N. and Duvall, R., 2005. Power in International Politics. International Organization. 
59 (Winter), pp. 39-75. 
Barnett, M. N. and Finnemore, M., 1999. The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of International 
Organizations. International Organization, 53(4), pp. 699-732. 
Bekemans, L., Tsoukalis, L., College d'Europe and Helleniko Kentro Euröpaikön Meletön, 1993. 
Europe and Global Economic Interdependence. College of Europe and European Interuniversity 
Press. Bruges. 
Bhagwati, J., 1991. The World Trading System at Risk. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University 
Press. 
-289- 
Binmore, K., 1997. Review of Robert Axelrod's Complexity of Cooperation. 
http: //jasss soc surrey. ac. uk/1/1/reviewl. html edn., The Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation: Surrey. 
Bollard, A. and Mayes, D., 1992. Regionalism and the Pacific Rim. Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 30(2), pp. 195. 
Bond, E. W., Ching, S. and Lai, E. L., 2002. A Game-Theoretic Analysis of China's WTO 
Accession. Working Paper edn. Australia National University. 
Brenton, P., 2002. The Economic Impact of Enlargement on the European Economy: Problems 
and Perspectives. Centre for European Policy Papers Working Document, 188 October, pp: 1- 
13. 
Breslin, S., 2003. Growth Without Development: Imagining China's Political Economy. IPEG 
Papers in Global Political Economy, 6, pp. 3-21. 
Bretherton, C., 1999. The European Union as a Global Actor. Routledge. London: . 
Bridges, B., 1999. Europe and the Challenge of the Asia Pacific : change, continuity and crisis. 
Edward Eigar Pub. Cheltenham, UK ; Northampton, MA: . 
Brooks, S. G., 1997. Dueling Realisms. International organization, 51(3), pp. 447-477. 
Brooks, S. G., and Wohlforth, W. C., 2002. International Relations Theory and the Case Against 
Unilateralism. Perspectives on Politics. 3 (3): 509-524. 
Suzan, B., 2001. The English School: an underexploited resource in IR. Review of International 
Studies, 27, pp. 471-488. 
Camroux, D. and Lechervy, C., 1996. Closer Encounter of a Third Kind? The Inaugural Asia- 
Europe. Meeting of March 1996. Pacific Review, 9(3), pp. 442-453. 
Cerny, P. G., 2004. Mapping Varieties of Neoliberalism. IPEG Papers in Global Political 
Economy, May(12), pp. 4-19. 
Chang, H-]. 1993. The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea. Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, 17 (2), pp. 131-157. 
Chavagneux, C., 2001. Economics and politics: some bad reasons for a divorce. Review of 
International Political Economy, 8(4), pp. 608-632. 
Chenggen, Z. and McGough, s., 2001. China: the politics of 'rational authoritarianism. In: P. 
PRESTON and J. GILSON, eds, The European Union and East Asia. 1 edn. Glos: Edwar Elgar 
Publishing, pp. 154-169. 
Cherry, J., 2001. Korean Multinationals in Europe. Curzon. Richmond. 
- 290 - 
Cherry, J., 2004. Presentation at Korea - Challenges and Opportunities. East Asia Institute, 
Cambridge University on the 4th March. 
Christiansen, T., 1997. Tensions of European Governance: Politicised Bureaucracy and Multiple 
Accountability in the European Commission. Journal of European Public Policy, 4(1), pp. 73- 
90. 
Clammer, J., 2001. Beyond Orientalism? Culture, power and post-colonialism in Europe-Asia 
relations. In: P. PRESTON and J. GILSON, eds, The European Union and East Asia. 1 edn. 
Glos: Edwar Elgar Publishing, pp. 46-64. 
Clark, I. 1999. Globalization and International Relations Theory. Oxford University Press. 
Oxford ; New York: 
Collinson, S., 1999. Issue-systems, 'multi-level games' and the analysis of the EU's external 
commercial and associated policies: a research agenda. Journal of European Public Policy, 
6(2), pp. 206-224. 
Conte-Helm, M., 1996. The Japanese and Europe: Economic and Cultural Encounters., 
Athlone: London. 
Cooley, A., 2003. Thinking Rationally About Hierarchy and Global Governance. Review of 
International Political Economy, 10(4), pp. 672-684. 
Corden, M. W., 1990. American Decline and the End of Hegemony. SAIS Review of 
International Affairs, 10(2), pp. 13-26. 
Cox, R. W. and Schechter, M. G., 2002. The Political Economy of a Plural World : Critical 
Reflections on Power, Morals and Civilization. Routledge. London; New York. 
Daniels, G., 1986. Japan in the Post-War World - Between Europe and the United States. In: 
G. DANIELS and R. DRIFTE, eds, Europe and Japan: Changing Relationships Since 1945.1 
edn. Kent: Paul Norbury Publications, pp. 12-22. 
Dent, C. M., 1998. Regionalism in Southeast Asia: Opportunities and Threats for the European 
Union. European Business Review, 98(4), pp. 184-195. 
Dent, C. M., 1999. The European Union and East Asia : An Economic Perspective. Routledge. 
London:. 
Dent, C. M., 2002. The Foreign Economic Policies of Singapore, South Korea and Taiwan. 
Edward Elgar. Cheltenham. 
Dent, C. M., 2003. From Inter-Regionalism to Trans-Regionalism? The Future of ASEM. Asia- 
Europe Journal, 1(2), pp 1-13. 
-291- 
Dent, C. M., 2004. The Asia-Europe Meeting and Inter-Regionalism: Toward a Theory of 
Multilateral Utility. Asian Survey, XLIV (2), pp. 213-233. 
Dieter, H. and Higgot, R., 2003. Exploring alternative theories of economic regionalism: from 
trade to finance in Asian co-operaiton? Review of International Political Economy, 10(3), pp. 
430-454. 
Doctor, M., 2007. Why Bother With Inter-Regionalism? Negotiations for a European Union- 
Mercosur Agreement. Journal of Common Market Studies, 45(2), pp. 281-314. 
Doidge, M., 2007. Joined at the Hip: Regionalism and Interregional ism. Journal of European 
Integration, 29(2), pp. 229-248. 
Drifte, R., 1986. Euro-Japanese Relations: Realities and Prospects. In: G. DANIELS and R. 
DRIFTE, eds, Europe and Japan: Changing Relationships Since 1945.1 edn. Kent: Paul 
Norbury Publications, pp. 92-105. 
Ethier, W. J., 1998. The New Regionalism. The Economic Journal, 108(449), pp. 1149-1161. 
Evers, H. and Kaiser, M., 2001. Two Continents, One Area: Eurasia. In: P. PRESTON and J. 
GILSON, eds, The European Union and East Asia. 1 edn. Glos: Edwar Elgar Publishing, pp. 65- 
90. 
Falkner, G., 1998. How intergovernmental are intergovernmental conferences? An example 
from the Maastricht Treaty Reform. Journal of European Public Policy, 9(1), pp. 98-119. 
Farrell, M., 2005. A Triumph of Realism over Idealism? Cooperation Between the European 
Union and Africa. Journal of European Integration, 27(3), pp. 263-283. 
Fatchett, D. 1999. Setting the Agenda for ASEM 2: From Bangkok to London via Singapore. 
In: W. STOKHOFF and P. VAN DER VELDE, ASEM: A Window of Opportunity: The Asia Europe 
Meeting. Kegan Paul International, pp. 13-18. 
Ferguson, N., 2003. Hegemony or Empire. Foreign Affairs, 82(5), pp. 154. 
Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K., 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. 
International Organization, 52(4), pp. 887-917. 
Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K., 2001. Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in 
International Relations and Comparative Politics. Annual Review of Political Science, 4, pp. 
391-416. 
Fishlow, A., and Haggard, S., 1992. The United States and the Regionalization of the World 
Economy. Paris: OECD Development Center Research Project on Globalization and 
Regionalization. 
- 292 - 
Folker, J. S., 2000. Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and Neoliberal 
Institutionalism Compared. International Studies Association, 44, pp. 97-119. 
Forster, A., 2000. Evaluating the EU-ASEM relationship: a negotiated order approach. Journal 
of European Public Policy, 7(5), pp. 787. 
Fort,. H., 2003. Cooperation with random interactions and without memory or "tags". 
http: //www. soc. surrey. ac. uk/JASSS/6/2/4. html edn., The Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation: Surrey. 
Fung, K. C., Iizaka, H. and Tong, S., 2002. Foreign Trade of China, China's Economy in the 
21st Century, 2002, . 
Gilligan, M. J., 2004. Is There a Broader-Deeper Trade-off in International Multilateral 
Agreements? International Organization, 58, pp. 459-484. 
Gilpin, R. and Gilpin, J. M., 2001. Global political economy : Understanding the International 
Economic Order. Princeton University Press. Princeton, N. J.: . 
Gilson, J., 2001. Europe-Asia: the formal politics of mutual definition. In: P. PRESTON and J. 
GILSON, eds, The European Union and East Asia. 1 edn. Glos: Edwar Elgar Publishing, pp. 
109-124. 
Gilson, J., 2000. Japan and the European Union :a Partnership for the Twenty-First Century? 
Macmillan; St. Martin's Press. Basingstoke; New York. 
Gilson, ]., 2004. Weaving a New Silk Road: Europe Meets Asia. In V. K. AGGARWAL and E. A. 
FOGARTY, eds., EU Trade Strategies: Between Regionalism and Globalization, Houndmills, 
pp. 64-92. 
Gilson, ]., 2005. New Interregionalism? The EU and East Asia. Journal of European 
Integration, 27(3): 307-326. 
Glaser, C. L., 2003. Structural realism in a more complex world. Review of International 
Studies, 29, pp. 403-414. 
Glenn, J., Howlett D., and Poore S., (eds), 2004. Neo-Realism Versus Culture; A Strategic 
Debate. London: Ashgate. 
Gosset, D., 2002. China and Europe: Towards a Meaningful Relationship. 
htto: //www. oycf. org/Perspectives/19 123102/contents. htm edn. Overseas Young Chinese 
Forum. Rockville. 
Goto, ]. and Hamada, K., 1999. Regional Economic Integration and Article XXIV of the GATT. 
Review of International Economics, 7(4), pp. 555-570. 
Grant, R. W. and Keohane, R. O., 2005. Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics. 
American Political Science Review, 99(1), pp. 29-43. 
- 293 - 
Greenwood, J., 1997. Representing Interests in the EU. 1 edn. Macmillan. London. 
Grilli, E., 1993. The European Community and the Developing Countries. 1 edn. Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge. 
Hamilton-Hart, N., 2003. Asia's New Regionalism: Government Capacity and Cooperation in the 
Western Pacific. Review of International Political Economy, 10(2), pp. 222-245. 
Harrison, L., 2001. Political Research: An Introduction. Routledge: London. 
Hasenclever, A., Mayer, P. and Rittberger, V., 2000. Integrating Theories of International 
Regimes. Review of International Studies, 26, pp. 3-33. 
Hay, C., 2004. Ideas, Interests and Institutions in the comparative political economy of great 
transformations. Review of International Political Economy, 11(1), pp. 204-226. 
Hänggi, H., 2000. Interreglonalism: empirical and theoretical perspectives, The Pacific Council 
on International Policy, Conference Paper, Los Angeles. 
Helleiner, E., 2003. Economic liberalism and its Critics: The Past as Prologue? Review of 
International Political Economy, 10(4), pp. 685-696. 
Hemmer, C. and Katzenstein, P. J., 2002. Why is There No NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, 
Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism. International Organization, 56(3), pp. 575- 
607. 
Herrman, R. K. and Shannon, V. P., 2001. Defending International Norms: The Role of 
Obligation, Material Interest, and Perception in Decision Making. International Organization, 
55(3), pp. 621-654. 
Hettne, B., 2001. "Regional Co-operation for security and development In Southern Africa". In: 
Vale, P., Swatuk, L. A. and Oden, B., eds., Theory, Change and Southern Africa's Future. New 
York: PALGRAVE. 
Hill, C., ed, 1996. The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy. 1 edn. Routledge, London. 
Hill, C., 1992. The Capabilities-Expectations Gap or Conceptualizing Europe's International 
Role. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(3), pp. 305-328. 
Hill, C. and Smith, M., eds. 2005. International Relations and the European Union. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Hilpert, H. G., 1998. Economic Interactions. In: H. W. MAULL, G. SEGAL, J. WANANDI, eds., 
Europe and the Asia Pacific, Routledge: London and New York. ' 
Hix, S., 1999. Interest Representation. In: S. HIX, ed, The Political System of the EU. 1 edn. 
Hampshire: Palgrave, . 
-294- 
Hobson, I. M. and Ramesh, M., 2002. Globalisation Makes of States What States Make of It: 
Between Agency and Structure in the State/Globalisation Debate. New Political Economy, 7(1), 
pp. 5-21. 
Hoffman, J., 1998. Sovereignty. Open University Press. Buckingham England: . 
Hoffman, J., 1995. Beyond the state : an introductory critique. Polity Press; Blackwell. 
Cambridge, UK; Cambridge, MA: 
Hoffman, J., 1984. The Gramscian challenge : Coercion and Consent in Marxist political 
Theory. B. Blackwell. Oxford. 
Holland, M., 2002. The European Union and the Third World. Palgrave/Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Hook, G. D., 2001. Japan's International Relations : Politics, Economics and Security. 
Routledge. London. 
Huang, D. W. F., 2002. On Institution Building of the European Union and Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation, Exploring Federalism and Integration - the EU, Taiwan, China and Korea, 26th- 
27th October 2002 2002, Strategic Alliance for Asian Studies ppl-18. 
Hwee, Y. L. H., 2002. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): From Selective Engagement to 
Comprehensive Partnership. SUDOSTASIEN aktuell Special Issue 2002. Hamburg: Institute for 
Asian Studies: Hamburg. 
Hwee, Y. L. H., 2003. Asia and Europe: The Development and Different Dimensions of ASEM. 
Routledge; London and New York. 
Hwee, Y. L. H., 2004. Dimensions of Asia-Europe Cooperation. Asia-Europe Journal, 2(1), 
January, Asia-Europe Foundation and Springer-Verlag: Singapore and Heidelberg. 
Hwee, Y. L. H., 2006. The ASEM Framework and EU-East Asia Relations: Potential and Reality. 
Paper presented at the Europe in Flux International Conference, University of Melbourne, 6-7 
December. 
Ikenberry, J. G., 2001. Getting Hegemony Right. The National Interest, 63(Spring), pp. 17-24. 
Ishikawa, K., 1990. Japan and the challenge of Europe. Pinter, for the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs. London: . 
Jackson, J., 1995. Singular Europe. 1 edn. University of Michigan Press. Michigan: . 
Jai-Dong, T., 2001. The European Union and China: the benefits of openness In international 
economic integration. In: P. PRESTON and J. GILSON, eds, The European Union and East Asia. 
1 edn. Glos: Edwar Elgar Publishing, pp. 189-197. 
Jervis, R., 1999. Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understand the Debate. 
International Security, 24(1), pp. 42-63. 
- 295 - 
Kahler, M., 1995. International Institutions and the Political Economy of Integration. Brookings 
Institution. Washington, D. C. 
Kahler, M., 2000. Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization. International 
Organization, 54 (3), pp. 661-683. 
Kahler, M. and Lake, D. A., 2003. Governance in a global economy : political authority in 
transition. Princeton University Press. Princeton, NJ: . 
Kang, D. C., 2003. Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks. International 
Security, 27(4), pp. 57-85. 
Kang, D. C., 2003. Hierarchy, Balancing and Empirical Puzzles in Asian International Relations. 
International Security; 28(3), pp. 165-180. 
Kapur, H., 1990. Distant Neighbours: China and Europe. 1 edn. Pinter Publishers. London. 
Kapur, H., 1986. China and the European Economic Community : The New Connection. 
Nijhoff. Dordrecht ; Lancaster. 
Katzenstein, P. J. 1997. Introduction: Asian Regionalism in Contemporary Perspective. In: P. 
J. Katzenstein and T. Shiraishi (eds) Network Power: Japan and Asia, Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press. 
Keohane, R. O., 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton University Press: Princeton, NJ. 
Keohane, R. O., 1989. International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International 
Relations Theory. Westview: Boulder, Colorado. 
Keohane, R. O., 2000. Ideas Part-Way Down. Review of International Studies, 26, pp. 125- 
130. 
Keohane, R. O. and Martin, L. L., 1999, Institutional Theory, Endogeneity, and Delegation. 
Paper prepared for 'Progress in International Relations Theory: A Collaborative Assessment of 
Application of Imre Lakatos's Methodology of Scientific Research Programs, January 15-16, 
1999, Scottsdale, Arizona. 
Keohane, R. O. and Moravscik, A., 2000. Legalized Dispute Resolution: Interstate and 
Transnational. International Organization, 54(3), pp. 457-488. 
Keohane, R. O. and Waltz, K. N., 2000. The Neorealist and His Critic. International Security, 
25(3), pp. 204-205. 
Keohane, R. O. and Nye, J. S., 2001. Power and interdependence. 3rd edn. Longman. New 
York. 
- 296 - 
Keohane, R. O., Nye, ]. S., and Hoffman S., eds., 1993. After the Cold War: International 
Institutions and State Strategies in Europe. Harvard University Press: Massachussets. 
Keukeleire, S., 2003. The European Union as a Diplomatic Actor: Internal, Traditional and 
Structural Diplomacy. Diplomacy and Statecraft, 14(3), pp. 31-56. 
Kindleberger C., 1973. The World in Depression. 1929-39. University of California Press, 
Berkeley. 
Kokko, A., 2002. Export-led Growth in East Asia: Lessons for Europe's Transition Economies, 
Asia-Pacific Studies in Australia and Europe: A Research Agenda for the Future, 5-6 July 2002, 
ppl-34. 
Krasner, S. D., 1983. International Regimes. Cornell University Press: Ithaca. 
Krasner, S. D., 2000. Wars, Hotel Fires, and Plane Crashes. Review of International Studies, 
26, pp. 131-136. 
Krasner, S. D., 1999. Sovereignty : Organized Hypocrisy. Princeton University Press. Princeton, 
N. J. 
Krenzler, H., 2002. The 4th ASEM Summit in Copenhagen. Paper presented In Barcelona 28th 
November 2002 for the Cooperation between Asia-Pacific, Latin America, and Spain 
Conference. 
Krishna, P., 1998. Regionalism And Multi nationalism: A Political Economy Approach. The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 113(1), pp. 227-251. 
Kupchan, C. A., 1994. The Vulnerability of Empire. Cornell University Press: Ithaca, N. Y. 
Kwa, A., 2002. Power Politics in the WTO: Developing Country Perspectives on Decision- 
making Processes in Trade Negotiations. Focus on the Global South: Bangkok. 
Lahteenmaki, K., and Kakonen, J., 1999. Regionalization and its Impact on the Theory of 
International Relations. In: B. Hettne, A. Inotai, and O. Sunkel, eds., Globalism and the New 
Regionalism. Macmillan: Basingstoke. 
Laird, S., 1999. Regional Trade Agreements: Dangerous Liaisons?. The World Economy, 
22(9), pp. 1179-1999. 
Lamy, P., 2002. Stepping-Stones or Stumbling-Blocks? The EU's Approach Towards the 
Problem of Multilateralism and Regionalism in Trade policy. The World Economy, 25(10), pp. 
1399-1414. 
Langenhove, L., Costea, A-C., 2005, The EU as a Global Actor and the Emergence of 'Third 
Generation' Regionalism. UNU-CRIS Occasional Papers, 0-2005/14, pp. 1-21. 
- 297 - 
Lawson, S., 2001. The Cultural Politics of Contemporary Asia-Europe Relations. In: P. 
PRESTON and J. GILSON, eds, The European Union and East Asia. 1 edn. Glos: Edwar Elgar 
Publishing, pp. 29-45. 
Lawton, T. C., Rosenau, I. N. and Verdun, A., 2000. Strange power : Shaping the Parameters of 
International Relations and International Political Economy. Ashgate. Aldershot. 
Lee, H., Lloyd, P. J. and Koo, C., 2002. New Regionalism in East Asia and its Relationship with 
the WTO and APEC. International Area Review, 5(2), pp. 87-103. 
Lee, ]. and Park, I., 2005. Free Trade Areas in East Asia: Discriminatory or Non- 
discriminatory? The World Economy, 28(1), pp. 21-48. 
Lehman, J. P., 1998. Economic Interactions. In: H. W. MAULL, G. SEGAL, J. WANANDI, eds., 
Europe and the Asia Pacific, Routledge: London and New York, pp. 55-84. 
Legro, ]. W. and Moravscik, A., 1999. Is Anybody Still a Realist? International Security, 24(2), 
pp. 5-55. 
Leifer, M., 1998. Europe and Southeast Asia. In: H. W. MAULL, G. SEGAL, J. WANANDI, eds., 
Europe and the Asia Pacific, Routledge: London and New York, pp. 198-212. 
Lim, P., 2001. The Unfolding Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Process. In: P. PRESTON and J. 
GILSON, eds, The European Union and East Asia. 1 edn. Glos: Edwar Elgar Publishing, pp. 91- 
108. 
Lipson, C., 1984. International Cooperation in Economic and Security Affairs. World Politics, 
37 (October), pp. 1-23. 
Manners, I., 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 40(2), pp. 235-258. 
Mansfield, E. D. and Milner, H. V., 1999. The New Wave of Regionalism. International 
Organization, 53(3), pp. 589-627. 
Mansfield, E. D. and Reinhardt, E., 2003. Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects 
of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements. International 
Organization, 57, pp. 829-862. 
Marney, J. P. and Tarbert, H. F. E., 2000. Why do simulation? Towards a working epistemology 
for practitioners of the dark arts. http: //www. soc. surrey. ac. uk/JASSS/3/4/4 html edn. The 
Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation: Surrey. 
Masaru, Y., 1986. Psychological Aspects of Euro-Japanese Trade Frictions: A Japanese 
Viewpoint. In: G. DANIELS and R. DRIFTE, eds, Europe and Japan: Changing Relationships 
Since 1945.1 edn. Kent: Paul Norbury Publications, pp. 48-58. 
-298- 
Maul, H. W. and Ofken, N., 2004. Inter-regionalism in international relations: Comparing APEC 
and ASEM. Asia-Europe Journal, 1(2), pp. 237-249. 
McGillivray, F. and Smith, A., 2000. Trust and Cooperation Through Agent-specific 
Punishments. International Organization, 54(4), pp. 809-824. 
McQueen, M., 2002. The EU's Free-trade Agreements with Developing Countries: A Case of 
Wishful Thinking?. The World Economy, 25(9), pp. 1369-1385. 
Meunier, S. and Nicolaides, K., 2000. European Union Trade Policy: Exclusive VS Shared 
Competence Debate. In: M. G. COWES and M. SMITH, eds, The State of the European Union 5 
edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press, . 
Meynell, B., 1982. Relations with Japan: The Problem and the European Community's 
Response. In: L. TSOUKALIS and M. WHITE, eds, Japan and Western Europe. 1 edn. London: 
Frances Pinter, pp. 100-118. 
Milner, H., 1998. International Political Economy: Beyond Hegemonic Stability. Foreign Policy, 
110, pp. 112-124. 
Milner, H. V., 1997. Interests, institutions, and information : domestic politics and International 
relations. Princeton University Press. Princeton, N. J.: . 
Milner, H. V., 1988. Resisting protectionism : global industries and the politics of international 
trade. Princeton University Press. Princeton, N. J.: . 
Moon, C., 1994. Changing Patterns of Business-Government Relations in South Korea. In: A. 
MACINTYRE, ed., Business and Government in Industrialising Asia, Allen & Unwin: St. 
Leonards, N. S. W, pp. 142-166. 
Moravscik, A., 1993. Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal 
Intergovernmentalist Approach. Journal of Common Market Studies, 31(2), pp. 473. 
Moravscik, A. and Nicolaidis, K., 1999. Explaining the Treaty of Amsterdam: Interests, 
Influence, Institutions. Journal of Common Market Studies, 37(1), pp. 59-86. 
Moravscik, A., 1999. A New State Craft? Supernational Entrepreneurs and International 
Cooperation. International Organization, 53(2), pp. 267-306. 
Moravscik, A., 1997. Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics. 
International Organization, 51(4), pp. 513-553. 
Murray, P., ed., forthcoming. Europe and Asia: Regions in Flux, Palgrave: Basingstoke. 
Nicole, A. F., Regelsberger, E., 2005, The EU and Inter-regional Cooperation. In: C. Hill and M. 
Smith, eds, International Relations in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
- 299 - 
O'Riordan, C., 2000. A Forgiving Strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. 
http: //www. soc. surrev. ac. uk/]ASSS/3/-4/-3. html edn., The Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation: Surrey. 
Panagariya, A., 1999. The Regionalism Debate: An Overview. The World Economy, 22(4), pp 
477-511. 
Panagariya, A., 2002. EU Preferential Trade Agreements and Developing Countries. The World 
Economy, 25(10), pp. 1415-1432. 
Park, S. H., 2004., ASEM and the Future of Asia-Europe relations: Background, Characteristics 
and Challenges. Asia-Europe Journal, 2(3), pp. 341-354. 
Pedersen, T., 2002. Cooperative hegemony: Power, Ideas and Institutions in Regional 
integration. Review of International Studies, 28, pp. 677-696. 
Perreira, R., 2005. The fifth Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) summit. An assessment. Asia Europe 
Journal, 3(1), pp. 17-23. 
Peterson, 3. and Bomberg, E., 1999. Decision-Making in the European Union. Macmillan Press: 
London. 
Peterson, J., 1995. Decision-Making in the European Union: Towards a Framework for 
Analysis. Journal of European Public Policy, 2(1), pp. 69. 
Peterson, J., 1999. Decision-making in the European Union. Macmillan. Basingstoke: . 
Peterson, J. and Shackleton M., eds., 2002, The Institutions of the European Union. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
Pie!, H., and Khalifah, N. A., 1998, Economic Interactions. In: H. W. MAULL, G. SEGAL, J. 
WANANDI, eds., Europe and the Asia Pacific, Routledge: London and New York, pp. 55-84. 
Piening, C., 1997. Global Europe : the European Union in world affairs. Lynne Rienner. Boulder 
; London. 
Pomfret, R., (2007), "Is Regionalism is an Increasing Feature of World Economy", The World 
Economy, 30(6), pp. 923-947. 
Pongvutitham, A., 2003. ASEM CONCERNS: Asians feel 'ignored' by EU trade bloc, in The 
th Nation July 26 
Preston, P., 2001. East Asia: emergent regional dynamics. In: P. PRESTON and ]. GILSON, 
eds, The European Union and East Asia. 1 edn. Glos: Edwar Elgar Publishing, pp. 198-218. 
Preston, P., 2001. Europe-Asia linkages: notes towards an historical/structural research 
agenda. In: P. PRESTON and 1. GILSON, eds, The European Union and East Asia. 1 edn. Glos: 
Edwar Elgar Publishing, pp. 219-244. 
-300- 
Preston, P. and Gilson, J., 2001. The European Union and East Asia : interregional linkages in 
a changing global system, 2001, Edward Elgar pp252. 
Preston, P. and Gilson, J., 2001. Europe-Asia: regional interlinkages, mutual definitions and 
formal mechanisms. In: P. PRESTON and J. GILSON, eds, The European Union and East Asia. 
1 edn. Glos: Edwar Elgar Publishing, pp. 3-28. 
Ravenhill, 1., 2003. The New Bilateralism in the Asia Pacific. Third World Quarterly, 24(2), pp. 
299-317. 
Relterer, M., 2001. ASEM - The Third Summit in Seoul 2000: A Roadmap to Consolidate the 
Partnership between Asia and Europe, European Foreign Affairs Review, 6, pp. 1-30. 
Relterer, M., 2004. The Role of Education and Culture in Contemporary International Relations. 
A Challenge for the Asia Europe Meeting. Asia Europe Journal 2, pp. 365-371. 
Reiterer, M., 2005, Interregionalism: A new Diplomatic Tool The European Experience with 
East Asia, European Union Studies Association Asia-Pacific, Conference Paper, Tokyo. 
Riodan, C. O., 2000. A Forgiving Strategy for the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. Journal of 
Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 3(4), pp. 1-9. 
Roloff, R., 1998. Globalisation, Regionaalisation and Balance of Power. In: C. Masala and R. 
Roloff (eds. ) Challenges of Realpolitik, Koin: SYH-Verlag, pp. 61-94. 
Rousseau, D. L., 1 July 1999. Relative or Absolute Gains: Beliefs and Behavior in International 
Politics. Paper edn. 
Ruggie, J. G., 1998. Constructing the World Polity : Essays on International Institutionalization. 
Routledge. London ; New York. 
Ruggie, J. G., -1993. Multilateralism matters : the theory and praxis of an institutional form. 
Columbia University Press. New York. 
Rüland, J., 2001, ASEAN and the European Union: A Bumpy Inter-regional Relationship, Bonn, 
Zentrum für Europeische Integrationsforschung (ZEI), discussion paper C95. 
Rüland, J., 2002. The European Union as an Inter- and Transregional Actor: Lessons for Global 
Governance from Europe's Relations with Asia. Paper presented to conference on The 
European Union in International Affairs, National Europe Centre, Australian National 
University, 3-4 July. 
Rüland, J., 2006. Interregionalism and the Crisis of Multilateralism: How to Keep the Asia- 
Europe Meeting (ASEM) Relevant? In: European Foreign Affairs Review, 11 (1) Spring, pp. 45- 
62. 
Rüland, )., 1996. The Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM): Toward a New Euro-Asian Relationship? 
(Institutfur Politik und Verwaltungswissenschaften, Universitat Rostock). 
-301- 
Sapir, A., 2000. EC Regionalism at the Turn of the Millennium: Toward a New Paradigm?. The 
World Economy, 23(9), pp. 1135-1146. 
Santander, S., 2005. The European Partnership with Mercosur: a Relationship Based on 
Strategic and Neo-liberal Principles. Journal of European Integration, 27(3), pp. 285-306. 
Sassen, S., 1996. Losing Control?. Columbia University Press: New York. 
Schirm, S., 2002. Globalization and the New Regionalism. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Schmidt, B. C., 2004. Realism as tragedy. Review of International Studies, 30, pp. 427-441. 
Schmidt, V. A., 1995. The New World Order, Incorporated: The Rise of Business and the 
Decline of the Nation State. Daedalus, 124(2),. 
Schmit, L., 2001, The ASEM Process: New Rules for Engagement in a Global Environment. In: 
W. STOKHOF and P. VAN DER VELDE, eds, Asian-European Perspectives: Developing the ASEM 
Process. 1 edn. London: Curzon Press. 
Scholte, 3. A., 1996. Globalisation and Collective Identities. In: 1. Krause & N. Renwick, eds., 
Identities in International Relations, pp. 38-78, London: Macmillan. 
Sekiguchi, S., 1982. Japanese Direct Investment in Europe. In: L. TSOUKALIS and M. WHITE, 
eds, Japan and Western Europe. 1 edn. London: Frances Pinter, pp. 166-183. 
Shambaugh, D. L., 1996. China and Europe, 1949-1995. Contemporary China Institute, School 
of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. London. 
Shepherd, G., 1982. Japanese Exports and Europe's Problem Industries. In: L. TSOUKALIS 
and M. WHITE, eds, Japan and Western Europe. 1 edn. London: Frances Pinter, pp. 131-153. 
Shin, Y. B., 2000. Seoul forum provides momentum for key link between Asia, Europe. The 
Korea Herald, October 22,2000. 
Smith, A., 1999. Runaway World. Profile Books: London. 
Karen, S., 2005. The EU and Central and Eastern Europe: The Absence of Interregionalism. 
Journal of European Integration, 27(3), pp. 347-364. 
Smith, M. H., 1998. The European Union and Asia-Pacific. In: A. MCGREW and C. BROOK, eds., 
Asia-Pacific in the New World Order. Routledge: London, pp. 289-315 
Smith, M. H., 2001. The European Union's Commercial Policy: Between Coherence and 
Fragmentation. Journal of European Public Policy, 8(5),. 
Smith, M. H., 2005. The European Union and the United States: The Politics of Bi-Multilateral 
Negotiation'. In: O. ELGSTROM and C. JONSSON, eds., European Union Negotiations: 
processes, institutions, networks. Routledge: London, 2005, pp 164-182. 
-302- 
Smith, M. H. and Vichitsorasatra, N., 2007. The European Union as a Foreign Policy Actor in 
Asia: Defining and Theorising EU-Asia Relations. In: P. ANDERSON and GEORG WIESSALA, 
eds., European Studies: A Journal of European Culture, History and Politics, The European 
Union and Asia, Rodopi: Amsterdam; New York. 
Smith, S., 2000. Wendt's World. Review of International Studies, 26, pp. 151-163. 
Soderbaum, F., Stalgren, P., Langenhove, L., 2005. The EU as a Global Actor and the 
Dynamics of Interregionalism: a Comparative Analysis. Journal of European Integration, 
27(3), pp. 365-380. 
Sterling-Folker, J., 2004. Realist-Constructivism and Morality. International Studies Review, 6 
(2) (June 2004). Contribution to a special symposium on "Realism-Constructivism. " 
Sterling-Folker, 1., 2000. Competing Paradigms or Birds of a Feather? Constructivism and 
Neoliberal Institutionalism Compared. International Studies Quarterly, 44 (March): 97-119. 
Sterling-Folker, J., (ed. ), 2006. Making Sense of International Relations Theory. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers: Colorado. 
Strange, R., Slater, 3. and Wang, L., 1998. Trade and Investment in China : the European 
Experience. Routledge. New York, N. Y. 
Strange, S., 1996. The Retreat of the State : The Diffusion of Power in the World Economy. 
Cambridge University Press. Cambridge ; New York. 
Strange, S., 1994. States and markets. 2nd edn. Pinter Publishers; Distributed in the USA and 
Canada by St. Martin's Press. London. 
Strange, S., 1986. Casino capitalism. B. Blackwell. Oxford, UK ; New York, NY, USA. 
Stubbs, R. and Underhill, G. R. D., eds., 2000. Political Economy and the Changing Global 
Order. 2nd edn. Oxford University Press. Don Mills, North York Ontario ; New York. 
Stubbs, R. and Underhill, G. R. D, eds. 2005. Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. 
3rd edition, Toronto: Oxford University Press. 
Su-Ling, T., 2001. The European Union's commercial policymaking towards China. In: P. 
PRESTON and 3. GILSON, eds, The European Union and East Asia. 1 edn. Glos: Edwar Elgar 
Publishing, pp. 170-188. 
Taylor, R., 1990. China, Japan and the European Community. Athlone : Fairleigh Dickinson 
University Press. London. 
Tharakan, P. K. M., 2002. European Union and Preferential Arrangements. The World 
Economy, 25 (10), pp. 1387 
- 303 - 
Thies, C. G., 2004. Are Two Theories Better Than One? A Constructivist Model of the 
Neorealist-Neoliberal Debate. International Political Science Review, 25(2), pp. 159-183. 
Tsoukalls, L., 1997. The New European Economy Revisited. 3rd edn. Oxford University Press. 
Oxford ; New York. 
Tsoukalls, L. and White, M., 1982. Japan and Western Europe . Conflict and Cooperation. St. 
Martin's. New York. 
Tussle, D. and Woods, N., 2000. Trade Regionalism and the Threat to Multilateralism. In: N. 
WOODS, ed, The Political Economy of Globalization. 1 edn. NY: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1-35. 
Underhill, G. R. D., 1994. Conceptualizing the Changing Global Order. In: R. STUBBS and 
G. R. D. UNDERHILL, eds., Political Economy and the Changing Global Order, 1 edn. Macmillan 
Press: London, pp. 17-44 
UNIVERSITY OF HELSINKI NETWORK FOR EUROPEAN STUDIES, 2006. ASEM in its Tenth 
Year., Looking Back, Looking Forward, An evaluation of ASEM in its first decade and an 
exploration of its future responsibilities. Helsinki: University of Helsinki. 
Varadarajan, L., 2004. Constructivism, identity and neoliberal (in)security. Review of 
International Studies, 30, pp. 319-341. 
Wallace, H. and Wallace, W., 2000. Policy-making in the European Union. 4th edn. Oxford 
University Press. Oxford England ; New York N. Y., U. S.. 
Waltz, K. N., 1986. Reflections on Theory of International Politics. A Response to My Critics. In: 
R. KEOHANE, Neorealism and Its Critics. Columbia University Press: New York. 
Waltz, K. N., 2000. Structural Realism after the Cold War. International Security, 25(1), pp. 5- 
41. 
Waltz, K. N., 1999. Globalization and Governance. Political Science and Politics, 32(4), pp. 
693-700. 
Waltz, K. N., 1979. Theory of international politics. Addison-Wesley. Reading, Mass. ; London: . 
Wang, Y., 2003. Financial Cooperation in East Asia, Building a New Era of Partnership: EU- 
Korea Relations 1963-2003, Wednesday, November 26,2003, pp. 1-17. 
Weise, C., 2002. How to Finance Eastern Enlargement of the EU. German Institute for 
Economic Research Discussion Paper, DIW: Berlin, pp. 1-18. 
Weise, C., Downes, ]., McMaster, R., Toepel, I. K.; 2001. The Impact of EU Enlargement on 
Cohesion - Background Report for the Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion of the 
European Commission, Study for DG Regio, Berlin and Glasgow. 
-304- 
Wendt, A., 2001. Driving with the Rearview Mirror: On the Rational Science of Institutional 
Design. International Organization, 55(4), pp. 1019-1049. 
Wendt, A., 2000. On the Via Media: A Response to the Critics. Review of International Studies, 
26, pp. 165-180. 
Wendt, A., 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press. 
Cambridge. 
Wiessala, G., 2002. The European Union and Asian Countries. Sheffield Academic Press: 
Sheffield. 
Wilkinson, E., 1986. The Economic and non-Economic Dimensions of Euro-Japanese Relations. 
In: G. DANIELS and R. DRIFTE, eds, Europe and Japan: Changing Relationships Since 1945.1 
edn. Kent: Paul Norbury Publications, pp. 31-47. 
Wilkinson, R., 2004. The Politics of Collapse: Development, the WTO and the Current Round of 
Trade Negotiations. IPEG Papers in Global Political Economy, June(15), pp. 3-12. 
Wilkinson, E., 1983. Japan versus Europe :A History of Misunderstanding. Penguin Books. 
Middlesex. 
Woolcock, S., 2000. European Trade Policy: Global Pressures. In: H. WALLACE and 
W. WALLACE, eds., Policy-Making in the European Union. Oxford University Press: Oxford. 
Zehfuss, M., 2001. Constructivism and Identity: A Dangerous Liaison. European Journal of 
International Relations, 7(3), pp. 315-348. 
Zhang, W., 2003. China's Political Transition: Trends and Prospects, EU-China: Implications of 
the Beijing Summit, 30 October 2003. 
Work Consulted 
Gersehonson, C., 2002. Philosophical Ideas on the Simulation of Social Behaviour. 
http: //www. soc. surrey. ac. uk/JASSS/5/3/-8. html edn., The Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation: Surrey. 
Lustick, I. S., 2002. PS-I: A User-Friendly Agent-Based Modeling Platform for testing Theories 
of Political Identity and Political Stability. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, 
5(3), pp. 1-39. 
Lustick, I. S., 2000. Agent-based modelling of collective identity: testing constructivist theory. 
http: //www. soc. surrey. ac. uk/JASSS/3/1/l. html edn., The Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation: Surrey. 
- 305 - 
Nabers, D., 2003. The Social construction of International Institutions: The Case of ASEAN+3. 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, 3, pp. 113-136. 
Navon, E., 2001. The 'Third Debate' Revisited. Review of International Studies, 27, pp. 611- 
625. 
Parsons, C., 2002. Showing Ideas as Causes: The Origins of the European Union. International 
Organization, 56(1), pp. 47-84. 
Rosamond, B., 2003. Babylon and on? Globalization and international political economy. 
Review of International Political Economy, 10(4), pp. 661-671. 
Rosendorff, B. P. and Milner, H. V., 2001. The Optimal Design of International Trade 
Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape. International Organization, 55(4), pp. 829-857. 
Scollay, R., 2001. The Changing Outlook for Asia-Pacific Regionalism. The World economy, 
24(9), pp. 1135-1160. 
Van Der Veen, A. Marits and Lustick, I. S., 2001. The Emergence of a European Identity: An 
Agent-Based Modeling Approach, Ideas, Discourse and European Integration, May 11-12, 
2001, ppl-19. 
Varadarajan, L., 2004. Constructivism, identity and neoliberal (in)security. Review of 
International Studies, 30, pp. 319-341. 
Wolfe, R. and Mendelsohn, M., 2005. Values and Interest in Attitudes toward Trade and 
Globalization: The Continuing Compromise of Embedded Liberalism. Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, 38(1), pp. 48-68. 
-306- 
